{
 "version": "2026.09",
 "released": "2026-08-31",
 "source": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitre-atlas/atlas-data/v2026.09/dist/v6/ATLAS-2026.09.yaml",
 "license": "Apache-2.0",
 "notice": "MITRE ATLAS data, copyright The MITRE Corporation, licensed under the Apache License 2.0. Content ATLAS adopts from ATT&CK is also subject to the ATT&CK terms of use.",
 "tactics": [
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0002",
   "name": "Reconnaissance"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0003",
   "name": "Resource Development"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0001",
   "name": "AI Attack Adaptation"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0004",
   "name": "Initial Access"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0000",
   "name": "AI Model Access"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0005",
   "name": "Execution"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0006",
   "name": "Persistence"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0012",
   "name": "Privilege Escalation"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0007",
   "name": "Defense Evasion"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0013",
   "name": "Credential Access"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0008",
   "name": "Discovery"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0015",
   "name": "Lateral Movement"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0009",
   "name": "Collection"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0014",
   "name": "Command and Control"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0010",
   "name": "Exfiltration"
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.TA0011",
   "name": "Impact"
  }
 ],
 "techniques": [
  {
   "id": "AML.T0000",
   "name": "Search Open Technical Databases",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1596",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000",
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 8,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search for publicly available research and technical documentation to learn how and where AI is used within a victim organization."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0000.000",
   "name": "Journals and Conference Proceedings",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0000",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Many of the publications accepted at premier artificial intelligence conferences and journals come from commercial labs."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0000.001",
   "name": "Pre-Print Repositories",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0000",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1596",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Pre-Print repositories, such as arXiv, contain the latest academic research papers that haven't been peer reviewed."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0000.002",
   "name": "Technical Blogs",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0000",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1596",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Research labs at academic institutions and company R&D divisions often have blogs that highlight their use of artificial intelligence and its application to the organization's unique problems."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0000.003",
   "name": "Scan Databases",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0000",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1596.005",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search public internet-scan services to identify a victim's exposed AI infrastructure."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0001",
   "name": "Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Much like the [Search Open Technical Databases](/techniques/AML.T0000), there is often ample research available on the vulnerabilities of common AI models."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0002",
   "name": "Acquire Public AI Artifacts",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search public sources, including cloud storage, public-facing services, and software or data repositories, to identify AI artifacts."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0002.000",
   "name": "Datasets",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0002",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0001"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may collect public datasets to use in their operations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0002.001",
   "name": "Models",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0002",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0001",
    "AML.M0014"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may acquire public models to use in their operations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0002.002",
   "name": "AI Agent Configuration",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0002",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may acquire publicly accessible AI agent configuration files to understand agent capabilities, gain unauthorized access to tools and data sources, or identify credentials for further attacks."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0003",
   "name": "Search Victim-Owned Websites",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1594",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0004",
   "name": "Search Application Repositories",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search open application repositories during targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0005",
   "name": "Create Proxy AI Model",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000",
    "AML.M0001",
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may obtain models to serve as proxies for the target model in use at the victim organization."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0005.000",
   "name": "Train Proxy via Gathered AI Artifacts",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0005",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000",
    "AML.M0001"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Proxy models may be trained from AI artifacts (such as data, model architectures, and pre-trained models) that are representative of the target model gathered by the adversary."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0005.001",
   "name": "Train Proxy via Replication",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0005",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may replicate a private model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0005.002",
   "name": "Use Pre-Trained Model",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0005",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use an off-the-shelf pre-trained model as a proxy for the victim model to aid in staging the attack."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0006",
   "name": "Active Scanning",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1595",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0032",
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may actively scan for publicly reachable AI systems and resources for targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0006.000",
   "name": "Enumerate Hosted AI Resources",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0006",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may directly probe an agentic or SaaS platform to enumerate the resources a specific victim has deployed on it."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0006.001",
   "name": "Query Platform Metadata APIs",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0006",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may query documented or undocumented APIs in agentic SaaS hosting platforms to uncover agentic targets."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0006.002",
   "name": "Scan for Exposed AI Infrastructure",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0006",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1595",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may scan network ports and services to identify deployed AI backends, model-serving endpoints, and AI agent infrastructure reachable over the internet."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0006.003",
   "name": "Probe AI Agent Trigger Channels",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0006",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1595",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may send crafted inputs to potential public triggers, such as email addresses, webhooks, or messaging channels, to elicit a response that indicates an invocation of agentic activity."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0007",
   "name": "Discover AI Artifacts",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0012"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search private sources to identify AI learning artifacts that exist on the system and gather information about them."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0008",
   "name": "Acquire Infrastructure",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1583",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure for use throughout their operation."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0008.000",
   "name": "AI Development Workspaces",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0008",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Developing and staging AI attacks often requires expensive compute resources."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0008.001",
   "name": "Consumer Hardware",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0008",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may acquire consumer hardware to conduct their attacks."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0008.002",
   "name": "Domains",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0008",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1583.001",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0008.003",
   "name": "Physical Countermeasures",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0008",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may acquire or manufacture physical countermeasures to aid or support their attack."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0008.004",
   "name": "Serverless",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0008",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1583.007",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0008.005",
   "name": "AI Service Proxies",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0008",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may utilize commercial proxy services that resell access to AI services such as frontier model APIs."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0010",
   "name": "AI Supply Chain Compromise",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0014",
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0023",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may gain initial access to a system by compromising the unique portions of the AI supply chain."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0010.000",
   "name": "Hardware",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0010",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may target AI systems by disrupting or manipulating the hardware supply chain."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0010.001",
   "name": "AI Software",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0010",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0013",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may target software packages that are commonly used in AI-enabled systems or are part of the AI DevOps lifecycle."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0010.002",
   "name": "Data",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0010",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0007",
    "AML.M0014",
    "AML.M0025",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Data is a key vector of supply chain compromise for adversaries."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0010.003",
   "name": "Model",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0010",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0013",
    "AML.M0017",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "AI-enabled systems often rely on open-source models in various ways."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0010.004",
   "name": "Container Registry",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0010",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "An adversary may compromise a victim's container registry by pushing a manipulated container image and overwriting an existing container name and/or tag."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0010.005",
   "name": "AI Agent Tool",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0010",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may target AI agent tools as a means to compromise a victim's AI supply chain."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0011",
   "name": "User Execution",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0011",
    "AML.M0014",
    "AML.M0016",
    "AML.M0018",
    "AML.M0023"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "An adversary may rely upon a user to load, execute, interpret, or otherwise use a malicious or unsafe artifact."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0011.000",
   "name": "Unsafe AI Artifacts",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0011",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0011",
    "AML.M0013",
    "AML.M0014",
    "AML.M0016",
    "AML.M0018",
    "AML.M0023"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may develop new AI artifacts or manipulate existing AI artifacts that have a deleterious effect when loaded, executed, interpreted, or used for inference by a victim."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0011.001",
   "name": "Malicious Package",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0011",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0011",
    "AML.M0013",
    "AML.M0016",
    "AML.M0018",
    "AML.M0023"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may develop malicious software packages that when imported by a user have a deleterious effect."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0011.002",
   "name": "Poisoned AI Agent Tool",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0011",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "A victim may invoke a poisoned tool when interacting with an AI agent."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0011.003",
   "name": "Malicious Link",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0011",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "T1204",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0012",
   "name": "Valid Accounts",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access",
    "Privilege Escalation",
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "T1078",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 12,
   "desc": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0013",
   "name": "Discover AI Model Ontology",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover the ontology of an AI model's output space, for example, the types of objects a model can detect."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0014",
   "name": "Discover AI Model Family",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0006"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover the general family of a model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0015",
   "name": "Evade AI Model",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access",
    "Defense Evasion",
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0009",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015",
    "AML.M0034",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015",
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "case_studies": 18,
   "desc": "Adversaries can [Craft Adversarial Data](/techniques/AML.T0043) that prevents an AI model from correctly identifying the contents of the data or [Generate Deepfakes](/techniques/AML.T0088) that fools an AI model expecting authentic data."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0016",
   "name": "Obtain Capabilities",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1588",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0001"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search for and obtain software capabilities for use in their operations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0016.000",
   "name": "Adversarial AI Attack Implementations",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0016",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search for existing open source implementations of AI attacks."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0016.001",
   "name": "Software Tools",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0016",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1588.002",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search for and obtain software tools to support their operations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0016.002",
   "name": "Generative AI",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0016",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0001",
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0022"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search for and obtain generative AI models or tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to assist them in various steps of their operation."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0016.003",
   "name": "Exploits",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0016",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1588.005",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search for and obtain exploits to support their operations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0016.004",
   "name": "AI Agent Tools",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0016",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search for and obtain tools extend the capabilities of an AI agent."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0017",
   "name": "Develop Capabilities",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1587",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 10,
   "desc": "Adversaries may develop their own capabilities to support operations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0017.000",
   "name": "Adversarial AI Attacks",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0017",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may develop their own adversarial attacks."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0017.001",
   "name": "Autonomous Exploit Development",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0017",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "An autonomous AI agent may identify a software vulnerability and develop or materially adapt an exploit capability with limited human direction."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0017.002",
   "name": "AI Agent Tools",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0017",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may develop or materially adapt tools, integrations, or tool servers designed to extend the capabilities of an AI agent."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0018",
   "name": "Manipulate AI Model",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation",
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0013",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate an AI model artifact or its bundled components to change AI system behavior, introduce malicious code, or establish persistent malicious functionality."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0018.000",
   "name": "Poison AI Model",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0018",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation",
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0007",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0013",
    "AML.M0025",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate an AI model's weights to change it's behavior or performance, resulting in a poisoned model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0018.001",
   "name": "Modify AI Model Architecture",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0018",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation",
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0013",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may directly modify an AI model's architecture to re-define it's behavior."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0018.002",
   "name": "Embed Malware",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0018",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation",
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0013"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may embed malicious code into AI Model files."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0018.003",
   "name": "Modify Prompt Construction Logic",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0018",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation",
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may modify templates, role delimiters, embedded system instructions, tokenizer settings, tool-call formatting, or other artifact-bundled logic that constructs the context sent to an AI model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0020",
   "name": "Training Data Poisoning",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0001",
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0007",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0023",
    "AML.M0025",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate data used for training or fine-tuning an AI model to influence the resulting model's behavior."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0021",
   "name": "Establish Accounts",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1585",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may create accounts with various services for use in targeting, to gain access to resources needed in [AI Attack Staging](/tactics/AML.TA0001), or for victim impersonation."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0024",
   "name": "Exfiltration via AI Inference API",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may exfiltrate private information via [AI Model Inference API Access](/techniques/AML.T0040)."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0024.000",
   "name": "Infer Training Data Membership",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0024",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may infer the membership of a data sample or global characteristics of the data in its training set, which raises privacy concerns."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0024.001",
   "name": "Invert AI Model",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0024",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "AI models' training data could be reconstructed by exploiting the confidence scores that are available via an inference API."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0024.002",
   "name": "Extract AI Model",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0024",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may extract a functional copy of a private model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0025",
   "name": "Exfiltration via Cyber Means",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 14,
   "desc": "Adversaries may exfiltrate AI artifacts or other information relevant to their goals via traditional cyber means."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0029",
   "name": "Denial of AI Service",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0015",
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0035",
    "AML.M0036"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may target AI-enabled systems with a flood of requests for the purpose of degrading or shutting down the service."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0031",
   "name": "Erode AI Model Integrity",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may degrade the target model's performance with adversarial data inputs to erode confidence in the system over time."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0034",
   "name": "Cost Harvesting",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0035",
    "AML.M0036"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may deliberately drive a victim's AI services beyond normal operating capacity with the intent of increasing the cost of services."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0034.000",
   "name": "Excessive Queries",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0034",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may send an excessive number of otherwise normal or low-complexity queries to an AI system with the goal of overwhelming its capacity and increasing operating costs."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0034.001",
   "name": "Resource-Intensive Queries",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0034",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0035",
    "AML.M0036"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may craft inputs specifically designed to increase the compute resources required for processing."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0034.002",
   "name": "Agentic Resource Consumption",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0034",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0035",
    "AML.M0036"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may coerce an agentic AI system into performing computationally expensive tool calls that waste resources and consume API budgets."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0035",
   "name": "AI Artifact Collection",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0001",
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0012",
    "AML.M0017"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may collect AI artifacts for [Exfiltration](/tactics/AML.TA0010) or for use in [AI Attack Staging](/tactics/AML.TA0001)."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0036",
   "name": "Data from Information Repositories",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "T1213",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0037",
   "name": "Data from Local System",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "T1005",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0040",
   "name": "AI Model Inference API Access",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Model Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 10,
   "desc": "Adversaries may gain access to a model via legitimate access to the inference API."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0041",
   "name": "Physical Environment Access",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Model Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0009"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "In addition to the attacks that take place purely in the digital domain, adversaries may also exploit the physical environment for their attacks."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0042",
   "name": "Verify Attack",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 7,
   "desc": "Adversaries can verify the efficacy of their attack via an inference API or access to an offline copy of the target model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0043",
   "name": "Craft Adversarial Data",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversarial data are inputs to an AI model that have been modified such that they cause the adversary's desired effect in the target model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0043.000",
   "name": "White-Box Optimization",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0043",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015",
    "AML.M0017"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "In White-Box Optimization, the adversary has full access to the target model and optimizes the adversarial example directly."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0043.001",
   "name": "Black-Box Optimization",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0043",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "In Black-Box attacks, the adversary has black-box (i.e."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0043.002",
   "name": "Black-Box Transfer",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0043",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "In Black-Box Transfer attacks, the adversary uses one or more proxy models (trained via [Create Proxy AI Model](/techniques/AML.T0005) or [Train Proxy via Replication](/techniques/AML.T0005.001)) they have full access to and are representative of the target model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0043.003",
   "name": "Manual Modification",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0043",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manually modify the input data to craft adversarial data."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0043.004",
   "name": "Insert Backdoor Trigger",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0043",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0003",
    "AML.M0006",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0010",
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0015"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "The adversary may add a perceptual trigger into inference data."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0044",
   "name": "Full AI Model Access",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Model Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0017"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may gain full \"white-box\" access to an AI model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0046",
   "name": "Spamming AI System with Chaff Data",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may spam the AI system with chaff data that causes increase in the number of detections."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0047",
   "name": "AI-Enabled Product or Service",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Model Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 16,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use a product or service that uses artificial intelligence under the hood to gain access to the underlying AI model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0048",
   "name": "External Harms",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may abuse their access to a victim system and use its resources or capabilities to further their goals by causing harms external to that system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0048.000",
   "name": "Financial Harm",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0048",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 11,
   "desc": "Financial harm involves the loss of wealth, property, or other monetary assets due to theft, fraud or forgery, or pressure to provide financial resources to the adversary."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0048.001",
   "name": "Reputational Harm",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0048",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Reputational harm involves a degradation of public perception and trust in organizations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0048.002",
   "name": "Societal Harm",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0048",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Societal harms might generate harmful outcomes that reach either the general public or specific vulnerable groups such as the exposure of children to vulgar content."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0048.003",
   "name": "User Harm",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0048",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 14,
   "desc": "User harms may encompass a variety of harm types including financial and reputational that are directed at or felt by individual victims of the attack rather than at the organization level."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0048.004",
   "name": "AI Intellectual Property Theft",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0048",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0012",
    "AML.M0017"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may exfiltrate AI artifacts to steal intellectual property and cause economic harm to the victim organization."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0049",
   "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "T1190",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 8,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0050",
   "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "T1059",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0011"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0051",
   "name": "LLM Prompt Injection",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021",
    "AML.M0022",
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0033",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "An adversary may craft malicious prompts as inputs to an LLM that cause the LLM to act in unintended ways."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0051.000",
   "name": "Direct",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0051",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0033",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 11,
   "desc": "An adversary may inject prompts directly as a user of the LLM."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0051.001",
   "name": "Indirect",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0051",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0033",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 18,
   "desc": "An adversary may inject prompts indirectly via a separate data channel that the LLM or AI agent ingests, such as text or multimedia pulled from documents, emails, databases or websites."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0051.002",
   "name": "Triggered",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0051",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0033",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "An adversary may trigger a prompt injection via a user action or event that occurs within the victim's environment."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0052",
   "name": "Phishing",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access",
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "T1566",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0018",
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0052.000",
   "name": "Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0052",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access",
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0018",
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may turn LLMs into targeted social engineers."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0052.001",
   "name": "Deepfake-Assisted Phishing",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0052",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access",
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0018",
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use deepfakes (AI-generated synthetic images, audio, or video) in phishing campaigns to impersonate trusted individuals, executives, or organizations."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0053",
   "name": "AI Agent Tool Invocation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution",
    "Privilege Escalation",
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021",
    "AML.M0022",
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0026",
    "AML.M0027",
    "AML.M0028",
    "AML.M0029",
    "AML.M0030",
    "AML.M0032",
    "AML.M0033",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 19,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use their access to an AI agent to invoke tools the agent has access to."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0054",
   "name": "LLM Jailbreak",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Privilege Escalation",
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021",
    "AML.M0022",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 9,
   "desc": "Adversaries may induce a large language model (LLM) to ignore, circumvent, or override its safety/alignment behaviors and/or guardrails to elicit outputs the model is intended to withhold."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0055",
   "name": "Unsecured Credentials",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Credential Access"
   ],
   "attack": "T1552",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 9,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0056",
   "name": "Extract LLM System Prompt",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021",
    "AML.M0022",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to extract a large language model's (LLM) system prompt."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0057",
   "name": "LLM Data Leakage",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021",
    "AML.M0022",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may craft prompts that induce the LLM to leak sensitive information."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0059",
   "name": "Erode Dataset Integrity",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0007",
    "AML.M0025"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may poison or manipulate portions of a dataset to reduce its usefulness, reduce trust, and cause users to waste resources correcting errors."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0060",
   "name": "Publish Hallucinated Entities",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may create an entity they control, such as a software package, website, or email address corresponding to a source hallucinated by an LLM."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0061",
   "name": "LLM Prompt Self-Replication",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021",
    "AML.M0022"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "An adversary may use a carefully crafted [LLM Prompt Injection](/techniques/AML.T0051) designed to cause the LLM to replicate the prompt as part of its output."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0062",
   "name": "Discover LLM Hallucinations",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0004",
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021",
    "AML.M0022"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may prompt large language models and identify hallucinated entities."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0063",
   "name": "Discover AI Model Outputs",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0002",
    "AML.M0012",
    "AML.M0017",
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover model outputs, such as class scores, whose presence is not required for the system to function and are not intended for use by the end user."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0064",
   "name": "Gather RAG-Indexed Targets",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may identify data sources used in retrieval augmented generation (RAG) systems for targeting purposes."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0065",
   "name": "LLM Prompt Crafting",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 25,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use their acquired knowledge of the target generative AI system to craft prompts that bypass its defenses and allow malicious instructions to be executed."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0066",
   "name": "Retrieval Content Crafting",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may write content designed to be retrieved by user queries and influence a user of the system in some way."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0067",
   "name": "LLM Trusted Output Components Manipulation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may utilize prompts to a large language model (LLM) which manipulate various components of its response in order to make it appear trustworthy to the user."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0067.000",
   "name": "Citations",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0067",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate the citations provided in an AI system's response, in order to make it appear trustworthy."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0068",
   "name": "LLM Prompt Obfuscation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 10,
   "desc": "Adversaries may hide or otherwise obfuscate prompt injections or retrieval content to avoid detection from humans, large language model (LLM) guardrails, or other detection mechanisms."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0069",
   "name": "Discover LLM System Information",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000",
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "The adversary is trying to discover something about the large language model's (LLM) system information."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0069.000",
   "name": "Special Character Sets",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0069",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover delimiters and special characters sets used by the large language model."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0069.001",
   "name": "System Instruction Keywords",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0069",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover keywords that have special meaning to the large language model (LLM), such as function names or object names."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0069.002",
   "name": "System Prompt",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0069",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005",
    "AML.M0019",
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover a large language model's system instructions provided by the AI system builder to learn about the system's capabilities and circumvent its guardrails."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0070",
   "name": "RAG Poisoning",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may inject malicious content into data indexed by a retrieval augmented generation (RAG) system to contaminate a future thread through RAG-based search results."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0071",
   "name": "False RAG Entry Injection",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may introduce false entries into a victim's retrieval augmented generation (RAG) database."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0072",
   "name": "Cyber Communication Channel",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Command and Control"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may establish or use cyber communication channels for command and control."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0073",
   "name": "Impersonation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "T1656",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0074",
   "name": "Masquerading",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "T1036",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0011",
    "AML.M0025"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 6,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0075",
   "name": "Enterprise Resource Discovery",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover resources available within an enterprise environment and information needed to identify or access them."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0076",
   "name": "Corrupt AI Model",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "An adversary may purposefully corrupt a malicious AI model file so that it cannot be successfully deserialized in order to evade detection by a model scanner."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0077",
   "name": "LLM Response Rendering",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may induce a large language model (LLM) to respond with private information structured in a reference to external content that, when rendered by the user's client, makes a request to an adversary-controlled server, exfiltrating the data."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0078",
   "name": "Drive-by Compromise",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "T1189",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may gain access to an AI system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing, or an AI agent retrieving information from the web on behalf of a user."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0079",
   "name": "Stage Capabilities",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 11,
   "desc": "Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0080",
   "name": "AI Agent Context Poisoning",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0031",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the context used by an AI agent's large language model (LLM) to influence the responses it generates or actions it takes."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0080.000",
   "name": "Memory",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0080",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0031",
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate the memory of a large language model (LLM) in order to persist changes to the LLM across future chat sessions."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0080.001",
   "name": "Thread",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0080",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may introduce malicious instructions into a chat thread of a large language model (LLM) to cause behavior changes which persist for the remainder of the thread."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0081",
   "name": "Modify AI Agent Configuration",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence",
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0035"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may modify the configuration files for AI agents on a system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0082",
   "name": "RAG Credential Harvesting",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Credential Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0026",
    "AML.M0027"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to use their access to a large language model (LLM) on the victim's system to collect credentials."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0083",
   "name": "Credentials from AI Agent Configuration",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Credential Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may access the credentials of other tools or services on a system from the configuration of an AI agent."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0084",
   "name": "Discover AI Agent Configuration",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000",
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to discover configuration information for AI agents present on the victim's system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0084.000",
   "name": "Embedded Knowledge",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0084",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to discover the data sources a particular agent can access."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0084.001",
   "name": "Tool Definitions",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0084",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover the tools the AI agent has access to."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0084.002",
   "name": "Activation Triggers",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0084",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover keywords or other triggers (such as incoming emails, documents being added, incoming message, or other workflows) that activate an agent and may cause it to run additional actions."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0084.003",
   "name": "Call Chains",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0084",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may extract call chains from AI agent configurations, which can reveal potentially targets for remote code execution (RCE) or other vulnerabilities."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0085",
   "name": "Data from AI Services",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0026",
    "AML.M0027",
    "AML.M0028",
    "AML.M0032"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use their access to a victim organization's AI-enabled services to collect proprietary or otherwise sensitive information."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0085.000",
   "name": "RAG Databases",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0085",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0026",
    "AML.M0027",
    "AML.M0032"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may prompt the AI service to retrieve data from a RAG database."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0085.001",
   "name": "AI Agent Tools",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0085",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0026",
    "AML.M0027",
    "AML.M0028",
    "AML.M0032"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may prompt the AI service to invoke various tools the agent has access to."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0086",
   "name": "Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Exfiltration"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0026",
    "AML.M0027",
    "AML.M0028",
    "AML.M0029",
    "AML.M0030",
    "AML.M0032",
    "AML.M0033"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 10,
   "desc": "AI agent tools capable of performing write operations may be invoked to exfiltrate data to an adversary."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0087",
   "name": "Gather Victim Identity Information",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1589",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0088",
   "name": "Generate Deepfakes",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0009",
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0034"
   ],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to create synthetic media (i.e."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0089",
   "name": "Enterprise Environment Discovery",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may discover configurations, conditions, relationships, activity, and other characteristics of an enterprise environment."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0090",
   "name": "OS Credential Dumping",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Credential Access"
   ],
   "attack": "T1003",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0011"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may extract credentials from OS caches, application memory, or other sources on a compromised system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0091",
   "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "T1550",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0091.000",
   "name": "Application Access Token",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0091",
   "tactics": [
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "T1550.001",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0091.001",
   "name": "Web Session Cookie",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0091",
   "tactics": [
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "T1550.004",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use stolen web session cookies to authenticate to AI-enabled applications and supporting services as another user."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0092",
   "name": "Manipulate User LLM Chat History",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate a user's large language model (LLM) chat history to cover the tracks of their malicious behavior."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0093",
   "name": "Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access",
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 13,
   "desc": "An adversary may introduce malicious prompts into the victim's system via a public-facing application with the intention of it being ingested by an AI at some point in the future and ultimately having a downstream effect."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0094",
   "name": "Delay Execution of LLM Instructions",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may include instructions to be followed by the AI system in response to a future event, such as a specific keyword or the next interaction, in order to evade detection or bypass controls placed on the AI system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0095",
   "name": "Search Open Websites/Domains",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1593",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0000",
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search public websites and/or domains for information about victims and AI targets that can be used during targeting and to discover opportunities for successful attacks."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0095.000",
   "name": "Code Repositories",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0095",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "T1593.003",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may search public code repositories for information about a victim or victim system that can be used during targeting."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0096",
   "name": "AI Service API",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Command and Control"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0019"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may communicate using the API of an AI service on the victim's system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0097",
   "name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "T1497",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0098",
   "name": "AI Agent Tool Credential Harvesting",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Credential Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0032"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to use their access to an AI agent on the victim's system to retrieve data from available agent tools to collect credentials."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0099",
   "name": "AI Agent Tool Data Poisoning",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate data in a victim-controlled, trusted, or connected data source that is accessible through an AI agent tool."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0100",
   "name": "AI Agent Clickbait",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0021"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may craft deceptive content designed to bait computer-using AI agents or AI web browsers and tools into taking unintended actions, such as clicking buttons, copying code, or navigating to specific web pages."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0101",
   "name": "Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024",
    "AML.M0026",
    "AML.M0027",
    "AML.M0028",
    "AML.M0029",
    "AML.M0030"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may invoke an AI agent's tool capable of performing mutative operations to perform Data Destruction."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0102",
   "name": "Generate Malicious Commands",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020",
    "AML.M0022"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use large language models (LLMs) to dynamically generate malicious commands from natural language."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0103",
   "name": "Deploy AI Agent",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Execution"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may launch AI agents in the victim's environment to execute actions on their behalf."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0105",
   "name": "Escape to Host",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Privilege Escalation"
   ],
   "attack": "T1611",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0106",
   "name": "Exploitation for Credential Access",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Credential Access"
   ],
   "attack": "T1211",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0016"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0107",
   "name": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "T1211",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0016"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0108",
   "name": "AI Agent",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Command and Control"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may abuse AI agents present on the victim's system for command and control."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0109",
   "name": "AI Supply Chain Rug Pull",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may publish legitimate AI components or software, gain user adoption, then push an update with a malicious variant, leading to [AI Supply Chain Compromise](/techniques/AML.T0010)."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0110",
   "name": "AI Agent Tool Poisoning",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may poison tools used by AI agents by introducing or modifying malicious content or behavior in a tool's model-visible definition, executable implementation, or runtime responses."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0110.000",
   "name": "Definition and Instructions",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0110",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may poison the model-visible definition or operational instructions of an AI agent tool to manipulate how an agent interprets, selects, or invokes the tool."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0110.001",
   "name": "Implementation",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0110",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may poison the executable implementation of an AI agent tool so that normal tool invocation produces unauthorized behavior or hidden side effects."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0110.002",
   "name": "Runtime Response",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0110",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may poison the runtime response channel of a malicious or compromised AI agent tool by deliberately returning content intended to influence the model's subsequent reasoning, decisions, or actions."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0111",
   "name": "AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation is the process of building or leveraging genuinely credible-looking trust signals to increase the perceived legitimacy of AI supply chain components, with the goal of driving adoption of malicious or compromised assets."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0112",
   "name": "Machine Compromise",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may compromise a machine by exploiting or manipulating AI-enabled components on the system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0112.000",
   "name": "Local AI Agent",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0112",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0020"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may achieve full system compromise by abusing AI agents running locally on a host, such as computer-use agents or AI-driven browsers."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0112.001",
   "name": "AI Artifacts",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0112",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0005"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may achieve full system compromise by introducing malicious AI artifacts, such as models or data, that contain embedded malware or other malicious commands."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0113",
   "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Credential Access"
   ],
   "attack": "T1539",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may steal web application or service session cookies used to authenticate users to AI-enabled systems, AI services, or supporting enterprise applications."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0114",
   "name": "AI Service Web Interface",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Command and Control"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0024"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may communicate with compromised systems by abusing the web interface of an AI service as an intermediary command-and-control relay."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0115",
   "name": "Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0007",
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0016"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may create or modify AI artifacts and publish them through public or shared distribution channels to facilitate compromise of downstream AI systems."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0115.000",
   "name": "Datasets",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0115",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0007"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may publish poisoned datasets intended for training or fine-tuning AI models."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0115.001",
   "name": "Models",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0115",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0008",
    "AML.M0016"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 5,
   "desc": "Adversaries may publish poisoned AI models through model registries, code repositories, or other model distribution channels."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0115.002",
   "name": "AI Agent Tools",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0115",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0016"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 3,
   "desc": "Adversaries may create and publish poisoned AI agent tools."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0116",
   "name": "Autonomous Reconnaissance",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Reconnaissance"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0037",
    "AML.M0038"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0038"
   ],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use autonomous AI agents to conduct [Reconnaissance](/tactics/AML.TA0002) activities."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0117",
   "name": "Autonomous Attack-Path Adaptation",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0037",
    "AML.M0038"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0038"
   ],
   "case_studies": 4,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use an AI agent to autonomously construct and repeatedly revise an attack path toward an adversary-defined objective."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0118",
   "name": "Autonomous AI Agent Communication",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Autonomous AI agents may exchange operational information with other AI agents, sub-agents, or independent agent runs."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0118.000",
   "name": "Communication via Shared Artifacts",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0118",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Autonomous AI agents may communicate by creating or modifying artifacts in a shared resource that persists outside their individual execution contexts."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0118.001",
   "name": "Direct Agent Communication",
   "sub": true,
   "parent": "AML.T0118",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Autonomous AI agents may communicate directly through agent-to-agent, sub-agent, or orchestrator interfaces."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0119",
   "name": "Exploit Automated Artifact Processing Pipeline",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0016"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may submit, publish, or modify an artifact in a way that triggers an automated processing pipeline."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0120",
   "name": "AI Artifact Repository",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Command and Control"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may repurpose AI artifact repositories as asynchronous command-and-control channels."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0121",
   "name": "AI Agent Environment Reconstruction",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "An autonomous AI agent may reconstruct the environment needed to continue an existing operation after its execution environment is lost, reset, replaced, denied, or made unusable."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0122",
   "name": "Exploitation of Remote Services",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Lateral Movement"
   ],
   "attack": "T1210",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0016"
   ],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may exploit a software or design weakness in a service reachable from their current environment to gain unauthorized access to another system, component, network, or trust boundary."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0123",
   "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0124",
   "name": "Autonomous Attack Orchestration",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "AI Attack Adaptation"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0037",
    "AML.M0038"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0038"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use autonomous AI systems as an operational control layer to manage multiple distinct autonomous agents or sub-agents toward a common adversary-defined objective."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0125",
   "name": "Create Account",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Persistence"
   ],
   "attack": "T1136",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to an AI system or its supporting infrastructure."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0126",
   "name": "Automated Collection",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "T1119",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 2,
   "desc": "Adversaries may use automated techniques to collect data from AI systems and supporting enterprise environments."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0127",
   "name": "Data Staged",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Collection"
   ],
   "attack": "T1074",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location before exfiltration."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0128",
   "name": "Compromise Infrastructure",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Resource Development"
   ],
   "attack": "T1584",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure and repurpose it to support attacks against AI system."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0129",
   "name": "Triggers in Multimodal Inputs",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may place instructions or triggers in one part of a multimodal input to influence the model while staying unnoticed by human reviewers and by defenses that do not inspect all input modalities."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0130",
   "name": "AI Agent Response Biasing",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Impact"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may manipulate an AI assistant so that it favors adversary-chosen sources, or content in its responses."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0131",
   "name": "Crafted AI Assistant Links",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Realized",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "Adversaries may craft links that open an AI assistant or agent with attacker-controlled input already supplied, so that opening the link initiates an interaction the adversary defines rather than one the target composed."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0132",
   "name": "Misconfigured or Publicly Exposed AI Services",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Initial Access"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Demonstrated",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 1,
   "desc": "AI agents and LLM platforms are deployed across diverse architectures, including standalone servers, SaaS platforms, and low-code builders."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0133",
   "name": "Discover AI Agent Runtime Capabilities",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Discovery"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "detect": [
    "AML.M0039"
   ],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may interact with an AI agent at runtime to reveal the capabilities available to it, without requiring access to its underlying configuration."
  },
  {
   "id": "AML.T0134",
   "name": "AI Targeted Cloaking",
   "sub": false,
   "parent": "",
   "tactics": [
    "Defense Evasion"
   ],
   "attack": "",
   "maturity": "Feasible",
   "mitigations": [],
   "detect": [],
   "case_studies": 0,
   "desc": "Adversaries may selectively deliver malicious or manipulated content to AI systems, while presenting different benign content to human users, web crawlers, or security detection mechanisms."
  }
 ],
 "mitigations": {
  "AML.M0000": {
   "name": "Limit Public Release of Information",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Limit the public release of technical information about the AI stack used in an organization's products or services."
  },
  "AML.M0001": {
   "name": "Limit Model Artifact Release",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Limit public release of technical project details including data, algorithms, model architectures, and model checkpoints that are used in production, or that are representative of those used in production."
  },
  "AML.M0002": {
   "name": "Predictive AI Output Obfuscation",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Reduce the fidelity and amount of information returned by predictive AI inference endpoints to make model discovery, extraction, replication, and black-box adversarial-example optimization more difficult."
  },
  "AML.M0003": {
   "name": "Predictive AI Model Hardening",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Design and train predictive AI models to maintain intended performance when presented with adversarial examples."
  },
  "AML.M0004": {
   "name": "Limit AI Service Query Volume and Rate",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Limit the number and rate of requests that users can submit to an AI service."
  },
  "AML.M0005": {
   "name": "Control Access to AI Models and Data at Rest",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Establish access controls on internal model registries and limit internal access to production models."
  },
  "AML.M0006": {
   "name": "Predictive AI Ensembles",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Use an ensemble of diverse predictive AI models to reduce reliance on a single model or model family and improve robustness against adversarial examples."
  },
  "AML.M0007": {
   "name": "Sanitize Training Data",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Detect and remove or remediate poisoned training data."
  },
  "AML.M0008": {
   "name": "Validate AI Model",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Validate that AI models perform as intended by testing for backdoor triggers, potential for data leakage, or adversarial influence."
  },
  "AML.M0009": {
   "name": "Predictive AI Multi-Sensor Fusion",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Use independent physical sensors (ideally across multiple modalities or from several perspectives) to avoid relying on a single sensor that may be manipulated, obstructed, or disrupted by an adversary."
  },
  "AML.M0010": {
   "name": "Predictive AI Input Restoration",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Preprocess predictive AI inference inputs to remove, reduce, or disrupt adversarial perturbations before the inputs are evaluated by the model."
  },
  "AML.M0011": {
   "name": "Restrict Library Loading",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Prevent abuse of library loading mechanisms in the operating system and software to load untrusted code by configuring appropriate library loading mechanisms and investigating potential vulnerable software."
  },
  "AML.M0012": {
   "name": "Encrypt Sensitive Information",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Encrypt sensitive data such as AI models to protect against adversaries attempting to access sensitive data."
  },
  "AML.M0013": {
   "name": "Code Signing",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing."
  },
  "AML.M0014": {
   "name": "Verify AI Artifacts",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Verify the cryptographic checksum of all AI artifacts to verify that the file was not modified by an attacker."
  },
  "AML.M0015": {
   "name": "Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection",
   "detect": true,
   "desc": "Detect and block digital or physical adversarial examples submitted to predictive AI models."
  },
  "AML.M0016": {
   "name": "Vulnerability Scanning",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them."
  },
  "AML.M0017": {
   "name": "AI Model Distribution Methods",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Deploying AI models to edge devices can increase the attack surface of the system."
  },
  "AML.M0018": {
   "name": "User Training",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Educate AI model developers to on AI supply chain risks and potentially malicious AI artifacts."
  },
  "AML.M0019": {
   "name": "Control Access to AI Models and Data in Production",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Require users to verify their identities before accessing a production model."
  },
  "AML.M0020": {
   "name": "Generative AI Guardrails",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Guardrails are safety controls placed between users, tools, and generative AI models to evaluate prompts, retrieved context, model outputs, and agent actions before they are accepted, executed, or shown to a user."
  },
  "AML.M0021": {
   "name": "Generative AI Guidelines",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Guidelines are instructions, policies, and behavioral constraints provided to a generative AI model to direct it toward desired outputs and away from unsafe, unreliable, or policy-violating behavior."
  },
  "AML.M0022": {
   "name": "Generative AI Model Alignment",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Generative AI Model Alignment is the process of training or fine-tuning a generative model to guide its output toward a set of human values, goals, or ethical principles."
  },
  "AML.M0023": {
   "name": "AI Bill of Materials",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "An AI Bill of Materials (AI BOM) contains a full listing of artifacts and resources that were used in building the AI."
  },
  "AML.M0024": {
   "name": "AI Telemetry Logging",
   "detect": true,
   "desc": "Implement logging of inputs and outputs of deployed AI models."
  },
  "AML.M0025": {
   "name": "Maintain AI Dataset Provenance",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Maintain a detailed history of datasets used for AI applications."
  },
  "AML.M0026": {
   "name": "Privileged AI Agent Permissions Configuration",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "AI agents may be granted elevated privileges above that of a normal user to enable desired workflows."
  },
  "AML.M0027": {
   "name": "Single-User AI Agent Permissions Configuration",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "When deploying an AI agent that acts as a representative of a user and performs actions on their behalf, it is important to implement robust policies and controls on permissions and lifecycle management of the agent."
  },
  "AML.M0028": {
   "name": "AI Agent Tools Permissions Configuration",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "When deploying tools that will be shared across multiple AI agents, it is important to implement robust policies and controls on permissions for the tools."
  },
  "AML.M0029": {
   "name": "Human In-the-Loop for AI Agent Actions",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Systems should require the user or another human stakeholder to approve AI agent actions before the agent takes them."
  },
  "AML.M0030": {
   "name": "Restrict AI Agent Tool Invocation on Untrusted Data",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Untrusted data can contain prompt injections that invoke an AI agent's tools, potentially causing confidentiality, integrity or availability violations."
  },
  "AML.M0031": {
   "name": "Memory Hardening",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Memory Hardening protects persistent state used by AI agents, including saved preferences, episodic or semantic memories, conversation summaries, stored chat history, and agent-managed experience stores."
  },
  "AML.M0032": {
   "name": "Segmentation of AI Agent Components",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Define enforceable security boundaries around AI agent tools, data sources, identities, and execution environments."
  },
  "AML.M0033": {
   "name": "Input and Output Validation for AI Agent Components",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Implement validation on inputs and outputs for the tools and data sources used by AI agents."
  },
  "AML.M0034": {
   "name": "Deepfake Detection",
   "detect": true,
   "desc": "Apply deepfake detection algorithms against any untrusted or user-provided data, especially in impactful applications such as biometric verification, to block generated content."
  },
  "AML.M0035": {
   "name": "AI Red Team",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Establish an AI red team responsible for conducting recurring, authorized, and threat-informed red-teaming exercises to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in AI-enabled systems before deployment and throughout operation."
  },
  "AML.M0036": {
   "name": "Limit AI Workload Resource Consumption",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Limit the resources that an AI request, inference job, or agent workflow can consume."
  },
  "AML.M0037": {
   "name": "AI Agent Authority Expansion Controls",
   "detect": false,
   "desc": "Limit an AI agent's ability to autonomously acquire, assume, or otherwise obtain additional authorities that expand its effective permissions during execution."
  },
  "AML.M0038": {
   "name": "AI Agent Scope Drift Detection",
   "detect": true,
   "desc": "Continuously evaluate whether an AI Agent's planned actions remain consistent with its current authorized objective throughout execution."
  },
  "AML.M0039": {
   "name": "AI Honeypots",
   "detect": true,
   "desc": "Deploy monitored decoy AI services, agents, credentials, or other resources that resemble legitimate, active assets in the external or internal environment, but serve no real business or operational functions."
  }
 },
 "counts": {
  "tactics": 16,
  "techniques": 120,
  "sub_techniques": 88,
  "mitigations": 40,
  "case_studies": 73,
  "case_study_types": {
   "exercise": 50,
   "incident": 23
  }
 }
}
