# DETECT: the whole site as text

Every page of https://detect.htora.dev, framework v0.136.0, in the order of the site's sidebar. Exported on 2026-11-17.
The interactive tools appear as their explanatory text; their controls and results run only in the browser.
DETECT by Habibullah Tora, licensed CC BY-NC 4.0. Library rules keep their source repositories' licenses.

## Contents

- [An open framework for running a detection engineering program](#an-open-framework-for-running-a-detection-engineering-program) (https://detect.htora.dev/)
- [The framework](#the-framework) (https://detect.htora.dev/overview/framework/)
- [Assumptions](#assumptions) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/assumptions/)
- [Sizing the practice](#sizing-the-practice) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/)
- [First steps](#first-steps) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/)
- [The lifecycle](#the-lifecycle) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/lifecycle/)
- [Build detections](#build-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/overview/building-detections/)
- [Ship a detection](#ship-a-detection) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/)
- [Prioritization](#prioritization) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/prioritization/)
- [Worked examples](#worked-examples) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/worked-examples/)
- [Emulation](#emulation) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/emulation/)
- [A detection record](#a-detection-record) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/example-record/)
- [Query languages](#query-languages) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/)
- [Detections in SQL](#detections-in-sql) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sql/)
- [Detection as code](#detection-as-code) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/detection-as-code/)
- [Working with agents](#working-with-agents) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/)
- [The closed loop](#the-closed-loop) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/)
- [Choosing AI for detection and response](#choosing-ai-for-detection-and-response) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)
- [Run and measure](#run-and-measure) (https://detect.htora.dev/overview/running-a-program/)
- [Operating rhythm](#operating-rhythm) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/)
- [Metrics](#metrics) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/metrics/)
- [Coverage scoring rules](#coverage-scoring-rules) (https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/model/)
- [ATLAS and D3FEND](#atlas-and-d3fend) (https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/atlas-d3fend/)
- [Maturity levels](#maturity-levels) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/maturity/)
- [Scaling](#scaling) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/scaling/)
- [Handling objections](#handling-objections) (https://detect.htora.dev/objections/)
- [Detection library](#detection-library) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/)
- [Internet scanning queries](#internet-scanning-queries) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/internet/)
- [Observables](#observables) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/observables/)
- [Library health](#library-health) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/health/)
- [Sources and licenses](#sources-and-licenses) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/sources/)
- [Reconnaissance detections](#reconnaissance-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/reconnaissance/)
- [Resource Development detections](#resource-development-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/resource-development/)
- [Initial Access detections](#initial-access-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/initial-access/)
- [Execution detections](#execution-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/execution/)
- [Persistence detections](#persistence-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/persistence/)
- [Privilege Escalation detections](#privilege-escalation-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/privilege-escalation/)
- [Stealth detections](#stealth-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/stealth/)
- [Defense Impairment detections](#defense-impairment-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/defense-impairment/)
- [Credential Access detections](#credential-access-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/credential-access/)
- [Discovery detections](#discovery-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/discovery/)
- [Lateral Movement detections](#lateral-movement-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/lateral-movement/)
- [Collection detections](#collection-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/collection/)
- [Command and Control detections](#command-and-control-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/command-and-control/)
- [Exfiltration detections](#exfiltration-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/exfiltration/)
- [Impact detections](#impact-detections) (https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/impact/)
- [The tools](#the-tools) (https://detect.htora.dev/overview/tools/)
- [Map your ATT&CK coverage](#map-your-attck-coverage) (https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/)
- [Find your starting point](#find-your-starting-point) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/start/)
- [Build a baseline](#build-a-baseline) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/baseline/)
- [Check a threat report](#check-a-threat-report) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/report/)
- [Score a backlog](#score-a-backlog) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/)
- [Translate a query](#translate-a-query) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/translate/)
- [Test a rule](#test-a-rule) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/test/)
- [Translate a scanning query](#translate-a-scanning-query) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scan/)
- [Check a record](#check-a-record) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/check/)
- [Explore the lifecycle](#explore-the-lifecycle) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/lifecycle/)
- [Check coverage and alert load](#check-coverage-and-alert-load) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/)
- [Score your maturity](#score-your-maturity) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/maturity/)
- [Plan OKRs and a roadmap](#plan-okrs-and-a-roadmap) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/okr/)
- [Map regulatory controls](#map-regulatory-controls) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/regulatory/)
- [Find your ceiling](#find-your-ceiling) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/)
- [Grade an AI product](#grade-an-ai-product) (https://detect.htora.dev/tools/ai/)
- [Templates](#templates) (https://detect.htora.dev/templates/)
- [Glossary](#glossary) (https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/)
- [Downloads](#downloads) (https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/)
- [The reference pipeline](#the-reference-pipeline) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/reference-pipeline/)
- [Borrowed practices](#borrowed-practices) (https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sources/)
- [Checks against outside sources](#checks-against-outside-sources) (https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/)
- [Appendix A: Definitions of done and stalls](#appendix-a-definitions-of-done-and-stalls) (https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/a/)
- [Appendix B: Score anchors](#appendix-b-score-anchors) (https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/b/)
- [Appendix C: Metric definitions](#appendix-c-metric-definitions) (https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/c/)


---

## An open framework for running a detection engineering program

https://detect.htora.dev/

Writing a detection is the easy part. The hard parts are deciding which one to write, proving it works, and admitting when it has stopped earning its alerts. So here every detection is scored before anyone builds it, tested against real events before it ships, and retired when its alerts cost more than they return.

Pick your route
[Read the overview](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/framework/)
[Downloads](https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/)

### Starting points

**I build detections**

Follow the step-by-step checklist, score the candidate, and translate the query for the target platform.

[Ship a detection](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/)[Score a backlog](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/)[Query languages](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/)[Translate a query](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/translate/)[Detection library](https://detect.htora.dev/library/)[Templates](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/)

**I run a detection program**

Set up the weekly routine, score the program's maturity, plan the quarter, and report it.

[Operating rhythm](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/)[Score your maturity](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/maturity/)[Plan OKRs and a roadmap](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/okr/)[Quarterly report](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/#quarterly-report)[Find your ceiling](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/)[Map your ATT&CK coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/)

**I am starting from nothing**

Answer three questions about log sources, incident history, and engineering hours, and get the first 10 detections and a plan for the first month.

[Find a starting point](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/start/)[First steps](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/)[Sizing the practice](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/)

**I am deciding whether to adopt it**

See what leadership gets, the objections a team raises, what has been checked against outside sources, and the license.

What an executive gets[Handling objections](https://detect.htora.dev/objections/)[Checks against outside sources](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/)[Sizing the practice](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/)[License and credit](https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/#credit)

**I want it in my own tools**

Grab the paper, both workbooks, the data file, and the agent instructions.

[Downloads](https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/)[framework.json](https://detect.htora.dev/data/framework.json)[AGENTS.md](https://detect.htora.dev/data/AGENTS.md)

**I am choosing AI for detection and response**

See which AI uses to adopt first, and whether to use the SIEM's AI, buy, or assemble. Then grade a product, and prove a triage agent before it closes an alert.

[Choosing AI](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)[Grade an AI product](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/ai/)[The closed loop](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/)[Working with agents](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/)

### Why it exists

I've built a detection engineering program from scratch and led incident response teams, and four things stayed true the whole way through. The backlog is longer than the team can ever build. Every live detection charges analysts a few minutes of triage a day, whether or not it ever catches anything. Counting detections per tactic flatters the coverage map. And rules go into production far more often than they come out, mostly because nobody gets promoted for deleting one. Leave all four alone and a program that only builds will bury its own analysts. The [assumptions page](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/assumptions/) walks through each of these realities and what follows from them.

### What it adds

The best ideas here are other people's. The record format, the rule syntax, the robustness scale, and the basic shape of the score all come from community work that was proven long before I showed up. The [Borrowed practices](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sources/) page gives full credit to where they came from.

What I added is the machinery that keeps a detection program honest, and it starts with the least glamorous detection you'll ever ship. Detection zero is an alert for any log source that goes quiet. You build it first because every other rule depends on its logs showing up, and a rule with no logs fails silently, which looks exactly like a quiet week. After that, every stage of the lifecycle ends on a definition of done that is a hard count. CI checks the count at every stage and fails the pipeline when it comes up short, so "done" stops being a matter of opinion. I owe one confession here. The check for tune's 30-day precision isn't written yet, so a person computes that number. Scoring happens at intake, before anyone spends an engineering hour. The score blocks any candidate whose telemetry doesn't exist. It charges the candidate for the analyst minutes it will cost every day, plus the compute a SQL detection burns. It also discounts a candidate that overlaps with what the live set already covers.

People are budgeted in minutes, because minutes run out before anything else does. The framework tracks three hard ceilings: analyst triage, detection upkeep, and ready telemetry. One program-wide cap on analyst minutes per true positive gives every detection a precision floor. A live detection that stays below its floor for two 30-day periods in a row has met a retirement trigger. The trigger is arithmetic, so the monthly review can skip the argument about whether it fired (it will find something else to argue about). Pulling a detection starts a second loop in the lifecycle. The replacement enters intake with the old retirement note attached, so the next attempt starts from why the last one was pulled.

The closed loop pushes the same machinery further. Agents run every stage and people keep the approvals. Each check is written against the way an agent would fake its way past it. An agent told to make the tests pass will find the cheapest way to make the tests pass. If you're shopping for AI for detection and response, the same tests come as a buying form. It says which uses to adopt first, what to ask any product, and how to prove a triage agent before you let it close an alert.

### What an executive gets

Once a quarter, leadership gets one page. It puts the raw rule count right next to coverage weighted by how hard each detection is to evade, which tends to be the moment the heatmap gets less green. It shows the share of confirmed incidents that a live detection caught first, along with median precision and the analyst minutes spent per true positive.

The page also names whichever capacity ceiling currently binds the program and pairs it with one costed ask, so the conversation is about a number and a price. Last comes a maturity score. It's set by the program's weakest dimension and graded on evidence that anyone outside the team could verify, which rules out grading yourself on vibes. The [quarterly report](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/#quarterly-report) template lays out the page, and the [maturity page](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/maturity/) explains how the grading works.

### Contents

1Framework

The model, and where a program enters it.

[**Assumptions***4 premises.* The operational realities of the backlog, alert load, coverage, and retirement.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/assumptions/)[**First steps***3 questions.* Answer three questions about current telemetry and environment to get the first 10 detections.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/)[**Sizing the practice***9 practices.* What to adopt first. Scales from one engineer to several teams.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/)[**The lifecycle***8 stages.* Every stage ends on a countable definition of done.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/lifecycle/)

2Build detections

How one detection goes from idea to production.

[**Ship a detection***8 steps.* The engineer's checklist, with the commands and a clear done-when for each step.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/)[**Prioritization***6 inputs.* A score that decides what to build next.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/prioritization/)[**Emulation***3 scopes.* How a detection gets real events to test against.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/emulation/)[**Detection record***11 sections.* What a finished detection documents.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/example-record/)[**Query languages***13 targets.* One detection written in six query languages, with practical tips for each. The others are listed for reference.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/)[**Working with agents***9 limits.* What an agent drafts, and what a person approves.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/)[**The closed loop***6 machine stages.* Agents run the stages, people keep the approvals, and each check is written against the way an agent would fake it.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/)[**Choosing AI***12 questions.* Which AI uses to adopt first, whether to buy or build, and how to prove a triage agent.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)

3Run and measure

The weekly routine, and how to know it is working.

[**Operating rhythm***4 meetings.* The standing meetings, the post-incident review, and who owns what.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/)[**Metrics***31 metrics.* Each defined once and owned by one stage or by the program.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/metrics/)[**ATT&CK coverage***706 techniques.* Coverage per technique on ATT&CK 20.1, in the browser.](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/)[**Maturity model***11 × 5.* Each dimension scored on evidence someone else can check.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/maturity/)[**Scaling***3 ceilings.* How many detections the team can carry.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/scaling/)[**Objections***10 answers.* What to say when people push back on the rollout.](https://detect.htora.dev/objections/)

**Use it**

[Detection library62,921 detections](https://detect.htora.dev/library/)[Browser tools16](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/tools/)[Templates8](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/)[PaperPDF, Word, Markdown](https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/)[Workbooks2](https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/)[Reference pipeline13 query languages](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/reference-pipeline/)[framework.jsonthe whole model](https://detect.htora.dev/data/framework.json)[AGENTS.mdfor agent runners](https://detect.htora.dev/data/AGENTS.md)


---

## The framework

https://detect.htora.dev/overview/framework/

Overview

This is the model itself: what a detection program has to do, in what order, and how you can tell a step is done without taking anyone's word for it. If you only read one part of the site, read this one. The rest is detail, and I say that as the person who wrote the detail.

Framework v0.136.0.

### The lifecycle

Each diamond is a [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done). A detection moves on only when the count is met, and anyone can check the count. [Tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) changes go back through validate, and a retired detection's replacement starts again at intake.

1. Backlog line**1. Intake**Done when: 6 scores, each with an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line), and 1 computed score
2. Backlog line**2. Hypothesis**Done when: 1 hypothesis sentence, 1 named log source, 1 named blind spot
3. Backlog line**3. Research**Done when: 1 [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) run, [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) saved, every field checked against a real event, 7 days of baseline counts, lab torn down
4. Build line**4. Build**Done when: lint passes, 1 conversion per target, 1 event it must match, 1 event it must ignore
5. Build line**5. Validate**Done when: fixtures pass on every replay engine, every converted query approved (matching its approved copy on a re-validation), 1 approval by someone other than the author (one-person team: the author after 24 hours)
6. Live line**6. Deploy**Done when: 7 days live with alerting off, alert volume at or under its threshold, then alerting on
7. Live line**7. Tune**Done when: [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) checked every 30 days, running query matches the approved copy at each check
8. Live line**8. Retire**Done when: status deprecated, alerting off, record kept, retirement note written, replacement linked if one exists

A detection leaves each stage only when the count under it is met. Tuning changes go back through validate, and a retired detection's replacement starts again at intake.

### In this part

[**Assumptions**Explains the operational realities behind the framework and the mechanics that follow from each.Read this to see if the framework is the right fit for your program.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/assumptions/)[**Sizing the practice**Outlines the core practices, the simplest version of each, and how role ownership scales with your team's size.Read this when deciding which parts of the framework to adopt first.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/)[**First steps**Uses your current log inventory, incident history, and available hours to choose your first 10 detections.Read this when you are starting a detection program from scratch.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/)[**The lifecycle**Details each stage of a detection's life, the definition of done required to move forward, and the feedback loops that send work back.Read this when setting up your ticket workflow.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/lifecycle/)

### The practices

Each one works on its own, so take the ones that fix a problem you have and leave the rest on the shelf.

[Detection zero](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-zero)The scored backlogCountable definitions of doneThe detection recordSecond-engineer reviewRetirement triggers and the [precision floor](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision-floor)The metric set[Detection as code](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-as-code)Threat-model intake

The other overviews: [Build detections](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/building-detections/) · [Run and measure](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/running-a-program/) · [The tools](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/tools/).


---

## Assumptions

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/assumptions/

Section 2

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

The whole framework rests on four things I believe are true of any working detection program. If they're true of yours, the machinery in the rest of the framework earns its keep. If they aren't, I'm a little jealous, and a simpler process will do.

### 2.1 The backlog is always bigger than the team's capacity

A detection backlog only grows. Threat reports come out faster than detections ship, every incident review adds a few more ideas, and about once a week somebody forwards a news article and asks whether it's covered. A team can build a handful of those candidates in a sprint. The rest wait, and some of them will wait forever.

That makes the build order the most important decision the team makes, and by default it goes to whoever asked last or loudest. I'd rather it were made with numbers. People can argue with a number, and nobody has ever won an argument with a mood.

So every candidate detection gets a deterministic priority score before anyone spends engineering hours building it. Each number in the score carries a line of evidence, which gives a reviewer something specific to disagree with. A candidate that needs a log source nobody collects is blocked at intake, since no amount of enthusiasm makes a rule fire on logs that don't exist.

### 2.2 Every live detection costs analyst triage minutes every day

A detection is never free once it's live. Every alert it raises takes a person a few minutes to open, read, and close, and it raises them every day, including the days when nothing is wrong. The bill arrives in analyst minutes, which run out long before disk or compute does. It's also the one cost that rarely gets written down next to the detection that ran it up.

The framework writes it down. Analyst capacity is measured in minutes, and one cap for the whole program says how many analyst minutes a [true positive](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive) is allowed to cost. Divide a detection's [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) minutes by that cap and you get its [precision floor](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision-floor). With the default cap of 120 minutes, a detection that takes 30 minutes to triage has to be right at least a quarter of the time. One that takes six minutes can get away with 5%.

### 2.3 Counting detections per tactic makes coverage look better than it is

The [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) heatmap has a flaw you could drive a truck through. A box turns green when a detection maps to the technique, and the chart has no opinion on whether that detection is any good. A fragile rule that matches one filename counts exactly as much as a stronger rule that matches the behavior, even though an attacker beats the fragile one by renaming a file.

So coverage scoring here discounts detections that are fragile and detections that overlap. The quarterly report and the coverage map both weight each detection by how hard it is to evade, and the weighted score sits next to the raw count. Leadership sees both numbers, and the gap between them is the coverage that only exists on the chart.

### 2.4 Detections are added to production far more often than they are removed

Shipping a detection gets you a closed ticket and a line in the quarterly update. Deleting one gets you a meeting where somebody asks what happens if the thing it covered turns up next week. So rules go in and almost never come out, and over time analysts end up triaging alerts from old detections that nobody owns.

The framework takes the courage out of it. Retirement runs on written triggers, such as a detection sitting below its precision floor for two 30-day periods in a row, and a trigger either fired or it didn't. When a detection is retired, its replacement enters intake with a link to the retirement note, so the next hypothesis starts from why the old one was pulled.

Next step [Sizing the practice](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/)


---

## Sizing the practice

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/

Section 3

Adopting every practice at once stalls a small team. Each practice works on its own, and the tables give the smallest working version of each and how a team of your size divides the roles.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Remember

- Start with the practice that fixes a problem you have today. You can adopt the practices in any order.
- A team of one can start with [detection zero](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-zero), the scored backlog, and the retirement triggers.
- Adopt the smallest working version of a practice first, and grow it when it stops answering a question somebody asks.
- Below five engineers, adopt [detection as code](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-as-code) last, once hand-converting queries has become the bottleneck.

### 3.1 The practices

| Practice | What it fixes | What it needs first | Effort |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Detection zero, the log source silence alert | A detection can't fire on telemetry that stopped arriving, and a silent log source looks exactly like a quiet network. | A list of log sources and their normal event rate. | An afternoon for the first source, an hour for each one after. |
| The scored backlog | Detection backlogs are longer than the team's capacity, so whoever asked most recently decides the order. | Nothing but the candidates. Readiness needs the log source inventory to be honest. | An hour to score 10 candidates once the score wording in [Appendix B](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/b/) is read. |
| Countable definitions of done | You can't report on stages that end on judgment ("it looks ready"). Work stalls between them and nobody sees it. | Somewhere to record the count: a ticket field is enough. | One editing session on your ticket template. |
| The detection record | If a detection's intent, log sources, blind spots, and response steps live only in the author's head, nobody else can [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) it, review it, or safely change it. | A place to keep it next to the detection: a repository, a wiki page, or the detection's own description field. | 30 minutes per detection, most of it recall. |
| Second-engineer review | A detection approved only by its author reaches production carrying the author's assumptions about the environment. | A pull request, a ticket transition, or a change record. | 20 minutes per detection for the reviewer. |
| Retirement triggers and the [precision floor](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision-floor) | Detections leave production far less often than they enter it, so analysts spend their day triaging alerts from detections nobody owns. | Alert outcomes from the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem): how many alerts fired and how many were [true positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive). | A scheduled query per month, plus one review of the results. |
| The metric set | Detection metrics get redefined between reports, so a change in the trend line can come from a changed definition. | The stages in use, plus alert outcomes for the live-side numbers. | Half a day to wire the first four; the rest as the data becomes available. |
| Detection as code, with a CI job per [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done) | When only habit enforces the definitions of done, people skip them under deadline pressure, and nobody notices until an alert fires on a detection that was never tested. | Version control, a CI runner, and detections stored as files. | A week for the first pipeline, then minutes per detection. |
| Threat-model intake | Threat models end as a document with a list of unmitigated threats, and the detection backlog never hears about them. Impact scores come from the engineer's guess about which assets matter. | A threat model for at least one service, with its threats mapped to [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) techniques and a named owner. | An hour per threat model to file the candidates, once the handoff fields are agreed with whoever runs the modeling. |

### 3.2 The smallest version of each

| Practice | Smallest version that still works |
| --- | --- |
| Detection zero | One saved search per source that compares the gap since the last event against three times the median gap, with a one-hour floor. |
| The scored backlog | Score the open backlog in the spreadsheet on the downloads page. Keep the [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) for each input; drop the weights and the presets until someone disputes the order. |
| Countable definitions of done | Copy the definition of done column into the template for your detection ticket type. |
| The detection record | For detections already live, four sections to start: goal, categorization (the ATT&CK technique), blind spots and assumptions, and response. For a new detection, you write goal, categorization, strategy abstract, and blind spots at hypothesis. |
| Second-engineer review | A checklist in the pull request: the [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) pass, the query matches the approved copy, the blind spots section is filled in. |
| Retirement triggers and the precision floor | Once a month, compute 30-day [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) for every live detection and compare each with its floor. At the smallest size that is a short list, and a spreadsheet does it. |
| The metric set | Detections live, percent with tests, precision over 30 days, and minutes per true positive. |
| Detection as code | One job that validates the rule file and the score record on every pull request. |
| Threat-model intake | Add the handoff fields to the threat model template, and file one candidate per unmitigated threat at the next intake meeting. |

### 3.3 Teams and roles

Stage owners are roles, and one person can own several.

| Team | Who owns which role | Work in progress limit | Adopt first |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| One engineer, detection part-time | Every stage owner is you. For review, use a colleague outside the team, a peer elsewhere, or a 24-hour wait before you approve your own change. | One detection in flight. Two half-built detections is the failure mode at this size. | Detection zero, the scored backlog, retirement triggers and the precision floor |
| Two to four engineers | One person has the lead role and owns intake and the backlog order. The others rotate build and review, so no detection is approved by its author. | Weekly engineering hours divided by the hours one detection takes from hypothesis through validation. Eight hours per detection until you measure your own. | The scored backlog, countable definitions of done, the detection record, retirement triggers and the precision floor |
| Five or more, or several teams | Stage owners map to real seats. The lead owns intake and prioritization, engineers build, and a rotating reviewer approves. The SOC lead co-owns [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning), because the triage cost lands on their analysts. | Set it per engineer, so one engineer's stalled detection doesn't use up the team's limit. | Detection as code, the metric set, countable definitions of done, the scored backlog |

### 3.4 The first month

| Team | The first month |
| --- | --- |
| One engineer, detection part-time | Build the log source inventory, ship the silence alert for each source, score the backlog once, and build the top three of the [section 4](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/) shortlist, one at a time. Track two numbers by hand: alerts per detection per day and minutes to triage one. |
| Two to four engineers | Put the definitions of done in the ticket template, score the open backlog, and run the retirement triggers against the live detection set. Expect the first pass to retire detections nobody has defended in a year. |
| Five or more, or several teams | Put the framework in version control. Wire one CI job per definition of done. Publish the metric set, so a number means the same thing each month. |

The detections to build come from the shortlist in section 4.

Next step [First steps](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/)


---

## First steps

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/

Section 4

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Find your starting point](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/start/)

Remember

- Build [detection zero](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-zero) first: an alert for every log source that stops sending events.
- Inventory your log sources before you write detections, with each one's owner, retention, parsing, and normal event rate.
- Score the backlog before you build anything, then build the top 10.
- A candidate with [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) 0 becomes a log source request.
- Wait on coverage targets until you know your telemetry ceiling.

The temptation with a new detection program is to open the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) and start writing rules. I'd do one boring thing first. A rule is only as good as the logs under it. Until you know which logs you have, who owns them, and whether they're still arriving, you're writing detections for an environment you're guessing at. So the first detection here is the least exciting one I can offer, an alert that fires when a log source goes quiet.

Your path depends on what you already have. Do you have a log source inventory? A list of every source feeding the SIEM: its owner, its retention, whether it is parsed and enriched, its usual gap between events, and whether a silence alert covers it. Do you have the last 12 months of incidents, each tagged with the [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) techniques the attacker used? How many engineering hours a week go to building detections, from the first draft through validation? Leave out [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) and [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning).

If you have no inventory, build one, ship DET-0000 for every source, and then score. If you have an inventory and no incident history, take threat relevance from public prevalence lists and sector reporting. Score every candidate, and build the readiness 4 or higher ones first. At 3 the fields still need parsing, and below 3 the source needs collection or retention work, so research would send those candidates back. Ship the top 10. If you have both, score threat relevance 5 for every technique in your own incident history, and ship the top 10. The top 10 is the shortlist; you build down it at your work in progress limit: one detection at a time for a single engineer, and for a team the capacity rule. Work on no more detections at once than your weekly hours divided by the hours one detection takes from hypothesis through validate. Use 8 hours per detection until you've measured your own.

Three plans on this site cover the start, each for a different reader. This section picks the first detections for any team. [Section 3.4](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/#3-4-the-first-month) gives the first month for a team of one, of two to four, or of five or more. [Section 11.3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/#11-3-the-first-90-days) gives the first 90 days to someone handed a function that already runs live detections. Its first month adds no new detections, because the live set comes first.

DET-0000, Log source silence: Alert when a source in the log inventory has sent nothing for three times its usual gap between events, and never sooner than 1 hour. Every other detection depends on its data arriving. A source covered by this alert is one step closer to a readiness score of 5.

### 4.1 Build a baseline

Do it in the browser [Build a baseline](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/baseline/)

The Build a baseline tool does the first pass of this for you. The baseline builder turns an environment into a first set of detections. Four questions each end as a list of log sources, because what is collected decides what can be detected. From the sources, ATT&CK's own analytics say which techniques are ready to build. For each ready technique, the library's best rule that your SIEM can run becomes a candidate, and the scorer's formula puts them in order. The baseline takes the best rule for every ATT&CK tactic the environment supports before it fills the rest in that order. The result is a backlog to start from, with DET-0000 first for every source, and a list of what the environment cannot see. Each environment it asks about ticks the log sources ATT&CK's analytics name for it:

| Environment | Platforms in scope | Log sources it ticks |
| --- | --- | --- |
| On-premises Windows and Active Directory | Windows, Identity Provider | 12 sources, such as WinEventLog:Security, WinEventLog:System, WinEventLog:Application |
| Linux servers | Linux | 10 sources, such as auditd:SYSCALL, auditd:EXECVE, auditd:PATH |
| macOS endpoints | macOS | 7 sources, such as macos:unifiedlog, macos:endpointsecurity, macos:auth |
| AWS | IaaS | 10 sources, such as AWS:CloudTrail, CloudTrail:Signin, CloudTrail:GetCallerIdentity |
| Azure and Entra ID | IaaS, Identity Provider | 10 sources, such as azure:activity, azure:audit, azure:policy |
| Google Cloud | IaaS | 5 sources, such as gcp:audit, gcp:iam, gcp:config |
| Kubernetes and containers | Containers | 10 sources, such as kubernetes:audit, kubernetes:apiserver, kubernetes:events |
| Microsoft 365 | Office Suite, SaaS | 10 sources, such as m365:unified, m365:audit, m365:exchange |
| Google Workspace | Office Suite, SaaS | 5 sources, such as gcp:workspaceaudit, Google Admin Audit, saas:googleworkspace |
| SaaS applications | SaaS | 8 sources, such as saas:audit, saas:auth, saas:api |
| VMware ESXi | ESXi | 9 sources, such as esxi:hostd, esxi:vpxd, esxi:auth |
| Network perimeter and devices | Network Devices | 12 sources, such as networkdevice:Firewall, networkdevice:Flow, networkdevice:IDS |

A library rule is a candidate for a technique when the technique is ready and your SIEM can run the rule. Running it means the rule is in the SIEM's language, or the translator converts it into that language; the library records which languages each rule converts to. On Sentinel, a translated rule counts by the table its KQL reads, either SecurityEvent or one of Defender's Device tables. A Device table needs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint ticked among your tools. On LogScale, it counts only when the translation reads Falcon's events, which needs CrowdStrike Falcon ticked among your tools. For Google SecOps, the translator writes YARA-L only for endpoint rules: process, registry, file, network, and DNS events on Windows, Linux, and macOS. For another SIEM only [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules are candidates, to convert with that SIEM's own Sigma tooling. A translated rule also has to keep the rule's logic. The translator keeps a query's filter and drops the stages after it. A rule that filters again after counting, or joins another table, would match far more in translation: a password spray rule would match every failed login. Those rules are offered only in the language they were written in. One rule per technique: a rule in your SIEM's own language first, then the highest [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) draft, then the one that converts to the most languages, then the one from the source with the most rules. A second rule for the same technique is taken only when it reads a different log source. The rows cover the ATT&CK tactics before they go by score. Every tactic with a ready technique and a rule that runs here gets its best rule first, two each at a baseline of 40 or more and three at 60 or more. The rest go down the ranking, and no tactic takes more than a fifth of the rows while another still has a rule to add. Without that, discovery commands, which a third of ATT&CK's groups run, take many of the top slots, and ransomware falls below the cut. A tactic left with no rule is named with the reason: nothing ready, or nothing that runs on these sources. DET-0000 comes first for every log source you tick, before any candidate. Each library rule's log source is read from where its source writes it: a Sigma rule's logsource, a Splunk rule's data_source field, an Elastic rule's index patterns, the tables a KQL query reads, a Panther rule's log type, a Google SecOps rule's folder. Each maps to the ATT&CK log sources that record it. A rule runs in your environment when one of those sources is ticked, and a KQL rule that joins two tables needs one source for each. Rules written for one EDR's own fields, such as CrowdStrike's or SentinelOne's, run only when that EDR is ticked among your tools. A rule that reads another vendor's own table or a threat intelligence list has no ATT&CK source, so the baseline leaves it out. What the page does not know, it says: Your assets, so impact is 3 everywhere. Your incidents, so threat relevance is ATT&CK group usage. Your alert volume, so [run cost](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) is 3 everywhere. Whether a source's fields are parsed, so readiness is 5 for every collected source; lower it in the map or the record when they are not.

The baseline downloads as kit starters, one DET folder per rule at the intake stage, so the first backlog arrives in the repository already scored on everything but impact and run cost. A coverage map with your log sources ticked opens the baseline with them through Export, Build a baseline.


---

## The lifecycle

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/lifecycle/

Section 5

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Explore the lifecycle](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/lifecycle/)

[*The detect lifecycle poster: the workflow from idea through production and ship to measure, a card for each of the eight stages with its owner and definition of done, and both loops*](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-lifecycle-v0.136.0.png)

Remember

- A detection leaves a stage only when its [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done) is met, and every definition of done is a count someone can check.
- Research ends with field names read from a real event and a 7-day count of how often the behavior happens normally.
- Deploy with alerting off, and switch alerting on only after 7 days at or under the [alert volume threshold](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-alert-volume-threshold).
- Every [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) change is a pull request that goes back through validate.
- A retired detection keeps its record and gets a retirement note. Any replacement starts at intake with a link to that note.

I grouped the stages onto three lines. The Backlog line carries intake, hypothesis, and research; the Build line carries build and validate; the Live line carries deploy, tune, and retire. A tuning change loops back to validate as a pull request. The replay runs the changed rule against its [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture), so an exclusion that blinds it to the attack fails the build. A retired detection's replacement loops back to intake with a link to the retirement note, so the next hypothesis starts from why the old one was pulled.

| Stage | What it is for | Definition of done, counted | Owner | Metrics |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Intake | Write down a request for a new detection with enough context that it can be scored. | 6 scores, each with an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line), and 1 computed score | Detection lead | intake_to_score_days, backlog_age_days |
| 2. Hypothesis | Write one sentence saying what the detection will catch, which log source it needs, and what it will miss. | 1 hypothesis sentence, 1 named log source, 1 named blind spot | Detection engineer | readiness_at_hypothesis |
| 3. Research | Produce the events the rule will be written against, and confirm they exist in your logs. Then count how often they appear during normal business. | 1 [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) run, fixtures saved, every field checked against a real event, 7 days of baseline counts, lab torn down | Detection engineer | research_hours_per_rule |
| 4. Build | Write the detection in [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) and the tests that prove it. | lint passes, 1 conversion per target, 1 event it must match, 1 event it must ignore | Detection engineer | percent_with_tests |
| 5. Validate | Prove the detection fires on what it should catch, stays silent on what it should ignore, and still matches the query a reviewer approved. | fixtures pass on every replay engine, every converted query approved (matching its approved copy on a re-validation), 1 approval by someone other than the author (one-person team: the author after 24 hours) | Reviewer, a second engineer | first_pass_validation_rate, review_turnaround_hours |
| 6. Deploy | Put the detection into production with alerting switched off, leave it running for 7 days, and switch alerting on only if the alert count stayed at or under its threshold. | 7 days live with alerting off, alert volume at or under its threshold, then alerting on | Detection lead | deploy_lead_time_days, post_deploy_replay_failures, detection_latency_median |
| 7. Tune | Keep the share of true alerts above the agreed floor as the environment changes. | [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) checked every 30 days, running query matches the approved copy at each check | Detection engineer with the SOC or [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) lead | precision_30d, triage_minutes_median, minutes_per_true_positive, upkeep_minutes_per_detection |
| 8. Retire | Remove detections whose alerts cost more analyst time than they are worth. | status deprecated, alerting off, record kept, retirement note written, replacement linked if one exists | Detection lead | rules_retired_per_quarter, rule_debt |

The metrics column leaves out the 15 metrics that measure the program as a whole: robustness_weighted_coverage, incident_detection_rate, silent_source_hours, priority_technique_gaps, misses_by_cause, open_detection_fixes_age, false_close_rate, time_to_scope_hours, time_to_contain_minutes, notifications_on_time, playbook_coverage, playbook_minutes_saved_per_alert, playbook_actions_unattended, playbook_actions_reverted, and incidents_without_followup.

[Appendix A](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/a/) has the full definition of done wording, the mistake that usually stalls each stage, and where a detection goes when a stage's count can't be met.


---

## Build detections

https://detect.htora.dev/overview/building-detections/

Overview

This part follows a single detection from somebody's idea to a reviewed rule: how you choose it, research it, write it, and prove it works. It's the practitioner's half of the framework, and the half where you get to open an editor.

Framework v0.136.0.

### The path of one detection

Every candidate starts at intake with six scored inputs. If the log source it needs isn't collected, the score is 0 and the candidate is blocked, which saves you from writing a careful rule for logs you don't have. A candidate that passes intake gets a written hypothesis, a named blind spot, and a read-only count over 7 days of production data. That count tells you how loud the rule will be before it pages anyone.

Before a rule ships, it needs real events to test against, because a rule that has only ever met its author's imagination tends to do well there. Engineers capture those events through [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) and scrub credentials and personal data out of them. The rule is written once in [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma), converted for every target, and replayed against its [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) on every replay engine. An agent can draft most of what each stage produces, and people keep review, deployment, and retirement.

**Hypothesis**One sentence: when an attacker does X, log source Y records Z.

->

**Emulation**Run it from a believable [foothold](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-foothold) and read what lands in the log.

->

**Record**Every section filled in, so somebody other than the author can [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) and change it.

->

**Detection and fixtures**Sigma, converted to every target, with an event it must match and one it must ignore.

->

**Review**A second engineer approves. The fixtures replay in CI.

The path a single detection takes from idea to review. The score decides which idea goes first.

### Backlog order

**Value**`T + I + B`Threat relevance, impact, and how hard the detection is to evade.

÷

**Cost**`E + C`Hours to build, and analyst minutes a day to live with.

×

**Readiness**`(R / 5)^k`Is the data in the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) and usable? A 0 blocks the candidate.

×

**Marginal**`M`What it adds to what already fires: first 1, stronger 0.8, equal 0.5.

=

**Score**`0.03 to 7.50`On the balanced preset. Scores in one 0.2 band tie, and the lower [run cost](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) goes first. [Mandates](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mandate) due inside 90 days go ahead of every score.

Each input carries an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line). Readiness is scored 0 to 5 and the rest 1 to 5. Every weight and k start at 1 on the balanced preset; threat_led doubles wT, asset_led doubles wI, and telemetry_led raises k to 2.

### In this part

[**Ship a detection**A checklist for each stage: what to do, the command to run, and the definition of done.Read this when you're building a detection right now.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/)[**Prioritization**The inputs, the formula, and the evidence each score needs.Read this when you need to order a backlog.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/prioritization/)[**Worked examples**Scoring, blocking, deadlines, and retirement, step by step.Read this when the formula doesn't make sense to you.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/worked-examples/)[**Emulation**How a detection gets the events you write and test it against.Read this when you're about to write a detection.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/emulation/)[**A detection record**Finished detection records with every section filled in.Read this when you need to see what good looks like.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/example-record/)[**Query languages**The same detection in Sigma, SPL, KQL, SQL, ES|QL, EQL, and LogScale, with tips for each.Read this when you write or review queries for a specific platform.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/)[**Detections in SQL**A detection as warehouse SQL, with declared variables.Read this when your detections run as scheduled queries.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sql/)[**Detection as code**The rules, the pipeline they run in, and the hosts, CI systems, and platforms that fill it.Read this when you're moving detections into version control.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/detection-as-code/)[**Working with agents**What an agent drafts, what a person approves, and how to keep log content from steering it.Read this when agents are writing detections.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/)[**The closed loop**Agents run every stage, a check after each one is written against how an agent would fake it, and three routes send work back.Read this when you want agents to run the pipeline, not only draft for it.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/)[**Choosing AI for detection and response**Which AI uses to adopt first, build or buy, what to ask any product, and how to prove a triage agent before it closes an alert.Read this when you are choosing or building AI for detection and response.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)

The other overviews: [The framework](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/framework/) · [Run and measure](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/running-a-program/) · [The tools](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/tools/).


---

## Ship a detection

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/

A checklist for the engineer doing the work, stage by stage: what to do, the command to run, and how you know the stage is done.

Checklist Framework v0.136.0. The purposes, owners, definitions of done, and common failures come from framework.json.

Remember

- Work from the top of the scored backlog, in the order the lead confirmed at the weekly intake meeting.
- Run lint, the conversion check, and the SQLite replay locally before you open or update a pull request.
- Never edit a query in the SIEM's own interface. Every change reaches production through a pull request.

1. 1

 ## Intake

 Owner: Detection lead

 Write down a request for a new detection with enough context that it can be scored.

 Do

 - Open an intake ticket with the fields from the intake template.
 - Score the six inputs with the wording in [Appendix B](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/b/): 1 to 5 for five of them and 0 to 5 for [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness). Write one [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) for each.
 - Run the scorer, or paste the numbers into the backlog scorer to see where the candidate lands.

 Run

 ```
 python tools/score.py detections/*/score.yml
 ```

 Example

 DET-0001 scored 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 2 on the balanced weights, for a score of 2.40.

 Done when

 6 scores, each with an evidence line, and 1 computed score.

 Watch for

 Requests arrive as nothing more than an alert name, with no note about the threat behind it, so you build them in the order they showed up.

 If it can't be met

 A candidate whose scores can't be evidenced stays at intake, and the missing evidence becomes a question for the next intake meeting. A candidate with telemetry readiness 0 is blocked, and its log source request goes to the platform owner.

 [Intake template](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/#intake-ticket)[Score wording](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/b/)[Score a backlog](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/)[Detection library](https://detect.htora.dev/library/)
2. 2

 ## Hypothesis

 Owner: Detection engineer

 Write one sentence saying what the detection will catch, which log source it needs, and what it will miss.

 Do

 - Write one sentence: when an attacker does X, log source Y records Z. It opens the Strategy Abstract section of ads.md.
 - Name the log source the detection will read. It goes in the first sentence of Strategy Abstract with the hypothesis.
 - Name one thing the detection misses, in the Blind Spots and Assumptions section.
 - Write the Goal and Categorization sections, so ads.md carries all four hypothesis sections.
 - Set the stage in score.yml to hypothesis, then run lint. It checks for a Hypothesis: line and a Log source: line in Strategy Abstract, and for something written under Blind Spots and Assumptions.

 Run

 ```
 python tools/lint.py DET-NNNN
 ```

 Example

 When an attacker requests a service ticket to crack offline, the domain controller's Security log records event 4769 with encryption type 0x17.

 Done when

 1 hypothesis sentence, 1 named log source, 1 named blind spot.

 Watch for

 The hypothesis describes one tool's fingerprint. When that tool changes, the detection goes quiet.

 If it can't be met

 If no log source you collect records the behavior, the candidate goes back to intake with telemetry readiness 0 and a log source request. If the only hypothesis anyone can write names one tool's fingerprint, rescore its [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) at intake before going on.

 [A finished record](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/example-record/)
3. 3

 ## Research

 Owner: Detection engineer

 Produce the events the rule will be written against, and confirm they exist in your logs. Then count how often they appear during normal business.

 Do

 - Run the behavior in a lab. An Atomic Red Team test covers many endpoint techniques; cloud and identity techniques need a planned [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation).
 - Save the events as [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture): one the detection must match and one it must ignore. Give each a fixture_source naming the [run tag](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-tag) or query it came from, and name the same tag or query in the Technical Context.
 - Read every field name you'll use from a real event.
 - Write the Technical Context section of ads.md from what the run showed: why the behavior looks like this and what normal traffic in it looks like. Add the four lines lint reads: Plan approved by, Run tag, Baseline (the query, its time range, and its count), and Teardown verified.
 - Count how often the behavior happens normally over 7 days of production data. That count sets the [alert volume threshold](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-alert-volume-threshold) on the record: 1.5 x 7 x the daily count, never under 3.
 - Tear the lab down and confirm nothing is left behind.
 - Set the stage in score.yml to research, then run lint.

 Run

 ```
 python tools/lint.py DET-NNNN
 ```

 Done when

 1 emulation run, fixtures saved, every field checked against a real event, 7 days of baseline counts, lab torn down.

 Watch for

 Field names come from documentation or memory, so the detection is almost right and never fires. The other common failure is skipping the 7-day count, which spends the first week in production on noise the count would have shown.

 If it can't be met

 If the events never reach the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem), or a field the rule needs arrives unparsed, the candidate goes back to intake with its telemetry readiness lowered and a log source request. If the 7-day count shows the behavior is routine here, rewrite the hypothesis before building anything.

 [Emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/emulation/)[Emulation plan](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/#emulation-plan)
4. 4

 ## Build

 Owner: Detection engineer

 Write the detection in [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) and the tests that prove it.

 Do

 - Write rule.yml in Sigma.
 - Complete ads.md: all 10 ADS headings plus an empty Retirement record, because lint fails on a missing heading. Hypothesis and research wrote five sections. Add [False Positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-false-positive), Validation, Priority, Response, and Additional Resources, and fill every section before review.
 - Add the fixtures to tests/.
 - Write the converted queries with python tools/convert.py --update-golden DET-NNNN. The conversion check compares against them from now on, and the reviewer approves them at validate.
 - Set the stage in score.yml to build and the status in rule.yml to experimental, then run lint and the conversion check.

 Run

 ```
 python tools/convert.py --update-golden DET-NNNN
 python tools/lint.py DET-NNNN && python tools/convert.py --check
 ```

 Done when

 Lint passes, 1 conversion per target, 1 event it must match, 1 event it must ignore.

 Watch for

 You write the detection straight in the SIEM's own query language. Then it runs on one product only, you can't compare its changes against an approved version, and it can't move when the SIEM changes.

 If it can't be met

 If a target can't express the rule, mark that target convert-only in targets.yml and say so in the record. If Sigma can't express it at all, as with a correlation across events, write it as a query file beside the same record and fixtures, and review that file directly.

 [The detection in seven languages](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/)[Record template](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/example-record/)
5. 5

 ## Validate

 Owner: Reviewer, a second engineer

 Prove the detection fires on what it should catch, stays silent on what it should ignore, and still matches the query a reviewer approved.

 Do

 - Set the stage in score.yml to validate and the status in rule.yml to test. Lint now wants every section but the retirement record written, and numbered steps under Response.
 - If the rule changed since build, run python tools/convert.py --update-golden DET-NNNN again, so the pull request carries the queries the reviewer approves.
 - Replay the fixtures on every replay engine in targets.yml.
 - Open a pull request with the review checklist.
 - Ask a second engineer to review the record first, then the query, and approve.

 Run

 ```
 python tools/replay.py --fixtures --target sqlite
 python tools/replay.py --fixtures --all-replay-targets
 ```

 Done when

 Fixtures pass on every replay engine, every converted query approved (matching its approved copy on a re-validation), 1 approval by someone other than the author (one-person team: the author after 24 hours).

 Watch for

 Whenever the conversion output changes, someone overwrites the approved copy to match it. After that the comparison can't fail, so it catches no changes.

 If it can't be met

 If a fixture fails or the reviewer asks for changes, the pull request goes back to build and stays open. If the reviewer rejects the hypothesis itself, the detection goes back to hypothesis.

 [Review checklist](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/#review-checklist)
6. 6

 ## Deploy

 Owner: Detection lead

 Put the detection into production with alerting switched off, leave it running for 7 days, and switch alerting on only if the alert count stayed at or under its threshold.

 Do

 - Merge the pull request that sets the stage to deploy. The lead approves the deploy run, which packages the detection with alerting off. The kit's vetting and install steps are placeholders, so fill them in for your Splunk stack before the first deploy.
 - Leave it running for 7 days and watch the alert count against the threshold on the record. If the count goes over, it stays at deploy with alerting off; fix it in a pull request that goes back through validate, and the 7 days start again from that merge.
 - After 7 days at or under the threshold, open a pull request that moves the stage to tune. Its promotion check counts the 7 days again, and merging it switches alerting on.

 Run

 ```
 python tools/history.py DET-NNNN
 python tools/replay.py --production
 ```

 Done when

 7 days live with alerting off, alert volume at or under its threshold, then alerting on.

 Watch for

 Alerting goes on before the 7-day check, and the SOC pays for the noise in [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) time.

 If it can't be met

 If the first 7 days run over the threshold, alerting stays off and the detection stays at deploy. The fix is a pull request that goes back through validate, and the 7 days start again from its merge. If they return nothing though research counted the behavior, check the fields and the index against a real event.

 [Find your ceiling](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/)
7. 7

 ## Tune

 Owner: Detection engineer with the SOC or triage lead

 Keep the share of true alerts above the agreed floor as the environment changes.

 Do

 - Check [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) every 30 days against the detection's floor.
 - Tune in a pull request that adds the exclusion as a filter_ selection in rule.yml, which the core lock allows, and names it. Record the value in variables.yml in the same pull request, because no tool substitutes it yet.
 - Send every [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) change back through validate. A change to the query is counted over the last 7 days before it merges.
 - When an incident or an exercise shows the detection missed something, add the missed events as a positive fixture and fix the rule in the same pull request. The fixture's source is the incident or exercise id, which the Validation section names.

 Run

 ```
 python tools/lint.py DET-NNNN && python tools/convert.py --check
 python tools/replay.py --fixtures --target sqlite
 ```

 Done when

 Precision checked every 30 days, running query matches the approved copy at each check.

 Watch for

 Someone tunes the detection by adding exclusions in the SIEM's own interface, so the rule in the repo no longer matches the rule running in production.

 If it can't be met

 If precision stays under the floor for two 30-day periods in a row, propose retirement. If an incident or an exercise shows the detection missed what it claims to catch, fix this detection. The missed events become a positive fixture, and the change goes back through validate and its 7-day count.

 [Check coverage and alert load](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/)[Detection variables](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sql/#detection-variables)
8. 8

 ## Retire

 Owner: Detection lead

 Remove detections whose alerts cost more analyst time than they are worth.

 Do

 - Retire when a retirement trigger fires, and record the numbers behind it.
 - Set the stage in score.yml to retire and the status in rule.yml to deprecated, and keep the record. The lead switches alerting off.
 - Write the Retirement record section, and add retired.date to score.yml. If the technique still matters, open its replacement at intake and name it in retired.replacement_id.

 Done when

 Status deprecated, alerting off, record kept, retirement note written, replacement linked if one exists.

 Watch for

 Nothing is ever retired, so analysts keep triaging alerts from detections that no one owns or understands anymore.

 If it can't be met

 A retirement is not undone. If the technique still matters, the replacement is a new detection at intake with a link to the retirement note.

 [Retirement check](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/#retirement-check)[A worked retirement](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/worked-examples/#7-6-retiring-a-detection)

### Copy it into a ticket

The same steps as a Markdown checklist, ready for a ticket or a pull request description.

```
# DET-NNNN: <name>

## 1. Intake
- [ ] Open an intake ticket with the fields from the intake template.
- [ ] Score the six inputs with the wording in Appendix B: 1 to 5 for five of them and 0 to 5 for telemetry readiness. Write one evidence line for each.
- [ ] Run the scorer, or paste the numbers into the backlog scorer to see where the candidate lands.
- Done when: 6 scores, each with an evidence line, and 1 computed score
- If it can't be met: A candidate whose scores can't be evidenced stays at intake, and the missing evidence becomes a question for the next intake meeting. A candidate with telemetry readiness 0 is blocked, and its log source request goes to the platform owner.

## 2. Hypothesis
- [ ] Write one sentence: when an attacker does X, log source Y records Z. It opens the Strategy Abstract section of ads.md.
- [ ] Name the log source the detection will read. It goes in the first sentence of Strategy Abstract with the hypothesis.
- [ ] Name one thing the detection misses, in the Blind Spots and Assumptions section.
- [ ] Write the Goal and Categorization sections, so ads.md carries all four hypothesis sections.
- [ ] Set the stage in score.yml to hypothesis, then run lint. It checks for a Hypothesis: line and a Log source: line in Strategy Abstract, and for something written under Blind Spots and Assumptions.
- Done when: 1 hypothesis sentence, 1 named log source, 1 named blind spot
- If it can't be met: If no log source you collect records the behavior, the candidate goes back to intake with telemetry readiness 0 and a log source request. If the only hypothesis anyone can write names one tool's fingerprint, rescore its robustness at intake before going on.

## 3. Research
- [ ] Run the behavior in a lab. An Atomic Red Team test covers many endpoint techniques; cloud and identity techniques need a planned emulation.
- [ ] Save the events as fixtures: one the detection must match and one it must ignore. Give each a fixture_source naming the run tag or query it came from, and name the same tag or query in the Technical Context.
- [ ] Read every field name you'll use from a real event.
- [ ] Write the Technical Context section of ads.md from what the run showed: why the behavior looks like this and what normal traffic in it looks like. Add the four lines lint reads: Plan approved by, Run tag, Baseline (the query, its time range, and its count), and Teardown verified.
- [ ] Count how often the behavior happens normally over 7 days of production data. That count sets the alert volume threshold on the record: 1.5 x 7 x the daily count, never under 3.
- [ ] Tear the lab down and confirm nothing is left behind.
- [ ] Set the stage in score.yml to research, then run lint.
- Done when: 1 emulation run, fixtures saved, every field checked against a real event, 7 days of baseline counts, lab torn down
- If it can't be met: If the events never reach the SIEM, or a field the rule needs arrives unparsed, the candidate goes back to intake with its telemetry readiness lowered and a log source request. If the 7-day count shows the behavior is routine here, rewrite the hypothesis before building anything.

## 4. Build
- [ ] Write rule.yml in Sigma.
- [ ] Complete ads.md: all 10 ADS headings plus an empty Retirement record, because lint fails on a missing heading. Hypothesis and research wrote five sections. Add False Positives, Validation, Priority, Response, and Additional Resources, and fill every section before review.
- [ ] Add the fixtures to tests/.
- [ ] Write the converted queries with python tools/convert.py --update-golden DET-NNNN. The conversion check compares against them from now on, and the reviewer approves them at validate.
- [ ] Set the stage in score.yml to build and the status in rule.yml to experimental, then run lint and the conversion check.
- Done when: lint passes, 1 conversion per target, 1 event it must match, 1 event it must ignore
- If it can't be met: If a target can't express the rule, mark that target convert-only in targets.yml and say so in the record. If Sigma can't express it at all, as with a correlation across events, write it as a query file beside the same record and fixtures, and review that file directly.

## 5. Validate
- [ ] Set the stage in score.yml to validate and the status in rule.yml to test. Lint now wants every section but the retirement record written, and numbered steps under Response.
- [ ] If the rule changed since build, run python tools/convert.py --update-golden DET-NNNN again, so the pull request carries the queries the reviewer approves.
- [ ] Replay the fixtures on every replay engine in targets.yml.
- [ ] Open a pull request with the review checklist.
- [ ] Ask a second engineer to review the record first, then the query, and approve.
- Done when: fixtures pass on every replay engine, every converted query approved (matching its approved copy on a re-validation), 1 approval by someone other than the author (one-person team: the author after 24 hours)
- If it can't be met: If a fixture fails or the reviewer asks for changes, the pull request goes back to build and stays open. If the reviewer rejects the hypothesis itself, the detection goes back to hypothesis.

## 6. Deploy
- [ ] Merge the pull request that sets the stage to deploy. The lead approves the deploy run, which packages the detection with alerting off. The kit's vetting and install steps are placeholders, so fill them in for your Splunk stack before the first deploy.
- [ ] Leave it running for 7 days and watch the alert count against the threshold on the record. If the count goes over, it stays at deploy with alerting off; fix it in a pull request that goes back through validate, and the 7 days start again from that merge.
- [ ] After 7 days at or under the threshold, open a pull request that moves the stage to tune. Its promotion check counts the 7 days again, and merging it switches alerting on.
- Done when: 7 days live with alerting off, alert volume at or under its threshold, then alerting on
- If it can't be met: If the first 7 days run over the threshold, alerting stays off and the detection stays at deploy. The fix is a pull request that goes back through validate, and the 7 days start again from its merge. If they return nothing though research counted the behavior, check the fields and the index against a real event.

## 7. Tune
- [ ] Check precision every 30 days against the detection's floor.
- [ ] Tune in a pull request that adds the exclusion as a filter_ selection in rule.yml, which the core lock allows, and names it. Record the value in variables.yml in the same pull request, because no tool substitutes it yet.
- [ ] Send every tuning change back through validate. A change to the query is counted over the last 7 days before it merges.
- [ ] When an incident or an exercise shows the detection missed something, add the missed events as a positive fixture and fix the rule in the same pull request. The fixture's source is the incident or exercise id, which the Validation section names.
- Done when: precision checked every 30 days, running query matches the approved copy at each check
- If it can't be met: If precision stays under the floor for two 30-day periods in a row, propose retirement. If an incident or an exercise shows the detection missed what it claims to catch, fix this detection. The missed events become a positive fixture, and the change goes back through validate and its 7-day count.

## 8. Retire
- [ ] Retire when a retirement trigger fires, and record the numbers behind it.
- [ ] Set the stage in score.yml to retire and the status in rule.yml to deprecated, and keep the record. The lead switches alerting off.
- [ ] Write the Retirement record section, and add retired.date to score.yml. If the technique still matters, open its replacement at intake and name it in retired.replacement_id.
- Done when: status deprecated, alerting off, record kept, retirement note written, replacement linked if one exists
- If it can't be met: A retirement is not undone. If the technique still matters, the replacement is a new detection at intake with a link to the retirement note.
```


---

## Prioritization

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/prioritization/

Section 6

A backlog score decides what earns engineering time next. It blocks candidates that cannot be built, penalizes ones that cost many build hours or analyst minutes, and discounts ideas that duplicate live coverage.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Score a backlog](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/)

Remember

- Every number in a score needs an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) a reviewer can check.
- Never type a score by hand. The scorer writes it, and CI fails any score that disagrees with the formula.
- A [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) of 0 blocks the candidate, and you fix that with a log source request.
- [Mandates](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mandate) due within 90 days go first, in order of due date.
- Scores in the same 0.2 band count as tied, and the cheaper detection goes first.
- A candidate the live set already covers scores half, unless it catches a variant the live detection misses.
- Publish the weights, so everyone can see why the backlog is in its order.

### 6.1 The inputs

| Input | Scale | Question |
| --- | --- | --- |
| threat_relevance (T) | 1 to 5 | How recently, and how close to you, has this technique been used? |
| impact (I) | 1 to 5 | What does the attacker reach if the technique succeeds? |
| [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) (B) | 1 to 5 | How hard is it for an attacker to slip past this detection using the data you have? Score it with the five [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) levels: 1 matches something the attacker can change in seconds, 5 matches something the technique cannot work without. |
| telemetry_readiness (R) | 0 to 5 | Is the data this detection needs already in the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem), and in good enough shape to use? |
| build_effort (E) | 1 to 5 | How many hours of work from writing the hypothesis to passing validation? |
| run_cost (C) | 1 to 5 | How many analyst minutes a day will this detection consume? Expected alerts per day multiplied by the typical minutes to [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) one. For a detection that runs as scheduled SQL, add the warehouse compute it burns, converted the same way your finance team converts it. |

[Appendix B](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/b/) has the wording for every level of every input.

Each input comes with one line saying where its number came from: an incident id, a report section, a query, or a ticket. CI rejects a record missing any of them.

### 6.2 The formula

```
value = wT·T + wI·I + wB·B
cost = wE·E + wC·C
score = (value / cost) × (R / 5)^k × M
```

A readiness of 0 sets the score to 0 and marks the detection blocked. M is the [marginal coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-marginal-coverage) factor from section 6.3. Scores round to two decimals. With every weight at 1 and k = 1, scores run from 0.06 to 7.50. The shape comes from Weighted Shortest Job First in SAFe, which divides value by size. I added readiness as a factor because you can't build anything on missing telemetry, and the marginal factor so a detection is scored on the coverage it contributes. The 0.8 and 0.5 behind that factor are defaults I chose so a stronger replacement still outranks most new work and a duplicate falls below it. Nothing derives them. If your program disputes them, change them in score.py and say why in the pull request.

Six one-to-five judgments carry noise, so the order sorts scores into fixed bands 0.2 wide (2.40 to 2.59, 2.60 to 2.79, and so on). The width is a chosen default until a team measures how far its scorers disagree. Scores in one band count as tied, and the one with the lower [run cost](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) goes first. The band is the rule, so two scores on either side of a band edge are ordered even when they differ by less than 0.2.

### 6.3 Additions to an existing program

Scored one at a time, the eighth detection for a covered technique scores the same as the first for an uncovered one. The marginal coverage factor fixes that by scoring a detection on what it adds to what already fires.

| It comes back | Factor | When | What to do about it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| first | ×1.0 | No live detection names this technique. | Full value. This is coverage the program lacks. |
| stronger | ×0.8 | The technique has a live detection, and this candidate scores higher on robustness than the best one live. | Most of the value. It replaces something brittle, so plan the retirement of what it supersedes in the same change. |
| equal | ×0.5 | A live detection already covers the technique at the same robustness level or higher. | Half. Build it only if it catches a variant the live one misses, and say which variant in the hypothesis. |

The pipeline computes it from the live set, comparing [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) technique and robustness level. It is written into the record like the score; a hand-typed value fails the build. With no live set to compare against, every candidate counts as first.

A candidate that comes back stronger ships in the same change as the retirement of what it supersedes, because leaving both live doubles the alerts for one technique. A candidate that comes back equal is a duplicate until somebody writes down the variant it catches that the live one misses. If the hypothesis can't name that variant, close the candidate.

### 6.4 Presets

| Preset | Change | Use when | Where it goes wrong |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| balanced | none | The default. One score for the whole backlog. | Only as good as the six numbers, so every number needs its evidence line. |
| threat_led | wT=2 | You have your own incident history or strong reporting about your sector. | Ranks by what attackers do, so it can pull effort toward techniques your logs can't see yet. |
| asset_led | wI=2 | You know which systems matter most and how an attacker would reach them. | Only works with a current asset inventory. |
| telemetry_led | k=2 | A new program that needs early wins from the data already in the SIEM. | Favors what your logs already show and can leave the biggest threats uncovered. |

A detection required by a regulation or an audit carries a mandate with the framework, the requirement number, and a due date. If the due date is within 90 days, it goes to the front of the queue, ordered by date. Everything else is ordered by score, highest first; ties go to the detection with the lower run cost. A mandated candidate with telemetry readiness 0 is still blocked; the mandate moves its log source request to the front of that list instead. Mandated detections come with budgets and deadlines of their own.

### 6.5 A worked example

DET-0001, Kerberoasting (T1558.003), scores 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 2 on the balanced preset: value 12, cost 4, scaled by 4/5, score 2.40. DET-0002, a scheduled task created by a non-admin user, scores 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 4: value 8, cost 6, scaled by 3/5, score 0.80. The gap comes from run cost and readiness. Under threat_led the two score 3.20 and 1.10; under telemetry_led, 1.92 and 0.48. The order doesn't change under any of the three.

### 6.6 The floor, and when a detection has to go

A detection's floor is its typical triage minutes divided by the program cap on analyst minutes per [true positive](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive). The cap is 120 by default. A detection that takes 30 minutes to triage must be right at least 25% of the time; one that takes 6 minutes, 5%.

Any one of these triggers proposes retirement, and the lead makes the call:

1. Its true-positive share stayed below its floor for two 30-day periods in a row.
2. It fired at least 10 times in 180 days and was never right.
3. The log source it needs has been missing for 30 days straight, so its readiness fell to 0. Suspend it with alerting off and raise a log source request, and retire it only if the source owner declines to restore the source.
4. The technique or the system it protects is gone, for example because the platform was decommissioned.
5. Another live detection covers the same technique at an equal or higher robustness level and catches everything this one catches. Retire the weaker one in the same change that ships the stronger one.

A detection that hasn't fired at all in 365 days gets a review before anyone retires it, because either its data stopped or its hypothesis was wrong.


---

## Worked examples

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/worked-examples/

Section 7

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Score a backlog](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/)

Remember

- Work a score in order: value, cost, their ratio, the readiness factor, then [marginal coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-marginal-coverage).
- A cheap detection still loses when an attacker can evade it by renaming a tool.
- Retire a detection when a trigger fires, and write the retirement note before you switch it off.

The examples below take DET-0001 to DET-0005 through the decisions one at a time. DET-0101, the password spray detection whose record is on the site, appears only in the ordered backlog. The environment details are illustrative, and the repository's own scorer computes every number when this paper is generated, so the numbers can't drift from the code.

### 7.1 Scoring one candidate

DET-0001 detects Kerberoasting ([ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) T1558.003). Each of its scores answers one question and carries one line of evidence. The [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) makes the score arguable, because a reviewer can dispute its source.

| Input | Score | The question it answers | The evidence line on the record |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| threat relevance (T) | 4 | How recently, and how close to you, has this technique been used? | sector ISAC report, Q2 2026, [section 3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/) |
| impact (I) | 4 | What does the attacker reach if the technique succeeds? | service account escalation path to tier-0 |
| [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) (B) | 4 | How hard is it for an attacker to slip past this detection using the data you have? Score it with the five [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) levels: 1 matches something the attacker can change in seconds, 5 matches something the technique cannot work without. | event 4769, RC4 ticket encryption, non-machine account |
| [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) (R) | 4 | Is the data this detection needs already in the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem), and in good enough shape to use? | DC security logs parsed, no enrichment |
| build effort (E) | 2 | How many hours of work from writing the hypothesis to passing validation? | 6 hours, comparable to DET-0007 |
| [run cost](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) (C) | 2 | How many analyst minutes a day will this detection consume? Expected alerts per day multiplied by the typical minutes to [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) one. For a detection that runs as scheduled SQL, add the warehouse compute it burns, converted the same way your finance team converts it. | 10 analyst minutes per day, estimated before any 7-day count |

On the balanced preset, where every weight is 1, the arithmetic goes like this:

1. Add the value side. value = 4 + 4 + 4 = 12.
2. Add the cost side. cost = 2 + 2 = 4.
3. Divide value by cost. 12 / 4 = 3.00.
4. Apply the readiness factor. Readiness is 4 out of 5, so the factor is (4/5) = 0.80. 3.00 × 0.80 = 2.40.

A score of 2.40 only means something when you compare it with the rest of the backlog. On the balanced preset, scores run from 0.06 to 7.50, and the median of the six example records in this section is 1.50. This candidate sits above the middle, so it's worth building before most of what's waiting. The scorer writes the score into the record, and CI fails a score typed in by hand.

### 7.2 Two candidates in a different order

DET-0002 detects a scheduled task created by a non-administrator (T1053.005). It's a reasonable detection, and it still ranks below DET-0001 for three reasons: a smaller value side, a higher run cost, and lower readiness.

| Input | DET-0001 Kerberoasting | DET-0002 Scheduled task |
| --- | --- | --- |
| threat relevance (T) | 4 | 3 |
| impact (I) | 4 | 2 |
| robustness (B) | 4 | 3 |
| telemetry readiness (R) | 4 | 3 |
| build effort (E) | 2 | 2 |
| run cost (C) | 2 | 4 |
| value | 12 | 8 |
| cost | 4 | 6 |
| score | 2.40 | 0.80 |

1. Add the value side. value = 3 + 2 + 3 = 8.
2. Add the cost side. cost = 2 + 4 = 6.
3. Divide value by cost. 8 / 6 = 1.33.
4. Apply the readiness factor. Readiness is 3 out of 5, so the factor is (3/5) = 0.60. 1.33 × 0.60 = 0.80.

Run cost and readiness make most of the gap. The run cost evidence on DET-0002 reads "80 analyst minutes per day", which scores 4; on DET-0001 it reads "10 analyst minutes per day, estimated before any 7-day count", which scores 2. Both are built on parsed logs, but DET-0001's source is the better prepared of the two.

Changing the weights doesn't rescue it. Each preset leans the score a different way, and the order stays the same under every one:

| Preset | DET-0001 | DET-0002 | Order |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| balanced | 2.40 | 0.80 | unchanged |
| threat_led | 3.20 | 1.10 | unchanged |
| asset_led | 3.20 | 1.00 | unchanged |
| telemetry_led | 1.92 | 0.48 | unchanged |

That's why I wrote the weights down. When somebody argues for a different lean, you change one number and the backlog re-sorts in front of them.

### 7.3 A candidate the score blocks

DET-0004 detects a program download to a PLC from an engineering workstation (ATT&CK for ICS T0843). It's the highest-value candidate in the sample: impact 5, robustness 5, threat relevance 4. Its value side adds to 14, the highest in the sample, and it scores 0.00.

Telemetry readiness is 0: no OT network monitoring log source ingested. A readiness of 0 sets the score to zero and marks the record blocked. A detection can't alert on telemetry nobody collects, so the work item becomes a log source onboarding ticket. You argue for it as an onboarding ticket, with the detection attached as the reason.

Once you ingest and parse the log source, readiness moves to 4. The same value and the same cost (build effort 5, run cost 1) give 14 / 6 × 0.80 = 1.87, third by score in this backlog. Nothing else about the candidate changed.

### 7.4 A candidate the live set already covers

DET-0005 detects the same Kerberoasting technique as DET-0001, by matching the name of the tool that requests the ticket. It's cheap, at two hours to build and four analyst minutes a day. On its inputs alone it scores 3.60, better than DET-0001, because it costs so little.

| Input | Score | The evidence line on the record |
| --- | --- | --- |
| threat relevance (T) | 4 | same sector ISAC report as DET-0001, Q2 2026, [section 3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/) |
| impact (I) | 4 | service account escalation path to tier-0, same as DET-0001 |
| robustness (B) | 1 | matches the requesting process name, a filename the attacker renames in seconds (Summiting level 1) |
| telemetry readiness (R) | 4 | DC security logs parsed, no enrichment |
| build effort (E) | 1 | 2 hours, the query is a filter on an existing search |
| run cost (C) | 1 | 4 analyst minutes per day from the 7-day baseline |

The record is scored for the day DET-0001 goes live, because that's when the comparison matters. In the example set no live record covers T1558.003 yet, because DET-0001 is still at build, so DET-0005's record carries the marginal state by hand. In a repository with a live set the pipeline compares the candidate against it, finds T1558.003 covered at robustness 4 against this candidate's 1, and marks it equal. That halves its score to 1.80. A low cost doesn't make up for low robustness. If an attacker renames the binary, this detection is worth nothing, while the behavioral detection that's already live keeps firing.

The marginal factor is there for this case. Without it, a backlog fills up with cheap variants of what already works. Each one scores well on its own, and the coverage chart climbs while nothing new gets detected.

That doesn't make the candidate automatically wrong. If somebody can write down a variant this one catches and DET-0001 misses, it earns its place at half score. If nobody can, close it.

### 7.5 A detection somebody else's deadline decides

DET-0003 detects an administrator logging in to the cardholder database outside a change window. On the numbers it scores 1.20, mid-table. It still goes first, because it carries a [mandate](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mandate): PCI DSS 4.0, requirement 10.4.1, due 2026-11-30. Measured from 2026-09-19, the as-of date the example is computed on, that's 72 days away, inside the 90-day window, so it sorts to the front by due date.

The scorer orders the whole six-record backlog like this. Live records stay in the list so every candidate is compared against the same set:

| Order | Id | Detection | Score | Status | Why it sits there |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | DET-0003 | PCI cardholder DB admin login outside change window | 1.20 | mandated | mandate due 2026-11-30 |
| 2 | DET-0101 | Password spray against Entra ID sign-in | 2.60 | in_progress | by score |
| 3 | DET-0001 | Kerberoasting | 2.40 | in_progress | by score |
| 4 | DET-0005 | Kerberoasting, RC4 ticket request by a known tool name | 1.80 | scored | by score |
| 5 | DET-0002 | New scheduled task by non-admin user | 0.80 | live | by score |
| 6 | DET-0004 | OT engineering workstation PLC program download | 0.00 | blocked | readiness 0 |

Keep mandated work in the same backlog with its reason recorded, so the time it takes shows up in the same place as everything else.

### 7.6 Retiring a detection

Retirement is arithmetic, then a check against the triggers. The figures in the two cases below are illustrative inputs, so use the method with your own measurements.

Measure the detection over 30 days: how many alerts it raised, how many were [true positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive), and how many minutes a typical triage took. Its floor is the triage minutes divided by the cap on analyst minutes per true positive, 120 by default. Compare [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) with the floor in two consecutive 30-day windows. One window below the floor triggers nothing, and two in a row is a retirement trigger.

| Case | Alerts, 30 days | True positives | Precision | Triage mins | Its floor | Mins per true positive | Verdict |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Keeps its place | 60 | 22 | 36.7% | 25 | 20.8% | 68 min | clears the floor |
| Retires | 900 | 27 | 3.0% | 14 | 11.7% | 467 min | below the floor, second window in a row |

The detection that stays is expensive per alert and still clears its floor. Its 60 alerts for 22 real findings cost 1500 analyst minutes, about 68 minutes per true positive and inside the 120-minute cap. The detection that retires is cheap per alert and costly in total. Its 900 alerts at 14 minutes each come to 12,600 minutes, or 210 analyst hours for 27 findings.

Then check the triggers. Any one of them proposes retirement:

1. Its true-positive share stayed below its floor for two 30-day periods in a row.
2. It fired at least 10 times in 180 days and was never right.
3. The log source it needs has been missing for 30 days straight, so its readiness fell to 0. Suspend it with alerting off and raise a log source request, and retire it only if the source owner declines to restore the source.
4. The technique or the system it protects is gone, for example because the platform was decommissioned.
5. Another live detection covers the same technique at an equal or higher robustness level and catches everything this one catches. Retire the weaker one in the same change that ships the stronger one.

When one fires, decide between [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) and retiring. Tune when the noise has one identifiable source you can exclude without losing the behavior, such as a service account, a backup window, or a scanner. Retire when the only way to quiet it is to narrow it until it no longer detects the thing it was written for. If you can't say which exclusion would fix it, you're retiring it.

To retire it, set the [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) status to deprecated, disable the alert action, and keep the record and its history. Write a note saying which trigger fired and what you measured. If the technique still matters, its replacement enters intake with a link back to that note. That's the second loop in the lifecycle.

A detection that hasn't fired at all in 365 days gets a review before anyone retires it, because either its data stopped or its hypothesis was wrong. The silence alert on its log source tells you which.


---

## Emulation

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/emulation/

Section 8

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Remember

- Write the plan and get a second person's approval before you provision anything.
- Start from a believable [foothold](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-foothold), with only the permissions an attacker would have at that point.
- Read field names from the raw event, because a field name taken from memory produces a detection that never fires.
- Never write a [fixture](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) by hand. Save each one from an [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) run, a research query, or an incident's missed events, and scrub credentials, tokens, and personal data out of it before you commit it.
- Record missing or late telemetry as a finding, and turn it into a log source request.
- Tag every resource and identity with the [run tag](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-tag). Destroy attacker-created leftovers before you tear down the provisioned infrastructure.
- In a cloud sandbox, Stratus Red Team marks every call with its run's uuid. Filter the telemetry by the mark, and never write the rule on it.

Emulation is how a detection gets its events. On an endpoint you can often detonate a sample and read the log. In cloud, SaaS, and identity there's no sample. You model the victim environment and the starting identity, provision a lab, run the behavior from that identity, and read what landed in the logs.

The research stage produces the fixtures you test a detection against and the field names you write it from. Both come out of an emulation run. For most endpoint techniques a scripted test does the job, and Atomic Red Team, from Red Canary, has one for many [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) techniques. Cloud, SaaS, and identity techniques usually need the planned run described below.

### 8.1 Starting a run

| Mode | The question it answers | What you start from | What to watch |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Intelligence-driven | Can the behavior described in public research be reproduced? | A report, advisory, campaign writeup, or a CTID emulation plan | Stay faithful to the source. Don't invent victim details that make the run easier. |
| Detection-driven | Does a live detection fire on the behavior it claims to catch? | An existing detection | The detection names the API calls and fields. You infer identity, permissions, and environment, so flag those as assumptions. |
| Coverage-driven | Which techniques have no detection today? | An ATT&CK technique or log source gap | The gap goes straight to intake as a candidate. |
| Hypothesis-driven | Could an adversary realistically abuse this service or permission? | A threat model of a service or an IAM pattern | This start needs the most judgment. Model what an adversary would do from a stolen identity. |

### 8.2 Scope

| Scope | What it covers | Effort | Use it for |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Atomic | One technique, one signal question. | Hours | Proving a single call lands in the log with the fields you expect. |
| Micro | Two or three chained behaviors, for example discover, stage, exfiltrate. | Days | Detections that depend on sequence or on an artifact an earlier step creates. |
| Full | End to end, across planes and surfaces. | Weeks | Reproducing a published campaign, or testing a whole tactic chain before a board-level claim. |

The lifecycle is the same at every scope. Scope changes the source material and how much of the victim environment has to be real.

### 8.3 Plan before you provision

Answer these, then get a second person to approve them:

1. State the objective, and what the source says and leaves out.
2. Describe the threat model: what the adversary is trying to achieve.
3. Describe the victim model, with its resources, controls, identities, and network paths.
4. Name the starting identity, and what the attacker has to earn later.
5. Write the operational flow: each call, its actor, its target, the expected result, and the log it should land in.
6. Estimate the cost if metered services are involved.
7. Name the second person who will approve the plan before anything is provisioned.

Keep the plan with the detection, because it records why you ran each command.

### 8.4 Keep the run realistic

- Start from the lowest privilege the hypothesis assumes: stolen long-term credentials, an assumed role, or compromised compute. An admin session is a believable start only for a hypothesis that begins with one, and the record has to say that.
- Use only the permissions that stage would have. Granting AdministratorAccess to make the run succeed invalidates the telemetry.
- Respect dependencies. Earlier actions enable later ones, and the artifacts they create are part of the trace.
- Keep the failures. A denied call during recon is often the exact event a detection should chase.
- No 0.0.0.0/0 ingress rules, even in a lab.
- Account for cloud timing. IAM is eventually consistent. Poll for readiness, and give logs a settle window before calling telemetry missing.

Give every run a unique tag, a name plus a short random id. Put it in resource names, identity names, and session names, so you can filter telemetry to the run and find leftovers during teardown. A resource tag alone won't appear in an ARN.

### 8.5 Verify the telemetry

1. Decide before the run which log should capture each step, and confirm that log is switched on. Data-access logging often ships off.
2. Open the raw event and read the field names from it. Names taken from memory or documentation are often wrong, and then the detection can't fire.
3. Look for what is late, partial, or absent as carefully as for what arrived.
4. Ask the last question: does this data distinguish the attacker from normal activity?

A technique that leaves no useful trace is still a result, so record it. Score the candidate readiness 0 and turn it into a logging request.

### 8.6 Test coverage against the exercise

Replay the run's events against the detections you already have, and read what fires and why:

| Outcome | What it means | What to do |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Fires for the right reason | The detection matched the behavior it was written for. | Nothing. Record the run id in the detection's Validation section. |
| Fires on a different link in the chain | Something alerted, but on a different step. | Decide which step you meant to catch. The gap may still be open. |
| A different detection fires by accident | Coverage that depends on a detail the attacker can change. | Treat as uncovered. Score the candidate. |
| A mapped detection never touches this telemetry | [Inventory coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-inventory-coverage). The heatmap is green and the log is silent. | Retire or rewrite the detection. |

The most expensive outcome is a mapped detection that never touches the telemetry it claims to cover, because it was counted as coverage and passed an audit.

Not every gap becomes a detection. Pick the response that fits:

- Write a new detection.
- Tune an existing one, naming the exclusion.
- Request a logging change, because the data is absent or partial.
- Hunt, because the behavior is too rare or too variable to alert on.
- Run a wider emulation, because the question is still open.

### 8.7 Teardown, and the run report

1. Treat the lab as a state machine. Don't redeploy on top of a half-dead environment.
2. Destroy attacker-created leftovers first: backdoor identities, keys, grants, topics. Infrastructure as code doesn't know about them.
3. Then destroy what the code provisioned.
4. Turn off any logging that was enabled only for the run.
5. Verify the teardown by run tag, and let the check fail loudly.

Write the run up as a short engagement report:

- Objective, scope, and source material
- Threat model and ATT&CK mapping
- Victim model and assumptions, each with the date it was true
- Operational flow: action, API call, identity, result
- Observations, including denials and identity progression
- Telemetry that appeared, and telemetry that did not
- Coverage outcome per detection that fired
- Infrastructure summary and teardown status
- Recommendation: new detection, tune, logging change, hunt, or more research

Date the environmental claims. When a detection gets noisy six months later, somebody will ask what normal meant when you wrote it. If nobody can answer, the comfortable move is to raise the threshold until it goes quiet.

### 8.8 Automation

Automate:

- Drafting the threat and victim model from a source
- Provisioning and tagging
- Executing with the right identity
- Tracking orphans
- Checking fields against real events
- Searching existing coverage
- Writing the run up and verifying teardown

Keep with the engineer:

- Whether the scenario is realistic
- Whether the assumptions are true
- Whether existing coverage is equivalent
- Whether the behavior is worth detecting at all

Adapted from Elastic Security Labs, "Cloud Threat Emulation on Autopilot: Context is Everything", Terrance DeJesus and Bryan Porras Blanch, 21 September 2026. The plan-first shape comes from the MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense Adversary Emulation Library.

### 8.9 Practical emulation in the cloud with Stratus Red Team

Stratus Red Team, from Datadog, is Atomic Red Team for the cloud. It is one Go binary, under the Apache 2.0 license, that carries its attack techniques. Each is one step an attacker has been documented taking, with its prerequisites, its detonation, and its cleanup. In this lifecycle a technique is an atomic run (8.2), and it fits the detection-driven and coverage-driven starts (8.1). Its warm-up provisions, so the plan of 8.3 and its second approver come first, as for any run.

At commit df3316f of 2026-11-04 it carried 103 techniques: 46 for AWS, 25 for GCP, 15 for Azure, 8 for Kubernetes, 7 for Entra ID, 2 for EKS. Every technique names its ATT&CK tactic, and 16 also name an ATT&CK technique id. 89 provision prerequisites with Terraform, 61 can revert their detonation, and 36 ship with a detonation log, a real event from one of the project's runs. The catalog those counts come from is published beside this site as emulation/stratus.json, and the weekly library job rereads it from the source.

One command set covers six platforms. A team with an AWS account, an Azure subscription, and a Kubernetes cluster runs the same research stage on each, with the same record lines and the same teardown check. What changes per platform is how you authenticate, which log receives the detonation, the field that names the action, and where the run's mark lands.

| Platform | Techniques | You authenticate with | The detonation lands in | The field that names the action | Where the run's mark lands |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| AWS | 46 | AWS credentials in the environment or a profile, for example through aws-vault | CloudTrail | eventSource and eventName | userAgent, as stratus-red-team_ followed by the run's uuid, on the warm-up's Terraform calls and the detonation alike. Resource names carry the uuid's first 8 characters, and every Terraform resource is tagged StratusRedTeam. |
| GCP | 25 | gcloud auth application-default login, and GOOGLE_PROJECT | Cloud Audit Logs, Admin Activity | protoPayload.methodName | requestMetadata.callerSuppliedUserAgent, with the same prefix and uuid. Resource names carry the short id. |
| Azure | 15 | az login, and AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID | The Activity Log | operationName.value | The SDK sends the uuid as its application id, and the Activity Log records no user agent. The run's resource group and resource names carry the short id, and they are the mark. |
| Entra ID | 7 | az login | Entra ID audit logs | The activity type, such as Add application | As for Azure. The applications, credentials, and users the run creates carry the tool's name or the short id in their display names. |
| Kubernetes | 8 | The current kubectl context; the tool does not create a cluster | The API server audit log | verb and objectRef.resource | userAgent, with the same prefix and uuid. The names of the pods, roles, and bindings carry the short id. |
| EKS | 2 | AWS credentials and the cluster's kubeconfig; the tool refuses a cluster that is not EKS | The control plane audit log, in CloudWatch, once audit logging is switched on | As for Kubernetes | As for Kubernetes. |

The run, step by step, on one AWS technique. Each step names the command and the line of the record it fills.

| Step | Command | What happens | What the record gets |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Choose | `stratus list --platform aws` | The list has one platform's techniques with their tactics, and stratus show prints a technique's warm-up and detonation as steps. For an AWS technique with a published detonation log, read the log first. The field names then come from a real event before anything is provisioned. | The technique id, and the field names, in the Technical Context. |
| Plan | | The plan of 8.3, with the technique's warm-up and detonation as its operational flow. The tool runs as the identity you authenticate, so that identity is the starting identity, with the permissions the hypothesis assumes and no more. A second person approves. | Plan approved by: who, and when. |
| Set the run tag | `export STRATUS_RED_TEAM_CORRELATION_ID=$(uuidgen)` | The tool makes a uuid for every run and puts it in the mark. Setting it yourself records it before the run, and keeps the run's state apart from another run of the same technique. | Run tag: the uuid. |
| Warm up | `stratus warmup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-stop` | Terraform creates the prerequisites, named with the tool's prefix and the short id. Nothing attacks yet, and stratus status reads WARM. | Nothing yet. |
| Detonate | `stratus detonate aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-stop` | The technique's calls run as the authenticated identity, each with the mark. Give the log its settle window before calling telemetry missing; CloudTrail delivers in minutes. | The time of the detonation. |
| Read the events | `a query on the log for the mark, in the run's window` | Open the raw events and read the field names from them. The detonation's events are the positive fixtures. The warm-up's calls carry the same mark and make the first negative fixtures: the same identity and window, a different action. | Fixtures in tests/events.jsonl, scrubbed of account ids, principals, and addresses, each with the run's uuid as its fixture_source. |
| Revert, then clean up | `stratus revert aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-stop && stratus cleanup aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-stop` | Revert undoes the detonation's side effect where it has one. Cleanup destroys the prerequisites, and cleanup with --all cleans every technique that can be cleaned. | Nothing. |
| Verify the teardown | `stratus status, then the same query after the cleanup` | Status must read COLD. The log must show the deletes with the mark, and a search by the short id and the StratusRedTeam tag must return nothing. | Teardown verified: the date, and the query that returned nothing. |

The event a rule is written from, as the project published it for aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-stop, with the account, key, principal, user, and address scrubbed the way a fixture is before it is committed:

```
{
 "eventSource": "cloudtrail.amazonaws.com",
 "eventName": "StopLogging",
 "eventTime": "2024-07-31T13:06:24Z",
 "eventType": "AwsApiCall",
 "awsRegion": "<region>",
 "readOnly": false,
 "requestParameters": {"name": "stratus-red-team-ct-stop-trail-buykxbqejv"},
 "responseElements": null,
 "sourceIPAddress": "<address>",
 "userAgent": "stratus-red-team_c97089f1-1ae3-4ecc-b006-f5e8fd0f2571",
 "userIdentity": {
 "type": "IAMUser",
 "arn": "arn:aws:iam::<account>:user/<user>",
 "accountId": "<account>",
 "accessKeyId": "<key>",
 "principalId": "<principal>",
 "userName": "<user>"
 }
}
```

The rule is written on eventSource and eventName, and on nothing the run put there. The trail name and the user agent are the run's, and a rule that matched on either would fire on nothing real. The kit's lint fails such a rule.

The four lines the record's Technical Context needs after such a run, with made-up names:

```
Plan approved by: R. Second, 2026-10-16, for aws.defense-evasion.cloudtrail-stop in the sandbox account, from an IAM user with cloudtrail:StopLogging and nothing wider.
Run tag: 6c1f0a2e-7b3d-4c58-9e21-5f0d8a7b4c13. Resources stratus-red-team-ct-stop-6c1f0a2e-*; the mark is stratus-red-team_6c1f0a2e-7b3d-4c58-9e21-5f0d8a7b4c13 in userAgent.
Baseline: StopLogging events in production CloudTrail, 2026-10-09 to 2026-10-15: 0 rows.
Teardown verified: 2026-10-16. stratus status reads COLD; DeleteTrail and DeleteBucket were seen with the mark; a search for the short id and the StratusRedTeam tag returned nothing.
```

What the tool leaves to you:

- Point it at a sandbox account, subscription, project, or cluster, and never at production. Its own documentation says so, and the plan's approver is the person who checks the account id in the plan.
- Never write the rule on the mark. The kit's lint fails a rule whose values contain the tool's mark or the record's run tag, because such a rule fires on nothing real.
- Pick the identity. The tool runs as whoever you authenticated, and 8.4 says that is the lowest privilege the hypothesis assumes. The record names the identity and its permissions.
- Detonate once unless the technique is idempotent. 59 of the 103 techniques can be detonated again without a revert. The rest need stratus revert first, and --force on one that has a side effect leaves two side effects to clean.
- The published detonation logs are the project's, from its own runs, and for AWS only. They give you the field names early. The fixture still comes from your run, in your tenant, with your identity.
- The list is the tool's. A technique it lacks still goes through the planned run of 8.3, or becomes a contribution to the tool.
- The warm-up has a bill. Some techniques launch instances or create a cluster's worth of resources, so the plan's cost estimate covers the warm-up as well as the detonation.
- A config file at ~/.stratus-red-team/config.yaml adds a prefix and tags to the AWS resources, so teams sharing a sandbox can tell their runs apart.

No technique has been detonated from this repository. The commands and flags here were run offline against a binary built from the source: list, show, and each command's help. The fields and the marks come from the source and from the published detonation logs, and the outside checks page lists this as untested.

Next step [The emulation plan template](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/#emulation-plan)


---

## A detection record

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/example-record/

A detection record has a section for each thing a reviewer or responder needs: goal, categorization, strategy abstract, technical context, blind spots and assumptions, [false positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-false-positive), validation, priority, response, additional resources, and the retirement record. The two records below, one Windows and one cloud identity, show the shape in more than one domain. The format follows Palantir's Alerting and Detection Strategy.

Example Framework v0.136.0. DET-0001 lives at detections/DET-0001/ads.md in the repository. DET-0101 is at the Validate stage, scored at 2.60; only its record is published. Environment details in both are illustrative.

Remember

- Write four sections at hypothesis: goal, categorization, strategy abstract, and blind spots. You fill in the rest during research and build.
- In the blind spots section, name a specific case the detection misses.
- Write response steps that someone who has never seen the detection could follow at 3 a.m.
- Date each assumption about the environment, so a later reader knows what normal meant at the time.
- Put each exclusion in an allowlist with a ticket id, an owner, and an expiry date.

**DET-0001 Kerberoasting: RC4 service ticket request for a user account**

1

### Goal

What an alert from this means, in one sentence a responder can act on.

Catch an attacker collecting Kerberos service tickets for services that run under user accounts, so that the tickets can be cracked offline to recover the account passwords ([ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) T1558.003).

2

### Categorization

The ATT&CK technique, so coverage can be counted and duplicates found.

Credential Access. T1558.003, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting.

3

### Strategy Abstract

The logic in prose, so a reviewer can disagree without reading the query.

Hypothesis: when an attacker runs Kerberoasting, the domain controller writes event 4769 (a service ticket was requested). The event carries encryption type 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) and status 0x0 (success), for a service run by a person or a service account. The detection alerts on that combination and ignores computer accounts (names ending in $) and the krbtgt account. Log source: the Windows Security log on every domain controller, event 4769.

4

### Technical Context

Why the behavior looks like this, and what normal traffic in it looks like.

Any domain user can ask for a service ticket for any service in the domain. The ticket is encrypted with the service account's password hash, so if the ticket was issued with RC4, the attacker can guess passwords against it offline at high speed. Attackers ask for RC4 on purpose: AES tickets crack far more slowly. The 7-day count during research shows how many legitimate RC4 requests the environment still produces. Older applications, and accounts that never had "This account supports Kerberos AES" set, are the usual sources.

Plan approved by: nobody; no lab was provisioned. The [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) come from a public recording, OTRF Security-Datasets SDWIN-201022042947, in which PurpleSharp ran T1558.003 against a lab domain on 2020-10-22.
[Run tag](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-tag): SDWIN-201022042947. The recording's 17 event 4769 records are the run; 5 of them are RC4 requests for user-run services.
Baseline: not measured. The kit's example has no production environment to count. A team copying this detection counts 4769 events with encryption type 0x17 over 7 days of its own domain controllers before setting the threshold.
Teardown verified: not applicable; nothing was provisioned.

5

### Blind Spots and Assumptions

What this will miss. The section reviewers argue with.

1. Every domain controller has the "Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations" policy on, and its events reach the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem).
2. An attacker who accepts AES tickets and cracks them slowly is not seen by this detection.
3. A request handled by a domain controller whose logs are missing is not seen. DET-0000, the silence alert, is what catches the missing logs.

6

### False Positives

What fires it that is not an attack, and how the exclusion is made.

Older applications that still ask for RC4 tickets. After the 7-day count, exclude them by ServiceName in a pull request, never in the SIEM's interface.

7

### Validation

How somebody proves it fires, and where the fixtures live.

The fixtures in tests/events.jsonl are five real event 4769 records from the SDWIN-201022042947 recording: two RC4 requests for user-run services (sysmonsvc, nxlogsvc) the detection must catch, and three it must ignore (two machine accounts and krbtgt). The recording has no RC4 request for a machine account, so the machine-account filter is exercised only together with the AES filter. A request with both RC4 and a machine account would still be ignored, but no fixture proves it. CI replays them on the SQLite engine on every change and diffs every converted query against its approved copy. On 2026-10-15 the Splunk container and Kusto emulator adapters ran them end to end by hand and returned the same two events. This team deploys to Splunk and Sentinel, so those two jobs become required checks once they run in CI.

8

### Priority

The score and where the numbers behind it are recorded.

High. Scores 2.40 on the balanced preset; score.yml carries the six inputs and the note behind each one.

9

### Response

The ordered steps to take at three in the morning.

1. Find the requesting account (TargetUserName) and where the request came from (IpAddress).
2. List every ServiceName that account requested in the same hour.
3. Check the requesting account and machine against the allowlist of legacy applications before anything is reset.
4. Look at the requesting machine for the tool that made the request.
5. Change the passwords of the service accounts behind those services; move them to group managed service accounts where possible.

10

### Additional Resources

Where the claims above came from.

- ATT&CK T1558.003
- Microsoft audit policy: Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations

11

### Retirement record

Empty until it retires, then the trigger that fired and what was measured.

DET-0001 is at the build stage and has no retirement to record.

**DET-0101 Password spray against Entra ID sign-in**

1

##### Goal

What an alert from this means, in one sentence a responder can act on.

Catch an attacker trying a small number of common passwords against many Entra ID accounts from one source, so the attempt is stopped before a single account is taken (ATT&CK T1110.003).

2

##### Categorization

The ATT&CK technique, so coverage can be counted and duplicates found.

Credential Access. T1110.003, Brute Force: Password Spraying.

3

##### Strategy Abstract

The logic in prose, so a reviewer can disagree without reading the query.

Hypothesis: when an attacker sprays passwords at the tenant, the Entra ID sign-in log records many distinct principals failing from one source inside a short window. Sign-in logs record one row per authentication attempt with a result code. Error 50126 is a wrong password for a real account. A password spray looks like one actor, many distinct accounts, few attempts each, over a short window. The rule counts distinct failed principals per source in a rolling hour and alerts above the threshold, then reports whether any account in the same set succeeded afterwards. A spray followed by a success is an incident. Log source: the Entra ID sign-in log, streamed through diagnostic settings.

4

##### Technical Context

Why the behavior looks like this, and what normal traffic in it looks like.

Normal sign-in failure in a corporate tenant is one account failing repeatedly from its own device after a password change or a stale token on a phone. That is the opposite shape: few principals, many attempts. Spraying inverts it deliberately to stay under per-account lockout. That is why the rule counts distinct principals.

Two sources of legitimate inversion exist. A misconfigured application using a service principal can fail against many mailboxes at once, and a security scanner running credential checks will do it on purpose. Both are identifiable by their source and belong in the allowlist with an owner and an expiry.

Sign-in logs arrive through the diagnostic settings pipeline with a delay of under 5 minutes at the 95th percentile, measured over the 7-day baseline. That delay sets the floor under this detection's latency, whatever the schedule is.

5

##### Blind Spots and Assumptions

What this will miss. The section reviewers argue with.

It assumes the attacker reuses one source address or one autonomous system. A spray distributed across residential proxies, one attempt per address, will not cross the threshold and this detection will not see it. The distributed case needs an identity-side signal instead: failures per principal across sources. That is a separate detection, on the backlog.

Conditional access does not hide the failures: Entra ID checks the password before any policy runs, so a wrong guess logs 50126 whatever the policy says. A correct guess blocked by policy logs 53003 instead of a success, so the follow-up success check treats 53003 from the spraying source as a hit.

It sees only Entra ID. Spraying against on-premises AD, ADFS, or a third party federated to the tenant produces different logs.

6

##### False Positives

What fires it that is not an attack, and how the exclusion is made.

A service principal authenticating on behalf of many users after a credential rotation. A vulnerability scanner performing credential checks. A load test against a non-production tenant that shares the log stream. All three are named exclusions in the allowlist table, each with a ticket id, an owner, and an expiry date.

7

##### Validation

How somebody proves it fires, and where the fixtures live.

True-positive fixture: 14 sign-in events, 12 distinct principals, one source address, result 50126, inside 8 minutes, captured from an authorized credential-access exercise on 2026-08-14.

False-positive fixture: 8 sign-in events, 1 principal, one source, result 50126, spread over an hour. That is a person with a stale password on a phone, and it stays under the tenant's smart lockout threshold of 10, after which the result code changes to 50053.

Both are written for a replay with the threshold at its default and at both bounds. The kit doesn't replay at the bounds yet, and the rule file and fixtures aren't in the reference repository, so neither has run.

8

##### Priority

The score and where the numbers behind it are recorded.

Score 2.60 on the balanced preset. threat_relevance 5, impact 4, [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) 4, telemetry_readiness 5, build_effort 2, run_cost 3. [Marginal coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-marginal-coverage): first, no live detection covers T1110.003. The six [evidence lines](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) are on the score record.

9

##### Response

The ordered steps to take at three in the morning.

1. Confirm the source: is it a known service principal, a scanner, or an unrecognized address.
2. List the principals in the set and check each for a successful sign-in from the same source in the following hour.
3. If any succeeded, this is an incident. Revoke the sessions and reset that account before anything else.
4. If none succeeded, block or throttle the source, confirm the affected accounts are covered by MFA, and check whether any of them are exempt from conditional access.
5. Record the count of principals, the source, and whether any success followed, because those three numbers decide whether the threshold is right.

10

##### Additional Resources

Where the claims above came from.

Entra ID sign-in error codes reference for 50126. The 7-day baseline query and its output, stored with the detection. The authorized exercise ticket from 2026-08-14 that produced the true-positive fixture.

11

##### Retirement record

Empty until it retires, then the trigger that fired and what was measured.

Empty. If it retires, this section records which trigger fired, what was measured, and the link to whatever replaced it.

### The blank version

Copy this into a file next to the detection. A new detection writes goal, categorization, strategy abstract, and blind spots at hypothesis, and the rest as it moves through the stages. From build on, lint fails a record missing any heading. From validate on, it also fails any empty section but the retirement record. A detection already live whose record sits on a wiki or in its own description field can start with four sections: goal, categorization, blind spots and assumptions, and response.

```
# DET-XXXX <name>

## Goal

## Categorization

## Strategy Abstract

## Technical Context

## Blind Spots and Assumptions

## False Positives

## Validation

## Priority

## Response

## Additional Resources

## Retirement record
```

Next step [Ship a detection](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/)


---

## Query languages

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/

Write the detection once in [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma), in rule.yml, and the pipeline converts it for each of the 13 targets in targets.yml that reads its log source. Here is DET-0001, the Kerberoasting detection, in 6 of them, with tips for writing and reviewing queries in each language. The other 5 are listed at the end.

Reference Framework v0.136.0. Every query below is the approved copy the repository checks conversions against.

Do it in the browser [Translate a query](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/translate/)

Remember

- Review the Sigma file. The pipeline generates each platform's query from it and checks that query against an approved copy.
- Field names differ between platforms. The pipeline maps them, so confirm the mapped names against a real event.
- Case sensitivity differs between languages. Check how your platform compares text before you trust an exclusion.
- Replay each converted query against the [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) on its own engine before deploying it.

**Sigma** The source every other query is generated from.

Sigma is the source. Every query below is generated from this file, and review happens here.

```
title: Kerberoasting - RC4 Service Ticket Request for a User Account
id: 6f1c2d4e-9a3b-4c5d-8e7f-0a1b2c3d4e5f
status: experimental
description: Someone requested a Kerberos service ticket with the weak RC4 encryption for a service that runs under a user account. Attackers make exactly this request when they want to take the ticket away and crack the service account's password offline, the technique called Kerberoasting.
references:
 - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/
author: Habibullah Tora
date: 2026-09-12
tags:
 - attack.credential_access
 - attack.t1558.003
 - detect.DET-0001
logsource:
 product: windows
 service: security
detection:
 selection:
 EventID: 4769
 TicketEncryptionType: '0x17'
 Status: '0x0'
 filter_machine_accounts:
 ServiceName|endswith: '$'
 filter_krbtgt:
 ServiceName: 'krbtgt'
 condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
fields:
 - TargetUserName
 - ServiceName
 - IpAddress
 - TicketEncryptionType
falsepositives:
 - Older applications that still ask for RC4 tickets. After the 7-day count, exclude them by ServiceName in a pull request, never in the SIEM's interface
level: high
```

Tips for Sigma

- Write each detection once in Sigma and review that file.
- Set logsource accurately. Each backend uses the product and service to choose indexes and field names.
- Use field modifiers such as |endswith, |contains, and |re, and keep wildcards out of values.
- Put known [false positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-false-positive) in named filter_ selections, so the condition reads 'selection and not 1 of filter_*'.
- Tag the [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) technique, for example attack.t1558.003, so coverage can be counted.
- Keep the status field honest. The pipeline maps experimental, test, and stable to lifecycle stages.

**SPL** Splunk.

Written to replay in CI against a Splunk Enterprise and Splunk Cloud service container. The fixtures load in, the query runs, and Validate passes only when it matches the true-positive events and ignores the rest. This adapter has run end to end against the engine by hand, and the [outside checks page](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/) has the run. Its CI job has not run yet.

```
source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4769 TicketEncryptionType="0x17" Status="0x0" NOT (ServiceName IN ("*$", "krbtgt")) | table TargetUserName,ServiceName,IpAddress,TicketEncryptionType
```

Tips for SPL

- Start with index plus sourcetype or source, so Splunk reads only the events that can match.
- Put field filters before the first pipe, and transforming commands such as stats and table after them.
- Avoid join and transaction. A stats by the shared field correlates the same events faster, with no subsearch row limit.
- A leading wildcard such as "*$" checks every value of the field. Narrow the search first so fewer events reach it.
- For high-volume scheduled detections, use tstats against an accelerated data model.
- Set the earliest and latest times to match the schedule, with a small overlap to cover indexing delay.
- Search terms and field values are case-insensitive by default, but field names are case-sensitive.
- Throttle alerts per entity so one attacker does not produce 100 notifications.

**KQL** Microsoft Sentinel, over the SecurityEvent table. Defender XDR's Device tables have their own target, kusto_xdr.

Written to replay in CI against the Kusto emulator (kustainer). The fixtures load in, the query runs, and Validate passes only when it matches the true-positive events and ignores the rest. This adapter has run end to end against the engine by hand, and the [outside checks page](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/) has the run. Its CI job has not run yet.

```
SecurityEvent
| where (EventID == 4769 and TicketEncryptionType =~ "0x17" and Status =~ "0x0") and (not((ServiceName in~ ("krbtgt") or ServiceName endswith "$")))
```

Tips for KQL

- Filter on TimeGenerated first, then on the most selective fields, as early in the query as possible.
- Use has for whole-term matches. It uses the term index and runs faster than contains.
- == is case-sensitive and =~ is not. The converted query uses =~ for that reason.
- Use project to keep only the columns the analyst needs.
- For thresholds, summarize with bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) or a window that matches the rule frequency.
- Map entities such as Account, Host, and IP in the analytics rule, so related alerts group into one incident.
- Make the rule's lookback longer than its frequency, so the windows overlap and cover ingestion delay.

**SQL** Data warehouses and databases, including Snowflake, BigQuery, and Databricks.

Replayed in CI with no infrastructure. The fixtures load into an in-memory database and the query runs against them. Validate passes only when the query matches the true-positive events and ignores the rest. This adapter has run end to end.

```
SELECT * FROM detect_fixtures WHERE (EventID=4769 AND TicketEncryptionType='0x17' AND Status='0x0') AND (NOT (ServiceName LIKE '%$' ESCAPE '\' OR ServiceName='krbtgt'))
```

Tips for SQL

- Filter on the event time column first, so the warehouse prunes files before it reads them.
- Extract only the JSON fields you use, and cast them once in a CTE.
- Declare thresholds, windows, and allowlists as variables.
- Use QUALIFY or a window function to keep one alert per entity.
- Case sensitivity depends on the database and its collation settings. Check before trusting an exclusion.
- Every scheduled run uses compute. Match the schedule and warehouse size to the latency you need.

**ES|QL** Elastic Security.

Written to replay in CI against an Elasticsearch service container. The fixtures load in, the query runs, and Validate passes only when it matches the true-positive events and ignores the rest. This adapter has run end to end against the engine by hand, and the [outside checks page](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/) has the run. Its CI job has not run yet.

```
from detect_fixtures metadata _id, _index, _version | where winlog.channel=="Security" and event.code=="4769" and winlog.event_data.TicketEncryptionType=="0x17" and winlog.event_data.Status=="0x0" and not (ends_with(service.name, "$") or service.name=="krbtgt")
```

Tips for ES|QL

- Start with FROM and a narrow index pattern, and filter with WHERE before any STATS.
- String comparison with == is case-sensitive. Use TO_LOWER on both sides for a case-insensitive match.
- Use the Elastic Common Schema field names, such as event.code. The pipeline maps Sigma names to them.
- Keep METADATA _id, _index, and _version in a rule with no aggregation. Elastic uses them to deduplicate alerts.
- Use KEEP to return only the fields the analyst needs.

**EQL** Elastic Security, for event sequences.

Converted and diffed only. No public test instance exists, so CI checks the conversion against the approved copy and cannot check how the query behaves. Treat it as a draft until it has run on a real instance.

```
any where winlog.channel:"Security" and ((event.code:"4769" and winlog.event_data.TicketEncryptionType:"0x17" and winlog.event_data.Status:"0x0") and (not (service.name like~ ("*$", "krbtgt"))))
```

Tips for EQL

- Use EQL when the detection needs a sequence, for example sequence by host.id with one step per event.
- Name the event category, such as process where or network where. any where searches every category.
- The: operator is case-insensitive and == is case-sensitive.
- like~ is a case-insensitive wildcard match, which is why the converted query uses it.
- Keep maxspan on a sequence as short as the behavior allows. Long spans carry more state.

**LogScale** CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale.

Converted and diffed only. No public test instance exists, so CI checks the conversion against the approved copy and cannot check how the query behaves. Treat it as a draft until it has run on a real instance.

```
EventID=4769 TicketEncryptionType=/^0x17$/i Status=/^0x0$/i not (ServiceName=/\$$/i or ServiceName=/^krbtgt$/i)
```

Tips for LogScale

- A query runs as a pipeline from left to right, so put the most selective filters first.
- Filter on tag fields, the ones that start with #, where you can. They narrow the data before the rest of the query runs.
- A regex ending in /i is case-insensitive.
- Anchor a regex with ^ and $ when you mean an exact match. An unanchored regex also matches inside longer values.
- Keep the converted query and the Sigma file in step. Change the Sigma file, then convert again.

### Other targets

The pipeline also converts to Elasticsearch and Kibana, Grafana Loki (convert only), NetWitness (convert only), OpenSearch, Panther (convert only). Their approved copies sit beside these in detections/DET-0001/golden/ in the repository: elastic_lucene.lucene, loki.logql, netwitness.nw, opensearch.opensearch, panther.py.

Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting (convert only) converts only process, image-load, file, registry, and network rules, since its tables carry no Windows Security log. DET-0001 reads the Windows Security log, so it has no copy there, and `convert.py` reports the target as skipped for it.

Google SecOps (convert only) converts only process, registry, file, network, and DNS rules, since Google's data model lacks fields for most others, such as Kerberos ticket types. DET-0001 reads the Windows Security log, so it has no copy there, and `convert.py` reports the target as skipped for it.

For detections that run as scheduled warehouse queries, [Detections in SQL](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sql/) shows the same detection with declared variables and a Snowflake task.


---

## Detections in SQL

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sql/

A detection that runs as a scheduled query against a data warehouse keeps the same lifecycle. [Tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) moves into declared variables, and each [run costs](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) warehouse compute.

Example Framework v0.136.0. DET-0001, the Kerberoasting detection from [section 7](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/worked-examples/), as it runs in Snowflake.

Remember

- Filter on the event time column first, so the warehouse reads fewer files.
- Declare thresholds, windows, allowlists, and scope as variables, each with a default, bounds, and evidence.
- Keep allowlists in a table with a ticket id, an owner, and an expiry date.
- Count warehouse compute in run cost. A lookback twice as long scans twice the data on every run.
- The task schedule sets the latency floor. A detection that runs every 15 minutes waits 7.5 minutes on average before it can alert.
- Handle late-arriving logs with a lookback longer than the schedule, and skip an entity that already has an alert inside the window.

### One detection, three views

The [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) SQL backend emits the predicate. Everything around it is dialect and scheduling. Every tunable number is a declared variable.

The Snowflake version changes one behavior on purpose. The Sigma rule and the portable query alert on every RC4 ticket request. The Snowflake version alerts when one account requests RC4 tickets for `min_distinct_services` (3 by default) or more distinct services inside the lookback window. The threshold trades single-request sensitivity for fewer alerts per batch run, and its [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) is in the variables tab.

```
-- DET-0001 Kerberoasting, as a scheduled Snowflake detection.
-- The Sigma SQL backend emits the predicate; everything around it is the warehouse dialect,
-- and every tunable is a variable declared on the record rather than a number in the logic.
-- A task runs in its own session, so session variables set here would not reach it. Substitute
-- each $name below from variables.yml before you run this file; the kit has no warehouse deploy step yet.

-- $lookback_minutes window, default 60, bounds 15 to 1440
-- $min_distinct_services threshold, default 3, bounds 2 to 5
-- $allowed_service_accounts allowlist, a governed table
-- $in_scope_domains scope, default ["CORP","OT"]

CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW SECURITY.DETECT.DET_0001_KERBEROASTING AS
WITH events AS (
 SELECT
 event_time,
 raw:EventID::INT AS event_id,
 raw:TargetUserName::STRING AS target_user,
 raw:ServiceName::STRING AS service_name,
 raw:IpAddress::STRING AS src_ip,
 raw:TicketEncryptionType::STRING AS ticket_encryption_type,
 raw:Status::STRING AS status,
 raw:TargetDomainName::STRING AS domain
 FROM SECURITY.RAW.WINDOWS_SECURITY -- VARIANT column, so the shape is read at query time
 WHERE event_time >= DATEADD('minute', -$lookback_minutes, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP())
 AND raw:EventID::INT = 4769 -- partition pruning happens here, before anything is flattened
),
scoped AS (
 SELECT * FROM events
 WHERE ARRAY_CONTAINS(domain::VARIANT, PARSE_JSON('$in_scope_domains'))
),
matched AS (
 -- the part that comes out of the Sigma SQL backend, field names mapped by the pipeline
 SELECT * FROM scoped
 WHERE ticket_encryption_type = '0x17'
 AND status = '0x0'
 AND NOT (service_name LIKE '%$' OR service_name = 'krbtgt')
),
allowed AS (
 SELECT service_name FROM $allowed_service_accounts WHERE expires_on > CURRENT_DATE()
)
SELECT
 target_user,
 src_ip,
 COUNT(DISTINCT service_name) AS services_requested,
 MIN(event_time) AS first_seen,
 MAX(event_time) AS last_seen,
 ARRAY_AGG(DISTINCT service_name) AS service_names
FROM matched
WHERE service_name NOT IN (SELECT service_name FROM allowed)
GROUP BY target_user, src_ip
HAVING COUNT(DISTINCT service_name) >= $min_distinct_services
QUALIFY ROW_NUMBER() OVER (PARTITION BY target_user ORDER BY last_seen DESC) = 1;

-- Scheduling and cost. The schedule sets the floor under detection_latency_median,
-- and the warehouse size sets the half of run_cost the analysts never see.
-- At the default window the task runs four times inside it, so the insert skips an entity
-- that already has an alert from this detection inside the window.
CREATE OR REPLACE TASK SECURITY.DETECT.T_DET_0001
 WAREHOUSE = DETECT_XS
 SCHEDULE = 'USING CRON */15 * * * * UTC'
AS
 INSERT INTO SECURITY.DETECT.ALERTS (detection_id, fired_at, entity, context)
 SELECT 'DET-0001', CURRENT_TIMESTAMP(), v.target_user,
 OBJECT_CONSTRUCT('src_ip', v.src_ip, 'services', v.service_names, 'count', v.services_requested)
 FROM SECURITY.DETECT.DET_0001_KERBEROASTING v
 WHERE NOT EXISTS (
 SELECT 1 FROM SECURITY.DETECT.ALERTS a
 WHERE a.detection_id = 'DET-0001'
 AND a.entity = v.target_user
 AND a.fired_at >= DATEADD('minute', -$lookback_minutes, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP())
 );
```

```
-- What the Sigma SQL backend emits for DET-0001, unchanged, against the fixture table.
-- This is the predicate the warehouse version wraps: same logic, no dialect, no variables.
SELECT * FROM detect_fixtures
WHERE (EventID=4769 AND TicketEncryptionType='0x17' AND Status='0x0')
 AND (NOT (ServiceName LIKE '%$' ESCAPE '\' OR ServiceName='krbtgt'))
```

```
# Declared on the detection record, and lint.py checks each declaration. No kit tool substitutes them
# into the warehouse query yet, and the warehouse version has no replay engine, so a person checks each
# bound against the fixtures at review.
variables:
 lookback_minutes:
 kind: window
 type: integer minutes
 default: 60
 bounds: [15, 1440]
 evidence: the task runs every 15 minutes, so a 60-minute window covers four runs and an event up to 45 minutes late still lands in one
 min_distinct_services:
 kind: threshold
 type: integer
 default: 3
 bounds: [2, 5]
 evidence: the recorded run, SDWIN-201022042947, asked for RC4 tickets for 5 user-run services, so the upper bound still fires on it. Set the default from your own 7-day count
 allowed_service_accounts:
 kind: allowlist
 type: table
 default: SECURITY.DETECT.ALLOWLIST_KERBEROAST
 evidence: empty at deploy; every row needs a ticket id and an owner, and the table is reviewed each quarter
 in_scope_domains:
 kind: scope
 type: list
 default: ["CORP", "OT"]
 evidence: both forests send 4769 events; the lab forest is excluded because its accounts are shared by design
```

### Detection variables

Most tuning changes a number: a threshold moves, a lookback widens, or an account joins an allowlist. Written inline in the query, each of those is a logic change. You re-review it, re-test it, and re-convert it for every target, and the reason for the old value gets lost. Declared on the record, each value keeps its evidence and its history. The kit's lint checks every declaration today. It doesn't substitute the values into a query or replay at the bounds yet, so a tuning change edits the rule and variables.yml in the same pull request.

| Kind | Type | Example (generic; DET-0001's own values are in the table below) | What it tunes |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **threshold** | integer or decimal | `min_failed_logons, default 10, bounds 5 to 50` | How much of the behavior has to happen before it is worth an alert. |
| **window** | interval | `lookback_minutes, default 60, bounds 15 to 1440` | How far back the query reads. It sets both the sensitivity and the warehouse bill. |
| **allowlist** | list of strings, or a reference to a table | `allowed_service_accounts, default empty, sourced from a governed table` | The named exclusions. Empty by default, so an exclusion is always a visible act. |
| **scope** | list of strings | `in_scope_domains, default every domain the log source covers` | Which part of the estate the detection runs against, for staged rollout and for OT segments that need their own thresholds. |
| **severity_cutoff** | integer | `page_above, default 3, bounds 1 to 5` | What reaches a human immediately against what waits in a queue. |

These requirements keep variables reviewable:

1. Every variable is declared once on the record with a type, a default, and, for thresholds and windows, bounds. Nothing reads a bare number out of the query.
2. The default carries one line of evidence, the same standard the six scoring inputs carry.
3. A variable change is a pull request against the record. Nobody edits it in the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem), so every threshold change stays in the detection's history.
4. A threshold needs one [fixture](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) that still fires at the upper bound and one that stays silent at the lower bound, so a value that works only at its default fails. The kit doesn't replay at the bounds yet, so the reviewer checks each bound against the fixtures.
5. Allowlists are variables too, and they are the only sanctioned way to exclude a known source of noise.
6. A variable changed three times in a quarter is a sign to review the hypothesis and the detection.

#### DET-0001's variables

| Variable | Kind | Default | Bounds | Evidence for the default |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `lookback_minutes` | window | `60` | [15, 1440] | the task runs every 15 minutes, so a 60-minute window covers four runs and an event up to 45 minutes late still lands in one |
| `min_distinct_services` | threshold | `3` | [2, 5] | the recorded run, SDWIN-201022042947, asked for RC4 tickets for 5 user-run services, so the upper bound still fires on it. Set the default from your own 7-day count |
| `allowed_service_accounts` | allowlist | `SECURITY.DETECT.ALLOWLIST_KERBEROAST` | - | empty at deploy; every row needs a ticket id and an owner, and the table is reviewed each quarter |
| `in_scope_domains` | scope | `['CORP', 'OT']` | - | both forests send 4769 events; the lab forest is excluded because its accounts are shared by design |

### Changes in a warehouse

A detection that runs as scheduled SQL carries a second run cost. The warehouse bills for a query that scans a day of events every five minutes. Score run cost as analyst minutes plus warehouse spend, and record both in the evidence line.

Latency and run cost land differently here. The schedule on the task is the floor under `detection_latency_median`. A detection running every 15 minutes averages seven and a half minutes of latency before an analyst sees anything, whatever the query does. The `lookback_minutes` variable sets the bill as well as the sensitivity, because a window twice as wide scans twice the data on every run. Widening it is a costed decision, so declare it and the decision stays visible.

Log forwarders buffer events, so a query whose lookback equals its schedule misses any event that arrives after the run whose window covers it. DET-0001's task runs every 15 minutes over a 60-minute lookback, so an event up to 45 minutes late still falls inside a run. The insert skips an entity that already has an alert inside the window, so the overlapping runs raise one alert per account.

Everything else stays the same: the record carries every section, the score comes from the same inputs, and the [precision floor](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision-floor) decides whether the detection stays in production. The kit has no replay engine for a warehouse yet, so a reviewer runs this version against the fixtures by hand.

Next step [Query languages](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/)


---

## Detection as code

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/detection-as-code/

Section 16

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Remember

- If the live rule and the repository disagree, the repository no longer tells you what runs. Alarm on the difference.
- Write the logic once in [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) and let the build produce the query for each target. A hand-edited query can never be regenerated.
- Commit the converted query for every target. The diff is what catches a converter upgrade changing your production logic.
- Prove each detection on a real engine with a [fixture](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) it must match and one it must ignore. A query that converts cleanly can still match nothing.
- Give the build two credentials: read-only for queries, and a deploy credential no pull request build can read.
- Your git host, your CI system, and your [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) will all be replaced before your detections are. The rule file and the record are the parts you keep.

[Detection as code](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-as-code) makes the repository the program's source of truth and the SIEM a copy of it. Whether a program has it comes down to one question: can you read the repository at a commit and say what ran in production that day, thresholds included? Storing YAML in version control gets you part of the way, because a file can still be copied into a console by hand and edited there. The rules below close the rest of the distance. The last column names what proves each rule, and it says where the kit's check is still planned.

| Rule | What goes wrong without it | What proves it |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Keep one directory per detection, named for its id, carrying the rule, the record, the score, the variables, the fixtures, and the approved queries. | Logic, intent, and tests are reviewed in three places, so a reviewer approves a query change and misses the record that no longer describes it. | Lint fails when the directory is missing a file the detection's stage requires. |
| Write the logic once in Sigma, and generate the query for every target in the registry from it. Never edit a generated query. | The same detection becomes a different detection on each platform, and a SIEM migration means rewriting every one of them. | Convert regenerates each target from rule.yml, so a hand edit shows up as a diff on the next build. |
| Commit the converted query for each target beside the rule, and fail the build when a conversion stops matching its approved copy. | A converter upgrade changes what runs in production, and the new query reaches the SIEM before anybody has read it. | The golden diff compares every conversion with its committed copy on each pull request. |
| Pin the converter, every query backend, and the [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) release the technique ids are checked against. | A dependency that floats rewrites a production query with no commit behind it, and a detection that stopped matching is the first sign. | Each backend is capped below its next major version, and lint rejects a technique id outside the pinned map. |
| Declare every threshold, window, allowlist, and scope on the record with a default, bounds, and an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line). | [Tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) edits the query, so each change needs a full re-review and the reason for the old number is gone. | Lint rejects a variable with no default or no evidence, and a threshold or window with no bounds. Substituting each value into the queries is planned. |
| Commit one event the detection must match and one it must ignore, and replay both on a real engine. | A query that converts cleanly can still match nothing, and the proof of it arrives as an incident the detection should have caught. | The replay job loads the fixtures into each engine and compares the hits with tests/expected.yml. |
| Scrub credentials, tokens, internal host names, and personal data out of a fixture before it is committed. | A captured event carries a live secret into version control, and git history keeps it after the fixture is cleaned. | A secret scan on every pull request, with a line in the review checklist as the backstop. The kit adds no scan of its own, so turn on the repository host's secret scanning. |
| Deploy from the build, make the production console read-only, and alarm on a live rule that no longer matches the repository. | An edit made in the console during a shift leaves production running a query no test has ever covered. | A daily check that compares each running query with its approved copy and fails when they differ. The kit's tools/running.py does it for Splunk, along with the schedule, the alert condition, and whether alerting is on. On another SIEM, compare them by hand at each [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) check. |
| Route every change that reaches production through a pull request approved by somebody other than its author. | Under deadline pressure the checks get skipped, and a week later nobody can say which detections skipped them. | Branch protection and required status checks on the default branch, with an owner named for the detections directory. |
| Deploy a new detection with alerting off, count seven days of alerts, and switch alerting on only at or under the threshold on the record. | A detection reaches the analyst queue before anybody has counted what it costs, and the first measurement is the complaint from the SOC. | The deploy job packages a detection at deploy with alerting off; its vetting and install steps are placeholders a team fills in for its own stack. The pull request that moves it to tune runs a check that counts its first seven days live against the threshold, and merging that pull request switches alerting on. |
| Retire inside the repository: set the rule status to deprecated, switch alerting off, and keep the record and the retirement note. | A deleted detection takes its coverage claim, its blind spots, and the reason it retired away with it. | Lint checks the Sigma status against the stage, and the record keeps its retirement record section. |

Most checks in the third column are the reference pipeline's jobs. An approval and an owner on the detections directory are repository settings, because a build can't enforce a rule about itself. The secret scan and the 30-day precision check are jobs I haven't written yet; today the review checklist covers the first and a person runs the second.

### 16.1 A common pipeline

The rule path

**Repository**One directory per detection: the Sigma rule, the record, the score, the variables, the fixtures, and the approved queries.

->

**Build**Lint, convert for every target, diff each conversion against its approved copy, replay the two fixtures.

->

**Deploy**One job, one credential, alerting off for seven days, then on under the threshold on the record.

The event path

*1***Collect**Each log source writes its events where it can, in its own schema and on its own delay.

*2***Land in object storage**Events arrive as compressed JSON objects, partitioned by date, kept long enough to replay a detection across them.

*3***Announce the new objects**One notification per object tells the next step that events arrived, so nothing has to poll the store.

*4***Normalize the fields**Vendor field names are mapped into one set, so a rule written once resolves against every source.

*5***Run the detection**The query runs on each object as it arrives or on a schedule, and emits an alert when it matches.

*6***Raise the alert**The alert carries the detection id, a link to the record, the severity, and the events that matched.

*7***[Triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) in the SOC**An analyst works the alert, records a disposition and the minutes it took, and closes it.

*8***Tune or retire**Precision over 30 days and minutes per [true positive](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive) go back to the detection, and a change to either becomes a pull request.

**The way back.** What an analyst records about each alert returns as a pull request: a tuning change to one declared variable, or a retirement proposal with the trigger that fired.

The event path runs left to right and wraps. The rule path above it writes into step 5 and nowhere else, so what runs there is what the repository converted and the build approved.

The parts differ by platform, and the order rarely does. Events land in object storage, a notification tells a runtime they arrived, the runtime runs the queries the build deployed, and the alerts reach a queue an analyst works. What the analyst records about each alert is what sends the next tuning change back to the repository. The steps below name the AWS parts; the Azure and GCP equivalents sit in the same order.

| Step | What happens | Example parts on AWS | What the repository controls |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Collect | Each log source writes its events where it can, in its own schema and on its own delay. | CloudTrail, GuardDuty, VPC flow logs, EKS audit logs, and whatever the identity provider and the EDR export | A row per source in the inventory, with the normal event rate DET-0000 alerts against. |
| 2. Land in object storage | Events arrive as compressed JSON objects, partitioned by date, kept long enough to replay a detection across them. | An S3 bucket per account or per source, with versioning on and retention set by its bucket policy | Nothing yet. Research reads field names and the 7-day baseline out of this store. |
| 3. Announce the new objects | One notification per object tells the next step that events arrived, so nothing has to poll the store. | S3 event notifications into SQS, SNS, or EventBridge, with a dead-letter queue behind them | Nothing. The age of the oldest message deserves the same silence alert a log source gets. |
| 4. Normalize the fields | Vendor field names are mapped into one set, so a rule written once resolves against every source. | OCSF or ECS names, applied by the ingest function, an Iceberg table, or the SIEM's own parsers | One field map per target, written from real events, so a conversion resolves the names the store has. |
| 5. Run the detection | The query runs on each object as it arrives or on a schedule, and emits an alert when it matches. | A Lambda or Panther rule per event, a scheduled search in Splunk, Sentinel, or Elastic, or scheduled SQL in Athena or Snowflake | The rule itself. CI converts rule.yml for this target, diffs it against the approved copy, and deploys it. |
| 6. Raise the alert | The alert carries the detection id, a link to the record, the severity, and the events that matched. | SNS or EventBridge into a case manager such as Jira, ServiceNow, or TheHive | The Response section of the record, linked from the alert, which is what an analyst reads at 3 a.m. |
| 7. Triage in the SOC | An analyst works the alert, records a disposition and the minutes it took, and closes it. | Case management, with the disposition stored in a field somebody can count | Nothing, and every number that decides this detection's future comes out of that field. |
| 8. Tune or retire | Precision over 30 days and minutes per true positive go back to the detection, and a change to either becomes a pull request. | A scheduled report out of case management, read at the monthly review | A tuning pull request that adds one named exclusion, or a retirement proposal with the trigger that fired. |

Whatever runs at step 5, the rule file stays the same. A streaming runtime evaluates one event at a time, which suits an object store that notifies on arrival. A scheduled search in a SIEM reads a window of indexed events. Scheduled SQL in a warehouse reads the same window out of a table. What changes per target is the conversion, and [section 9](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sql/) covers what the warehouse variant adds on top.

Steps 1 to 5 are infrastructure, so each one has a name on every cloud:

| Step | On Azure | On Google Cloud |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Collect | Azure Activity log, Entra ID sign-in logs, and Defender for Cloud alerts | Cloud Audit Logs and Security Command Center findings |
| 2. Land in object storage | Blob Storage, or Data Lake Storage Gen2 | A Cloud Storage bucket |
| 3. Announce the new objects | Event Grid on Microsoft.Storage.BlobCreated, into Storage queues or Service Bus | Pub/Sub notifications for Cloud Storage, or an Eventarc trigger |
| 4. Normalize the fields | A Function or a Data Factory job writing the agreed names | A Dataflow or Cloud Run job writing the agreed names |
| 5. Run the detection | A Function, or a scheduled analytics rule in Microsoft Sentinel | A Cloud Run function, or a scheduled query in BigQuery |

The pipeline above is a shape, and what fills it is whatever the team already runs. The tables below say what each choice gives this job and where it stops. I read each one against the vendor's own documentation on 2026-10-06. They are documented mechanisms and not products I run, and the names move fast enough that you should check again before you build on one.

### 16.2 Where the detections live

A detection repository asks four things of its host: a default branch nobody can push to, a check that must pass before a merge, a named owner for the detections directory, and a scan that stops a credential reaching the history. Every host below does at least three.

| Host | Protected branch and required checks | Owner for a directory | Secret scanning on a push |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| GitHub | Rulesets, or the older branch protection rules | CODEOWNERS, required through the pull request rule | Push protection, paid on a private repository |
| GitLab | Protected branches, with pipelines that must succeed | CODEOWNERS, with approval enforced on Premium and above | Secret push protection, on Ultimate only |
| Bitbucket Cloud | Branch restrictions and merge checks |.bitbucket/CODEOWNERS, added as default reviewers | Nothing at push time, so add a pipeline step |
| Bitbucket Data Center | Branch permissions and the required builds check |.bitbucket/CODEOWNERS, added as reviewers | On by default, but it reports after the push lands |
| Azure Repos | Branch policies for reviewers, build validation, and status checks | Automatically included reviewers on a path filter, with no CODEOWNERS file | Push protection through the paid Advanced Security add-on |
| Gitea and Forgejo | Protected branches with required approvals and status checks | CODEOWNERS; Gitea can require the owner's approval and Forgejo can only request it | Nothing |
| Google Secure Source Manager | Branch rules with required approvals and checks |.securesourcemanager/CODEOWNERS | Rejects the push, with a documented skip option |

Two hosts are closed to new customers, so neither should start a detection repository: AWS CodeCommit since July 2024, and Cloud Source Repositories since June 2024.

The build needs two credentials and no more: a read-only query credential scoped to the indexes a baseline check reads, and a deploy credential only the deploy job can read. Keep the deploy credential out of pull request builds, because a pull request from a fork runs code a stranger wrote.

### 16.3 What runs the checks

The reference pipeline in [section 17](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/reference-pipeline/) declares its jobs for GitHub Actions: lint, convert, score, and a replay matrix with a service container per engine on every change, then deploy after a merge, and a promotion check on the pull request that switches a detection's alerting on. Any CI system can carry them. What differs is where the jobs are declared, whether a runner can sit inside the network where the SIEM runs, and what a build started by a stranger is allowed to read.

| CI system | Where the jobs are declared | Runners you can own | What a build on a fork's pull request reads |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| GitHub Actions | Files under.github/workflows | Self-hosted runners, per repository or organization | No secrets until a maintainer approves the run |
| GitLab CI/CD |.gitlab-ci.yml | Self-managed runners, per group or per project | Protected variables only where the project allows them |
| Azure Pipelines | azure-pipelines.yml | Self-hosted agent pools | Nothing, until an administrator turns fork secrets on |
| Jenkins | Jenkinsfile | Agents are the whole model | What the fork trust setting allows, and Collaborators is the recommended one |
| CircleCI |.circleci/config.yml | Container runners and machine runners | What the context restrictions allow |
| Buildkite | A pipeline file the agent uploads | Every agent is yours | Whatever your own secret store hands the plugin |
| Bitbucket Pipelines | bitbucket-pipelines.yml | Self-hosted runners | Secured variables, masked in the log |
| Tekton, with Pipelines as Code | Pipeline runs under.tekton | Your own cluster | What the repository policy allows, after an ok-to-test comment |
| Concourse | A pipeline file set with fly set-pipeline | Workers are yours | Only what the pipeline's own credential manager gives it |

Woodpecker CI, TeamCity, Argo Workflows, Dagger, and the beta successor to Drone all do the same job. Ask any of them the same four questions: where the jobs are declared, whether a job can run beside a SIEM that has no public address, what a stranger's pull request can read, and whether the repository can refuse a merge on the answer.

### 16.4 What ships the rule into the platform

Delivery takes one of two shapes. The build pushes, calling the platform's API after a merge, which is simple and leaves the platform with no idea the repository exists. Or the platform pulls, reconciling against the repository on its own, which closes the drift question and gives you one more system to operate. Of the platforms in 16.5, only Microsoft Sentinel offers the pull shape itself. Everywhere else the pull side means Argo CD or Flux plus a controller that speaks the vendor's API.

| How the rule ships | What it reaches | What to watch |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The platform's own repository connection | Microsoft Sentinel, from GitHub or Azure Repos | Five connections per workspace, and deleting a file leaves the rule running |
| Terraform or OpenTofu | Sentinel, Elastic, Splunk saved searches, Datadog, Sumo Logic, and Google SecOps | A rule edited in the console drifts until the next apply silently overwrites it |
| The vendor's content CLI | Elastic detection-rules, Splunk contentctl-ng, Panther's upload tool, SecOps Content Manager | Upload adds and replaces, so a deleted detection needs a delete call of its own |
| A REST call from the build | Elastic's import endpoint, Sekoia's rules catalog, Exabeam, Devo | The script is yours to maintain, and the API host is often pinned to one region |
| GitOps reconciliation with Argo CD or Flux | Anything expressed as a Kubernetes resource | Neither reaches a SaaS rule without a controller that speaks the vendor's API |
| Packages pulled onto the node, as falcoctl does for Falco | Rules shipped as OCI artifacts | Follow mode installs new versions on its own, with no deploy step in between |

### 16.5 The platform on the other end

Sigma covers a detection whose logic is a match on fields inside one event, which is most of them. A correlation across events, a stateful sequence, or a scheduled warehouse query goes in as its own query file, with the same record, score, variables, and fixtures beside it. Review happens on that file, because no conversion can regenerate it.

| Platform | Query language | The rule in version control | What deploys it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Splunk Enterprise Security | SPL | One YAML file per detection, built into an app | contentctl-ng, then the Admin Config Service on Splunk Cloud |
| Microsoft Sentinel | KQL | Bicep or ARM for a scheduled alert rule, or YAML converted into it | A repository connection, an az deployment, or Terraform |
| Microsoft Defender XDR | KQL | A custom detection rule | The Bicep security extension, still in preview |
| Elastic Security | KQL, Lucene, EQL, and ES|QL | One TOML file per rule | The detection-rules CLI, through the detection engine API |
| Google SecOps | YARA-L 2.0 over UDM | Rule text beside the state that says whether it runs | The rules API, Content Manager, or the Terraform resource |
| CrowdStrike Falcon Next-Gen SIEM | Its correlation rule query | A Terraform resource per rule | The CrowdStrike Terraform provider |
| CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale | LogScale query | A package: a manifest with alerts, parsers, and queries beside it | Installed per repository or view, so a fleet rollout is many installs |
| Panther | Python, or Simple Detections YAML | A.py and.yml pair per detection | The upload command, with an API token the build carries |
| Datadog Cloud SIEM | Its own query syntax | A Terraform resource per rule | The Datadog Terraform provider |
| Sumo Logic Cloud SIEM | Its rule expressions | Terraform, with a different resource per rule shape | The Sumo Logic Terraform provider |
| Sekoia.io | Sigma, used natively | The Sigma rule itself | A post to the rules catalog, scripted by you |
| Grafana Loki | LogQL | A ruler rules file | lokitool, or the ruler API |
| IBM QRadar | AQL, plus the rule engine | A content export | The content management tool; the SaaS product reached end of life in April 2026 |
| A warehouse: Snowflake, Databricks, BigQuery, Athena | SQL | A.sql file beside the schedule that runs it | A task or alert, a scheduled query, or a scheduler rule |

Sigma reaches these platforms unevenly, and the gap is worth measuring before a team commits to one rule format. Sekoia reads Sigma directly. Splunk, Elastic, OpenSearch, Kusto, Loki, CrowdStrike, Panther, and SQL all have a converter that works. Google SecOps converts only rules whose fields already have a UDM name, and the QRadar converter that still builds is the one IBM maintains. Correlation across events converts for fewer targets again, so a rule that counts or sequences is portable in theory more than in practice.

[Section 17](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/reference-pipeline/) takes the pipeline I run against this framework's own example detections, job by job.

### 16.6 Where this pipeline breaks

| What breaks | What you see | The check that finds it |
| --- | --- | --- |
| The notification queue wedges | The bucket keeps filling, every log source reports healthy, and nothing has run for six hours. | Alert on the age of the oldest message, the way DET-0000 alerts on a silent source. |
| A normalization change renames a field | Every rule still converts and every build still passes, and the live queries match nothing. | Field names come from real events at research, and re-validation replays the fixtures against the current schema. |
| Somebody deploys by hand during an incident | The live rule and the approved copy diverge, so the detection's tests prove nothing about what runs. | The daily running check, which compares the running query with its approved copy. |
| Retention is shorter than the longest window | You can't re-measure a detection before tuning it, so the tuning argument comes down to opinion. | Set retention from the longest window any detection declares, and check it again when a window moves. |
| Alert delivery fails | The failure is itself an alert that nobody receives, and the queue looks quiet because it is empty. | A dead-letter queue behind the alert topic, with what lands in it counted as a program metric. |
| A retired detection keeps running | The rule is gone from the repository and still live on the platform, because an upload adds and replaces but never deletes. | Make the delete its own deploy step, and count live rules against the repository at each review. |
| A notification fires before the object is finished | The runtime reads a partial file, so the detection misses the events that were still being written. | Subscribe to the event that marks the write complete, which on Data Lake Storage Gen2 means FlushWithClose. |

These failures make no noise, with one exception: the retention gap announces itself on the day you need the data. A detection that throws an error gets noticed; a detection that runs, matches nothing, and reports success stays unnoticed for as long as nobody asks.

Next step [The reference pipeline](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/reference-pipeline/)


---

## Working with agents

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/

Section 10

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Remember

- Agents draft and CI checks. People keep review, deployment, and retirement.
- Give an agent its own read-only service identity, scoped to the tables, time ranges, and byte limits the task needs.
- Treat log content as hostile data. An agent never acts on an instruction found in a log, an alert, a ticket, or a report.
- List every query an agent ran in the pull request, with its time range, bytes scanned, and row count.
- Limit open agent pull requests to the number reviewers clear in a week.

An agent can draft most of what the lifecycle produces. That includes scores, hypotheses, [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) plans, rules, test [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture), and the records that document them. The definitions of done make this safe, because every stage ends on a hard count that CI or a named person checks. People keep review, deployment, and retirement.

### 10.1 Division of work

| Stage | Agent | Person | What checks it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Intake | Drafts the six scores and an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) for each. Every line cites something a reviewer can open: an incident id, a report, or a query and its result. | The lead confirms the priority order at the weekly intake meeting. | score.py validates the record and writes the final score. |
| Hypothesis | Drafts the hypothesis, names the log source, and names one blind spot the detection cannot see. | The engineer who owns the detection accepts or rewrites it. | lint.py confirms the four record sections exist and are more than placeholders. A person judges the hypothesis itself. |
| Research | Writes the emulation plan. Runs read-only queries to inspect field names from real events and count the 7-day baseline. | A second person approves the emulation plan before any test infrastructure is provisioned. | lint.py counts the fixtures and the four research lines in the record: plan approval, [run tag](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-tag), baseline, and teardown. The pull request carries the exact queries, their time ranges, bytes scanned, and row counts. |
| Build | Takes the fixtures from the emulation run or the research queries, writes rule.yml, and converts the rule for every target with convert.py --update-golden. | Nothing at this stage. | lint.py, which also checks that every fixture names the run, query, or incident it came from, and convert.py --check. |
| Validate | Runs the replays against the positive and negative fixtures, and explains any change to an approved query. | A second engineer reviews and approves. An agent never approves. | Replay jobs, approved-query diffs, and one human approval. |
| Deploy | Prepares the release package with alerting off, and drafts the pull request that moves the detection to tune once its 7 days live are up. | The lead approves the deploy run, checks the 7-day threshold, and approves the pull request that switches alerting on. | The promotion check, which counts the first 7 days live against the threshold. |
| Tune | Drafts a [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) pull request that adds the specific exclusion as a filter selection and records it in variables.yml. | The owning engineer and the SOC lead approve it. | The core lock refuses a change to the rule's selections, and the change goes back through validate to prove the true-positive fixtures still fire. |
| Retire | Proposes retirement by citing the exact trigger that fired and the numbers behind it. | The lead makes the final call, and the retirement note records the decision. | The rule status check and the retirement record. |

Human approval at validate is the control that matters most. An agent-drafted detection reaches production only after an engineer has read both its record and its rule logic. [Section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/) takes this further, to a loop in which agents run every stage and each check is written against the way an agent would fake its way past it.

### 10.2 Limits on agents

An agent is never permitted to do any of the following.

- Write or edit a prioritization score by hand. tools/score.py --write computes it, and CI fails any score that disagrees with the formula.
- Synthesize test fixtures during build. Fixtures come from a captured emulation run, a scrubbed research query, or an incident's missed events, and each names where it came from.
- Change an approved query outside of a reviewed pull request.
- Approve a pull request, whether its own or someone else's.
- Deploy a rule, switch alerting on, or disable a live detection.
- Keep credentials that can write to the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem), the EDR, or the identity provider.
- Provision test infrastructure without a human-approved emulation plan.
- Rewrite a retirement note or alter the git history of a detection.
- Act on an instruction found inside a log event, an alert payload, a ticket, a threat report, or a web page.

### 10.3 Log content is hostile input

Log content is controlled by the attacker. Command lines, user names, URLs, file names, and email subjects are all written by whoever caused the event. An agent that reads raw logs can be hijacked by prompt-injection text an attacker planted in those fields. The controls below assume every log line is hostile.

1. Separate data from instructions: Treat log events, alert payloads, ticket text, threat reports, and web pages as untrusted data. Never follow instructions found inside them.
2. Lock down query credentials: Give query tools a dedicated, read-only service identity of their own, scoped to the indexes or tables the task needs, with hard limits on rows returned, time range, and bytes scanned. A shared account hides which run caused a compute spike, so the SIEM's audit log should name the agent.
3. Lock the tool sequence: The task sets which tools an agent may call and in what order. A query result may refine the next query's parameters, within a schema allowlist. It never adds a tool call or widens the query's scope.
4. Sanitize before quoting: Deterministic code in the [agent runner](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-agent-runner), never the model, strips control characters and escapes backticks and markup before log content goes into a fenced block in a record or a pull request. Raw log strings never reach a shell command.
5. Put production behind human review: Every change reaches production through a pull request that passes the definitions of done and carries a person's approval.
6. Audit every query: The pull request lists every query the agent ran, failed runs included, with the query text, the time range, the bytes scanned, and the row count. The SIEM's own audit log backs the list.
7. Scrub fixtures deterministically: Automated scanners strip credentials, session tokens, and personal data from fixtures before they are committed.

### 10.4 The review bottleneck

Faster drafting does not make a program bigger. It moves the bottleneck to human review, alert [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage), and monthly upkeep. Every live detection still costs about 20 minutes a month to maintain and adds daily triage load, so the program reaches its capacity ceilings sooner.

Track how many pull requests the team can properly review in a week. Cap the number of open agent pull requests at that limit.

The scored backlog still decides what gets built. An agent pulls work from the top of the backlog and introduces new candidates only through intake.

### 10.5 Three metrics for agent work

Drafting speed measures compute. These three metrics show whether agent-drafted rules survive human review and production.

| Metric | Unit | Aggregation | Definition |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `intake_to_review_ready_hours` | hours | median per month | Hours from a candidate entering intake to a pull request that passes every automated check and waits only on human review. |
| `agent_draft_acceptance_rate` | percent | per month | Share of agent-drafted pull requests approved at first review, without a rewrite by the reviewer or a second round of changes. |
| `agent_detection_survival_90d` | percent | per quarter | Share of agent-drafted detections deployed 90 or more days ago that remain live and at or above their [precision floor](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision-floor). |

A high acceptance rate says the drafts are healthy only while 90-day survival stays high. Acceptance rising while survival falls means reviewers are waving noisy rules through. A third number helps when the first two disagree: the share of an agent's pull request lines the reviewer had to rewrite before merging.

### 10.6 The files in the repository

AGENTS.md sits at the root of the reference repository and on the site's downloads page. It gives any agent runner the lifecycle, the commands for each stage, and the boundaries above. The script tools/agents_md.py generates it from framework.json, and lint fails when the file is out of date, so the instructions an agent reads match the definitions of done CI enforces. CLAUDE.md points Claude Code at the same file. The pull request template carries the review checklist and a line that discloses agent-drafted work.

Next step [The closed loop](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/)


---

## The closed loop

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/

Section 18

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Remember

- Write every check against the way an agent would fake its way past it, and make each check a job the build runs.
- Take field names from a dictionary the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) exported today, never from documentation or memory.
- [Fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) come from a collector the agent cannot write to, with a signature the build verifies.
- Lock the selection blocks that express the behavior with a hash. [Tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) adds filters beneath them and changes nothing above.
- Survival after 90 days is the number that says the checks work. Acceptance alone says reviewers are tired.

[Section 10](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/) lets agents draft the lifecycle's artifacts while people review, deploy, and retire. In the closed loop, agents run the mechanics of every stage, from a threat report to a tuning pull request, and people keep the approvals. The loop stays safe because each stage ends on a check written to catch the way an agent would fake its way past it. Three routes send work back when a check fails.

The loop has six machine stages, and they map onto the eight lifecycle stages. The definitions of done, the records, and the kit's tools stay the same; the loop adds the checks an unattended run needs and the routes back. Nothing in the Never list of [section 10](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/) changes. An agent still never approves, deploys, switches alerting on, or acts on an instruction found in a report or a log.

### 18.1 The six stages and their checks

*1. Extract***Intake and hypothesis**Reads a threat report, an incident, or an exercise result as data and writes a blueprint: the technique id, the behavior in terms of what the host or service must do, and the fields that would show it.Passes when: Schema-valid blueprint, ids in the pinned map, no duplicate.

*2. Ground***Research**Looks each field in the blueprint up in a dictionary exported from the SIEM.Passes when: Every field in today's dictionary, source reporting, baseline counted.

*3. Author***Build**Writes the rule in [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) from the blueprint and the dictionary, and converts it for every target.Passes when: Lint, approved copies, scan under the cap, core hashed.

*4. Prove***Research and validate**Runs the behavior in a throwaway environment, collects the events, and replays the converted query over them and over the last 30 days of production..Passes when: Every variant caught on signed fixtures, 30-day replay grouped.

*5. Tune***Tune**For each group of benign matches, adds one filter beneath the locked core: the parent process, a valid signature and its signer, and the command or flag, as an allowlist entry with a ticket and an expiry.Passes when: Core hash unchanged, filters only, three attributes each, recall re-run.

*6. Ship***Validate, deploy, and the first week live**Opens one pull request carrying the rule, the conversions, the signed fixtures, the replay counts, the hash of every artifact, and every query it ran with its time range and row count.Passes when: Every check plus one person, 7 days alerting off, rate check armed.

**Prove back to Author**A variant in the plan that the rule misses sends the blueprint and the missed event back to Author.

**Prove back to Tune**Matches over the threshold in the 30-day replay go to Tune with the groups already made, and the tuned rule goes through Prove again before it ships..

**Live back to Tune**An analyst's false-positive disposition, an alert rate over the hourly limit, or a daily field check that finds a renamed column each opens a tuning pull request.

**People keep** every pull request approval, the deploy run, the switch that turns alerting on, every retirement, and the thresholds the checks use.

Each stage ends in a check that a job runs, written against the way an agent would fake its way past it. A failed check sends the work back along one of the three routes, or stops it with a log source request.

| Stage | Lifecycle stages | What the agent does | What passes it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Extract | Intake and hypothesis | Reads a threat report, an incident, or an exercise result as data and writes a blueprint: the technique id, the behavior in terms of what the host or service must do, and the fields that would show it. It leaves out the clues the attacker picks, such as file names, hashes, and addresses. It drafts the six scores with an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) each, which is intake. | The blueprint validates against a schema, and every technique id is in the pinned [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) map. No rule in the repository already names the same behavior, by a similarity score under a threshold the team sets. |
| Ground | Research | Looks each field in the blueprint up in a dictionary exported from the SIEM. Documentation is never the source. Checks that the source is arriving: the share of hosts that reported in the last day and the rate of empty values in the fields it needs. Counts the 7-day baseline with a read-only query. | Every field the rule will read exists in the live dictionary. The source reports from at least the share of the fleet the team sets, and 85% is a starting point. The baseline count and its query are in the record. A missing field or a silent source stops the run and opens a log source request, which is research's route back to intake. |
| Author | Build | Writes the rule in Sigma from the blueprint and the dictionary, and converts it for every target. Writes the fixtures it expects to match and to ignore. Declares every threshold, allowlist, and scope as a variable with bounds and evidence. | Lint passes, each conversion matches its approved copy or creates one, and the rule passes the validators. No high-volume field is matched with a leading wildcard, and the estimated scan over the baseline window is under the team's cap. The selection blocks that express the behavior are canonicalized and hashed, and that hash is the core the later stages protect. |
| Prove | Research and validate | Runs the behavior in a throwaway environment, collects the events, and replays the converted query over them and over the last 30 days of production. | Every variant the plan names is caught, the fixtures carry the collector's signature, and the 30-day replay's matches are grouped by parent process, signer, and command, with the groups in the record. A missed variant goes back to Author. Matches over the threshold go on to Tune. |
| Tune | Tune | For each group of benign matches, adds one filter beneath the locked core: the parent process, a valid signature and its signer, and the command or flag, as an allowlist entry with a ticket and an expiry. Then runs Prove again. | The core's hash is unchanged. The diff adds filter selections and nothing else. Each filter names at least three conjunctive attributes, one of them a signature where the source carries one, and no path wildcard. Recall is still complete, and the 30-day matches are under the threshold. A rule with no historical matches at all skips tuning, because an exclusion on a rule that never fired removes something nobody has seen. |
| Ship | Validate, deploy, and the first week live | Opens one pull request carrying the rule, the conversions, the signed fixtures, the replay counts, the hash of every artifact, and every query it ran with its time range and row count. After the merge it packages the rule with alerting off, and seven days later opens the pull request that switches alerting on, with the week's count attached. | Branch protection requires every check above plus one approval by a person, and the deploy run needs the lead's approval. Its opening seven days run with alerting off and at or under the threshold. A rule that fires more than its hourly limit after alerting is on goes back to alerting off and to Tune. |

### 18.2 How each check can be gamed, and what stops it

| Stage | How an agent games it | What stops it | Tools |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Extract | The report is the attack surface. Text planted in a page, a ticket, or a log can tell the agent to skip a check or weaken a rule. | The extractor produces structure and nothing else. It runs with no tool but the schema validator, hidden text and markup are stripped before it reads, and the hostile-input rules of [section 10](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/) apply to everything it sees. | A model call with a JSON schema for its output; the pinned ATT&CK extract for ids; an embedding or tag match against the catalog for duplicates. |
| Ground | An agent invents a field name that reads well, or picks a source that is configured but not arriving, and the rule converts cleanly and matches nothing. | The dictionary comes from a scheduled job the agent does not run, exported daily from the SIEM's own schema. The agent's query credential is read-only and scoped to that export and the baseline count. | Splunk tstats and fieldsummary over the data models, Microsoft Sentinel's table schema and getschema, Elasticsearch's field capabilities, OCSF for the neutral names; the framework's inventory.csv for the sources and their silence alert. |
| Author | A rule that matches the blueprint's ephemeral clues, the file name or the hash, passes every syntax check and is worthless a week later. | The [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) draft scores the rule from its observables, the way the library's sources page describes. A draft at level 1 fails the build unless the record says why that is enough. | pySigma and its validators, sigma-cli check, the backends in the kit's target registry; the SIEM's job statistics for bytes scanned; the kit's lint, convert, and golden diff. |
| Prove | The agent writes the fixtures it needs, or picks the replay window that returns the count it wants. | The sandbox and its collector run under a credential the agent does not have and sign what they emit. The replay window is fixed by the job. The fixtures are read from the signed archive, never from the pull request. | Atomic Red Team through Invoke-Atomic, Stratus Red Team for cloud accounts, and Caldera for chains. Throwaway hosts from Terraform or Ludus, with Sysmon and nxlog or Winlogbeat. OTRF's Security-Datasets when there is no lab. The SIEM's own search over 30 days, or a lakehouse query over OCSF, and Chainsaw or Hayabusa for EVTX offline. |
| Tune | The cheapest way to zero false alarms is to silence the rule: widen a filter, drop a selection, or exclude a directory. | The lock, the additive-only diff, and the re-run of recall. The exclusion policy is a lint rule the build runs. | The kit's declared variables and allowlist entries; a lint that diffs the parsed rule between base and head; the same replay as Prove. |
| Ship | A reviewer who trusts the bundle approves in a minute, and the bundle is the agent's own account of itself. | The bundle links to artifacts that other jobs produced, under hashes the reviewer can check, and the metrics below count how many approvals still look right after 90 days. That number says whether review is still review. | GitHub Actions job summaries and branch protection, the kit's promotion check, and the rule APIs of Sentinel, Splunk ACS, and Elastic. A scheduled alert-rate query that switches alerting off. The case tool's dispositions, such as Sentinel's incident classification or a Splunk ES notable status, as the webhook that drafts a tuning pull request. |

### 18.3 The routes back

| Route | When it is taken |
| --- | --- |
| Prove to Author | A variant in the plan that the rule misses sends the blueprint and the missed event back to Author. The next draft is written against the event the rule did not match. |
| Prove to Tune | Matches over the threshold in the 30-day replay go to Tune with the groups already made, and the tuned rule goes through Prove again before it ships. |
| Live to Tune | An analyst's false-positive disposition, an alert rate over the hourly limit, or a daily field check that finds a renamed column each opens a tuning pull request. The detection stays live until it merges, unless the rate already switched alerting off. |

### 18.4 What people keep

- Approve every pull request. Branch protection enforces it, so it never depends on habit.
- Approve the deploy run and the pull request that switches alerting on.
- Decide every retirement, as in section 6.
- Set the thresholds the checks use: the share of the fleet a source must report from, the scan cap, the exclusion policy, and the hourly alert limit. Write each one down with the reason.
- Read the 90-day survival number every month, and sample the approvals when review time per pull request falls under a few minutes.

### 18.5 What the kit has and what it lacks

Lint on the record, the fixtures, and the stage moves. Conversion with an approved copy per target, and replay on five engines. Declared variables, and the promotion check that reads a detection's live date from git. The core lock and the exclusion policy, in tools/corelock.py. The daily field check in tools/fields.py fails when a live rule's log source sends nothing or a field the rule reads is empty in every event. A person opens the tuning pull request from the failed run. The daily running check in tools/running.py fails when a live rule's saved search in Splunk differs from what the deploy job packaged, is disabled, or alerts at the wrong stage. AGENTS.md as the policy an [agent runner](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-agent-runner) reads, the hostile-input rules, and the four research lines the record must carry.

The extractor, and the daily export of the whole field dictionary for Ground to draft from. The scan estimate, and the robustness draft as a build check. The sandbox runner and its signing collector, and the 30-day replay job. The alert-rate check that switches alerting off, and the disposition webhook. Each is one job in the pipeline, and the rollout below adds them in the order that pays first.

### 18.6 The pieces, specified

Each check above is a job. These are the six pieces the loop rests on, specified closely enough to build. The kit carries two of them, the core lock and the exclusion policy; the other four are the team's to build.

| Piece | What it is |
| --- | --- |
| The field dictionary | One table a scheduled job writes daily: source, table, field, type, the share of events in the last 24 hours in which the field was non-empty, and the share of hosts that reported. Ground reads this and nothing else for field names. A field under the team's non-empty share is treated as absent. |
| The core lock | Every selection in the detection block whose name does not start with filter, plus the condition with its 'and not filter' clauses removed. The two are canonicalized, with keys and value lists sorted and values stripped, and hashed with SHA-256. Tuning must leave the hash unchanged. The kit's tools/corelock.py computes it and fails a pull request that changes it on a live rule. |
| The exclusion policy | A filter is one map of at least three fields that must all be true, such as the parent process, the signer or original file name, and the flag or path. No value may replace a whole directory with a wildcard. Removing a filter widens the rule and goes back through validate. Each filter cites a ticket and an expiry in the record's allowlist variable. |
| The signed fixture | The collector in the sandbox writes each run's events to an archive with a manifest listing every file's SHA-256, and signs the manifest with a key the agent never sees. Prove reads fixtures from that archive only. The build verifies the signature before it counts a match as recall. |
| The pull request bundle | The rule, the approved copy for every target, the signed fixture archive's hash, and the recall result per variant. With them, the replay window and its counts grouped by parent and signer, the core hash, the scan estimate, and every query the agent ran with its time range and row count. Branch protection requires the jobs that produced each item. |
| The alert-rate check | A scheduled query every few minutes counts each live rule's alerts in the last hour against the hourly limit on its record. Over the limit, the job switches the rule's alerting off, records the hour's count, and opens a tuning pull request with the matches grouped. Alerting comes back on only through the promotion pull request, as for a new rule. |

### 18.7 What to measure

| Target | How to measure it |
| --- | --- |
| First-time pass rate per check | The monthly share of runs that pass each check on the first try. A check that always passes checks nothing, and one that never passes is set wrong. |
| Trips around the loop per rule | Median count of returns to Author and to Tune before a rule merges. A rising number points at the extractor or the dictionary before it points at the model. |
| Hours from intake to review-ready | The intake_to_review_ready_hours metric of [section 10](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/), which the loop should move from days to hours. Report the median; the best run flatters. |
| Acceptance and survival | agent_draft_acceptance_rate and agent_detection_survival_90d from section 10. Survival is the number that tells you the checks work; acceptance alone tells you reviewers are tired. |
| Review minutes per pull request | Measured from the pull request's timeline. When it falls below a few minutes, sample a tenth of the approvals and re-review them. |
| Alerting switched off by the rate check | Count per month, with the rule and the cause. Each one is a tuning pull request the loop should have opened earlier. |
| Renames the field check caught | Count per month. Each one is a detection that would have gone silent. |

### 18.8 Rolling it out

| Phase | Add | Done when |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Days 1 to 30 | The repository, lint, conversion with approved copies, the daily dictionary export, and the scan cap. No model yet. | No rule reaches a pull request with a field the dictionary lacks, and no query over the scan cap merges. |
| Days 31 to 60 | The extractor, then Prove: the sandbox or the recordings, the signing collector, and the 30-day replay. | Every pull request carries signed fixtures, a recall result, and a replay count. |
| Days 61 to 90 | Tune with the core lock and the exclusion policy, the promotion check, the alert-rate check, and the disposition webhook. | A false-positive disposition becomes a tuning pull request without a person starting it, and the core hash of every live rule matches its approved copy. |

### 18.9 One pass, by hand

No agent has run the loop. To see whether its checks work on real events, I walked the six stages by hand. The tools were the kit's, and the events were the 107 recorded attacks the library already runs its rules against. The procedure was LSASS memory dumped through comsvcs.dll, T1003.001, the example the reference architecture behind this section was built around. The table shows what each stage did and what came back.

| Stage | What was done | What came back |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Extract | Read the procedure. rundll32.exe loads comsvcs.dll and calls its MiniDump export against the process id of lsass.exe. The library name and the export are durable; the attacker can also name the export by its ordinal, 24. The dump file's path and name are the attacker's choice, so they were left out. | One behavior and two candidate observables: the command line of the rundll32 process, and the call trace of its access to lsass.exe. Both map to T1003.001, which the offline ATT&CK copy confirms is a real id. |
| Ground | Counted, in the recordings, the two event types the candidates read, and how many of each had its field filled. | Sysmon event 1, process creation: 1,515 events in 95 of the 107 recordings, with CommandLine filled in every one. Sysmon event 10, process access: 249,519 events in 103 recordings, with CallTrace filled in every one. Both fields are safe to build on. |
| Author | Wrote the rule as Sigma: process creation where CommandLine contains comsvcs and one of MiniDump, #24, #+24, or '24 followed by a space. Computed its core hash and its robustness draft, and converted it to SQL with the kit's SQLite backend. | Core hash b251dfc760654ed9. The same rule with its keys and its list of values in another order gives the same hash. The robustness draft is level 2, text from the attacker's own tool, because the attacker types the command line. SigmaHQ's rule for the same procedure, a49fa4d5, reads the call trace of the process access, and it drafts at level 2 as well. |
| Prove | Ran both rules over all 776,654 events in the corpus, grouped by recording. The recording of this procedure is SDWIN-201018195009, Lsass Memory Dump via Comsvcs.dll, 184 events. | The candidate fired on 1 event, in that recording, and on nothing else in the corpus. SigmaHQ's rule fired on 2 events, in the same recording, and on nothing else. The match is the fixture: rundll32.exe started by powershell.exe as WORKSTATION5\wardog, with the MiniDump command line quoted below. Recall against the one recording of this procedure is 1 of 1. |
| Tune | Looked for noise to exclude. | There was nothing to exclude. The corpus has no benign recording, so zero [false positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-false-positive) here says nothing about a real fleet. The exclusion policy was tested another way. The kit self-test adds a one-field filter, a filter that wildcards a directory, and a change to a live rule's selections, and the core lock refuses each. |
| Ship | Nothing. No SIEM received the rule, no pull request was opened, and no seven days ran. | Most of the bundle the pull request would carry exists: the rule, the SQL conversion, the one fixture, the replay counts per recording, the core hash, and the queries below with their row counts. The signature on the fixture does not, because no collector outside the author's reach produced it. |

The one event the candidate matched, quoted the way a record quotes log content, as data in a fenced block:

```
"C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe" C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump 756 C:\Users\wardog\AppData\Local\Temp\lsass-comsvcs.dmp full
```

The queries the pass ran, listed the way the pull request template asks for them:

| Query | Over | Rows |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Sysmon event 1 with CommandLine filled, by recording | all 107 recordings | 1,515 in 95 recordings |
| Sysmon event 10 with CallTrace filled, by recording | all 107 recordings | 249,519 in 103 recordings |
| The candidate rule, converted to SQL | all 776,654 events | 1, in SDWIN-201018195009 |
| SigmaHQ a49fa4d5, converted to SQL | all 776,654 events | 2, in SDWIN-201018195009 |
| Any command line containing comsvcs | all 776,654 events | 2, both in SDWIN-201018195009 |

The other four T1003.001 recordings, Mimikatz twice, Task Manager, and direct syscalls, each set off 8 to 10 library rules, and none of those rules was a comsvcs rule. One rule covers one procedure, and a technique's recall is the sum over its procedures. Extract should emit one candidate per procedure a report describes, and a coverage count by technique overstates what one rule covers.

The pass shows that ground, author, prove, and the core lock work on real events with the kit's tools, and that the replay has a corpus to run on today. It does not show that a model can do extract or author unassisted, or how the exclusion policy fares against a tuning agent. It says nothing about the rule's alert rate on a real fleet. The outside checks page lists the pass and these gaps.

The loop multiplies what [section 10](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/) already says about the review bottleneck. Cap open agent pull requests at what reviewers clear in a week, and let the scored backlog decide what gets drafted.

A 30-day replay over every candidate is the loop's largest bill. Run it over a sample of hosts first, and over the whole fleet only for a rule that passed.

One pass has been measured, by hand and against recordings, in 18.9. The targets above are what a team should expect to see, and the outside checks page lists them as untested.


---

## Choosing AI for detection and response

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/

Section 19

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Grade an AI product](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/ai/)

Remember

- Adopt AI where a bad output costs one review, such as drafting into a pull request, before uses where it costs an incident.
- Count an agent's benefit in analyst minutes saved and its price in alerts it wrongly closed, and report the two together.
- Run an AI [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) agent in shadow mode on the team's own alerts, and replay every confirmed incident through it before it closes anything.
- Ask for all four counts on the team's own alerts, with the number of real attacks. A share of alerts closed hides every attack the agent missed.
- Ask any product where its rules go, which events prove them, and who switches alerting on. Grade it by its weakest answer.
- Treat a new model, prompt, or vendor release as a new agent that goes back through shadow mode.

An AI detection and response program pays for itself in analyst and engineering minutes. It fails when it misses an attack it was trusted to catch. Every choice in this section weighs the minutes an AI use saves against the evidence that it misses nothing. The same tests apply whether the AI ships inside a [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem), comes from a separate vendor, or is assembled from open-source parts.

[Section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/) says what a safe automated detection pipeline looks like. This section turns that design into a buying and building decision. It covers which uses to adopt first, which path fits a team, what to ask any product, and how to prove an AI triage agent before it closes an alert.

### 19.1 Where AI earns its keep

Each use below saves a kind of minute the scaling ceilings of [section 14](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/scaling/) count, and each can break something the lifecycle exists to catch. The order is the order to adopt them in.

| Use | Minutes it saves | What it can break | What proves it | When to adopt it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Drafting detections and records | Engineering minutes spent writing a rule, its record, and its conversions. | A rule keyed on one tool's fingerprint, a field the logs do not carry, or a test event the model wrote. | The closed loop's checks in CI, and the share of drafts still live at 90 days. | First. Every draft goes through a pull request, so a bad one costs one review. |
| Translating rules between platforms | Engineering weeks in a SIEM migration. | A translation that reads the same and matches different events, as with case sensitivity or a renamed field. | The same [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) replayed in the old engine and the new one, with identical matches. | First, during any migration. |
| Enriching and summarizing an alert | Analyst minutes per alert, which raises the triage ceiling. | A summary that leaves out the deciding fact, or states one the data does not show. | A weekly sample in which analysts mark each summary right, incomplete, or wrong. | Second. It only reads, and the analyst still decides. |
| Triage verdicts that close alerts | More analyst minutes than any other use. | It closes a real attack, the costliest failure the program can have. | Shadow mode on the team's own alerts, with every confirmed incident replayed through it, as 19.4 describes. | Third, one alert class at a time, after shadow mode passes. |
| [Tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) proposals | Upkeep minutes spent on noisy rules. | An exclusion broad enough to blind the rule. | The core lock and the exclusion policy of [section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/), with the true-positive fixtures still firing. | Once the core lock runs in CI. |
| Response actions | Minutes to contain an intrusion. | A wrong action that causes an outage, or one an attacker steered with text planted in a log. | A playbook the team wrote for each action, a log of every action taken, and the count of actions people reverted. | Last. Without a person's approval, only actions that can be undone in one step. |

### 19.2 Build, buy, or assemble

| Path | It fits when | Watch for | Start with |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Use the AI in the SIEM or XDR the team runs | One platform carries most of the telemetry, and the team is small. | Agent actions logged only in the vendor's console, verdicts that cannot be replayed, and per-unit pricing that grows with use. | The investigation assistant, read-only. Then triage in shadow mode. |
| Buy an AI SOC product | Alert volume is past the triage ceiling, and the telemetry spans several tools. | Write credentials into the team's tools, accuracy claims with no method, and verdicts that cannot be exported. | Shadow mode on 30 days of the team's own alerts with known outcomes. |
| Assemble from open models and [MCP](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mcp) servers | Logs cannot leave the team's tenant, or the team already runs [detection as code](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-as-code). | The team owns the evaluation, the defenses against planted instructions, and the on-call rota for the agent. | A drafting agent that opens pull requests into the kit's CI and does nothing else. |
| Build the closed loop of [section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/) | The detection program is itself the product, as at a managed security provider or a team with its own platform group. | The checks cost more than the model. Budget the field dictionary and the signed fixtures before the prompts. | The 90-day rollout in 18.8. |

A team can mix the paths by function. A common split takes triage from the SIEM vendor, builds drafting around the team's own repository, and keeps response with people until the action log has a quarter of history.

### 19.3 What to ask any product

Each question comes from a check in section 18. A product that passes all of them behaves like the closed loop, whoever built it. The Grade an AI product tool records the answers and does the arithmetic.

| Area | Ask | A passing answer | A red flag |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Extract | What happens to instructions hidden in a threat report, a ticket, or a log line? | Untrusted text reaches only a model with no tool access, and the vendor shows a test of it. | The model has been trained to ignore them. |
| Ground | Where do the field names in a generated rule come from? | From the team's own data, queried read-only when the rule is drafted. | From documentation, a schema the vendor ships, or the model's memory. |
| Author | Where does a generated rule go when it is done? | Into a pull request in the team's repository, through the team's CI. | Straight into the SIEM, or into a vendor-side library the team cannot diff. |
| Prove | Which events prove that a generated rule fires? | Captured events from the team's environment or a named [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) run, stored beside the rule. | Events the model wrote, or no test events at all. |
| Tune | Can the agent change what a live rule catches? | Only by adding a narrow, named exclusion that a person approves. The detection logic itself is locked. | It adjusts live rules on its own to cut noise. |
| Ship | Who switches alerting on for a new rule? | A named person, after a period with alerting off and an alert count at or under its threshold. | The agent, or anyone with access to the console. |
| Triage | Which alerts can the agent close without a person, and who decided that? | Classes the team chose after shadow mode, each with a measured false-close rate. | Any alert above a confidence score the vendor set. |
| Investigate | Can every query the agent ran be seen outside the vendor's console, with its time range and cost? | Yes. The SIEM's own audit log records them under the agent's identity, or the product exports them. | Only a written summary of the investigation. |
| Respond | What can the agent do without a person's approval? | A short list of actions that can be undone, each in a playbook the team wrote. | Anything an analyst could do. |
| Access | What credentials does the agent use? | Its own identity, read-only and scoped, with write access only for the listed actions. | An administrator's API key, or an analyst's account. |
| Data and model | Where do the team's logs go, and can the model be pinned? | A stated region, no training on customer data, and a pinned model version whose changes are announced. | The model changes without notice. |
| Accuracy | What were the four counts in the trial, real attacks escalated and closed and benign alerts escalated and closed? | All four counts for each alert class, from the team's own labeled alerts during the trial, with the number of real attacks stated. | A share of alerts closed, an agreement rate, or a percentage from an unnamed benchmark or other customers. |

The grade is the weakest answer among the questions that count. Any failed question keeps that function with people until it passes.

### 19.4 Proving an AI triage agent before it closes anything

An agent that closes alerts goes through the steps a detection takes before its alerting goes on. It runs where it can do no harm, its record is counted, and a person promotes it.

1. Run the agent on every alert for 30 days with no power to close one. It records a verdict, and analysts decide as before without seeing it until they have.
2. Replay the alerts of every confirmed incident and purple-team exercise from the last year through the agent. Each one must come back escalated. The number replayed sets the smallest miss rate the trial can show, as 19.7 explains.
3. Count the agent's four cells for each alert class: real attacks it escalated or would have closed, and benign alerts it escalated or would have closed. Count analyst minutes per alert with and without its summary too.
4. Promote one class to auto-close when it shows no wrong closes over at least 100 alerts and every replayed incident came back escalated. The team can raise either number.
5. After promotion, analysts review a random 5% of each class's auto-closed alerts every week.
6. One confirmed miss sends the class back to shadow mode. So does a new model, prompt, or vendor release, because each makes it a different agent.

### 19.5 Metrics for AI in detection and response

| Metric | Unit | Aggregation | Definition |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `ai_false_close_rate` | percent | per month | Share of alerts later confirmed malicious, by an incident, an exercise, or the weekly sample, that the agent closed or would have closed. |
| `ai_verdict_agreement` | percent | per month | Share of shadow or sampled alerts on which the agent's verdict matched the analyst's. |
| `ai_minutes_saved_per_alert` | minutes | median per month | Analyst minutes per alert without the agent's summary, minus minutes with it, on the same alert class. |
| `ai_actions_reverted` | count | per month | Response actions the agent took or proposed that a person then undid or refused. |
| `ai_cost_per_true_positive` | currency | per month | The agent's spend on licenses, model tokens, and query compute, divided by the [true positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive) it worked on. |

The triage ceiling of [section 14](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/scaling/) rises as minutes per alert fall, so minutes saved is the agent's benefit. The false-close rate is its price, and a report shows the two side by side.

### 19.6 What ships today

These tables list what each maker documents, read on 2026-10-17 from product documentation, release notes, model cards, and repositories, with DefendBench read on 2026-10-27. Each row maps a product to the loop's stages and lists the controls its maker documents. Grading is left to the questions in 19.3 and the scorecard tool.

Read side by side, the documents show the following.

- Every SIEM and XDR platform read for this table ships AI for triage or investigation, and most let a person approve each response action.
- Google's detection engineering agent and Panther's builder test the rules they write against events or test cases a model generated. Prophet backtests against the customer's own history, which counts a rule's noise. None of the products that write rules documents a test against a recorded run of the attack, the event [section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/)'s Prove stage asks for.
- No AI SOC product or platform publishes all four counts of its triage record from production. Qevlar publishes a false-negative rate without saying what it is out of, and 19.7 compares what each maker publishes.
- Several MCP servers can change the tenant as soon as they run, so the access question in 19.3 applies to the open-source path too.
- The one public benchmark that scores generated rules covers Azure and KQL. DefendBench scores rules on six SIEMs and keeps its tasks private. No defense against planted instructions reports a test on log fields.

#### AI in the SIEM or XDR

Google's detection engineering agent and Panther's builder are the two platforms here that test the rules they write.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Security Copilot with Sentinel and Defender XDR** (Microsoft). The triage agent is generally available for user-reported phishing and in preview for some identity and cloud alerts. The Sentinel MCP server is in preview, with some tools generally available. | Ground, author, triage, investigate, respond with a person | The triage agent classifies Defender alerts and resolves the ones it judges [false positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-false-positive), leaving true positives open. A hunting assistant writes and runs KQL, and a migration tool maps Splunk and QRadar rules to Microsoft's own. | The agent runs under its own Entra identity with scoped roles, and its actions go to Purview audit logs. Analyst feedback becomes lessons in its memory, which an administrator can review or reject. | [learn.microsoft.com (1)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/phishing-triage-agent), [learn.microsoft.com (2)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/security-copilot-agents-defender), [learn.microsoft.com (3)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/advanced-hunting-security-copilot-threat-hunting-assistant), [learn.microsoft.com (4)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/siem-migration), [learn.microsoft.com (5)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/copilot/security/privacy-data-security) |
| **Gemini in Security Operations** (Google Cloud). The triage agent is generally available. The detection engineering agent and event simulation have been in preview since 2026-08-18. | Extract, author, prove, ship, triage, investigate | A triage agent investigates SIEM alerts and returns a verdict with a confidence and a summary. A detection engineering agent, run from MCP clients, drafts YARA-L where no existing rule matches the intelligence, and tests rules against simulated events. | The user approves or rejects each draft rule. Simulated events are machine-generated, ingested live under a SIMULATION label the caller must add, and counted against quota. Agent calls go to Cloud Audit Logs. | [docs.cloud.google.com (1)](https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/secops/agentic-detection-engineering), [docs.cloud.google.com (2)](https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/secops/event-simulation), [docs.cloud.google.com (3)](https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/secops/triage-agent), [docs.cloud.google.com (4)](https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/secops/use-google-secops-mcp), [docs.cloud.google.com (5)](https://docs.cloud.google.com/chronicle/docs/secops/release-notes) |
| **Charlotte AI** (CrowdStrike). Detection triage has been available since 2025-02-13. The product documentation needs a customer login, so this row rests on public pages. | Author, triage, investigate, respond | Detection triage gives each endpoint detection a priority, a true or false positive call, and a recommended action. Named agents write correlation and YARA rules and translate Splunk queries into CrowdStrike's query language. | It takes no automated response by default, and each action can run on its own or wait for approval, set per workflow. Responses respect the user's permissions. The public pages do not say where audit logs or data are kept. | [crowdstrike.com (1)](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/agentic-ai-innovation-in-cybersecurity-charlotte-ai-detection-triage/), [crowdstrike.com (2)](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-delivers-seven-agents-to-build-agentic-security-workforce/), [crowdstrike.com (3)](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/charlotte-ai/) |
| **Cortex XSIAM with Cortex AgentiX** (Palo Alto Networks). AgentiX has been available in XSIAM since 2025-10-28. Agentic response and AI data-model rules are in preview. | Ground, author queries, triage, investigate, respond | Agents plan and run playbooks, scripts, and commands on cases, write and run XQL, and summarize cases. An AI feature proposes field mappings for raw data from sampled logs. | Sensitive actions need a user's explicit approval, and an audit dataset names the agent and the user behind each action. EU and US tenants pick the model per chat. Prompts stay in region and are not used for training. | [cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com (1)](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex-xsiam/learn-about-cortex-xsiam/agentic-ai-in-cortex-xsiam), [cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com (2)](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex-xsiam/learn-about-cortex-xsiam/agentic-ai-in-cortex-xsiam/agentic-assistant-security), [cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com (3)](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex-xsiam/configure-cortex-xsiam/automations/agentic-response-preview), [cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com (4)](https://cortex-docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex-xsiam/configure-cortex-xsiam/data-management/data-model-rules/generate-data-model-rules-with-ai-preview) |
| **Splunk Enterprise Security** (Splunk, a Cisco company). Enterprise Security 8.7 was released 2026-09-02. The AI SOC analyst is in the Premier edition. | Author, tune, triage, investigate, respond | A detection builder drafts and tunes SPL detections in the editor, and it cannot save, test, or change a detection's status. An AI SOC analyst triages findings and runs the response actions it is allowed to run. | Each builder suggestion needs Approve or Reject, and each response action is set to run automatically or wait for approval. The MCP server blocks REST writes, and its Enterprise Security tools only read. | [help.splunk.com (1)](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/administer/8.7/ai-assistant-in-security-and-agentic-capabilities/author-detections-using-the-detection-builder-agent-in-splunk-enterprise-security), [help.splunk.com (2)](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/administer/8.7/ai-assistant-in-security-and-agentic-capabilities/setting-up-the-ai-soc-analyst-agentic-workflow-in-splunk-enterprise-security), [help.splunk.com (3)](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/release-notes-and-resources/8.7/splunk-enterprise-security-release-notes), [help.splunk.com (4)](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-cloud-platform/mcp-server-for-splunk-platform/1.3/mcp-server-rest-command-support) |
| **Elastic Security** (Elastic). Agent Builder has been generally available since 9.4, with AI rule creation in the Enterprise tier. Attack Discovery is generally available. | Ground, author, triage, investigate, respond | Drafts an ES|QL rule with an [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) mapping from a description and previews it on live data. Automatic Migration translates Splunk, QRadar, and Sentinel rules, and Attack Discovery groups alerts into attacks. | Rule drafts must be applied by hand, and migrated rules are installed for the user to enable. The customer picks the model connector and can anonymize fields. Everyone using one MCP API key acts with that key's permissions. | [elastic.co (1)](https://www.elastic.co/docs/solutions/security/ai/agent-builder/agent-builder), [elastic.co (2)](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/ai-esql-detection-rule-creation), [elastic.co (3)](https://www.elastic.co/docs/solutions/security/get-started/automatic-migration), [elastic.co (4)](https://www.elastic.co/docs/solutions/security/ai/attack-discovery), [elastic.co (5)](https://www.elastic.co/docs/explore-analyze/ai-features/agent-builder/mcp-server) |
| **Purple AI** (SentinelOne). Auto-triage has been generally available since April 2025. The product documentation needs a customer login, so this row rests on public pages. | Triage, investigate, respond | Investigates alerts without an analyst, collects evidence, and issues verdicts that can trigger automated responses. No detection-writing feature is documented publicly. | Automated actions run only within policies the customer approved, and each verdict carries an evidence chain. Customer data is not used for training. | [sentinelone.com (1)](https://www.sentinelone.com/platform/purple/), [sentinelone.com (2)](https://www.sentinelone.com/press/sentinelone-opens-purple-ai-agentic-investigation-to-all-customers-bringing-frontier-ai-directly-into-the-soc/) |
| **Panther AI** (Panther Labs). The AI Detection Builder has been in open beta since version 1.118, and automatic closing of low-risk alerts is in closed beta. | Author, prove, ship, triage, investigate | The builder writes Python detections, log types, and test cases, and triage judges each alert a true or false positive. | Write tools wait for a person to accept or reject them, and each decision goes to Panther's audit logs. Builder changes save only when a person clicks Deploy. Claude runs through Amazon Bedrock in the customer's single-tenant AWS account. | [docs.panther.com (1)](https://docs.panther.com/ai), [docs.panther.com (2)](https://docs.panther.com/ai/panther-ai-and-alerts), [docs.panther.com (3)](https://docs.panther.com/detections/rules/ai-builder) |
| **Cloud SIEM SOC analyst agent** (Sumo Logic). The help page states no release stage. | Triage, investigate | Investigates each Cloud SIEM insight in the background and labels it malicious, suspicious, benign, or inconclusive, with its key findings. | It takes no remediation or containment action, and its recommended severity applies only when an analyst accepts it. Every tool call is logged to Cloud SIEM. Models run on Amazon Bedrock, with no training on customer data. | [sumologic.com (1)](https://www.sumologic.com/help/docs/cse/get-started-with-cloud-siem/soc-analyst-agent), [sumologic.com (2)](https://www.sumologic.com/help/docs/get-started/ai-machine-learning/) |

#### AI SOC products

Products that triage and investigate alerts from the team's existing tools. Qevlar alone publishes a false-negative rate, from a test it ran, and Intezer alone publishes results with a sampling method. [Section 19.7](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/#19-7-reading-an-accuracy-claim) compares what each publishes.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Dropzone AI SOC Analyst** (Dropzone AI). | Triage, investigate, respond | Investigates each alert it receives and writes a conclusion with its evidence. Containment runs when a user starts it, and customer-written Python actions can run without a click. | Read-only access by default. A changelog and a system events log record activity. Models from Anthropic, Azure OpenAI, and others, in AWS's Oregon region, or in the EU on request, with no training on customer data. | [docs.dropzone.ai (1)](https://docs.dropzone.ai/integrations), [docs.dropzone.ai (2)](https://docs.dropzone.ai/platform/settings/system-events), [docs.dropzone.ai (3)](https://docs.dropzone.ai/platform/settings/response-actions), [dropzone.ai](https://dropzone.ai/security-privacy-trust) |
| **Socrates** (Torq). | Triage, investigate, respond | An agent inside Torq's automation platform that triages and investigates cases and runs response workflows. | Asks a user to confirm sensitive actions and runs only the tools given to it. Torq's audit log records every action with the user who asked. Torq's model or the customer's own subscription, in US, EU, or Japan regions. | [kb.torq.io (1)](https://kb.torq.io/en/articles/9738849-transform-your-soc-with-responsible-ai), [kb.torq.io (2)](https://kb.torq.io/en/articles/9743934-socrates-auditing-monitor-your-ai-analyst), [kb.torq.io (3)](https://kb.torq.io/en/articles/13424122-ai-in-torq), [kb.torq.io (4)](https://kb.torq.io/en/articles/15516103-regional-availability-deployment-and-data-residency-options) |
| **AI SOC Analyst** (Prophet Security). | Triage, investigate, respond | Investigates every alert with a plan built for that alert, and sends its findings to case management. | Takes only actions the customer approved, each previewed and backtested first. Documents every query and reasoning step. Single-tenant with a bring-your-own-key option, and setup asks for read-only access. | [prophetsecurity.ai (1)](https://www.prophetsecurity.ai/ai-soc-analyst), [prophetsecurity.ai (2)](https://prophetsecurity.ai/why-prophet-security), [prophetsecurity.ai (3)](https://www.prophetsecurity.ai/security) |
| **Intezer AI SOC** (Intezer). | Triage, investigate, respond | Triages every alert by combining forensic analysis, such as sandboxing and memory analysis, with AI models, and closes false positives automatically. | Remediation can be automated with a person's explicit approval, and any verdict can be challenged. Experts review a random 5% of alerts each week, stated at 95% confidence with a margin under 2%. Models and residency are not documented. | [intezer.com (1)](https://intezer.com/ai-autonomous-soc-platform), [intezer.com (2)](https://intezer.com/blog/quality-assurance-in-intezers-autonomous-soc) |
| **CognitiveSOC** (Conifers.ai). | Author, prove, tune, ship, triage, investigate, respond | Agents investigate alerts to a verdict and a remediation plan. Others write, deploy, and tune detections, testing rule changes in a sandbox. | The customer picks a person in the loop, on the loop, or full autonomy. Each conclusion lists the queries run and the data touched. Runs in Azure in a chosen region, and reads from and writes to the customer's tools. | [conifers.ai (1)](https://www.conifers.ai/ai-soc-agents/), [conifers.ai (2)](https://www.conifers.ai/security-trust-center/), [conifers.ai (3)](https://www.conifers.ai/integrations/) |
| **Qevlar AI**. | Triage, investigate, respond when an analyst starts it | An orchestrator plans the steps of an investigation and model agents carry them out. Each produces a verdict, a report, and a containment or tuning recommendation. | Analysts review and start remediation. Every step and every queried observable is visible. Hosted in the EU on Google Cloud, with no training on customer inputs. | [qevlar.com (1)](https://www.qevlar.com/), [qevlar.com (2)](https://www.qevlar.com/faq), [qevlar.com (3)](https://www.qevlar.com/integrations) |
| **Command Zero**. | Triage, investigate | Runs investigations as sequences of curated questions that query the connected sources at the time, without ingesting their data. | Connects through read-only APIs, logs every decision, and replays investigations. Analysts can take over any autonomous run. Model and residency are not documented. | [commandzero.ai](https://www.commandzero.ai/platform) |

#### AI for detection engineering

Products that apply a model to writing, translating, testing, or tuning rules. None of them publishes an accuracy figure for the rules it writes.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **AI Detection Engineer** (Prophet Security). Announced 2026-07-30 for its AI SOC Analyst customers. | Ground in part, author, prove, tune, ship | Maps coverage from the customer's own detections, drafts detections for the gaps, and tunes noisy rules in Splunk, Sumo Logic, or Microsoft Sentinel. Each change is backtested against the customer's recent history. | Suggests by default, and the team approves version-controlled changes before they deploy. Autonomy can be raised per category of work. The model is not named. | [prophetsecurity.ai (1)](https://www.prophetsecurity.ai/blog/introducing-prophet-ai-detection-engineer-find-every-coverage-gap-and-close-it), [prophetsecurity.ai (2)](https://www.prophetsecurity.ai/ai-detection-engineer) |
| **Anvilogic**. | Author, tune, ship, triage, investigate | A detection layer over Splunk, Snowflake, and Databricks. Its agents plan detections for coverage gaps, write the queries, and deploy them, and users accept or dismiss tuning suggestions. | Approval steps, roles, and budgets limit what agents run, with version history and rollback. Its chat assistant uses OpenAI-hosted models, with no training on raw customer data. | [anvilogic.com](https://www.anvilogic.com/detection-engineering), [public-docs.anvilogic.com (1)](https://public-docs.anvilogic.com/get-started/ai-operating-system-pricing), [public-docs.anvilogic.com (2)](https://public-docs.anvilogic.com/security-controls/ai-chat-and-ai-privacy-and-controls) |
| **Uncoder AI** (SOC Prime). | Extract, author, ship | Writes [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules or indicator queries from pasted threat-report text, translates Sigma into 48 query languages, checks syntax, and suggests ATT&CK tags. | Open-weight models hosted by SOC Prime, an opt-in OpenAI option for some functions, and no training on user data. Its validation checks syntax only, and the user reviews the output. | [help.socprime.com (1)](https://help.socprime.com/en/articles/11679138-how-to-generate-behavior-rules-and-queries-with-ai), [help.socprime.com (2)](https://help.socprime.com/en/articles/7185726-translation-overview), [help.socprime.com (3)](https://help.socprime.com/en/articles/10748890-soc-prime-uncoder-ai-release-notes-4-0), [socprime.com](https://socprime.com/prime-architect/) |
| **NARC** (Tidal Cyber). | Extract | Turns threat reports, blogs, and incident documents into ATT&CK procedures linked to groups, software, and campaigns. | Analysts review and correct the extractions. Single-tenant with a choice of region on the enterprise tier. The model is not described. | [tidalcyber.com (1)](https://www.tidalcyber.com/narc), [tidalcyber.com (2)](https://www.tidalcyber.com/blog/why-llms-alone-cant-do-threat-comprehension-what-specialized-models-like-narc-add), [tidalcyber.com (3)](https://www.tidalcyber.com/pricing) |
| **Detection Rule Validation** (Picus Security). | Ground, prove | Reads the live rule inventory from Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, or QRadar, checks that each rule's log sources send events, and runs attack simulations to see which rules fire. Its AI maps unmapped rules to ATT&CK. | Integrates with read-only access and does not change rules. The customer applies any fix. | [picussecurity.com](https://www.picussecurity.com/platform/detection-rule-validation) |

#### MCP servers for security tools

Several servers expose tools that change the tenant as soon as they run. Read each tool list, start a server read-only where it offers a flag, and give it an identity of its own, as [section 10.3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/#10-3-log-content-is-hostile-input) asks.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **MCP Server for the Splunk platform** (Splunk). A Splunkbase app, version 1.3. | Ground, author queries, triage, investigate | Runs SPL searches and saved searches, lists indexes and metadata, and generates or explains SPL. Its Enterprise Security tools list findings, investigations, and response plans. | A search may be refused past 1 minute or 1,000 events, or when it uses a command the server deems unsafe. REST writes are blocked, the Enterprise Security tools only read, and each tool needs a capability an administrator grants. | [help.splunk.com (1)](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-cloud-platform/mcp-server-for-splunk-platform/1.3/mcp-server-tools), [help.splunk.com (2)](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-cloud-platform/mcp-server-for-splunk-platform/1.3/mcp-server-rest-command-support), [help.splunk.com (3)](https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/user-guide/8.7/introduction/use-the-splunk-mcp-server-app-to-access-tools-in-splunk-enterprise-security) |
| **mcp-security** (Google). Apache 2.0 local servers, plus a managed remote server. | Ground, prove, tune, ship, triage, investigate, respond | Local servers cover the SIEM, SOAR, threat intelligence, and Security Command Center. Some tools change the tenant, such as creating rule exclusions, changing curated rule deployments, and ingesting events. | The remote server needs an IAM role, writes to Cloud Audit Logs, and can screen tool calls with Model Armor. The local servers run under the caller's Google Cloud credentials. | [github.com](https://github.com/google/mcp-security), [raw.githubusercontent.com (1)](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/mcp-security/main/server/secops/README.md), [raw.githubusercontent.com (2)](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/mcp-security/main/docs/remote_server.md) |
| **Microsoft Sentinel MCP server** (Microsoft). Hosted. In preview, with some tools generally available. | Ground, triage, investigate | Tool collections explore the data lake with KQL, list and fetch incidents and alerts, run Defender advanced hunting, and create and deploy Security Copilot agents. | Uses the caller's Entra identity and roles. The triage and exploration tools only query data, and deploying an agent writes. | [learn.microsoft.com (1)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/datalake/sentinel-mcp-overview), [learn.microsoft.com (2)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/datalake/sentinel-mcp-triage-tool), [learn.microsoft.com (3)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/datalake/sentinel-mcp-agent-creation-tool) |
| **Agent Builder MCP endpoint** (Elastic). Generally available since 9.3. | Ground, author, prove, triage, investigate | Serves Agent Builder's tools, among them ES|QL queries, index mappings, security alerts, a tool that writes an ES|QL detection rule from a description, and rule preview. | An API key gives every caller one shared identity, so Elastic advises scoping it to the needed indices and rotating it. Per-user OAuth is available on Serverless only. | [elastic.co (1)](https://www.elastic.co/docs/explore-analyze/ai-features/agent-builder/mcp-server), [elastic.co (2)](https://www.elastic.co/docs/explore-analyze/ai-features/agent-builder/tools/builtin-tools-reference), [elastic.co (3)](https://www.elastic.co/docs/explore-analyze/ai-features/agent-builder/mcp-server-api-keys) |
| **falcon-mcp** (CrowdStrike). MIT. Pre-1.0, maintained by CrowdStrike, and described as not an official product. | Ground, author, tune, triage, investigate, respond | Covers 28 Falcon modules, including detections, hosts, SIEM search, intelligence, exclusions, correlation rules, and SOAR, with tools that create, update, and delete exclusions and run workflows. | A --read-only flag registers only the tools that read. HTTP transports have no authentication unless an API key is set. | [github.com](https://github.com/CrowdStrike/falcon-mcp) |
| **purple-mcp** (SentinelOne). MIT. Maintained by SentinelOne and described as not an official product. | Ground, triage, investigate | Asks Purple AI questions, runs PowerQuery over the data lake, and reads alerts, vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and assets. | Read-only, with one token scoped to an account or a site. It has no built-in authentication, so it belongs off shared networks or behind a proxy. | [github.com](https://github.com/Sentinel-One/purple-mcp) |
| **mcp-panther** (Panther Labs). Apache 2.0. | Ground, triage, investigate | Runs data-lake SQL, lists schemas and log sources, updates alerts, and lists or disables detections. | Uses a scoped Panther API token, and the README advises starting with a read-only one. Disabling a detection is among its tools. | [github.com](https://github.com/panther-labs/mcp-panther) |
| **Wazuh-MCP-Server** (gensecaihq, a community project). MIT. | Ground, triage, investigate, respond | Exposes 55 tools for Wazuh, 41 that read and 14 that act, such as blocking an IP, isolating a host, or disabling a user, each with a rollback. | Read-only by default. Write tools need a write scope and a confirmation in production, and each is audit-logged. | [github.com](https://github.com/gensecaihq/Wazuh-MCP-Server) |
| **Sumo Logic MCP Server** (Sumo Logic). Hosted. Generally available since 2026-07-30. | Ground, author, triage, investigate | Searches logs and alerts, creates and updates dashboards, and works with Cloud SIEM insights and detection rules. | Uses OAuth 2.0, and its tools respect existing permissions. The release note does not say which rule operations are allowed. | [sumologic.com](https://www.sumologic.com/help/release-notes-developer/2026/07/30/mcp-server/) |

#### Open models trained for security

The model cards report knowledge tests such as CTIBench and CyberMetric. None reports a result for writing or translating rules.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Foundation-Sec-8B and its variants** (Cisco Foundation AI). The base model is Apache 2.0. The instruct and reasoning variants use the Llama 3.1 license, with Cisco's changes under Apache 2.0. | Extract, triage, investigate | Eight-billion-parameter Llama 3.1 models trained further on about 5.1 billion tokens of security text, with instruct, 64k-context, and reasoning variants. The cards report CTIBench scores. | The reasoning card says the model is unsuited to autonomous security decisions. The cards recommend an extra safety filter and human oversight. | [huggingface.co (1)](https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B), [huggingface.co (2)](https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-1.1-8B-Instruct), [huggingface.co (3)](https://huggingface.co/fdtn-ai/Foundation-Sec-8B-Reasoning) |
| **Llama-Primus** (Trend Micro AI Lab). MIT, plus the Llama 3.1 license. | Extract, investigate | Eight-billion-parameter Llama 3.1 models trained further on 2.77 billion tokens of security text, which Trend Micro publishes, then tuned on about 1,000 security tasks. | The card reports small losses on general benchmarks and has no limitations section. | [huggingface.co](https://huggingface.co/trendmicro-ailab/Llama-Primus-Merged), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.11191) |
| **SecureBERT 2.0** (Cisco AI). Apache 2.0. | Extract | A 150-million-parameter encoder trained on threat reports and code, with an entity model that tags indicators, malware, and vulnerabilities in text. | It labels and embeds text and generates none. Its entity labels do not include ATT&CK techniques. | [huggingface.co (1)](https://huggingface.co/cisco-ai/SecureBERT2.0-base), [huggingface.co (2)](https://huggingface.co/cisco-ai/SecureBERT2.0-NER) |

#### Open-source detection engineering projects

SigmaOptimizer is the one project here that tests a generated rule against captured logs and a benign baseline, the pattern [section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/) asks for.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **SigmAIQ** (AttackIQ). LGPL 2.1. Pre-release. | Author | Wraps pySigma with an optional LangChain toolkit for writing and translating Sigma rules with a model, and converts rules to 18 backends. | The README warns that it is pre-release and may have bugs. | [github.com](https://github.com/AttackIQ/SigmAIQ) |
| **SigmaOptimizer** (Yusuke Nakajima). MIT. The original repository is unmaintained, and the author points to a UI version. | Author, prove, tune | Runs a command, captures the Windows and Sysmon logs, and has a model draft a Sigma rule from them. It tests the rule with Hayabusa against those logs and a benign baseline, then refines it. | Windows only. The default benign baseline is one bundled set of Windows 10 client logs. | [github.com (1)](https://github.com/YusukeJustinNakajima/SigmaOptimizer), [github.com (2)](https://github.com/YusukeJustinNakajima/SigmaOptimizer-UI) |
| **Security-Detections-MCP** (MHaggis). Apache 2.0, per its README. | Author | Indexes about 8,200 detections from Sigma, Splunk, Elastic, KQL, Sublime, and CrowdStrike, so a model can search them by technique, CVE, or process, find coverage gaps, and open a draft pull request. | Local mode reads the repositories the user points it at. A hosted mode offers read-only tools behind a token. | [github.com](https://github.com/MHaggis/Security-Detections-MCP) |
| **TRAM** (MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense). Apache 2.0. | Extract | Maps sentences in threat reports to ATT&CK techniques with fine-tuned SciBERT models, covering up to 50 common techniques, and lets users annotate and retrain. | Publishes no accuracy figures, and targets ATT&CK v13. | [github.com](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/tram) |
| **CTINexus** (peng-gao-lab). MIT. | Extract | Uses a model to pull entities and relations out of threat-intelligence text, merge duplicates, and draw a knowledge graph, with OpenAI, Gemini, Bedrock, or a local Ollama model. | Its README gives no evaluation figures. | [github.com](https://github.com/peng-gao-lab/ctinexus), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.21060) |
| **Atomic Red Team MCP** (cyberbuff, a community project). MIT. | Prove | Lets an agent search Red Canary's Atomic Red Team tests, check a test against the schema, and optionally run one to produce telemetry. | Running tests stays off until an environment variable turns it on, and the README says to run them only in isolated machines. | [github.com](https://github.com/cyberbuff/atomic-red-team-mcp) |

#### Benchmarks and recorded attack data

CTI-REALM is the one public benchmark found that scores rules an agent writes from threat reports, and it covers Azure and KQL. Spectrum's DefendBench scores writing, tuning, and repairing rules on six SIEMs, but its tasks are private. No public benchmark found scores tuning, and GUIDE's labels are the nearest public data for triage.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **CTI-REALM** (Microsoft Security AI). Evaluation code in inspect_evals. The dataset states no license. | Extract, ground, author, prove | Agents read threat reports, explore the data, and write detections over emulated Linux, AKS, and Azure attacks in a Kusto emulator. Scores weigh both the steps taken and the detections' results. | The authors say it centers on Azure and does not reproduce production-scale telemetry. The best of 16 models reached a reward of 0.637. | [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.13517), [github.com](https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/inspect_evals/tree/main/src/inspect_evals/cti_realm) |
| **DefendBench** (Spectrum). Announced 2026-10-27. The tasks stay private to keep them out of training data, and Spectrum plans to release the simulated environment. | Extract, ground, author, tune | Agents work 100 tasks in threat research, rule writing, tuning, rule health, and data engineering on Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic, Google SecOps, CrowdStrike, and Databricks. Each task runs in a simulated enterprise built from real environments and passes only if it meets all of its checks. An agent grades some of the checks. | The best of 14 entries, each a model in a coding agent, passed 31 of 100. At 95% confidence that score fits a pass rate from about 23% to 41%, a range that takes in the top five entries. The post gives no pass rate for experts other than each task's author, and no counts of attacks kept or benign events removed on tuning tasks. | [spectrum.security (1)](https://www.spectrum.security/blog/introducing-defendbench), [spectrum.security (2)](https://www.spectrum.security/defendbench) |
| **ExCyTIn-Bench** (Microsoft). MIT code. The dataset states no license. | Ground, investigate | Agents answer 7,542 investigation questions by querying 57 log tables drawn from 8 incidents. | Needs about 33 GB of disk, and the best model in the paper reached a reward of 0.606. | [github.com](https://github.com/microsoft/SecRL), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.14201) |
| **CyberSOCEval** (Meta and CrowdStrike). MIT code, with data licensed per folder. | Extract, investigate | Questions on malware analysis and on reasoning over threat-intelligence reports, built from sandbox output and CrowdStrike reports. | Its paper says current models are far from saturating it. | [github.com](https://github.com/CrowdStrike/CyberSOCEval_data), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.20166v1) |
| **CTIBench** (Rochester Institute of Technology). CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. | Extract | Five threat-intelligence tasks, among them mapping CVEs to CWEs, scoring CVSS, and extracting ATT&CK techniques from reports. | The extraction and attribution sets are small, at 60 and 50 items. | [github.com](https://github.com/xashru/cti-bench), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.07599) |
| **GUIDE** (Microsoft Security Research). CDLA 2.0, per its paper. | Triage, tune | About one million incidents from 6,100 organizations, each labeled true positive, benign positive, or false positive by the customer's analysts. | Its labels are per incident, so it tests triage and leaves rules untested. Microsoft's guided-response paper publishes a full confusion matrix for one region's test split. | [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/html/2407.09017v4), [kaggle.com](https://www.kaggle.com/datasets/Microsoft/microsoft-security-incident-prediction) |
| **SIR-Bench** (Amazon Web Services researchers). Preprint, 2026-04-13. The authors plan to release the test cases, labels, and replay framework. | Triage, investigate | 794 cases built from 129 anonymized incident patterns, replayed in cloud environments for an incident response agent to triage and investigate. 475 are true positives and 319 false positives. | Its results give all four cells for the authors' agent, which missed 14 of 475 true positives and raised 85 false alarms on 319 false positives. | [arxiv.org (1)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.12040), [arxiv.org (2)](https://arxiv.org/html/2604.12040) |
| **ALERT-BENCH** (Virginia Tech, Google, and North Carolina State University researchers). Preprint, 2026-10-07. No release of the benchmark is stated. | Triage | Replays the AIT-LDSv2 log dataset through a Wazuh SIEM, producing 225 alerts tied to a multi-stage attack and 1,022 benign ones for an agent to triage. | Reports the false-negative rate beside the share of alerts escalated. Five approaches on GPT-4.1 each missed at least 40.4% of the attack alerts, and the authors' AIDA missed 7 of 225 while escalating 18.4% of all alerts. | [arxiv.org (1)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10608v1), [arxiv.org (2)](https://arxiv.org/html/2610.10608v1) |
| **CyberSecEval 4** (Meta). MIT. | Any stage | Measures a model's help with attacks, its false refusals, [prompt injection](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-prompt-injection), and code-interpreter abuse, among other risks. | Its prompt-injection tests apply to any agent that reads untrusted text. | [github.com](https://github.com/meta-llama/PurpleLlama/tree/main/CybersecurityBenchmarks) |
| **Security-Datasets** (OTRF). MIT. | Ground, prove | Recorded attack and benign telemetry from simulated techniques, mapped to ATT&CK. The library on this site replays its rules against these recordings. | Each recording covers one procedure, so a rule's silence on one says little. | [github.com](https://github.com/OTRF/Security-Datasets) |
| **attack_data** (Splunk). Apache 2.0. | Ground, prove | Raw attack logs filed by ATT&CK technique, most produced with Attack Range, ready to replay into a SIEM. | More than 9 GB through Git LFS, and a single dataset can be fetched alone. | [github.com](https://github.com/splunk/attack_data) |
| **BOTSv3** (Splunk). CC0. | Investigate, prove | About 320 MB of indexed Splunk data across about 100 sourcetypes, built for a capture-the-flag in 2018. | It needs the Splunk app versions it was built with. | [github.com](https://github.com/splunk/botsv3) |

#### Defenses against planted instructions

Each is tested on chat and agent benchmarks. None of the pages read for this table reports a test on instructions planted in log fields, the attack [section 10.3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/#10-3-log-content-is-hostile-input) assumes.

| Product | Stages and functions | What it does | Controls it documents | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Llama Prompt Guard 2** (Meta). Llama 4 license. | Any stage that reads untrusted text | A small classifier that flags text trying to override instructions. Its card reports recall of 97.5% at a 1% false-positive rate on English text. | It reads 512 tokens at a time, so long inputs must be split, and the card says adaptive attacks can succeed. | [huggingface.co](https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-Prompt-Guard-2-86M) |
| **LlamaFirewall** (Meta). MIT. | Any stage that reads untrusted text | Combines Prompt Guard, a model that audits an agent's reasoning for goal hijacking, and checks on generated code. | Its paper calls the reasoning audit experimental, and the framework needs a model to run. | [github.com](https://github.com/meta-llama/PurpleLlama/tree/main/LlamaFirewall), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03574) |
| **Meta SecAlign** (Meta). Llama 3.1 and 3.3 licenses for the models. | Any stage that reads untrusted text | Llama models fine-tuned to ignore instructions inside untrusted data placed in a separate input role. On the 8B model, attack success on InjecAgent fell from 15.1% to zero. | It works only when untrusted text goes in the input role, and adaptive attacks still succeed at times. | [huggingface.co](https://huggingface.co/facebook/Meta-SecAlign-8B), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02735) |
| **CaMeL** (Google Research). Apache 2.0. Research code. | Ground, triage, investigate, respond | Takes control flow and data flow from the trusted request, so untrusted data cannot change what the program does, and enforces data-flow rules at each tool call. | Its README calls it a research artifact that likely contains bugs and is unmaintained. | [github.com](https://github.com/google-research/camel-prompt-injection), [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.18813) |
| **NeMo Guardrails** (NVIDIA). Apache 2.0. | Any stage that reads untrusted text | Programmable checks on input, dialog, retrieval, tool calls, and output, including jailbreak and injection detection. | The README says its built-in checks may not suit a given production use. | [github.com](https://github.com/NVIDIA-NeMo/Guardrails) |
| **Agent Scan** (Snyk). Apache 2.0. | Before an agent's tools are trusted | Scans MCP server configurations, tool descriptions, and agent skills for injection, tool poisoning, destructive tools, and exposed secrets. | Sends tool names and descriptions, with secrets redacted, to Snyk's API. Scanning can start local MCP servers, so it belongs in a sandbox. | [github.com](https://github.com/snyk/agent-scan) |
| **MCP Scanner** (Cisco AI Defense). Apache 2.0. | Before an agent's tools are trusted | Scans MCP tools, prompts, resources, and server code with YARA rules, a model judge, and heuristics. | Static scanning works offline, and the API engine needs a Cisco subscription. | [github.com](https://github.com/cisco-ai-defense/mcp-scanner) |

### 19.7 Reading an accuracy claim

A triage agent's record has four cells. A true positive is a real attack it escalated, and a false positive is benign activity it escalated. A true negative is benign activity it closed, and a false negative is a real attack it closed. The false-close rate of 19.5 divides the false negatives by every real attack the agent saw.

Common figures hide the false negatives. A share of alerts closed automatically counts true and false negatives together, so every missed attack sits inside it. An agreement rate counts the alerts where agent and analyst made the same call, and both can miss the same attack. A sample of closed alerts measures the share of closes that were wrong, which stays small when benign alerts dominate. With a hundred benign alerts for each attack, an agent that closes half the attacks and nine in ten benign alerts makes about 0.6% of its closes wrong.

Only real attacks show how often an agent misses one. An agent that misses none of 30 real attacks may still miss up to 1 in 10, at 95% confidence. One that misses none of 100 may still miss up to 3 in 100. Eleven attacks with none missed leave room for a miss rate of 24%.

Ask any maker for all four counts for each alert class, from the team's own alerts during the trial, with the number of real attacks stated. The table lists what makers and the researchers studying their products publish, read on 2026-10-18, with the most complete first.

| Publisher | What it publishes | What it leaves out | Sources |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **SIR-Bench (Amazon Web Services researchers, 2026)** | Counts that give all four cells for the authors' own agent on 794 replayed cases. It caught 461 of 475 true positives and rejected 234 of 319 false positives. | A commercial product and production alerts. The cases are not yet released. | [arxiv.org (1)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.12040), [arxiv.org (2)](https://arxiv.org/html/2604.12040) |
| **Copilot Guided Response (Microsoft researchers, 2024)** | A full confusion matrix for one region's test split of GUIDE, real incidents graded true positive, benign positive, or false positive. Macro-F1 is 0.87, and misgrading a true positive as benign or false positive is rare, at 2.4%. | Results from the triage agent Microsoft ships. The model in the paper is a research system. | [arxiv.org (1)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.09017), [arxiv.org (2)](https://arxiv.org/html/2407.09017v4) |
| **ALERT-BENCH (Virginia Tech, Google, and North Carolina State University researchers, 2026)** | False-negative rates beside the share of alerts escalated, on 225 attack and 1,022 benign alerts. Every approach studied missed at least 40.4% of the attacks, and the authors' AIDA missed 7 while escalating 18.4% of alerts. | A full matrix for every system, a second attack scenario, and a release. | [arxiv.org (1)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10608v1), [arxiv.org (2)](https://arxiv.org/html/2610.10608v1) |
| **Charlotte AI reasoning triage (CrowdStrike researchers, 2026)** | [Precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) and recall for each verdict on 42,686 real Windows endpoint detections kept out of training. Benign calls tuned to 98% precision on validation data were 90.8% precise on the test set, so about 1 in 11 was a real attack. Malicious calls were 98.9% precise, and overall accuracy is 82.6%. | Counts and the share of detections that were malicious. The product claims more than 98% agreement with Falcon Complete's analysts, which leaves misses both made uncounted. | [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/html/2607.28460v1), [crowdstrike.com (1)](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/teaching-ai-to-reason-through-detection-triage/), [crowdstrike.com (2)](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/agentic-ai-innovation-in-cybersecurity-charlotte-ai-detection-triage/) |
| **Qevlar AI (2025 test)** | 99.8% accuracy, 0.3% false positives, and 0.1% false negatives on 5,000 email alerts that analysts at four organizations had reviewed in January 2025. The analysts themselves scored 97%, 4%, and 2%. | What each percentage is out of and how many alerts were malicious. The three figures do not add up on any one basis. | [qevlar.com](https://www.qevlar.com/post/real-world-results-qevlar-ai-proves-accuracy-speed) |
| **Intezer (2024 review)** | Production rates for 2024 across over 5.4 million alerts in 500+ customer environments, from a sample of about 5%. Accuracy was 93.45% on the 3.81% of alerts it escalated and 97.68% on the 68.40% it closed, at 95% confidence with a margin under 2%. | Counts, a definition of accuracy, and how many of the wrong closes were real attacks. | [intezer.com (1)](https://intezer.com/blog/2024-ai-soc-review-for-security-operations), [intezer.com (2)](https://intezer.com/blog/quality-assurance-in-intezers-autonomous-soc) |
| **Phishing Triage Agent trial (Microsoft, 2025)** | The agent's precision and recall, both 100%, on 93 user-reported emails, 11 of them malicious. | Enough attacks to bound the miss rate, which could still be 24%. | [arxiv.org (1)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.13860), [arxiv.org (2)](https://arxiv.org/html/2511.13860v1) |
| **Exaforce (2025 review)** | 98% accuracy across 1.29 million alerts in 2025, defined as AI recommendations that matched outcomes confirmed by human review. | How many alerts were reviewed. The same post says 98% of alerts were benign or false positives after review, so closing every alert would score about the same. | [exaforce.com](https://www.exaforce.com/blogs/exaforce-agentic-soc-2025-year-in-review) |
| **Prophet Security** | 99.8% agreement with the analysts of one Fortune 500 manufacturer across 12,000 investigations, and a 98.5% accuracy rate on its product page. | How agreement and accuracy are measured, and any count of misses. | [prophetsecurity.ai (1)](https://www.prophetsecurity.ai/blog/ai-soc-statistics), [prophetsecurity.ai (2)](https://www.prophetsecurity.ai/why-prophet-security) |
| **Conifers.ai** | Accuracy above 99% across roughly 500,000 investigations, checked against the ground truth of each customer's environment. | A definition of accuracy, a period, and any split by verdict. | [conifers.ai](https://www.conifers.ai/about/) |
| **ReliaQuest GreyMatter** | 99.4% accuracy on routine tier 1 and tier 2 alerts. | A definition, a sample, a method, a date, and any word on misses. | [reliaquest.com](https://reliaquest.com/resources/greymatter-faq/ai-and-data-trust-faq/) |
| **Torq** | Auto Triage accuracy that rises from roughly 94% to 99% within weeks. | A definition, a sample, or a method. | [torq.io](https://torq.io/blog/agentic-auto-triage/) |
| **Elastic (agentic SOC benchmark)** | Scores from 1 to 10 for each model on eight intrusions and roughly 95 alerts, graded against an answer key Elastic built, with misses marked down. | Precision, recall, and any result from customer alerts. | [elastic.co](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/llm-benchmarking-agentic-soc) |
| **Splunk (Cisco,.conf26)** | The triage agent's suggested dispositions at the.conf26 event: 44% true positive, 42% benign positive, 6% false positive, and 7% with no suggestion. | Whether the suggestions were right. Cisco says to read the figures as observations from the event environment. | [blogs.cisco.com](https://blogs.cisco.com/security/conf26-agentic-soc-triage-agent) |
| **Command Zero** | A 95 to 98% auto-triage rate. | Any accuracy figure. A share handled automatically counts the misses with the correct closes. | [commandzero.ai](https://www.commandzero.ai/use-cases/alert-triage) |
| **Google Security Operations** | Over 5 million alerts investigated by its triage agent, each in about 60 seconds. | Any accuracy or miss figure. | [cloud.google.com](https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/detecting-and-containing-powered-threats-with-google-security-operations-agents) |
| **Sumo Logic** | That senior analysts regularly review a sample of the agent's verdicts. | Any result from that review. | [sumologic.com](https://www.sumologic.com/help/docs/cse/get-started-with-cloud-siem/soc-analyst-agent) |
| **Dropzone AI (quality control post)** | Definitions of precision and recall, tracked as rolling averages and checked with ISO 2859-1 sampling. | Any figure from that tracking. Simbian's ranking reports that Dropzone's CEO cited a false-negative rate below 1% in a press interview. | [dropzone.ai](https://www.dropzone.ai/blog/dropzone-ai-quality-control-alert-validation), [simbian.ai](https://simbian.ai/blog/ai-soc-vendors) |

A precision tuned on one set of alerts can slip on the next. In CrowdStrike's paper, benign calls tuned to 98% on validation data reached 90.8% on the test set, which is why 19.4 keeps sampling closes after promotion.

Palo Alto Networks, SentinelOne, and Panther publish volume and speed figures for their triage agents, and this reading found no accuracy figure from them. It found none for 7AI, Radiant Security, Arctic Wolf, or Expel either.

[Simbian's 2026 ranking of AI SOC vendors](https://simbian.ai/blog/ai-soc-vendors) says almost no vendor publishes a measured false-negative rate, and that Simbian does not publish one either.

A benchmark's pass rate needs the same reading. Ask how people other than each task's author score, and how wide the interval is. The best score on [DefendBench](https://www.spectrum.security/defendbench), 31 of 100 tasks, fits a true pass rate anywhere from about 23% to 41% at 95% confidence. A tuning score needs the four counts as well. Ask for the attack events a tuned rule still catches and those it lost, and the benign events it still matches and those it dropped.

The tables in 19.6 list what each maker documents on the date given. Products change monthly, so check a claim against its linked page before relying on it.

The author has not run any product in those tables. The questions in 19.3 and the steps in 19.4 are how a team finds out for itself.

The thresholds in 19.4 are defaults the author chose, and the outside checks page lists them as untested.


---

## Run and measure

https://detect.htora.dev/overview/running-a-program/

Overview

Building one detection is a project. Running a few hundred of them is a job, and this part covers the job: the meetings and roles, the metrics, [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) coverage, maturity, and where the program runs out of room. It's also where you find out whether any of it is working, which is the question leadership will ask first.

Framework v0.136.0.

### Meetings

Weekly**Intake and order**What enters build this week, and which candidates are blocked on telemetry.

Monthly**Live review**What gets tuned with a named exclusion, what gets retired, what gets left alone.

Quarterly**Coverage and capacity**Next quarter's telemetry asks, whether the weights still match the threat picture, and which ceiling to spend against.

Within 5 working days of every incident**Detection review after an incident**Which live detections get a fix carrying the incident's events as a [fixture](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture), which candidates enter intake with what threat relevance, and which rules put live by hand during it enter intake.

The bars show how often each meets across a quarter. The post-incident review runs whenever there is an incident.

### In this part

[**Operating rhythm**Meetings, roles, the first 90 days, and common failures.Read this when you've just been handed the function.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/)[**Metrics**Every number the program reports, each defined once.Read this when you owe somebody a report.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/metrics/)[**Coverage scoring rules**The rules behind every color in the ATT&CK coverage map and workbook.Read this when a coverage number needs defending.](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/model/)[**ATLAS and D3FEND**Attacks on AI systems from ATLAS, and the defenses D3FEND links to each ATT&CK technique.Read this when you detect attacks on AI, or want a named analysis to start a hypothesis from.](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/atlas-d3fend/)[**Maturity levels**Each dimension scored 0 to 4 on evidence, with your level set by the lowest.Read this when you need to say where you stand.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/maturity/)[**Scaling**The ceilings that cap a program, and what breaks at each size.Read this when you're planning headcount or telemetry.](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/scaling/)[**Handling objections**The objections a rollout meets, and the answer to each.Read this when you're about to present this.](https://detect.htora.dev/objections/)

### Roles

**Detection lead**Intake, the backlog order, the metric set, and the quarterly report

**Detection engineer**The hypothesis, the detection, the record, the fixtures, and the score's [evidence lines](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line)

**Reviewer, a second engineer**The approval on the change, and the argument with the blind spots section

**SOC or [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) lead**The triage minutes, the alert outcomes, and half of the [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) decision

**Incident response lead**Investigation, containment, and the notification path

**Platform or data owner**The log source inventory, the silence alerts, parsing and retention

### Ceilings

The smallest ceiling is the size of your program.

**Triage ceiling**How many live detections can the analysts absorb?

**Maintenance ceiling**How many live detections can the engineers keep current?

**Telemetry ceiling**How many detections can be built at all?

The other overviews: [The framework](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/framework/) · [Build detections](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/building-detections/) · [The tools](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/tools/).


---

## Operating rhythm

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/

Section 11

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Remember

- Run intake weekly, live review monthly, and coverage and capacity quarterly, and review detections within 5 working days of each incident.
- Every role needs an owner, and one person can own several.
- Check that the reviewer and SOC lead roles have owners. Gaps in those two take the longest to show.
- Spend the first 30 days on the inventory, [detection zero](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-zero), and measurement, before you write new detections.
- Report the incident detection rate even when it's low.
- A playbook gets a record, the eight stages, and 14 days in propose mode before it acts. A person approves every containment.
- Every incident ends in a candidate, a [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) pull request, or a log source request, and the report names the ones that ended in nothing.

The framework says what good looks like. Three standing meetings and a review after every incident keep the backlog scored, noisy rules tuned or retired, and leadership informed. Running a program also takes an owner for every role and the templates on the Templates and cadence page.

### 11.1 Meetings

| Meeting | Time box | Who is in it | What it decides | What it produces |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Intake and order, weekly | 30 minutes | Detection lead, the engineers, whoever brought a candidate | What enters build this week, and which candidates are blocked on telemetry | A re-ordered backlog with every new candidate scored and every score carrying its [evidence lines](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) |
| Live review, monthly | 60 minutes | Detection lead, the SOC or [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) lead, the engineer who owns each detection under discussion | What gets tuned with a named exclusion, what gets retired, what gets left alone | Tuning pull requests and retirement notes, each naming the trigger that fired and the number behind it |
| Coverage and capacity, quarterly | 90 minutes | Detection lead, SOC lead, the platform or data owner, the manager who owns the budget | Next quarter's telemetry asks, whether the weights still match the threat picture, and which ceiling to spend against | The quarterly report: the numbers, the ask, the lowest maturity dimension with the work that raises it, and next quarter's OKRs |
| Detection review after an incident, within 5 working days of every incident | 45 minutes | Incident responder who ran it, detection lead, the engineer who will build what comes out | Which live detections get a fix carrying the incident's events as a [fixture](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture), which candidates enter intake with what threat relevance, and which rules put live by hand during it enter intake | Intake items backed by your own incident with dates, the strongest evidence a candidate can have. A row in incidents.csv says who found the incident first and, when no live detection did, gives its miss code. |

Each meeting prevents a specific failure:

| Meeting | What happens when it is skipped |
| --- | --- |
| Intake and order | The loudest request wins, and blocked candidates sit in the queue looking like engineering work. |
| Live review | Nothing leaves production. Analysts absorb the cost until they stop reading alerts. |
| Coverage and capacity | The program grows until a ceiling breaks it, and you find out from a missed incident. |
| Detection review after an incident | The most valuable intake source in the organization goes unread, and the same technique works twice. |

None of these meetings needs a tool. The weekly takes half an hour. On a one-person team you spend it alone with a written backlog, which beats carrying the order in your head.

### 11.2 Roles

On a small team one person owns several roles, and [section 3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/) says which ones collapse at each size.

| Role | Owns | Decides | Stages it owns |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Detection lead | Intake, the backlog order, the metric set, and the quarterly report | What is built next and what the weights are | intake, deploy, retire |
| Detection engineer | The hypothesis, the detection, the record, the fixtures, and the score's evidence lines | How the behavior is matched, and what the detection will not catch | hypothesis, research, build |
| Reviewer, a second engineer | The approval on the change, and the argument with the blind spots section | Whether it ships | validate |
| SOC or triage lead | The triage minutes, the alert outcomes, and half of the tuning decision | What the analysts can absorb, which sets the triage ceiling | tune |
| Incident response lead | Investigation, containment, and the notification path | When an alert becomes an incident, what gets contained, and who is told by when | none; receives what triage escalates, and sends every confirmed incident to the detection review |
| Platform or data owner | The log source inventory, the silence alerts, parsing and retention | What gets onboarded and when, which sets [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) | none; supplies readiness for research |

What goes wrong when nobody owns a role:

| Role | What goes wrong with no holder |
| --- | --- |
| Detection lead | Priority becomes whoever asked most recently, and no number is reported the same way twice. |
| Detection engineer | Detections exist without records, and nobody but the author can triage or change them. |
| Reviewer, a second engineer | Every detection carries its author's assumptions about the environment into production. |
| SOC or triage lead | [Run cost](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) is a guess, the [precision floor](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision-floor) has no data behind it, and nobody notices alert fatigue until analysts leave. |
| Incident response lead | Confirmed incidents never reach detection engineering, so the same technique works twice, and reporting deadlines depend on memory. |
| Platform or data owner | Readiness scores are fiction, and detections are built on log sources that stopped last month. |

Check the reviewer and the SOC lead first, because their absence takes the longest to notice. Without a reviewer, detections reach production built on an assumption the author didn't know they were making. Without a SOC lead, nobody measures run cost, and the backlog order becomes a guess.

### 11.3 The first 90 days

This is for you if you've just been handed the function, with or without a team. A team starting from nothing begins with [section 4](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/) instead.

**Days 1 to 30: See what you have**

- Inventory the log sources: source, owner, retention, parsed yes or no, normal event rate.
- Ship the silence alert for every source that matters. This is detection zero.
- List the live detections and find the ones nobody has looked at in a year.
- Pull the last 12 months of incidents and tag each with the technique the attacker used and with whether a live detection alerted on it first.

Report at the end of the block: The inventory, the live count, and the share of incidents a detection caught first.

Refuse for now: Don't write new detections yet, and don't promise coverage percentages.

**Days 31 to 60: Put the work in order**

- Score the open backlog on the six inputs, with an evidence line each.
- Put the definitions of done into your ticket template so a detection can't close on judgment alone.
- Start the weekly intake meeting and the post-incident detection review.
- Measure [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) and triage minutes for the 10 noisiest live detections.

Report at the end of the block: The ordered backlog, the first precision numbers, and the first retirement candidates.

Refuse for now: Don't buy a platform to fix a process problem, and don't adopt the CI pipeline before the records exist.

**Days 61 to 90: Make it repeat without you**

- Build the first three detections through every [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done), records and fixtures included.
- Retire what the triggers say to retire, with a note each.
- Run the monthly live review for the first time.
- Score the maturity dimensions and publish the lowest one with the work that raises it.

Report at the end of the block: The quarterly report: coverage weighted by [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness), the three ceilings against the live count, the maturity score, and one ask.

Refuse for now: Don't report a detection count as progress, and don't commit to a coverage target before you know the telemetry ceiling.

### 11.4 Common failure patterns

None of these failures takes a bad engineer. Each one is the reasonable thing to do on a busy day, which is why they keep happening. The table says what each looks like, what it costs, and what replaces it.

| Pattern | What it looks like, and why it happens | What it costs | What replaces it |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The console edit | A detection is changed directly in the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) to quiet an alert during a shift. It takes 30 seconds, and nobody reviews it. | The change has no author, no reason, no test, and no way back. The next replay fails and nobody knows why. | Deployment from the repository only; console edits reverted or alarmed. Tune through an allowlist variable. |
| The coverage heatmap | A grid of [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) techniques shaded green wherever a detection exists. It's the easiest artifact to produce and the easiest to present. | Seven brittle detections and one solid detection both show green, with no way to tell which is which. | Report coverage weighted by robustness beside the raw count, and report the gap between them. |
| The vendor pack | 400 out-of-the-box detections enabled at once because they came with the platform. It looks like instant coverage and costs nothing up front. | Alert volume past the triage ceiling in a week, and no record, score, or owner for any of them. | Enable them against the alert budget, scored like anything else, in batches you can measure. |
| The unowned alert | An alert fires into a queue that nobody is accountable for reading. The detection shipped before the response steps were written. | Triage minutes are spent and no decision comes out of them. | Deploy only detections whose record has response steps. |
| The hero detection | One engineer's detection that only that engineer can interpret. The detection is clever and the record feels like overhead. | It goes unread on their leave and unmaintained after they move on. | 11 sections, and a reviewer who has to triage from the record alone. |
| Tuning that becomes narrowing | Each exclusion shaves the detection until it matches only the original sample. Every individual exclusion is defensible in the moment. | A detection that still reports as live coverage and can no longer catch the technique. | Name the exclusion as a variable and count them. When a detection needs a new exclusion every month, propose its retirement at the monthly meeting. |
| The silent source | A log source stops and the detections on it keep reporting as healthy. Nothing alerts on absence, and dashboards only show what arrived. | Coverage is reported for a technique nobody could detect that month. | Detection zero, and readiness that drops automatically when a source dies. |
| The redefined metric | Precision means one thing this quarter and another the next. The number was inconvenient, and the definition was never written down. | Every trend line tracks the definition. | One written definition per metric, one owning stage, and a change to a definition treated as a release. |
| The god-mode [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) | The technique is run from an admin session because that session was already open. It's faster, and the commands succeed the first time. | The events carry an identity no attacker would have. Detections written from them fire in the lab and never in production. | Start from the [foothold](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-foothold) the scenario allows. Use only the permissions that stage would have. |
| The remembered field name | The detection is written from documentation or from memory of the schema. The engineer has read that log 100 times. | A detection that is almost right, never fires, and reports as coverage until an incident proves otherwise. | Read every field name off a real event from the emulation run. |
| The steered agent | An agent reading logs follows an instruction that an attacker planted in a command line or a user name. Nothing told the agent that log content is data. | The agent queries, writes, or opens pull requests for the attacker, with the program's own credentials. | Read-only credentials, tool calls taken only from the task, and every change through a pull request a person approves. |

### 11.5 Miss codes

The detection review after an incident names the cause of every miss with one code. Counted over a quarter, the codes show leadership where misses come from and which owner fixes them.

| Code | What happened | The fix | Owner |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `no_log_source` | The behavior happened where no collected log source records it. | A log source request to the platform owner, and the technique's candidates rescored with telemetry readiness 0. | Platform or data owner |
| `source_silent` | The log source is collected, but it sent nothing while the incident ran. | A silence alert for the source in DET-0000, with the source's usual gap measured. | Platform or data owner |
| `field_unparsed` | Events arrived, but a field the detection needs was missing or unparsed. | A parsing fix, and a lower telemetry readiness for the source until it lands. | Platform or data owner |
| `no_detection` | The telemetry was there, and no live detection covered the behavior. | A candidate at intake, with the incident as its threat-relevance evidence and its events as the positive fixture. | Detection lead |
| `detection_broken` | A live detection covers the behavior and stayed silent, because of a wrong field, a changed format, or a query that drifted from its approved copy. | Fix this detection. The missed events become a positive fixture, and the change goes back through validate and its 7-day count. | Detection engineer |
| `tuned_out` | An exclusion added in tuning suppressed the alert. | Narrow the exclusion. The missed events become a positive fixture, so the next tuning change has to keep them. | Detection engineer and SOC lead |
| `alert_late` | A detection alerted, but after a person or another source had already found the incident. | Shorten the detection's latency through its schedule, its lookback, or its place in the queue. | Detection engineer |
| `alert_unworked` | The alert fired and nobody opened it in time. | Cut the load or raise the triage ceiling: retire noisy detections, or route this one to a faster queue. | SOC lead |
| `alert_closed` | A person or an agent opened the alert and closed it as benign. | Fix the record's response section, add the case to triage calibration, and count it in the false-close rate. | SOC lead |

Record one code for each incident or exercise that a live detection did not catch first. When more than one applies, take the first break along the path from the log source to the analyst, because a fix further along cannot work until the earlier one lands. The repository keeps the record in incidents.csv, one row per confirmed incident or exercise. Lint checks every row against this list, and tools/metrics.py counts the codes per quarter for the reporting page. One row per confirmed incident or exercise. The found_by column says detection only when a live detection alerted first, and then miss_code stays empty. The fix column names the detection id or the log source request, and fix_validated_on is the date the fix passed validate.

### 11.6 Quarterly OKRs

Do it in the browser [Plan OKRs and a roadmap](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/okr/)

Each quarter, the coverage and capacity review sets at most three objectives, each raising one maturity dimension by one level. Every objective carries two kinds of key result: the work that earns the next level, and a metric that moves because of that work.

- Raise at most three dimensions in a quarter, each by one level. A level counts only when every statement at it is true, so two levels in one quarter is rare.
- Start from the lowest dimension, because the program's level is its lowest dimension.
- Write each metric key result as a baseline and a target. With no baseline yet, the key result is to measure it this quarter.
- Use a KRI as a key result only when it is past its tolerance today, and set the target at the tolerance.
- Score last quarter's objectives at the same review, before setting the next ones.

The roadmap plays the same rule forward. Each quarter, the lowest dimensions below the year's target rise one level, up to three a quarter. Re-run it every quarter, because a quarter's real results change the next one. The Plan OKRs and a roadmap tool drafts both from a maturity score. Each maturity dimension names an owner and the metrics that show it moving:

| Dimension | Owner | Metrics that show it moving |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Telemetry | Platform or data owner | `readiness_at_hypothesis`, `silent_source_hours` |
| Backlog and order | Detection lead | `intake_to_score_days`, `backlog_age_days`, `priority_technique_gaps` |
| The detection record | Detection engineers | `triage_minutes_median`, `minutes_per_true_positive` |
| Validation | Detection lead | `percent_with_tests`, `first_pass_validation_rate`, `review_turnaround_hours` |
| Deployment | Detection engineering, with the platform owner | `deploy_lead_time_days`, `post_deploy_replay_failures`, `detection_latency_median` |
| Upkeep and retirement | Detection lead and SOC lead | `precision_30d`, `upkeep_minutes_per_detection`, `rule_debt`, `rules_retired_per_quarter` |
| Measurement | Detection lead | `robustness_weighted_coverage`, `incident_detection_rate`, `misses_by_cause`, `open_detection_fixes_age` |
| Triage | SOC or triage lead | `triage_minutes_median`, `false_close_rate` |
| Investigation | Incident response lead | `time_to_scope_hours`, `misses_by_cause` |
| Containment | Incident response lead | `time_to_contain_minutes` |
| Communication | Incident response lead, with legal and the CISO's office | `notifications_on_time` |

### 11.7 Regulatory requirements

Do it in the browser [Map regulatory controls](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/regulatory/)

A detection and response program already keeps most of the records a security regulation or an audit asks for: the logs it collects, the detections it reviews, the incidents it records, and the notifications it sends. The crosswalk names, for each control, the records that answer it, so an audit request becomes a list of files.

Answer each control with a record the program already keeps, and add a record only when none answers. An auditor, or counsel for a regulation, decides whether a record meets the control. A notification clock starts at the event its rule names, and the program records that time with the notification.

The crosswalk maps 59 controls from 9 regulations and standards. NIST's wording is quoted; the rest is paraphrased from the source, except where the last column says otherwise:

| Regulation or standard | Version | Controls | Read in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 | CSWP 29, 26 February 2024 | 16 | the source |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Annex A | 2022 | 10 | control titles only |
| PCI DSS | 4.0.1, June 2024 | 10 | the source |
| SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria | 2017, points of focus revised 2022 | 6 | a secondary copy |
| DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 | Applies from 17 January 2025, with Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 for report timing | 3 | the source |
| NIS2, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 | Directive of 14 December 2022, applied through each member state's law | 3 | the source |
| US SEC cybersecurity disclosure rules | Form 8-K Item 1.05 and Regulation S-K Item 106 | 2 | the source |
| HIPAA Security Rule and Breach Notification Rule | 45 CFR Part 164 as in force; the 2025 proposed rule is not final | 4 | the source |
| NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation, 23 NYCRR 500 | As amended 1 November 2023 | 5 | the source |

Most controls ask for the same few records, so the program keeps each once:

| Record | Where it is | Asked for by |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Case records | the case system | NIST CSF, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, SOC 2, DORA, NIS2, SEC, HIPAA, NYDFS |
| Detection records | detections/*/ads.md and rule.yml | NIST CSF, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, SOC 2, DORA, NIS2, HIPAA, NYDFS |
| Notification log | notifications.csv | NIST CSF, ISO 27001, SOC 2, DORA, NIS2, SEC, HIPAA, NYDFS |
| Log source inventory | inventory.csv | NIST CSF, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, SOC 2, DORA, HIPAA, NYDFS |
| Incident log | incidents.csv | NIST CSF, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, SOC 2, DORA, SEC, HIPAA |
| Detection zero | detections/DET-0000/ | NIST CSF, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, DORA, HIPAA, NYDFS |
| Alert dispositions | the case system | NIST CSF, ISO 27001, PCI DSS, SOC 2, NIS2, HIPAA |
| Validation replays | detections/*/tests/ and the CI log | ISO 27001, PCI DSS, SOC 2, DORA, NIS2 |
| Emulation runs | the Technical Context section of each ads.md | NIST CSF, PCI DSS, SOC 2, DORA, NYDFS |
| Metrics report | site-data/metrics.json, from tools/metrics.py | NIST CSF, SOC 2, DORA, NIS2, SEC |
| Precision checks | the 30-day precision review, which a person runs today | ISO 27001, SOC 2, NIS2 |
| Maturity score and OKRs | the maturity and OKR tools | NIST CSF, NIS2, SEC |
| Backlog scores | detections/*/score.yml | NIST CSF, ISO 27001 |
| Review approvals | the pull request history | ISO 27001, SOC 2 |
| Retirement notes | the Retirement record section of each ads.md | PCI DSS |

The reporting clocks run from an event the regulation names. Each notice goes in notifications.csv with its clock and the time the clock started. Lint computes each deadline and fails a hand-typed one that disagrees, and metrics.py reports notifications_on_time each quarter. A late notice to a regulator or a customer turns that KRI red. Business days count weekdays and skip no holidays, so the computed deadline is never later than the real one. National law sets the details of NIS2 reporting, and counsel decides which clocks apply to an incident.

| Report | Due | Clock |
| --- | --- | --- |
| DORA initial notification | 4 hours after the incident is classified as major | `dora_initial` |
| DORA initial notification, outer limit | 24 hours after the entity becomes aware of the incident | `dora_initial_awareness` |
| DORA intermediate report | 72 hours after the initial notification is sent | `dora_intermediate` |
| DORA final report | 1 month after the latest intermediate report is sent | `dora_final` |
| NIS2 early warning | 24 hours after the entity becomes aware of a significant incident | `nis2_early_warning` |
| NIS2 incident notification | 72 hours after the entity becomes aware of a significant incident | `nis2_notification` |
| NIS2 incident notification by a trust service provider | 24 hours after the provider becomes aware of a significant incident | `nis2_notification_trust` |
| NIS2 final report | 1 month after the incident notification is sent | `nis2_final` |
| Form 8-K Item 1.05 | 4 business days after the company determines the incident is material | `sec_8k` |
| Form 8-K amendment with information missing from the first filing | 4 business days after the missing information is determined or becomes available | `sec_8k_amendment` |
| HIPAA notice to affected individuals | 60 days after the breach is discovered | `hipaa_individuals` |
| NYDFS notice to the superintendent | 72 hours after the company determines a cybersecurity incident occurred | `nydfs_notice` |
| NYDFS notice of an extortion payment | 24 hours after the extortion payment is made | `nydfs_extortion` |
| NYDFS reasons for an extortion payment | 30 days after the extortion payment is made | `nydfs_extortion_reasons` |

Some clocks bend in cases the table can't show:

- `dora_initial`: When a deadline falls on a weekend or bank holiday, Delegated Regulation 2025/301 moves it to noon of the next working day for most entities. The tools do not, so their deadline can only come earlier.
- `dora_initial_awareness`: Log this clock beside dora_initial only when the incident was classified major within 24 hours of awareness. A later classification leaves dora_initial alone, at 4 hours.
- `nis2_notification`: Trust service providers have 24 hours, on the nis2_notification_trust clock.
- `nis2_final`: For an incident still being handled at the one-month mark, a progress report is due then, and the final report one month after the handling ends.
- `sec_8k`: The materiality determination itself must come without unreasonable delay after discovery.

The kit's audit_pack.py reads the records the repository keeps and writes an index for the regulations named, with each record found, empty, or missing. It lists the records kept elsewhere, case records above all, for a person to export. The Map regulatory controls tool shows the same crosswalk in a browser.

### 11.8 Response playbooks

A playbook is the automation that runs when a detection fires: it enriches the alert, decides, and acts or proposes an action. It gets the same treatment as a detection. It has a record, it moves through the eight stages with a countable definition of done at each, it runs in propose mode before it acts, and a trigger retires it. A playbook that only exists in the SOAR console is a live detection with no record.

Playbooks serve detections, so a playbook names the detection ids or the alert class it runs on, and it enters intake only when that detection is live. The agent rules of [section 10](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/) cover a playbook that calls a model; the approval points below apply either way.

The record lives at playbooks/PB-NNNN/playbook.md and carries these sections:

| Section | What it holds |
| --- | --- |
| Serves | The detection ids or the alert class the playbook runs on, and the alert volume per day it will see. |
| Trigger | The alert field values that start it. Nothing else does, so an alert the trigger does not name goes to a person. |
| Enrichment | Each lookup, its source, and the field it fills. A lookup that fails leaves its field empty and says so, and the playbook goes on. |
| Decision | The rule that turns the enriched alert into one outcome: close as benign, escalate, or act. Every branch is written down, and the default branch is escalate. |
| Action | What it does on each outcome, at which tier of the ladder, and the exact call it makes. |
| Approval point | Which actions wait for a person, who that person is, and how long the action waits before it expires unacted. |
| Rollback | The call that undoes each action, tested once against a real object, and who may run it. |
| Manual baseline | The steps an analyst took by hand before the playbook, timed over at least 20 alerts: median minutes, and the outcome each one got. |
| Fixtures | One past alert per outcome, with the enrichment results as they were, and the outcome the analyst recorded. |
| What it gets wrong | The alert the decision rule will misread, with its name. A playbook that closes alerts has at least one. |

What a playbook may do comes in four tiers. Each tier up changes more outside the alert, and each needs more of a person:

| Tier | What the playbook does | Who approves |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Enrich | Adds context to the alert: asset owner, user's role, prior alerts, reputation, the detection's record. | None. Nothing changes outside the alert. |
| 2. Route | Sends the alert to a queue, a person, or a ticket, and sets its severity from the enrichment. | None, once the routing rule has run in propose mode. |
| 3. Close | Closes an alert as benign with a code, and records why. | No person for a detection rated impact 1 to 3 once agreement is above the floor. A person every time for impact 4 or 5. |
| 4. Contain | Changes something outside the alert: disables an account, isolates a host, blocks an address, revokes a token. | A person, always, and the action expires unacted after the time the record sets. A reversible action on an asset the record names as expendable, such as a test host, may skip the approval. |

A playbook moves through the same eight stages as a detection. Where a stage's definition of done differs, this table says how; the rest is [Appendix A](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/a/):

| Stage | What differs for a playbook | Definition of done, counted |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Intake | The candidate names the detection or alert class it serves, the alerts per day it would see, and the ladder tier it wants. Scored on the six inputs like a detection, where build effort covers the integrations and run cost covers the actions it would take. | 6 scores with an evidence line each, 1 detection id or alert class, 1 tier |
| 2. Hypothesis | One sentence: on this alert, with these lookups, this rule gives this outcome, and it will misread this case. | 1 sentence, 1 named outcome, 1 named misread |
| 3. Research | An analyst works at least 20 of the alerts by hand and times each one. The steps they took become the enrichment list and the decision rule; the minutes become the manual baseline. | 20 alerts timed, each with its steps and its outcome |
| 4. Build | The playbook is written as code in the repository, where it can be reviewed and replayed. Each lookup has a fixture, each outcome has a fixture, and the rollback runs once against a real object. | 1 fixture per outcome, 1 fixture per lookup, 1 rollback run |
| 5. Validate | Replayed against the last 30 days of closed alerts for the alerts it serves. Its outcome agrees with the analyst's recorded outcome at or above the floor, it proposes no close on an alert later confirmed malicious, and a second person approves. | 30 days of alerts replayed, agreement at or above the floor, 0 closes on a confirmed alert, 1 approval by someone other than the author |
| 6. Deploy | Runs for 14 days in propose mode: it enriches, decides, and writes what it would do, and a person does it. Acting switches on only if agreement stayed above the floor for the whole 14 days and no proposed action was refused on an alert rated impact 4 or 5. | 14 days in propose mode, agreement at or above the floor on every day, 0 refused proposals on an impact 4 or 5 alert |
| 7. Tune | Every refused or reverted action is a tuning pull request that changes the decision rule and adds the alert as a fixture. The playbook stays in propose mode until it merges. | 1 pull request per refused or reverted action, with the alert as a fixture |
| 8. Retire | A trigger fires, the owner decides, and the record keeps a retirement note. The playbook's actions switch off before its code is removed. | 1 trigger named, 1 retirement note, actions off before removal |

The agreement floor is 0.95. The share of alerts on which the playbook's outcome matched the analyst's. The default is a chosen starting point that no team has measured yet. Set it lower for tier 1 and 2 playbooks, which cost a person a minute when wrong, and never below 0.99 for a playbook that closes alerts on its own.

Four triggers propose a playbook's retirement, and the owner decides, as with a detection:

- `agreement`: Agreement under the floor for two months running. Back to propose mode first; retirement if the tuning pull requests do not raise it.
- `orphaned`: Every detection it serves is retired. The playbook retires with the last one.
- `idle`: No run in 90 days. Either the alert stopped, which is a detection question, or the trigger no longer matches, which is a playbook bug. Both end at retire or tune.
- `reverted`: A tier 4 action reverted by a person. The playbook drops to propose mode that day, and the live review decides whether it comes back.

Four metrics, defined in [Appendix C](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/c/) with the rest. The kit does not compute them yet; the SOAR's own run log and the alert outcomes supply the counts.

| Metric | Unit | Aggregation | Definition |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `playbook_coverage` | percent | per quarter | Share of alerts in the quarter whose detection has a live playbook at tier 1 or higher. |
| `playbook_minutes_saved_per_alert` | minutes | median per quarter | The manual baseline minutes on the playbook's record, minus the analyst minutes an alert takes with the playbook running, per alert class. |
| `playbook_actions_unattended` | count | per month, by tier | Actions a playbook completed with no person in the loop, counted by ladder tier. A tier 4 count above zero names the expendable asset the record allows. |
| `playbook_actions_reverted` | count | per quarter | Playbook actions a person refused in propose mode or undid after they ran. Each one is a tuning pull request. |

### 11.9 After an incident, and who carries the pager

Every confirmed incident changes the backlog or a detection. The detection review names what it changes, and the quarterly report counts the incidents that changed nothing.

- Every confirmed incident gets a row in incidents.csv within 5 working days, with found_by filled in and, when no live detection caught it first, one miss code.
- Every incident produces at least one of: an intake candidate carrying the incident's events as its positive fixture, a tuning pull request on the detection that fired late or stayed silent, or a log source request to the platform owner. The row's fix column names it.
- An incident that produced none of these within 30 days counts in incidents_without_followup. The quarterly report lists each one with the responder who ran it.
- A rule put live by hand during the incident enters intake the same week, with the incident as its evidence. It stays live until its candidate passes validate or the live review retires it.
- The responder brings the timeline; the detection lead brings the alert record. Neither writes the other's part.

The SOC's rotation answers alerts. A second, lighter rotation answers for the detection pipeline itself. A silent log source or a red build on main is not an alert, so nobody is paged for it unless someone is named.

| What pages | Who answers | Within |
| --- | --- | --- |
| A DET-0000 silence alert on a log source rated readiness 3 or higher | The platform or data owner, with the detection engineer on rotation in copy | The source's usual gap, as DET-0000 measures it |
| A red build on the default branch, or a conversion that no longer matches its approved copy | The detection engineer on rotation | The next working day; nothing deploys until it is green |
| A live detection whose alert count passes its hourly limit | The detection engineer on rotation, with the SOC lead | One hour, and alerting switches off on its own before anyone answers |
| A tier 4 playbook action waiting for approval | The incident response lead or the named approver | The time the playbook's record sets; the action expires if nobody answers |

One engineer carries the pipeline pager for a week at a time. A one-person team carries it always, which is one reason the silence alert's floor is an hour and not a minute.

Next step [Templates](https://detect.htora.dev/templates/)


---

## Metrics

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/metrics/

Section 15

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Check coverage and alert load](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/)

Remember

- Define each metric once, and treat a change to a definition as a release.
- Report robustness-weighted coverage beside the raw detection count.
- Measure [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) for each detection against that detection's own floor.
- The incident detection rate is the share of confirmed incidents a live detection caught first.
- Ingestion delay and the schedule set the floor under detection latency.

The program measures its health with 31 metrics. Each has one definition and one owning stage, except the 15 that belong to the program as a whole: robustness_weighted_coverage, incident_detection_rate, silent_source_hours, priority_technique_gaps, misses_by_cause, open_detection_fixes_age, false_close_rate, time_to_scope_hours, time_to_contain_minutes, notifications_on_time, playbook_coverage, playbook_minutes_saved_per_alert, playbook_actions_unattended, playbook_actions_reverted, and incidents_without_followup. The agent metrics in [section 10](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/agents/) sit outside this set. The repository produces the build-side ones from score.yml and the file layout. The pull request system and the backlog's entry dates supply the durations. The rest come from what analysts record about each alert and the engineering hours logged on each pull request. The definitions are in Appendix C.

The Check coverage and alert load tool opens on a chart that puts the raw detection count beside robustness-weighted coverage. On a 30-detection sample program run through the repository's own metrics code, Execution has the most detections and Credential Access has the most weighted coverage. A detection mapped to more than one tactic is counted under each, so the detection column adds up past 30, and the sample includes two ICS tactics, Evasion and Impair Process Control:

| Tactic | Live detections | Robustness-weighted |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Execution | 7 | 3.2 |
| Persistence | 5 | 3.0 |
| Privilege Escalation | 5 | 3.0 |
| Credential Access | 4 | 3.4 |
| Stealth | 3 | 1.6 |
| Command and Control | 3 | 0.8 |
| Defense Impairment | 2 | 1.4 |
| Impact | 2 | 1.4 |
| Lateral Movement | 2 | 1.4 |
| Initial Access | 2 | 1.2 |
| Discovery | 2 | 1.0 |
| Exfiltration | 2 | 0.8 |
| Evasion | 1 | 1.0 |
| Impair Process Control | 1 | 1.0 |

The coverage numbers answer different questions, so report the one that answers the question asked:

| Number | The question it answers | How it is computed | Where it tops out |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Detection count | How many live detections name a technique in this tactic? | One per live detection, counted under every tactic it maps to. | Never. A brittle detection adds to it as much as a strong one. |
| Robustness-weighted coverage | How much evasion-resistant work sits in this tactic? | Each live detection counts as its [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) divided by 5, summed per tactic. | Never. Five detections at robustness 1 equal one at robustness 5. |
| Weighted share | What share of the matrix is covered, and how well? | Each technique scores its strongest live detection's robustness divided by 5, averaged across every technique. | 100%, when every technique has a detection at robustness 5. |
| Covered count | How many techniques are covered at all? | A technique counts once its strongest live detection is at robustness 4 or 5. | The technique count of the pinned [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) release. |

Both per-tactic numbers keep growing, which is what makes a bare detection count easy to inflate. Both per-technique numbers cap at the matrix, so a weighted share of 40% is a figure a board can compare quarter to quarter. The ATT&CK coverage workbook lists every Enterprise ATT&CK 20.1 technique and sub-technique and computes all four. The site's coverage app runs the same rules in your browser, keeps your team's data on your own machine, and exports to Excel, PNG, or PDF. It also reads the log sources each of ATT&CK's analytics names. A technique counts as ready to build only when one analytic has every log source it reads collected. From that the app reports which uncovered techniques you could build today, which have some of the telemetry, which are blind, and which log source would make the most of them ready. For every technique it also says how many of the detection library's open-source rules are tagged with it, and links to them.

### 15.1 Checks from outside

Four of the site's claims are checked against something other than its author, and the numbers are republished with each run. MITRE's own ATT&CK library reads the same STIX bundle the site parses; on 2026-11-06 the two agreed on every technique, platform, analytic, and data component in ATT&CK 20.1. D3FEND's own API returned the same count of defenses as the coverage map for 5 of the 5 techniques checked on 2026-10-20. The library's robustness draft is run against the 72 SigmaHQ rules that MITRE's CTID scored by hand for [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid). It matches the hand score on 55 and stays at or under it on 66. The library's Windows [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules run against 107 recorded attacks from OTRF's Security-Datasets; of the 1,695 rules with a recording of their technique, 139 fired on it. The site's evidence page lists what each check shows, what it doesn't, and which claims remain opinion: the score model, the lifecycle's numbers, the maturity levels, and the ceilings.

### 15.2 Performance and risk

A KPI says how well the program does its work, and the team sets a target for it. A KRI says how exposed the program is, and the team sets a tolerance for it: the level at which someone has to act. The tolerances here are defaults to replace once a quarter of the team's own numbers exists. Of the 31 metrics, 10 are KRIs:

| KRI | Amber | Red |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `detection_latency_median` | over 15 minutes | over 60 minutes |
| `rule_debt` | over 10% | over 20% |
| `silent_source_hours` | over 4 hours for a source behind a live detection | over 24 hours |
| `priority_technique_gaps` | over 20% | over 40% |
| `misses_by_cause` | the same code twice in a quarter | the same code in two quarters running |
| `open_detection_fixes_age` | over 30 days | over 60 days |
| `false_close_rate` | any confirmed wrong close in a quarter | a wrong close on a detection rated impact 4 or 5 |
| `notifications_on_time` | any internal notification late | any regulator or customer deadline missed |
| `playbook_actions_reverted` | any reverted action in a quarter | a reverted tier 4 action, or a refused close on an impact 4 or 5 alert |
| `incidents_without_followup` | any incident in a quarter | the same responder twice, or any incident in two quarters running |

[Section 19](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/) adds `ai_false_close_rate` as a KRI for a program that lets an agent close alerts. The quarterly report lists every KRI against its tolerance, red ones first.

### 15.3 ATLAS and D3FEND

ATT&CK covers attacks on hosts, networks, identities, and cloud services, and two other MITRE knowledge bases extend it. ATLAS 2026.09 lists 120 techniques and 88 sub-techniques against AI systems, and 44 of the 208 are adopted from ATT&CK. ATLAS names no log sources, so the coverage map can't score its techniques. A score.yml accepts an ATLAS id beside an ATT&CK one, and the kit checks both. ATLAS ties 48 of its techniques to a mitigation that, by this site's reading, detects an attack in progress, most often AI telemetry logging, which records a deployed model's inputs and outputs. Collect that log first, because a detection for [prompt injection](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-prompt-injection) or for exfiltration through an inference API has nothing to read without it. ATT&CK 20.0 added direct and indirect prompt injection too, and a detection for a technique both list carries both ids.

D3FEND 1.6.0 links 387 current Enterprise and ICS techniques to the defenses that counter them, through an artifact both touch, such as a process, a file, a network flow, or a credential. Of the 156 defensive techniques it links, 56 detect. The coverage map lists those for each technique by the artifact they analyze, so a hypothesis can start from a named analysis such as process spawn analysis. D3FEND 1.6.0 maps to ATT&CK 19.0. The extract moves the 22 ids ATT&CK has since revoked to their replacements, and the techniques ATT&CK added after 19.0 have no D3FEND links yet.


---

## Coverage scoring rules

https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/model/

The rules behind every color in the coverage app and the coverage workbook. Both apply the same statuses and the same weighting, so a matrix exported from one matches the other.

Reference Framework v0.136.0.

Do it in the browser [Map your ATT&CK coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/)

### Statuses

| Status | When a technique gets it |
| --- | --- |
| Covered | A live detection at [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) 4 or 5, the [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) levels tied to the technique itself. |
| Partial | Live detections exist, but the strongest is at robustness 1 to 3, tied to a tool or an artifact the attacker controls. A parent technique is also partial when some of its sub-techniques are detected, and covered when its own best detection reaches 4 or 5; a sub-technique never lifts its parent past partial. |
| Ready to build | No live detection, and every log source one of [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck)'s analytics for the technique reads is collected. Analytics written for platforms you do not run do not count. |
| Some telemetry | No live detection. Some of the log sources the technique's analytics read are collected, but no single analytic has all of them, so the next step is collecting what one analytic still lacks. |
| Blind | No live detection, and none of the log sources the technique's analytics read are collected. |
| Check telemetry | A live detection exists, but none of the log sources the technique needs are marked collected. Either the log source list is out of date or the detection reads a log source nobody collects. Check telemetry wins over covered and partial, and the technique still counts in the detected and weighted shares. |
| Out of scope | Excluded from every count. Techniques whose only platform is PRE start out of scope; anything else can be switched off per technique. |

### The coverage numbers

Coverage is four numbers that answer different questions. The two per tactic keep growing; the two per technique cap at the matrix.

| Number | The question it answers | How it is computed | Where it tops out |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Detection count** | How many live detections name a technique in this tactic? | One per live detection, counted under every tactic it maps to. | Never. A brittle detection adds to it as much as a strong one. |
| **Robustness-weighted coverage** | How much evasion-resistant work sits in this tactic? | Each live detection counts as its robustness divided by 5, summed per tactic. | Never. Five detections at robustness 1 equal one at robustness 5. |
| **Weighted share** | What share of the matrix is covered, and how well? | Each technique scores its strongest live detection's robustness divided by 5, averaged across every technique. | 100%, when every technique has a detection at robustness 5. |
| **Covered count** | How many techniques are covered at all? | A technique counts once its strongest live detection is at robustness 4 or 5. | The technique count of the pinned ATT&CK release. |

### Scope

- Pick the platforms you run, and techniques that exist only on other platforms go out of scope. Leave every platform unticked to keep them all in scope. Any technique can be switched in or out by hand, and a hand setting wins.
- Techniques whose only platform is PRE, the reconnaissance and resource development a defender cannot log, start out of scope.

### Log sources

- Log sources are listed by the names ATT&CK's own analytics use, such as WinEventLog:Sysmon, auditd:SYSCALL, AWS:CloudTrail, and m365:unified, grouped by the platform they serve. Ticking one marks every kind of event it produces as collected.
- Behind the names sit ATT&CK's data components, the kinds of event a detection strategy reads. Each can be ticked or unticked on its own, and a hand setting overrides what the named log sources imply.
- A log source's rank is the number of techniques it would make ready to build by completing one of their analytics. A kind of event ranks by the analytics it is the last missing piece of.

### Weighting and counts

- A technique's weighted coverage is its strongest live detection's robustness divided by 5. Extra detections at a lower level add nothing, which matches how the detect score treats a candidate the live set already covers.
- Detected share counts any live detection; weighted share uses the robustness weighting. When the weighted share is much lower, most detections in that tactic match tools and artifacts an attacker can change.
- Weighted share is not the program metric robustness_weighted_coverage. That metric adds robustness divided by 5 for every live detection in a tactic, so it keeps growing as detections are added. Weighted share caps each technique at its strongest detection, so it reads as a percentage of the matrix.
- Only detections with status live count. Live means deploy or tune, the two stages the kit counts as live, so a detection running with alerting off counts. Building covers hypothesis through validate. Building and retired detections stay in the list so the pipeline and the workbook can see them.
- The suggested [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) for a technique is the lowest readiness among the log sources of its best complete analytic, scored on the Log sources tab. It is 1 when no analytic is complete, and 0 when none of its log sources is collected. When ATT&CK lists no log source, the app suggests none, because only your inventory can say.

### Working with it

- Import detection rules from where they already live. The app reads a folder of [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules, taking technique ids from their attack tags. It also reads Splunk savedsearches.conf or its REST export, Microsoft Sentinel rule exports in YAML or JSON, and Elastic rule exports in ndjson. Rules do not say how hard they are to evade, so each arrives unscored and counts as partial until someone scores it. An unscored detection counts as robustness 0 in the weighted share and the Navigator score.
- Robustness is scored with four questions from MITRE CTID's Summiting the Pyramid, one per level: changeable values, attacker tools, environment tools, and variant-specific artifacts. Does the detection match a value the attacker changes in seconds? A tool the attacker brings? A tool already in the environment? Something only some ways of doing the technique produce, so another way gets past? The number of the earliest question answered yes is the level, 1 to 4; four noes make it 5.
- ATT&CK Navigator layers go both ways. The export colors every technique by status and scores it by its strongest live detection's robustness. An imported layer shows as an overlay, so a threat-intelligence layer can sit on top of the coverage.
- Threat groups come from ATT&CK's own records of which groups used which techniques. Choosing the groups that matter to you marks their techniques and puts them first in what to build next.
- A snapshot stores the date, the totals, the tactic shares, and every technique's status. Comparing with an older snapshot shows the change per tactic and, within one ATT&CK version, which techniques changed status.

### Sharing

- Merging a teammate's backup adds the detections missing from yours, adds the logs they ticked, and asks which version to keep when the same detection id differs.
- A read-only view link carries every technique's status packed into the part of the address after #, which browsers do not send to the web server. It carries no detection names, log sources, or notes. It still shows where you are blind, so share it the way you would share the report.
- A link only opens against the ATT&CK version it was made with. After an update it says so and asks for a new link, since the technique list may have changed underneath it.

### ATT&CK versions

- The site pins the ATT&CK release it was built with. A daily job checks MITRE's index and rebuilds the site when a new release lands.
- Detections are saved with the release they were entered against. After an update, the app lists every saved reference that MITRE revoked (with the replacement MITRE names), deprecated, or moved to another tactic. Nothing changes until you accept it.

### Privacy

- Everything you enter is stored in your browser's own database on your machine. The page sends nothing anywhere.
- Every change in the app reports what moved and can be undone from its message or with Ctrl or Cmd+Z, one step back, within the matrix it was made in.
- The one outbound request is the check of MITRE's public release index, which stays off until you turn it on, runs at most once a day, and carries nothing about your data.
- Clearing your browser's site data deletes the workspace. Back up to a file, which is also how a teammate gets a copy.

Open the [coverage app](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/), or download the [workbook](https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/) to do the same in Excel.


---

## ATLAS and D3FEND

https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/atlas-d3fend/

[ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) covers attacks on hosts, networks, identities, and cloud services. MITRE ATLAS lists attacks on AI systems, and MITRE D3FEND names the defenses that counter ATT&CK techniques. This page says how the framework uses each, and where its copy of their data differs from the source.

Reference Framework v0.136.0. ATLAS 2026.09, D3FEND 1.6.0, ATT&CK 20.1.

### ATLAS

ATLAS 2026.09 lists 16 tactics, 120 techniques, 88 sub-techniques, 40 mitigations, and 73 case studies. Of the case studies, 23 are incidents against deployed AI systems and 50 are exercises by red teams and researchers. ATLAS adopted 44 of its 208 techniques and sub-techniques from ATT&CK and names the ATT&CK technique each came from, as with Exploit Public-Facing Application. The rest are specific to AI, such as [prompt injection](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-prompt-injection), jailbreaks, and poisoned training data.

ATLAS lists no log sources and no analytics, so the coverage map can't score its techniques the way it scores ATT&CK's. A `score.yml` accepts an ATLAS id such as `AML.T0051` beside its ATT&CK ids. The kit's lint checks it against the pinned ATLAS release, so a detection for an AI system enters the backlog like any other.

#### Collect the model's telemetry first

Of the 40 ATLAS mitigations, 5 detect an attack in progress: Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015), AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024), Deepfake Detection (AML.M0034), AI Agent Scope Drift Detection (AML.M0038), AI Honeypots (AML.M0039). The other 35 prevent, harden, or limit. ATLAS files its mitigations as policy or technical controls, so this split by what each one does is this site's reading. AI Telemetry Logging records the inputs and outputs of a deployed model, and 18 techniques name it. A detection for prompt injection, or for exfiltration through an inference API or an agent's tools, has nothing to read without that log. Treat it like any other log source: give it a row in `inventory.csv` and a silence alert under DET-0000.

#### ATT&CK's own AI techniques

ATT&CK 20.1 has 7 techniques of its own for AI: Direct Prompt Injection (T1699), Indirect Prompt Injection (T1698), AI-Enabled Exfiltration (T1700), Impair Autonomous Defenses (T1685.007), AI Result Poisoning (T1608.007), Query Public AI Services (T1682), and Artificial Intelligence (T1588.007). The coverage map scores them like any other technique. ATT&CK names log sources for T1699, T1698, and T1700 only, so the map can't yet say which logs the others need. T1608.007, T1682, and T1588.007 are PRE techniques, so the map starts them out of scope. A detection for a technique both knowledge bases list carries both ids: the ATT&CK id counts toward coverage, and the ATLAS id ties it to ATLAS's case studies and mitigations.

#### Techniques ATLAS ties to a mitigation that detects

48 of the 208 techniques and sub-techniques name at least one detecting mitigation. The techniques with the most ATLAS case studies come first.

| Technique | Tactics | Mitigation that detects | Case studies | From ATT&CK |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [AML.T0053](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0053) AI Agent Tool Invocation | Execution, Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 19 | |
| [AML.T0015](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0015) Evade AI Model | Initial Access, Defense Evasion, Impact | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015), Deepfake Detection (AML.M0034) | 18 | |
| [AML.T0051.001](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051.001) LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect | Execution | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 18 | |
| [AML.T0047](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0047) AI-Enabled Product or Service | AI Model Access | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 16 | |
| [AML.T0093](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0093) Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application | Initial Access, Persistence | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 13 | |
| [AML.T0051.000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051.000) LLM Prompt Injection: Direct | Execution | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 11 | |
| [AML.T0040](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0040) AI Model Inference API Access | AI Model Access | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024), AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 10 | |
| [AML.T0086](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0086) Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation | Exfiltration | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 10 | |
| [AML.T0000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000) Search Open Technical Databases | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 8 | T1596 |
| [AML.T0049](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0049) Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 8 | T1190 |
| [AML.T0031](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0031) Erode AI Model Integrity | Impact | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 6 | |
| [AML.T0006](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0006) Active Scanning | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 5 | T1595 |
| [AML.T0051.002](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051.002) LLM Prompt Injection: Triggered | Execution | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 5 | |
| [AML.T0085.001](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0085.001) Data from AI Services: AI Agent Tools | Collection | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 5 | |
| [AML.T0116](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0116) Autonomous Reconnaissance | Reconnaissance | AI Agent Scope Drift Detection (AML.M0038) | 4 | |
| [AML.T0117](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0117) Autonomous Attack-Path Adaptation | AI Attack Adaptation | AI Agent Scope Drift Detection (AML.M0038) | 4 | |
| [AML.T0043.000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0043.000) Craft Adversarial Data: White-Box Optimization | AI Attack Adaptation | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 3 | |
| [AML.T0043.002](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0043.002) Craft Adversarial Data: Black-Box Transfer | AI Attack Adaptation | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 3 | |
| [AML.T0043.003](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0043.003) Craft Adversarial Data: Manual Modification | AI Attack Adaptation | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 3 | |
| [AML.T0088](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0088) Generate Deepfakes | AI Attack Adaptation | Deepfake Detection (AML.M0034) | 3 | |
| [AML.T0095](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0095) Search Open Websites/Domains | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 3 | T1593 |
| [AML.T0095.000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0095.000) Search Open Websites/Domains: Code Repositories | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 3 | T1593.003 |
| [AML.T0101](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0101) Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation | Impact | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 3 | |
| [AML.T0000.003](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0000.003) Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 2 | T1596.005 |
| [AML.T0005.001](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0005.001) Create Proxy AI Model: Train Proxy via Replication | AI Attack Adaptation | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 2 | |
| [AML.T0029](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0029) Denial of AI Service | Impact | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 2 | |
| [AML.T0043.001](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0043.001) Craft Adversarial Data: Black-Box Optimization | AI Attack Adaptation | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 2 | |
| [AML.T0052](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052) Phishing | Initial Access, Lateral Movement | Deepfake Detection (AML.M0034) | 2 | T1566 |
| [AML.T0085.000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0085.000) Data from AI Services: RAG Databases | Collection | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 2 | |
| [AML.T0006.003](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0006.003) Active Scanning: Probe AI Agent Trigger Channels | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 1 | T1595 |
| [AML.T0024.002](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0024.002) Exfiltration via AI Inference API: Extract AI Model | Exfiltration | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0043](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0043) Craft Adversarial Data | AI Attack Adaptation | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0043.004](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0043.004) Craft Adversarial Data: Insert Backdoor Trigger | AI Attack Adaptation | Predictive AI Adversarial Input Detection (AML.M0015) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0051](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0051) LLM Prompt Injection | Execution | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0052.000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052.000) Phishing: Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM | Initial Access, Lateral Movement | Deepfake Detection (AML.M0034) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0084](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0084) Discover AI Agent Configuration | Discovery | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0114](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0114) AI Service Web Interface | Command and Control | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0124](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0124) Autonomous Attack Orchestration | AI Attack Adaptation | AI Agent Scope Drift Detection (AML.M0038) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0132](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0132) Misconfigured or Publicly Exposed AI Services | Initial Access | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 1 | |
| [AML.T0006.000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0006.000) Active Scanning: Enumerate Hosted AI Resources | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 0 | |
| [AML.T0006.001](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0006.001) Active Scanning: Query Platform Metadata APIs | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 0 | |
| [AML.T0006.002](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0006.002) Active Scanning: Scan for Exposed AI Infrastructure | Reconnaissance | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 0 | T1595 |
| [AML.T0024](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0024) Exfiltration via AI Inference API | Exfiltration | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 0 | |
| [AML.T0024.000](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0024.000) Exfiltration via AI Inference API: Infer Training Data Membership | Exfiltration | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 0 | |
| [AML.T0024.001](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0024.001) Exfiltration via AI Inference API: Invert AI Model | Exfiltration | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 0 | |
| [AML.T0052.001](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0052.001) Phishing: Deepfake-Assisted Phishing | Initial Access, Lateral Movement | Deepfake Detection (AML.M0034) | 0 | |
| [AML.T0085](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0085) Data from AI Services | Collection | AI Telemetry Logging (AML.M0024) | 0 | |
| [AML.T0133](https://atlas.mitre.org/techniques/AML.T0133) Discover AI Agent Runtime Capabilities | Discovery | AI Honeypots (AML.M0039) | 0 | |

### D3FEND

D3FEND links an attack to a defense through a digital artifact. The attack technique accesses, creates, or modifies an artifact such as a process, a file, or a network flow, and a defensive technique analyzes or hardens the same artifact. D3FEND 1.6.0 links 392 Enterprise and ICS technique ids to 156 defensive techniques: 56 detect, 32 harden, 29 isolate, 14 evict, 12 model, 9 restore, 4 deceive. Once the ids ATT&CK has revoked move to their replacements, 387 of them are techniques in ATT&CK 20.1. A detection program reads the Detect techniques, because each one is a named kind of analysis a hypothesis can start from.

In the [coverage map](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/), a technique's detail lists the Detect techniques D3FEND links to it, grouped by the artifact they analyze, and counts the rest by tactic. A parent technique counts its sub-techniques' links and a sub-technique counts its parent's, which is how D3FEND's own site shows them, and each link that comes through another id says which. Mobile techniques have no D3FEND links.

#### Two examples

For T1003.001, LSASS Memory, the map shows 12 defensive techniques, and 3 of them detect:

| Detect technique | Artifact it analyzes | Linked through |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [D3-PLA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessLineageAnalysis/) Process Lineage Analysis | Process | the technique itself |
| [D3-PSMD](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSelf-ModificationDetection/) Process Self-Modification Detection | Process | the technique itself |
| [D3-PSA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis/) Process Spawn Analysis | Process | the technique itself |

For T1558.003, Kerberoasting, D3FEND links the sub-technique itself to 10 defensive techniques, all through Network Traffic and RPC Network Traffic. The parent, T1558, adds links through Access Token and Credential, for 21 defensive techniques in all, and 10 of them detect:

| Detect technique | Artifact it analyzes | Linked through |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [D3-APCA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ApplicationProtocolCommandAnalysis/) Application Protocol Command Analysis | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-CSPP](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Client-serverPayloadProfiling/) Client-server Payload Profiling | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-NTCD](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:NetworkTrafficCommunityDeviation/) Network Traffic Community Deviation | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-NTSA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:NetworkTrafficSignatureAnalysis/) Network Traffic Signature Analysis | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-PHDURA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:PerHostDownload-UploadRatioAnalysis/) Per Host Download-Upload Ratio Analysis | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-PMAD](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProtocolMetadataAnomalyDetection/) Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-RTSD](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:RemoteTerminalSessionDetection/) Remote Terminal Session Detection | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-UGLPA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:UserGeolocationLogonPatternAnalysis/) User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis | Network Traffic | the technique itself |
| [D3-CCSA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:CredentialCompromiseScopeAnalysis/) Credential Compromise Scope Analysis | Credential | T1558 |
| [D3-RTA](https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:RPCTrafficAnalysis/) RPC Traffic Analysis | RPC Network Traffic | the technique itself |

#### Differences from D3FEND's own data

The extract reads D3FEND's bulk mappings file, which lists each technique's links on its own, and the coverage map folds parents and sub-techniques when it shows one. On 2026-10-20 the folded counts matched D3FEND's API for 5 of the 5 techniques checked; the [outside checks page](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/#d3fend) has the numbers.

D3FEND 1.6.0 maps to ATT&CK 19.0, and this site pins 20.1. ATT&CK has since revoked 22 of the ids D3FEND maps. The extract moves their links to the technique ATT&CK names as each one's replacement, such as T1562.001 to T1685 and T1574.002 to T1574.001. 3 more, T0807, T0853, T1053.004, have no current technique, so the map never shows them. Techniques ATT&CK added after 19.0 have no D3FEND links yet. Of ATT&CK's 7 AI techniques, none has a D3FEND link.

### Pinning and updating

`tools/atlas_extract.py` and `tools/d3fend_extract.py` each read one pinned release and write [`atlas-2026.09.json`](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/data/atlas-2026.09.json) and [`d3fend-1.6.0.json`](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/data/d3fend-1.6.0.json). Rerun them on each release and review the diff, then rerun `tools/d3fend_extract.py --check`. In the kit, `python tools/attack_pin.py` pins the ATLAS ids with ATT&CK's in the technique list lint checks against, and `--atlas-only` re-pins ATLAS alone.

### Licenses

MITRE ATLAS data, copyright The MITRE Corporation, licensed under the Apache License 2.0. Content ATLAS adopts from ATT&CK is also subject to the ATT&CK terms of use. MITRE D3FEND data, copyright The MITRE Corporation, licensed under the MIT License and the D3FEND terms of use, which ask that copies keep this notice. The extracts carry these notices, and this site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them.


---

## Maturity levels

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/maturity/

Section 13

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Score your maturity](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/maturity/)

*Level 0***Ad hoc**Detections exist. Nothing about them is written down in a place a second person can find.

*Level 1***Repeatable**Every detection has a record and a defined way in. Two people would build the next one the same way.

*Level 2***Measured**The program counts its own work: definitions of done carry numbers, the backlog carries scores, alerts carry outcomes.

*Level 3***Enforced**Machines enforce the definitions of done. A skipped step fails the build.

*Level 4***Self-correcting**Measurement drives change: detections retire themselves on evidence and coverage claims can be falsified.

Every dimension is scored on this ladder, and the program sits at the lowest rung any dimension reaches.

Remember

- Claim a level only for what is true today at that level and every level below it. A pilot counts for nothing.
- Your overall level is your lowest dimension, never the average.
- Use evidence someone outside the team could check.
- Work on the lowest dimension first. The Score your maturity tool lists the dimensions in that order.

The maturity model scores a program at five levels on each dimension: seven for detection, and four for response that a team scores only if it owns response. Your overall level is your lowest scored dimension and never the average, so a strong pipeline can't make up for a missing inventory.

Every cell is an evidence test somebody outside the team could run, so a level is a claim an auditor can check and a self-assessment can't inflate.

Score a level only if every statement at that level and below is true today. A pilot earns no credit. The gap between your lowest dimension and your highest is the work queue.

### 13.1 The dimensions

**Detection**

Detection dimensions cover how the program finds attacks: what it collects, what it builds, and how it keeps its detections honest.

| Dimension | The question it answers | 0. Ad hoc | 1. Repeatable | 2. Measured | 3. Enforced | 4. Self-correcting |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Telemetry | Do you know what you collect, and do you know within a day when a source stops? | No inventory. A source can stop and nobody finds out until a detection is needed. | An inventory exists with an owner per source, refreshed at a stated interval. | Every source has a measured normal rate, and readiness is scored 0 to 5 on the backlog. | The silence alert covers every source in the inventory and fires to a real destination. | New detections cannot reference an uninventoried source, and readiness drops automatically when a log source stops. |
| Backlog and order | How is the order of detection work decided, and could you defend it to a skeptic? | Order is whoever asked most recently, or whoever asked loudest. | A single written backlog exists, ordered by hand. | Every candidate carries six scores, six [evidence lines](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line), and a computed score. | Scores are computed by the pipeline; a hand-typed score fails the build. [Mandates](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mandate) carry their framework, requirement, and due date. | The backlog re-scores on a schedule and the order changes without anyone arguing about it. |
| The detection record | What does a responder have in front of them at three in the morning? | The query, and whatever the author remembers. | Each detection names its goal and its technique. | Records carry goal, technique, log sources, and response steps. | Records carry all 11 sections, the 10 ADS sections plus the retirement record, and the pipeline rejects a detection missing any of them. | Records are versioned with the detection, and every change to the logic changes the record in the same commit. |
| Validation | What proves a detection fires on the behavior, and that somebody other than the author agreed? | It went live because it looked right in the console. | Each detection is spot-checked by hand against one true event. | Every detection has a true-positive [fixture](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) and a false-positive fixture stored with it. | Fixtures replay in CI on every change, and a second engineer's approval is required to merge. | Fixtures and golden query diffs run for every target, and a failing replay blocks the release. |
| Deployment | How does a detection get from a text editor into production, and can you replay how? | Edited directly in the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) console. | Detections live in version control and are copied into the SIEM by hand. | Deployment is a documented, repeatable procedure with a change record. | The pipeline deploys; console edits are reverted or alarmed. | Every release is reproducible from a commit, and a rollback is one revert. |
| Upkeep and retirement | What removes a detection, and how long does a dead one keep costing you? | Nothing. Detections accumulate. | Detections are reviewed when somebody complains about the noise. | [Precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) and [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) minutes are measured per detection every month. | Each detection has a floor, and a detection under its floor for two windows is proposed for retirement on the record. | The precision check runs on a schedule and proposes retirements; replacements enter the backlog with a link to the retirement note. |
| Measurement | What numbers does the program report, and would two people compute them the same way? | Detection count, when asked. | A handful of numbers are reported without written definitions. | Every reported number has one written definition and one owning stage. | The pipeline produces the build-side numbers, and coverage is reported weighted. | Numbers change decisions on the record, and a claim about coverage can be falsified by pointing at a test. |

**Response**

Response dimensions cover what happens after an alert fires. Score them only if the team owns response. A team that hands confirmed incidents to another group leaves them out, and its level is its lowest detection dimension.

| Dimension | The question it answers | 0. Ad hoc | 1. Repeatable | 2. Measured | 3. Enforced | 4. Self-correcting |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Triage | Who works each alert, how long does it take, and would two analysts close it the same way? | Alerts are worked by whoever sees them, and nothing records how they closed. | Every alert goes to one queue, and each closed alert carries an outcome. | Every alert closes with a code from a fixed list, and triage minutes and precision are measured per detection. | Analysts calibrate each month on the same sampled alerts, and an alert closed as benign that proves malicious gets the miss code alert_closed. | A weekly sample of closed alerts measures the false-close rate, and each wrong close changes a record or a runbook. |
| Investigation | When an alert is real, how fast does someone establish what happened, and could a second person repeat the work? | Investigations happen in chat and in people's heads. | Every escalated alert opens a case with an owner and a timeline. | The most frequent alert types have playbooks, and the hours from escalation to a known scope are measured. | Each case records its queries and their time ranges, and a second person can repeat the investigation from the case alone. | Every confirmed incident reaches the detection review, and its events become fixtures or intake items with a miss code. |
| Containment | Once something is confirmed, how fast is it stopped, and who is allowed to stop it? | Containment depends on who is online and what they can reach. | The containment actions, and who may take each one, are written down. | The common actions are scripted, and the minutes from confirmation to containment are measured. | Actions that can be undone are approved in advance in playbooks, and each one is logged with who took it. | Every containment action is tested each quarter, and a failed test is fixed before an incident needs it. |
| Communication | Who hears about an incident, how soon, and does the program meet its reporting deadlines? | Leadership and regulators hear about an incident when someone remembers to tell them. | A notification list exists for each severity, with every deadline that applies. | Every notification is timestamped and measured against its deadline. | The notification path is rehearsed each year, and a late notification is reported with its cause. | Reports are drafted from the case record, and no notification missed its deadline in the last year. |

### 13.2 Reading your own score

Score each dimension on what's true today, then take the lowest. A program at Enforced on deployment and Ad hoc on telemetry is an Ad hoc program with good deployment. Its coverage numbers may describe detections reading a log source that stopped last month.

Raise your lowest dimension first. Each dimension names the next action from where you stand, and the site's Score your maturity tool prints that list for the levels you select.

| Dimension | To reach Measured | To reach Self-correcting |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Telemetry | Record whether each source's fields are parsed, and its normal event rate. | Fail the pipeline when a detection cites a source that is not in the inventory. |
| Backlog and order | Score each candidate on the six inputs, with one evidence line per input. | Re-score the standing backlog on a schedule, so stale relevance falls away. |
| The detection record | Add the log sources it reads and the response steps for the analyst. | Version each record with its detection, so a change to the logic changes the record in the same commit. |
| Validation | Capture that event as a fixture stored next to the detection. | Diff the converted query for each target against an approved copy, so a conversion change cannot pass silently. |
| Deployment | Write the deployment step down so two people do it the same way. | Make every release reproducible from a commit, with a rollback that is one revert. |
| Upkeep and retirement | Measure precision and triage minutes per detection over 30 days. | Automate the check so the report arrives without anyone running it. |
| Measurement | Write one definition per metric, with its unit and how it aggregates. | Tie the numbers to decisions: what gets built next, what gets retired. |
| Triage | Close every alert with a code from a fixed list, and measure triage minutes per alert. | Sample a share of closed alerts every week, and send each wrong close back to the detection's record. |
| Investigation | Write a playbook for each of the most frequent alert types, naming the queries to run. | Send every confirmed incident's events to the detection review, as fixtures and intake items. |
| Containment | Script the common actions, and measure the minutes from confirmation to containment. | Test each containment action every quarter against a test host or account. |
| Communication | Record when each notification went out, and measure it against its deadline. | Draft the regulator reports from the case record, so the timeline is written before the clock starts. |

Each detection dimension maps to one of the practices in [section 3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/), so your level also tells you which practice to adopt or deepen next. Countable definitions of done is the one practice without a dimension of its own. I left it out because a [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done) is how every other dimension moves from Repeatable to Enforced.


---

## Scaling

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/scaling/

Section 14

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser [Find your ceiling](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/)

Remember

- Analyst [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) time, engineering upkeep time, and telemetry each cap a program, and the smallest cap sets your size.
- Each live detection costs about 20 minutes a month to maintain, on top of its triage minutes.
- Replace the 20-minute default with your own number after a quarter of measuring.
- [Tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) and retirement raise the triage ceiling for less than hiring analysts does.
- A candidate blocked on telemetry needs a log source request before it needs an engineer.

Triage minutes cap how many alerts analysts can absorb, engineering minutes cap how many detections stay current, and [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) caps what you can build at all. The smallest of the three sets the size of your program.

### 14.1 The ceilings

| Ceiling | What it limits | How it is computed |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Triage ceiling | How many live detections can the analysts absorb? | `(analysts x triage hours each per day x 60) / (alerts per detection per day x minutes per alert)` |
| Maintenance ceiling | How many live detections can the engineers keep current? | `(engineers x upkeep hours each per week x 60 x 52 / 12) / upkeep minutes per detection per month` |
| Telemetry ceiling | How many detections can be built at all? | `count of techniques whose log sources are all at readiness 3 or above; one detection per technique until you have measured your own ratio` |

I count both recurring ceilings in minutes, because minutes are what run out. The maintenance figure defaults to 20 minutes per live detection per month. That covers the [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) check, one look at the tuning queue, and fixing the query after a field changes. Replace it once you've measured a quarter.

**Triage ceiling**

- Cut alerts per detection: tighten the logic, exclude one named source of noise, or raise the threshold.
- Cut minutes per alert: enrich the alert with the context the analyst looks up by hand.
- Group related alerts into one case, so 10 alerts cost one triage.

Common mistake: Hiring analysts is the most expensive way to raise this ceiling.

**Maintenance ceiling**

- Generate the query for every target from one source rule.
- Let the precision check propose retirements, so upkeep shrinks the estate.
- Template the detections that differ only by a field or a threshold.

Common mistake: Nobody books the recurring cost when the detection ships, so this ceiling goes unnoticed until upkeep falls behind.

**Telemetry ceiling**

- Onboard first the source that unblocks the most scored candidates.
- Fix sampling, truncation, and short retention. That moves a source from readiness 2 to 3, where this ceiling starts counting it; parsing the fields then takes it to 4.
- Ship the silence alert, so a source that dies doesn't take its detections with it.

Common mistake: Treating a blocked candidate as engineering work keeps it in the detection backlog. It belongs on the log source request list until someone onboards the data.

### 14.2 Breaking points by size

| Live detections | What still works | What breaks first | The change that reaches the next order of magnitude |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| About 10 | A spreadsheet, a shared folder, and one person's memory. | Nobody can say why a detection exists once its author is on leave. | Write the record: goal, technique, blind spots, response. |
| About 50 | Records, a written backlog, manual deployment. | Alert volume becomes a rostering problem, and tuning changes lose their history. | Put the definitions of done in CI and start measuring precision per detection. |
| About 200 | CI, scores, a metric set. | No one person knows the estate. Near-duplicates appear, and hand-converting queries per platform stops scaling. | One source rule per detection, converted to every target by the pipeline; ownership assigned per platform. |
| About 1000 | Generated queries, owners, automated checks. | Coverage claims become unfalsifiable and the maintenance ceiling binds before the triage one. | Automate retirement, decouple alert volume from detection count by grouping into cases, and report coverage weighted by [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness). |

At every step, coordination between people fails before the detections do. Each move swaps something one person remembers for a file, a [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done), or a generated artifact.

### 14.3 Work that doesn't scale

- Counting detections. 200 detections that match filenames add up to the same weighted coverage as 40 at robustness 5, and each of the 200 still costs upkeep every month.
- One query per platform maintained by hand. Every new target multiplies the estate by the number of [SIEMs](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem).
- Triage headcount. Alert volume grows with the estate; analyst hours grow with the budget cycle.
- Review by the author. It's the first check dropped under deadline.

Review is the cheapest of these to keep. A second engineer's review costs 20 minutes, and it's the only check that catches an assumption the author didn't know they were making.


---

## Handling objections

https://detect.htora.dev/objections/

Bring this into a working program and people will push back, usually in the first meeting. These are the arguments I'd expect, with my answer to each. Some of them are at least partly right, and for those my answer is to agree.

For the rollout Framework v0.136.0. 10 objections.

Remember

- Concede early on the four objections that are partly right: the record cost on a small team, the score's precision, the size of a move to code, and fixing telemetry first.
- Answer with your own program's numbers where you have them.
- Keep the vendor rules and score them like any other detection.

Objections that are partly or wholly right: 4 of 10

### "Our SIEM ships hundreds of rules. Why write our own?"

Usually from: The platform owner, usually in month one

Keep them. Nobody is asking you to rewrite a vendor's work out of pride. Score the vendor pack like anything else, enable it in batches you can measure against the alert budget, and retire what doesn't clear its floor. Switch on a whole pack at once and you've made a coverage claim nobody can check and signed your analysts up for alert volume nobody agreed to.

### "Writing a record for every detection is overhead we cannot afford."

Usually from: The engineer who is already behind

For detections already live, start with four of the 11 sections: goal, categorization, blind spots, and response. That takes 30 minutes a detection, and most of it is remembering what you already know. Lint wants every section written from validate on, so keep these short records outside the kit's detections folder until the other seven are written. For new detections, you write the rest as they move through the stages. Skipping the record only moves the cost. The next person re-derives the intent from the query, and the responder at 3 a.m. has no response steps and a strong opinion about whoever wrote the rule.

**What it gets right.** That's true for a program of 10 detections that one person owns and will keep owning. It stops being true the first time that person takes a vacation.

### "Our MSSP or vendor manages detections for us."

Usually from: The manager who signed the contract

Then the definitions of done and the metrics become contract terms. Ask for the record, the [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture), the [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) per detection, and the retirement list. A provider who can't produce precision per detection is selling you alert volume with no measure of quality. Your analysts still spend the alert budget, whoever wrote the rules.

### "We already report ATT&CK coverage. This duplicates it."

Usually from: Whoever built the heatmap

Keep reporting it and add the weighted number beside it. If the two are close, the heatmap was honest and you've lost nothing. If they're far apart, the gap is the finding, and it's much nicer to find it yourself than to have a post-incident review find it for you.

### "Scoring is false precision. Six numbers do not capture the judgment."

Usually from: The most experienced engineer in the room, and they have a point

The score records the judgment, so somebody other than its author can inspect it. The value is in the [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) under each number, and that's what a reviewer argues with. The order treats differences under 0.2 as ties for the same reason. I picked that width as a default, because nobody has measured how far two scorers disagree, me included.

**What it gets right.** The objection is right about precision. A score of 2.40 and a score of 2.52 are the same score, which the band rule states and the sort implements.

### "We cannot retire detections. Audit will ask why coverage dropped."

Usually from: The compliance lead

A retirement with a note is a stronger audit position than a detection nobody has looked at in a year. The note says which trigger fired, what you measured, and what replaced it. If an auditor is going to object to something, it should be counting a detection that fired for 180 days and was never right as coverage.

### "This is too heavy for a team of two."

Usually from: The team of two

Then take the four practices [section 3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/) gives a team of two to four: the scored backlog, the definitions of done, the detection record, and the retirement triggers. Defer the full metric set, but keep precision and [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) minutes per detection, because the retirement triggers need them. Keep the review too. One of you builds and the other reviews, so neither of you approves your own detection.

### "Our detections are in the SIEM console. Moving to code is a six-month project."

Usually from: Anyone who has tried it

[Section 3](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/adoption/) puts [detection as code](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-detection-as-code) last for teams under five engineers. Records, scores, definitions of done, and retirement all work with the console. What code adds is a build that enforces the definitions of done, including on the day a deadline makes skipping them look reasonable.

**What it gets right.** Migrating is a project with its own plan and budget. Do it when hand-converting queries becomes the bottleneck, around 200 live detections.

### "Nobody will attend four more meetings."

Usually from: Everybody

I don't like meetings either. The four take about three hours and 40 minutes a month for a small team: three standing ones, plus 45 minutes after each incident. The three standing ones replace something you're already doing badly: an ad-hoc request queue, a [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) conversation in chat, a quarterly slide nobody can source. The post-incident review is the only new one, and it produces the intake items with the strongest evidence.

### "Our telemetry is a mess. We should fix that first."

Usually from: The person who is right

I agree, and the framework makes that answer visible. Every candidate gets a readiness score, a zero blocks the build, and the backlog then shows which log source unblocks the most value. That list is the telemetry business case, and you get it as a side effect of doing the detection work.

**What it gets right.** Telemetry work outranks detection work whenever [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) blocks more than about a third of the scored backlog.

Concede the four marked above first, then answer the rest.

Next step [Checks against outside sources](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/)


---

## Detection library

https://detect.htora.dev/library/

62,921 detections from 56 open-source repositories, indexed by [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) tactic and technique, platform, and query language. Somebody has probably already written the detection you're about to write, and this is where to check. Open one to read its query, translate it into the other languages, or score it. Then treat it as an intake candidate, the first step of [Ship a detection](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/#intake), because a rule that worked in somebody else's environment has proven nothing about yours. Before it alerts in production, it clears every stage through deploy, including 7 days of baseline counts from your own logs, passing [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture), and 7 days live with alerting off.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Source: **All sources**56 repositories

Loading the catalog.

Every detection belongs to its author and stays under its own license; each entry links to the file it came from. [Sources and licenses](https://detect.htora.dev/library/sources/).


---

## Internet scanning queries

https://detect.htora.dev/library/internet/

8,779 searches that run in an internet scanning engine and find servers, where the rest of the library reads your own logs. Their sources wrote 4,767 for Shodan, 341 for Censys, 237 for Netlas, 3,382 for FOFA, and 52 for ZoomEye. This site writes each one for the other engines where they can run it. A server that matches is a lead to verify, since researchers and red teams run the same tools. A confirmed one is an address to block, or to watch for in your proxy and firewall logs. [Browse all 8,779](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet), or [translate a search of your own](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scan/).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

### Attacker infrastructure

864 searches from Malicious infrastructure hunting queries, by the family each finds. Most families have several, by page title, certificate, JARM fingerprint, favicon hash, or banner, and the ones that combine two signals miss fewer and match less by accident.

#### Phishing kits

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Gophish (Phishing Framework) | 35 | 32 | 32 | 27 | 29 | 29 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=gophish+(phishing+framework)) |
| Clickfix Phishing Campaign | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=clickfix+phishing+campaign) |
| Phishing Tools | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=phishing+tools) |
| EVILGINX2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=evilginx2) |
| Evilgophish (Phishing Framework) | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=evilgophish+(phishing+framework)) |

#### Ransomware

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Ransomhub C2 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=ransomhub+c2) |
| Bianlian GO Trojan (Ransomware) | 3 | 3 | 3 | | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=bianlian+go+trojan+(ransomware)) |
| Ransomware | 2 | | 2 | 2 | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=ransomware) |

#### Stealers, loaders, and banking trojans

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Info Stealers | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=info+stealers) |
| Shadow C2 (Information Stealer) | 24 | 24 | 23 | 21 | 21 | 23 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=shadow+c2+(information+stealer)) |
| Icedid / Gozi / Bokbot (Banking Trojan) | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=icedid+/+gozi+/+bokbot+(banking+trojan)) |
| Panda C2 / Panda Stealer | 21 | 21 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 16 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=panda+c2+/+panda+stealer) |
| Panda C2 / Panda Stealer (Collector Stealer Variant) | 20 | 16 | 20 | 15 | 15 | 16 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=panda+c2+/+panda+stealer+(collector+stealer+variant)) |
| Banking Trojans | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=banking+trojans) |
| Immortal Dropper (XMRig Cryptominer) | 15 | 15 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=immortal+dropper+(xmrig+cryptominer)) |
| Immortal Dropper (Cryptominer) | 9 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=immortal+dropper+(cryptominer)) |
| Stealth C2 (Banking Trojan) | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=stealth+c2+(banking+trojan)) |
| Hookbot Panel | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=hookbot+panel) |
| Qakbot (Banking Trojan) | 7 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=qakbot+(banking+trojan)) |
| Meduza Stealer | 5 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=meduza+stealer) |
| Vidar C2 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=vidar+c2) |
| Loaders & Droppers | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=loaders+&+droppers) |
| Stealc V2 (Info Stealer) | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=stealc+v2+(info+stealer)) |
| Pikabot (Loader Malware) | 5 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=pikabot+(loader+malware)) |
| Titan Stealer | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=titan+stealer) |
| Bianlian GO Trojan | 1 | | 1 | | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=bianlian+go+trojan) |

#### Remote access trojans

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Rats | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=rats) |
| Asyncrat / Quasar / Orcus / Dcrat | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=asyncrat+/+quasar+/+orcus+/+dcrat) |
| Ares RAT | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=ares+rat) |
| Nanocore RAT | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=nanocore+rat) |
| Netsupport RAT | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=netsupport+rat) |
| Orcus RAT | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=orcus+rat) |
| Remcos RAT | 9 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=remcos+rat) |
| Bitrat | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=bitrat) |
| Venomrat | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=venomrat) |
| Xworm | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=xworm) |
| Darkcomet RAT | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=darkcomet+rat) |
| Njrat | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=njrat) |
| Pupy RAT | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=pupy+rat) |
| Xtremerat | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=xtremerat) |
| Nanocore / Pupy | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=nanocore+/+pupy) |
| GH0ST RAT | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=gh0st+rat) |
| Chaos RAT | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=chaos+rat) |
| Asyncrat | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=asyncrat) |

#### C2 frameworks

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C2 Frameworks | 37 | 36 | 37 | 37 | 36 | 36 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=c2+frameworks) |
| KVM Tools (Potential C2 Access) | 28 | 26 | 25 | 25 | 24 | 24 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=kvm+tools+(potential+c2+access)) |
| HAK5 Cloud C2 | 28 | 26 | 24 | 16 | 18 | 22 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=hak5+cloud+c2) |
| Mythic C2 | 23 | 23 | 22 | 19 | 20 | 23 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=mythic+c2) |
| Other C2 & Tools | 19 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 18 | 18 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=other+c2+&+tools) |
| Cobalt Strike (Beacon / Team Server) | 24 | 24 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 15 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=cobalt+strike+(beacon+/+team+server)) |
| Sliver C2 | 19 | 15 | 19 | 14 | 14 | 14 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=sliver+c2) |
| Generic C2 Indicators | 13 | 11 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=generic+c2+indicators) |
| Deimos C2 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=deimos+c2) |
| Interactsh C2 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=interactsh+c2) |
| Cobalt Strike (Cert / JARM) | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=cobalt+strike+(cert+/+jarm)) |
| GEACON_PRO (Cobalt Strike Go Implementation) | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=geacon_pro+(cobalt+strike+go+implementation)) |
| Merlin C2 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=merlin+c2) |
| Meterpreter | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=meterpreter) |
| Havoc C2 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=havoc+c2) |
| Keycloak (Potential C2 Infrastructure) | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=keycloak+(potential+c2+infrastructure)) |
| Metasploit | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=metasploit) |
| Generic Werkzeug/Flask C2 Panels | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=generic+werkzeug/flask+c2+panels) |
| Pyramid C2 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=pyramid+c2) |
| Covenant C2 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=covenant+c2) |
| Viper (Chinese C2 Framework) | 6 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=viper+(chinese+c2+framework)) |
| Oyster C2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=oyster+c2) |
| POSHC2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=poshc2) |
| Nighthawk C2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=nighthawk+c2) |
| Brute Ratel C4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=brute+ratel+c4) |
| Sectoprat C2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=sectoprat+c2) |
| Supershell C2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=supershell+c2) |
| Empire C2 | 3 | 3 | | | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=empire+c2) |
| Generic Werkzeug/Flask C2 | 3 | | 3 | | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=generic+werkzeug/flask+c2) |

#### Tunneling and red team tools

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| RED Team Tools | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=red+team+tools) |
| Wstunnel | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=wstunnel) |
| Responder (Llmnr/NBT-NS Poisoning) | 6 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=responder+(llmnr/nbt-ns+poisoning)) |
| Ligolo-NG (Tunneling Tool) | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=ligolo-ng+(tunneling+tool)) |
| Tunneling Tools | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=tunneling+tools) |
| Ligolo-NG (Tunneling) | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=ligolo-ng+(tunneling)) |
| Reverse SSH | 3 | 2 | | | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=reverse+ssh) |

#### Open directories and hosting

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Open Directories & Payload Hosting | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=open+directories+&+payload+hosting) |
| Open Directory – Payload Hosting | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=open+directory+–+payload+hosting) |
| Bulletproof Hosting - Serv.Host | 5 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=bulletproof+hosting+-+serv.host) |
| Open Directory - Suspicious | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=open+directory+-+suspicious) |

#### Other infrastructure

| Hunts for | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Locust Ddos Panel / HTTP Flood Tool | 21 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=locust+ddos+panel+/+http+flood+tool) |
| CVE Hunting | 16 | 4 | 6 | 16 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=cve+hunting) |
| Ddos & Flood Tools | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=ddos+&+flood+tools) |
| APT41 (Double Dragon / Barium / Winnti) | 12 | 9 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=apt41+(double+dragon+/+barium+/+winnti)) |
| Cryptominers | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=cryptominers) |
| APT Infrastructure | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=infraq&q=apt+infrastructure) |

### Exposed services and devices

Searches from Awesome Censys queries and Awesome Shodan queries, by their lists' own categories. They find industrial controls, cameras, databases, and remote desktops left open to the internet, and Censys's Security Applications category adds C2 framework servers.

| Category | List | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Security Applications | Awesome Censys queries | 31 | 21 | 31 | 23 | 21 | 21 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=security+applications) |
| Random Services | Awesome Censys queries | 13 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=random+services) |
| Industrial Control Systems | Awesome Censys queries | 10 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=industrial+control+systems) |
| Advanced Queries | Awesome Censys queries | 8 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=advanced+queries) |
| Internet of Things Devices | Awesome Censys queries | 8 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=internet+of+things+devices) |
| Dashboards | Awesome Censys queries | 7 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=dashboards) |
| Game Servers | Awesome Censys queries | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=game+servers) |
| Media Servers | Awesome Censys queries | 3 | | 3 | | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=media+servers) |
| Databases | Awesome Censys queries | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=censysq&q=databases) |
| Industrial Control Systems | Awesome Shodan queries | 14 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=industrial+control+systems) |
| Network Infrastructure | Awesome Shodan queries | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=network+infrastructure) |
| Random Stuff | Awesome Shodan queries | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=random+stuff) |
| Network Attached Storage (NAS) | Awesome Shodan queries | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=network+attached+storage+(nas)) |
| Printers & Copiers: | Awesome Shodan queries | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=printers+&+copiers:) |
| Webcams | Awesome Shodan queries | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=webcams) |
| Home Devices | Awesome Shodan queries | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=home+devices) |
| Remote Desktop | Awesome Shodan queries | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=shodanq&q=remote+desktop) |

### Exposed products

7,777 searches from ProjectDiscovery search queries, which find a named product on the internet: a web application, an admin panel, a network device, a server. ProjectDiscovery collects them from its Nuclei templates, 4,337 for Shodan, 3,382 for FOFA, 52 for ZoomEye, and 6 for Censys, across 2,206 vendors. When a vulnerability in a product is announced, its search says where that product faces the internet. [Browse them](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq), or search the library for the product's name. The 25 vendors with the most searches:

| Vendor | Searches | Run in Shodan | Run in Censys | Run in Netlas | Run in FOFA | Run in ZoomEye | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| cisco | 244 | 241 | 55 | 48 | 56 | 54 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=cisco) |
| apache | 215 | 194 | 174 | 161 | 192 | 174 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=apache) |
| dlink | 172 | 169 | 19 | 17 | 22 | 19 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=dlink) |
| hp | 108 | 107 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 10 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=hp) |
| microsoft | 103 | 100 | 38 | 36 | 41 | 38 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=microsoft) |
| fortinet | 76 | 73 | 42 | 29 | 46 | 43 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=fortinet) |
| oracle | 71 | 66 | 47 | 47 | 53 | 48 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=oracle) |
| vmware | 69 | 68 | 64 | 56 | 66 | 65 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=vmware) |
| bestwebsoft | 56 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 56 | 28 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=bestwebsoft) |
| ibm | 50 | 48 | 39 | 33 | 41 | 39 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=ibm) |
| atlassian | 46 | 44 | 22 | 18 | 24 | 22 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=atlassian) |
| redhat | 46 | 42 | 37 | 33 | 40 | 37 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=redhat) |
| zohocorp | 41 | 38 | 38 | 37 | 40 | 38 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=zohocorp) |
| wavlink | 35 | 35 | 35 | 33 | 35 | 35 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=wavlink) |
| developer | 33 | 33 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=developer) |
| ivanti | 31 | 30 | 29 | 23 | 30 | 29 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=ivanti) |
| adobe | 30 | 27 | 15 | 15 | 18 | 15 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=adobe) |
| citrix | 30 | 27 | 27 | 25 | 29 | 27 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=citrix) |
| konicaminolta | 30 | 30 | | | | | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=konicaminolta) |
| progress | 29 | 27 | 27 | 21 | 27 | 26 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=progress) |
| wordpress | 26 | 23 | 21 | 21 | 23 | 21 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=wordpress) |
| papercut | 25 | 21 | 20 | 18 | 20 | 20 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=papercut) |
| sap | 25 | 24 | 18 | 10 | 19 | 20 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=sap) |
| zyxel | 25 | 23 | 16 | 14 | 18 | 16 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=zyxel) |
| dell | 22 | 22 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#plat=internet&src=pdq&q=dell) |

### One search, five engines

The engines index the same things under different names: a page title, a certificate's common name, a JARM fingerprint, a response header, a port. [The scanning query translator](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scan/) reads a search written for one engine and writes it for the other four, where they have a field for each thing it tests. Of the 8,779 searches, 6,044 now run in all five: 8,054 in Shodan, 6,869 in Censys, 6,124 in Netlas, 7,332 in FOFA, and 6,818 in ZoomEye.

A search stays in its own engine when it tests something only that engine computes or names. Shodan's CPE and product names, FOFA's app names, Netlas's tags, and Censys's software names are the common ones. Each search in the library says which engine it has no form for and why. Shodan also has no way to say or between two filters, so a search with alternatives becomes several Shodan searches.

The same search returns different servers in each engine, because each one scans its own ports on its own schedule and stores what it finds its own way. Running a search in two engines finds more than either does alone.

#### Censys and its two languages

Censys's earlier search wrote a page title as `services.http.response.html_title`. Censys is retiring that search for the Platform, which writes `host.services.endpoints.http.html_title`. 90 of the Censys searches here use the earlier language, and 87 more are written for the Platform with field names it lacks. The translator writes both kinds for the Platform, so 173 of them open there. Each Censys field name is checked against the field list in Censys's own SDK, censys-platform 0.16.7.

Nobody has run the searches this site wrote, so treat each as a draft and check what it returns. The file `scanquery.js` does the writing, for the library and for the tool. The library check fails the build when a Censys search names a field the Platform lacks.

### Running them

Shodan needs a paid account for most filters, such as http.title and ssl.jarm. Censys and Netlas count searches against a quota, and FOFA and ZoomEye limit what a free account sees. None of these maps to an [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) technique, so the coverage map and the baseline builder leave them out.


---

## Observables

https://detect.htora.dev/library/observables/

The build reads each detection's query and pulls out what it matches on. 19,958 of 62,921 detections name at least one value. Select a value to see every detection built on it, or type one into the [library search](https://detect.htora.dev/library/): `lsass.exe`, `event:4624`, `CreateAccessKey`, or `CVE-2021-44228`.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

- Programs and files (8,979 values)
- Windows event IDs (524 values)
- Registry keys (680 values)
- Actions and API calls (1,159 values)
- CVEs (3,238 values)

### Programs and files

Program and file names in the query: the processes, DLLs, scripts, and documents a detection names. The 40 most used of 8,979 values:

| Value | Detections | By source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [`cmd.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=cmd.exe) | 982 | SigmaHQ 199, Elastic protections 139, signature-base YARA 139 and 28 more |
| [`powershell.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=powershell.exe) | 978 | SigmaHQ 239, Elastic protections 195, Elastic detection rules 113 and 26 more |
| [`rundll32.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=rundll32.exe) | 600 | SigmaHQ 150, Elastic protections 140, Elastic detection rules 68 and 23 more |
| [`pwsh.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=pwsh.exe) | 425 | SigmaHQ 204, Elastic detection rules 59, Anvilogic Forge armory 53 and 11 more |
| [`wscript.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=wscript.exe) | 410 | Elastic protections 121, SigmaHQ 103, Elastic detection rules 58 and 16 more |
| [`svchost.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=svchost.exe) | 396 | Elastic protections 118, SigmaHQ 88, Elastic detection rules 48 and 19 more |
| [`cscript.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=cscript.exe) | 365 | Elastic protections 108, SigmaHQ 98, Elastic detection rules 43 and 14 more |
| [`mshta.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=mshta.exe) | 351 | Elastic protections 95, SigmaHQ 86, Elastic detection rules 54 and 16 more |
| [`regsvr32.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=regsvr32.exe) | 337 | SigmaHQ 93, Elastic protections 90, Elastic detection rules 44 and 17 more |
| [`explorer.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=explorer.exe) | 316 | Elastic protections 102, SigmaHQ 70, Elastic detection rules 36 and 19 more |
| [`msiexec.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=msiexec.exe) | 289 | Elastic protections 106, SigmaHQ 60, Elastic detection rules 53 and 15 more |
| [`wmic.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=wmic.exe) | 245 | SigmaHQ 71, Elastic protections 38, Splunk Security Content 29 and 15 more |
| [`lsass.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=lsass.exe) | 207 | SigmaHQ 43, Elastic protections 32, Anvilogic Forge armory 22 and 17 more |
| [`net.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=net.exe) | 193 | SigmaHQ 43, Anvilogic Forge armory 34, Microsoft Sentinel 33 and 15 more |
| [`ntdll.dll`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=ntdll.dll) | 191 | Elastic protections 170, SigmaHQ 5, signature-base YARA 5 and 7 more |
| [`certutil.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=certutil.exe) | 184 | SigmaHQ 42, Elastic protections 34, Elastic detection rules 26 and 16 more |
| [`reg.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=reg.exe) | 183 | SigmaHQ 62, Anvilogic Forge armory 30, Elastic protections 20 and 15 more |
| [`schtasks.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=schtasks.exe) | 182 | SigmaHQ 59, Microsoft Sentinel 30, Splunk Security Content 19 and 14 more |
| [`winword.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=winword.exe) | 168 | Elastic protections 54, SigmaHQ 37, Microsoft Sentinel 17 and 16 more |
| [`excel.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=excel.exe) | 167 | Elastic protections 56, SigmaHQ 32, Microsoft Sentinel 17 and 14 more |
| [`chrome.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=chrome.exe) | 156 | Elastic protections 44, SigmaHQ 38, Splunk Security Content 24 and 15 more |
| [`powershell_ise.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=powershell_ise.exe) | 150 | SigmaHQ 50, Microsoft Sentinel 29, Elastic detection rules 26 and 10 more |
| [`kernelbase.dll`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=kernelbase.dll) | 144 | Elastic protections 135, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 2 and 3 more |
| [`dllhost.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=dllhost.exe) | 143 | Elastic protections 40, SigmaHQ 28, Anvilogic Forge armory 19 and 11 more |
| [`werfault.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=werfault.exe) | 143 | Elastic protections 54, SigmaHQ 29, Elastic detection rules 25 and 8 more |
| [`wmiprvse.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=wmiprvse.exe) | 142 | Elastic protections 35, SigmaHQ 24, Elastic detection rules 18 and 11 more |
| [`services.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=services.exe) | 137 | Elastic protections 34, SigmaHQ 23, Anvilogic Forge armory 23 and 14 more |
| [`msedge.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=msedge.exe) | 136 | Elastic protections 41, SigmaHQ 32, Splunk Security Content 18 and 17 more |
| [`sc.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=sc.exe) | 135 | Anvilogic Forge armory 26, SigmaHQ 23, Splunk Security Content 15 and 13 more |
| [`bitsadmin.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=bitsadmin.exe) | 132 | SigmaHQ 36, Elastic detection rules 20, Splunk Security Content 17 and 14 more |
| [`msbuild.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=msbuild.exe) | 131 | Elastic protections 39, Elastic detection rules 26, SigmaHQ 13 and 14 more |
| [`kernel32.dll`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=kernel32.dll) | 126 | Elastic protections 86, signature-base YARA 30, SigmaHQ 4 and 5 more |
| [`conhost.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=conhost.exe) | 123 | Elastic protections 47, SigmaHQ 22, Elastic detection rules 18 and 14 more |
| [`powerpnt.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=powerpnt.exe) | 123 | Elastic protections 45, SigmaHQ 25, Elastic detection rules 13 and 11 more |
| [`curl.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=curl.exe) | 121 | SigmaHQ 36, Elastic protections 33, Elastic detection rules 30 and 9 more |
| [`net1.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=net1.exe) | 115 | SigmaHQ 39, Elastic detection rules 14, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 13 and 11 more |
| [`firefox.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=firefox.exe) | 110 | SigmaHQ 29, Elastic protections 28, Elastic detection rules 13 and 13 more |
| [`mmc.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=mmc.exe) | 107 | Elastic protections 28, SigmaHQ 17, Splunk Security Content 14 and 11 more |
| [`outlook.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=outlook.exe) | 103 | SigmaHQ 28, Elastic protections 18, Microsoft Sentinel 15 and 12 more |
| [`pwsh.dll`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=pwsh.dll) | 101 | SigmaHQ 82, Elastic detection rules 14, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 3 and 1 more |

### Windows event IDs

Windows event IDs a detection filters on. Security log IDs are four digits; Sysmon IDs are 1 to 29, so an ID like 1 or 10 means Sysmon. The 40 most used of 524 values:

| Value | Detections | By source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [`4688`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4688) | 438 | Anvilogic Forge armory 291, Microsoft Sentinel 80, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 39 and 8 more |
| [`1`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A1) | 334 | Anvilogic Forge armory 247, MITRE CAR 34, Microsoft Sentinel 22 and 6 more |
| [`4104`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4104) | 333 | Anvilogic Forge armory 158, Splunk Security Content 121, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 39 and 2 more |
| [`4103`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4103) | 155 | Anvilogic Forge armory 112, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 39, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 3 and 1 more |
| [`4624`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4624) | 123 | Microsoft Sentinel 22, Hayabusa rules 17, SigmaHQ 15 and 12 more |
| [`7045`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A7045) | 85 | SigmaHQ 48, Splunk Security Content 11, Anvilogic Forge armory 6 and 7 more |
| [`5136`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A5136) | 83 | Splunk Security Content 25, Microsoft Sentinel 17, Elastic detection rules 11 and 8 more |
| [`5145`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A5145) | 79 | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 24, SigmaHQ 19, Anvilogic Forge armory 11 and 5 more |
| [`4663`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4663) | 64 | Splunk Security Content 20, SigmaHQ 18, Anvilogic Forge armory 11 and 5 more |
| [`11`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A11) | 60 | Splunk Security Content 18, Joe Security Sigma rules 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 11 and 6 more |
| [`3`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A3) | 58 | SigmaHQ 19, Anvilogic Forge armory 15, Splunk Security Content 6 and 6 more |
| [`4625`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4625) | 56 | Microsoft Sentinel 19, Hayabusa rules 7, Splunk Security Content 6 and 9 more |
| [`13`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A13) | 52 | Anvilogic Forge armory 18, MITRE CAR 8, Joe Security Sigma rules 6 and 7 more |
| [`7`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A7) | 52 | Splunk Security Content 36, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 9, Hayabusa rules 2 and 5 more |
| [`4656`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4656) | 44 | Anvilogic Forge armory 15, SigmaHQ 14, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 6 and 3 more |
| [`800`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A800) | 37 | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 37 |
| [`4697`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4697) | 36 | SigmaHQ 22, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 5, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 2 and 6 more |
| [`4662`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4662) | 34 | SigmaHQ 7, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 5, Splunk Security Content 5 and 7 more |
| [`10`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A10) | 32 | Splunk Security Content 14, Elastic detection rules 7, MITRE CAR 3 and 5 more |
| [`4728`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4728) | 32 | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 9, Microsoft Sentinel 7, reprise99 Sentinel queries 4 and 6 more |
| [`4657`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4657) | 31 | Anvilogic Forge armory 14, Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 2 more |
| [`12`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A12) | 30 | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Hayabusa rules 7, MITRE CAR 4 and 5 more |
| [`4698`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4698) | 28 | Splunk Security Content 10, SigmaHQ 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 5 more |
| [`4768`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4768) | 28 | Splunk Security Content 10, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 5, SigmaHQ 3 and 6 more |
| [`4738`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4738) | 25 | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 6, Splunk Security Content 6, reprise99 Sentinel queries 5 and 4 more |
| [`4769`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4769) | 25 | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 5, Splunk Security Content 5, SigmaHQ 3 and 7 more |
| [`4732`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4732) | 24 | Microsoft Sentinel 8, reprise99 Sentinel queries 4, Hayabusa rules 3 and 5 more |
| [`5156`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A5156) | 24 | Anvilogic Forge armory 17, SigmaHQ 3, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 2 and 2 more |
| [`4720`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4720) | 21 | Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 4 and 5 more |
| [`22`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A22) | 20 | Splunk Security Content 15, Hayabusa rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more |
| [`5140`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A5140) | 19 | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, ep3p Sentinel KQL 3 and 5 more |
| [`4648`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4648) | 18 | Hayabusa rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3 and 3 more |
| [`33205`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A33205) | 17 | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 9, SigmaHQ 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 2 more |
| [`4742`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4742) | 17 | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 8, Splunk Security Content 6, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more |
| [`17`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A17) | 16 | Splunk Security Content 9, Hayabusa rules 2, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 2 and 3 more |
| [`18`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A18) | 16 | Splunk Security Content 9, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Hayabusa rules 2 and 2 more |
| [`5137`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A5137) | 16 | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 5, Splunk Security Content 4 and 2 more |
| [`8`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A8) | 16 | Splunk Security Content 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Hayabusa rules 2 and 4 more |
| [`23`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A23) | 15 | Splunk Security Content 11, Hayabusa rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 |
| [`4756`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=event%3A4756) | 15 | Microsoft Sentinel 7, reprise99 Sentinel queries 4, ep3p Sentinel KQL 2 and 2 more |

### Registry keys

Registry keys, written without the hive so HKLM and HKCU spellings of one key count together. The 40 most used of 680 values:

| Value | Detections | By source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Crun) | 48 | Elastic protections 18, SigmaHQ 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 6 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\explorer\run`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cpolicies%5Cexplorer%5Crun) | 33 | Elastic protections 16, SigmaHQ 8, Elastic detection rules 5 and 2 more |
| [`software\wow6432node\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cwow6432node%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Crun) | 28 | Elastic protections 13, SigmaHQ 9, Elastic detection rules 3 and 2 more |
| [`system\currentcontrolset\services`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=system%5Ccurrentcontrolset%5Cservices) | 23 | SigmaHQ 9, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 6, Splunk Security Content 5 and 2 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\winlogon\shell`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cwinlogon%5Cshell) | 17 | Elastic protections 10, Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more |
| [`software\microsoft\office`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Coffice) | 15 | SigmaHQ 6, Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more |
| [`software\wow6432node\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\explorer\run`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cwow6432node%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cpolicies%5Cexplorer%5Crun) | 14 | Elastic protections 13, Elastic detection rules 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\windows\load`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cwindows%5Cload) | 13 | Elastic protections 10, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\command processor\autorun`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Ccommand%20processor%5Cautorun) | 12 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\ctf\langbaraddin`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cctf%5Clangbaraddin) | 12 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\winlogon\userinit`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cwinlogon%5Cuserinit) | 12 | Elastic protections 7, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\runonce`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Crunonce) | 12 | Elastic protections 8, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 |
| [`software\microsoft\internet explorer\extensions`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cinternet%20explorer%5Cextensions) | 11 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\system\shell`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cpolicies%5Csystem%5Cshell) | 11 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2 |
| [`software\policies\microsoft\windows\system\scripts\logoff\script`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cpolicies%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Csystem%5Cscripts%5Clogoff%5Cscript) | 11 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2 |
| [`software\policies\microsoft\windows\system\scripts\logon\script`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cpolicies%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Csystem%5Cscripts%5Clogon%5Cscript) | 11 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2 |
| [`software\policies\microsoft\windows\system\scripts\shutdown\script`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cpolicies%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Csystem%5Cscripts%5Cshutdown%5Cscript) | 11 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2 |
| [`software\policies\microsoft\windows\system\scripts\startup\script`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cpolicies%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Csystem%5Cscripts%5Cstartup%5Cscript) | 11 | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 2 |
| [`system\currentcontrolset\control\securityproviders\wdigest`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=system%5Ccurrentcontrolset%5Ccontrol%5Csecurityproviders%5Cwdigest) | 11 | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 2, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2 and 3 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\image file execution options`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cimage%20file%20execution%20options) | 9 | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2, osquery packs 1 and 3 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\runonceex`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Crunonceex) | 9 | Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 |
| [`software\classes\clsid`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cclasses%5Cclsid) | 8 | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more |
| [`software\classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cclasses%5Cms-settings%5Cshell%5Copen%5Ccommand) | 8 | Anvilogic Forge armory 7, Joe Security Sigma rules 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion) | 7 | signature-base YARA 4, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\runmru`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cexplorer%5Crunmru) | 7 | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\internet settings`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cinternet%20settings) | 7 | Elastic protections 3, signature-base YARA 3, SigmaHQ 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\policies\system`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cpolicies%5Csystem) | 7 | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic protections 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more |
| [`system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=system%5Ccurrentcontrolset%5Ccontrol%5Clsa) | 7 | SigmaHQ 3, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Splunk Security Content 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\winlogon`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cwinlogon) | 6 | SigmaHQ 2, signature-base YARA 2, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1 and 1 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\user shell folders`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cexplorer%5Cuser%20shell%20folders) | 6 | Elastic protections 2, SigmaHQ 1, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1 and 2 more |
| [`control panel\desktop\scrnsave.exe`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=control%20panel%5Cdesktop%5Cscrnsave.exe) | 5 | SigmaHQ 3, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\netsh`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cnetsh) | 5 | SigmaHQ 2, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows defender\exclusions\paths`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20defender%5Cexclusions%5Cpaths) | 5 | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Defender hunting 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows defender\exclusions\processes`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20defender%5Cexclusions%5Cprocesses) | 5 | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Defender hunting 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\schedule\taskcache\tree`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cschedule%5Ctaskcache%5Ctree) | 5 | SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\windows`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cwindows) | 5 | SigmaHQ 2, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1, Joe Security Sigma rules 1 and 1 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\winlogon\specialaccounts\userlist`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20nt%5Ccurrentversion%5Cwinlogon%5Cspecialaccounts%5Cuserlist) | 5 | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, SigmaHQ 2 |
| [`software\microsoft\windows script\settings\amsienable`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%20script%5Csettings%5Camsienable) | 5 | Elastic protections 2, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\explorer\shell folders`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cexplorer%5Cshell%20folders) | 5 | Elastic protections 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more |
| [`software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\uninstall`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=software%5Cmicrosoft%5Cwindows%5Ccurrentversion%5Cuninstall) | 5 | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more |

### Actions and API calls

Cloud and SaaS actions a detection filters on: CloudTrail event names, Azure operations, Defender action types, and Google method names. The 40 most used of 1,159 values:

| Value | Detections | By source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [`ProcessRollup2`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=ProcessRollup2) | 128 | Elastic detection rules 128 |
| [`UserSubmission`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=UserSubmission) | 65 | Microsoft Sentinel 64, reprise99 Sentinel queries 1 |
| [`ConsoleLogin`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=ConsoleLogin) | 41 | Splunk Security Content 10, Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 8 and 4 more |
| [`FileCreated`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=FileCreated) | 41 | Microsoft Sentinel 23, reprise99 Sentinel queries 9, Microsoft Defender hunting 5 and 3 more |
| [`ConnectionSuccess`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=ConnectionSuccess) | 37 | Bert-JanP hunting queries 11, reprise99 Sentinel queries 10, Microsoft Sentinel 6 and 5 more |
| [`AdminSubmissionSubmitted`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=AdminSubmissionSubmitted) | 35 | Microsoft Sentinel 35 |
| [`SubmissionContentType`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=SubmissionContentType) | 35 | Microsoft Sentinel 35 |
| [`LogonSuccess`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=LogonSuccess) | 31 | Microsoft Sentinel 13, reprise99 Sentinel queries 8, FalconForce FalconFriday 3 and 4 more |
| [`MailItemsAccessed`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=MailItemsAccessed) | 31 | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Microsoft Defender hunting 7, Splunk Security Content 3 and 5 more |
| [`FileDownloaded`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=FileDownloaded) | 28 | reprise99 Sentinel queries 14, Microsoft Sentinel 10, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 2 and 1 more |
| [`CreateAccessKey`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CreateAccessKey) | 24 | Elastic detection rules 7, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 4, Panther analysis 3 and 5 more |
| [`AttachRolePolicy`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=AttachRolePolicy) | 21 | Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 3 and 4 more |
| [`InboundConnectionAccepted`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=InboundConnectionAccepted) | 21 | reprise99 Sentinel queries 7, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Bert-JanP hunting queries 3 and 4 more |
| [`ProcessCreated`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=ProcessCreated) | 21 | FalconForce FalconFriday 14, cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries 6, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 |
| [`RegistryValueSet`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=RegistryValueSet) | 21 | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Bert-JanP hunting queries 4, Microsoft Defender hunting 2 and 3 more |
| [`FileMalwareDetected`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=FileMalwareDetected) | 19 | Microsoft Sentinel 11, reprise99 Sentinel queries 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 3 more |
| [`PowerShellCommand`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=PowerShellCommand) | 19 | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Alex Verboon hunting queries 3, Microsoft Defender hunting 2 and 3 more |
| [`PutUserPolicy`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=PutUserPolicy) | 19 | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 2 and 3 more |
| [`PutRolePolicy`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=PutRolePolicy) | 18 | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 1 more |
| [`UserLoggedIn`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=UserLoggedIn) | 18 | Elastic detection rules 7, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 6, Splunk Security Content 3 and 2 more |
| [`ClickBlocked`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=ClickBlocked) | 17 | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Bert-JanP hunting queries 2, cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries 1 and 1 more |
| [`AttachUserPolicy`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=AttachUserPolicy) | 16 | Elastic detection rules 6, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more |
| [`ClickAllowed`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=ClickAllowed) | 16 | Microsoft Sentinel 12, cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries 3, ep3p Sentinel KQL 1 |
| [`CreateUser`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CreateUser) | 16 | Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 3, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 2 and 4 more |
| [`FileSyncDownloadedFull`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=FileSyncDownloadedFull) | 16 | reprise99 Sentinel queries 14, Microsoft Sentinel 2 |
| [`SetIamPolicy`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=SetIamPolicy) | 15 | Google SecOps (Chronicle) 4, Microsoft Sentinel 4, Google Cloud security analytics 3 and 3 more |
| [`UsbDriveMounted`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=UsbDriveMounted) | 15 | reprise99 Sentinel queries 8, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Microsoft Defender hunting 1 |
| [`PutGroupPolicy`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=PutGroupPolicy) | 14 | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Panther analysis 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more |
| [`user.authentication.auth_via_mfa`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=user.authentication.auth_via_mfa) | 14 | Elastic detection rules 4, Okta customer detections 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 3 more |
| [`AdminSubmission`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=AdminSubmission) | 13 | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Splunk Security Content 1 |
| [`BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl) | 13 | Microsoft Sentinel 8, reprise99 Sentinel queries 4, Microsoft Defender hunting 1 |
| [`CreateRole`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CreateRole) | 13 | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 2 and 5 more |
| [`MemberAdded`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=MemberAdded) | 13 | reprise99 Sentinel queries 8, Microsoft Sentinel 4, ep3p Sentinel KQL 1 |
| [`Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=Microsoft.ContainerService/managedClusters/diagnosticLogs/Read) | 13 | Elastic detection rules 13 |
| [`AssumeRole`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=AssumeRole) | 12 | Elastic detection rules 5, Panther analysis 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more |
| [`AttachGroupPolicy`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=AttachGroupPolicy) | 12 | Google SecOps (Chronicle) 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 3 more |
| [`CreateLoginProfile`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CreateLoginProfile) | 12 | Google SecOps (Chronicle) 3, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 5 more |
| [`FileUploaded`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=FileUploaded) | 12 | Microsoft Sentinel 9, reprise99 Sentinel queries 2, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 |
| [`PutObject`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=PutObject) | 12 | Elastic detection rules 5, Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more |
| [`GetCallerIdentity`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=GetCallerIdentity) | 11 | Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more |

### CVEs

CVE identifiers named in a detection's query, name, or description. The 40 most used of 3,238 values:

| Value | Detections | By source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [`CVE-2021-44228`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2021-44228) | 143 | Emerging Threats Open 55, Snort 3 community rules 38, Microsoft Sentinel 14 and 8 more |
| [`CVE-2006-4575`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-4575) | 78 | Emerging Threats Open 78 |
| [`CVE-2006-6927`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6927) | 78 | Emerging Threats Open 78 |
| [`CVE-2006-6092`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6092) | 54 | Emerging Threats Open 54 |
| [`CVE-2006-6204`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6204) | 54 | Emerging Threats Open 54 |
| [`CVE-2007-1550`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-1550) | 54 | Emerging Threats Open 54 |
| [`CVE-2006-6270`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6270) | 42 | Emerging Threats Open 42 |
| [`CVE-2006-6816`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6816) | 42 | Emerging Threats Open 42 |
| [`CVE-2021-44832`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2021-44832) | 38 | Snort 3 community rules 38 |
| [`CVE-2021-45046`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2021-45046) | 37 | Snort 3 community rules 37 |
| [`CVE-2006-6152`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6152) | 36 | Emerging Threats Open 36 |
| [`CVE-2006-6161`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6161) | 36 | Emerging Threats Open 36 |
| [`CVE-2006-6187`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6187) | 36 | Emerging Threats Open 36 |
| [`CVE-2006-7170`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-7170) | 36 | Emerging Threats Open 36 |
| [`CVE-2007-0372`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-0372) | 36 | Emerging Threats Open 36 |
| [`CVE-2007-0373`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-0373) | 36 | Emerging Threats Open 36 |
| [`CVE-2000-0138`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2000-0138) | 33 | Snort 3 community rules 33 |
| [`CVE-2021-1675`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2021-1675) | 32 | SigmaHQ 14, Microsoft Sentinel 8, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 5 and 2 more |
| [`CVE-2024-1709`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2024-1709) | 31 | SigmaHQ 13, signature-base YARA 10, Emerging Threats Open 5 and 2 more |
| [`CVE-2006-6208`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6208) | 30 | Emerging Threats Open 30 |
| [`CVE-2007-0375`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-0375) | 30 | Emerging Threats Open 30 |
| [`CVE-2007-1304`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-1304) | 30 | Emerging Threats Open 30 |
| [`CVE-1999-0760`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-1999-0760) | 27 | Snort 3 community rules 27 |
| [`CVE-2014-0160`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2014-0160) | 27 | Snort 3 community rules 27 |
| [`CVE-2022-30190`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2022-30190) | 26 | SigmaHQ 11, signature-base YARA 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 3 more |
| [`CVE-2024-1708`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2024-1708) | 25 | SigmaHQ 10, signature-base YARA 10, Splunk Security Content 2 and 3 more |
| [`CVE-2004-1154`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2004-1154) | 24 | Snort 3 community rules 24 |
| [`CVE-2006-6398`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6398) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2006-6667`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6667) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2006-6672`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6672) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2006-6709`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6709) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2006-6880`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6880) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2006-6993`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2006-6993) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2007-0350`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-0350) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2007-1434`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-1434) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2007-3178`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2007-3178) | 24 | Emerging Threats Open 24 |
| [`CVE-2022-41082`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2022-41082) | 24 | SigmaHQ 7, signature-base YARA 5, Snort 3 community rules 5 and 5 more |
| [`CVE-2002-1717`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2002-1717) | 23 | Snort 3 community rules 23 |
| [`CVE-2025-55182`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2025-55182) | 21 | signature-base YARA 7, Panther analysis 3, Emerging Threats Open 3 and 3 more |
| [`CVE-2021-34527`](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#q=CVE-2021-34527) | 20 | SigmaHQ 6, Splunk Security Content 5, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 3 more |

### Value extraction

Patterns over the query text find file names by their extension and event IDs after an event ID field. They find registry paths under SOFTWARE, SYSTEM, Environment, or Control Panel, and action names after an action or operation field. A value a pattern misses stays out, so a detection with no values listed can still match on one of these. Network rules and email rules match on content these patterns do not read.


---

## Library health

https://detect.htora.dev/library/health/

What each source ships with, as a share of its detections. 31,964 of 62,921 detections carry no [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) technique, so the coverage map leaves them out. 10,088 of them are YARA rules, which match malware families in files and memory and name no technique. The 1,208 that name a tactic still appear on that tactic's page, under No technique tagged.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Source | Detections | ATT&CK technique | Description | Severity | Query text | Keys-on values | Translator reads it | Robustness draft | Fired on a recording |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Emerging Threats Open | 10,313 | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 48% | 0% | 0% | - |
| ProjectDiscovery search queries | 7,777 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 1% | 0% | 0% | - |
| signature-base YARA | 5,852 | 0% | 99% | 0% | 100% | 41% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Microsoft Sentinel | 4,984 | 78% | 100% | 59% | 100% | 22% | 75% | 74% | - |
| Snort 3 community rules | 4,024 | 4% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 42% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Wazuh ruleset | 3,840 | 27% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 3% | 0% | 0% | - |
| SigmaHQ | 3,766 | 87% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 67% | 100% | 100% | 9% |
| Elastic protections YARA | 3,069 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 11% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Elastic detection rules | 2,216 | 96% | 100% | 100% | 95% | 41% | 66% | 66% | - |
| Splunk Security Content | 2,090 | 99% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 53% | 59% | 59% | - |
| Anvilogic Forge armory | 1,898 | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 57% | 71% | 71% | - |
| Exabeam content library | 1,424 | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Elastic protections | 1,332 | 99% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 63% | 30% | 30% | - |
| Sublime Security | 1,291 | 0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 1% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Panther analysis | 866 | 69% | 97% | 100% | 100% | 17% | 24% | 23% | - |
| Malicious infrastructure hunting queries | 864 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 3% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Agent Threat Rules | 844 | 27% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 39% | 0% | 0% | - |
| LOLRMM | 716 | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 58% | 100% | 99% | 0% |
| reprise99 Sentinel queries | 462 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 30% | 66% | 65% | - |
| Google SecOps (Chronicle) | 379 | 78% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 36% | 0% | 0% | - |
| ep3p Sentinel KQL | 354 | 0% | 28% | 0% | 100% | 27% | 53% | 53% | - |
| mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules | 337 | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 98% | 100% | 71% | 5% |
| ReversingLabs YARA | 309 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Bert-JanP hunting queries | 302 | 33% | 91% | 0% | 100% | 37% | 57% | 57% | - |
| Microsoft Defender hunting | 266 | 2% | 98% | 0% | 100% | 58% | 77% | 77% | - |
| JPCERT/CC YARA | 239 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 16% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Micah Babinski Sigma rules | 223 | 94% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 80% | 100% | 100% | - |
| Alex Verboon hunting queries | 198 | 23% | 94% | 0% | 100% | 27% | 73% | 72% | - |
| osquery packs | 196 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 7% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Hayabusa rules | 191 | 20% | 85% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 100% | 50% | 15% |
| Mandiant red team tool countermeasures | 172 | 0% | 62% | 0% | 100% | 8% | 0% | 0% | - |
| AIPT detection pack | 155 | 33% | 100% | 88% | 100% | 10% | 35% | 35% | - |
| Volexity threat intel (YARA) | 149 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 18% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Elastic hunting queries | 143 | 97% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 33% | 5% | 5% | - |
| bartblaze YARA | 142 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 19% | 0% | 0% | - |
| CrowdStrike LogScale community | 136 | 24% | 30% | 0% | 100% | 14% | 30% | 30% | - |
| AI DFIR toolkit | 136 | 24% | 100% | 44% | 100% | 26% | 29% | 28% | 0% |
| Falco plugin rules | 134 | 12% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 9% | 0% | 0% | - |
| ESET malware IOCs (YARA) | 117 | 0% | 86% | 0% | 100% | 20% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Joe Security Sigma rules | 112 | 12% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 41% | 100% | 99% | 11% |
| Google Cloud security analytics | 102 | 97% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 6% | 0% | 0% | - |
| MITRE CAR | 99 | 99% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 79% | 62% | 62% | - |
| Falco rules | 95 | 85% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 8% | 0% | 0% | - |
| cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries | 87 | 38% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 45% | 68% | 67% | - |
| Awesome Censys queries | 84 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Jamf Protect custom analytics | 80 | 1% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| GitLab threat detections (TLDR) | 61 | 79% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 20% | 100% | 38% | - |
| Awesome Shodan queries | 54 | 0% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| benscha KQL advanced hunting | 51 | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 18% | 84% | 80% | - |
| FalconForce FalconFriday | 48 | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 83% | 62% | 62% | - |
| Okta customer detections | 34 | 100% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 76% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Tracee detectors | 33 | 97% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook | 26 | 69% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 100% | 0% | 0% | - |
| Auth0 customer detections | 26 | 100% | 100% | 88% | 100% | 0% | 100% | 96% | - |
| CTID cloud analytics | 16 | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 6% | 100% | 56% | - |
| vector-sec Sublime rules | 7 | 0% | 100% | 86% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | - |
| **All sources** | **62,921** | **49%** | **99%** | **52%** | **98%** | **32%** | **24%** | **24%** | **8%** |

### Columns

ATT&CK technique
: Detections tagged with a technique the pinned ATT&CK version knows, counting a revoked technique as the one that replaced it.

Severity
: The share of detections with a severity level the catalog can map. It reads 0% where a source rates its rules on another scale. Splunk scores risk per rule, and the YARA sources carry a 0 to 100 score that the library shows as the score draft instead. Elastic protections, osquery, and MITRE CAR carry no rating.

Keys-on values
: Detections with at least one program, event ID, registry key, action, or CVE read from the query ([observables](https://detect.htora.dev/library/observables/)).

Translator reads it
: Sigma rules and queries the translator can parse into at least one other language.

[Robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) draft
: Detections with a first-pass level of 1 to 3, scored the way [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) scores an analytic: each observable the rule matches gets a level, and the condition combines them.

Fired on a recording
: Of the Windows Sigma rules that have a recording of their technique in OTRF Security-Datasets, the share that fired on it. The denominator is those rules, 1,689 in all, so sources with no Windows Sigma rules show a dash.

### Checks against outside sources

The robustness draft was checked against the 72 SigmaHQ rules MITRE's CTID scored by hand: it matched the hand score on 55 and stayed at or under it on 66. The Windows Sigma rules were run against 107 recordings of attacks, 776,654 events over 56 techniques: of the 1,695 rules with a recording of their technique, 139 fired on it. [The outside checks page](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/) has the full numbers and what they do and do not show.

Every figure is computed from the catalog on each build. This build read the catalog on 2026-10-05.


---

## Sources and licenses

https://detect.htora.dev/library/sources/

The library indexes 62,921 detections from 56 repositories. Each detection stays under its own license and links to the file it came from. The site keeps a copy of the rule text where the license allows, so the tools can read it, and the linked file stays the reference. One source states no license, and its note below says why the library carries it.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

**62,921**detections

**30,957**tagged with an [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) technique

**12,625**translated into 10 or more languages

**14,850**with a [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) draft

### Sources

| Source | License | Detections | What this site stores | Commit read |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [SigmaHQ](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma) | [Detection Rule License 1.1](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/Detection-Rule-License/blob/main/LICENSE.md) | 3,766 | Query and metadata | `ca24243a6e` |
| [Splunk Security Content](https://github.com/splunk/security_content) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/develop/LICENSE) | 2,090 | Query and metadata | `502a59a8bb` |
| [Elastic detection rules](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules) | [Elastic License 2.0](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/LICENSE.txt) | 2,216 | Query and metadata | `0aacc5e192` |
| [Elastic hunting queries](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules) | [Elastic License 2.0](https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/LICENSE.txt) | 143 | Query and metadata | `0aacc5e192` |
| [Elastic protections](https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts) | [Elastic License 2.0](https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/blob/main/LICENSE.txt) | 1,332 | Query and metadata | `ccefbba2b6` |
| [Elastic protections YARA](https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts) | [Elastic License 2.0](https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/blob/main/LICENSE.txt) | 3,069 | Query and metadata | `ccefbba2b6` |
| [Microsoft Defender hunting](https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries) | [MIT License](https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/master/LICENSE) | 266 | Query and metadata | `efa17a600b` |
| [Microsoft Sentinel](https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel) | [MIT License](https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/LICENSE) | 4,984 | Query and metadata | `4db27c9820` |
| [Panther analysis](https://github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/panther-labs/panther-analysis/blob/develop/LICENSE.txt) | 866 | Query and metadata | `d155b5922e` |
| [Google SecOps (Chronicle)](https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 379 | Query and metadata | `234e9223c3` |
| [Sublime Security](https://github.com/sublime-security/sublime-rules) | [MIT License](https://github.com/sublime-security/sublime-rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 1,291 | Query and metadata | `fd25119a07` |
| [Falco rules](https://github.com/falcosecurity/rules) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/falcosecurity/rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 95 | Query and metadata | `21ef6d5f5f` |
| [MITRE CAR](https://github.com/mitre-attack/car) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/mitre-attack/car/blob/master/LICENSE.txt) | 99 | Query and metadata | `1b922fe152` |
| [LOLRMM](https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLRMM) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/magicsword-io/LOLRMM/blob/main/LICENSE) | 716 | Query and metadata | `33941c32b5` |
| [Okta customer detections](https://github.com/okta/customer-detections) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/okta/customer-detections/blob/master/LICENSE) | 34 | Query and metadata | `f7c7bceecc` |
| [Tracee detectors](https://github.com/aquasecurity/tracee) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/aquasecurity/tracee/blob/main/LICENSE) | 33 | Query and metadata | `2f9dc40c20` |
| [osquery packs](https://github.com/osquery/osquery) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/osquery/osquery/blob/master/LICENSE-Apache-2.0) | 196 | Query and metadata | `f0af4d8426` |
| [signature-base YARA](https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base) | [Detection Rule License 1.1](https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE) | 5,852 | Query and metadata | `94a1c48d7a` |
| [Emerging Threats Open](https://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/) | [BSD license (ET Open)](https://detect.htora.dev/library/licenses/et-open.txt) | 10,313 | Query and metadata | `sha256:f14` |
| [Hayabusa rules](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules) | [Detection Rule License 1.1](https://github.com/Yamato-Security/hayabusa-rules/blob/main/LICENSE.md) | 191 | Query and metadata | `3d81fa7977` |
| [ESET malware IOCs (YARA)](https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc) | [BSD 2-Clause License](https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/blob/master/LICENSE) | 117 | Query and metadata | `17baf44964` |
| [ReversingLabs YARA](https://github.com/reversinglabs/reversinglabs-yara-rules) | [MIT License](https://github.com/reversinglabs/reversinglabs-yara-rules/blob/develop/LICENSE) | 309 | Query and metadata | `e0a0be54aa` |
| [Mandiant red team tool countermeasures](https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures) | [BSD 2-Clause License](https://github.com/mandiant/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/LICENSE.txt) | 172 | Query and metadata | `3561b71724` |
| [Volexity threat intel (YARA)](https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel) | [BSD 2-Clause License](https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/LICENSE.txt) | 149 | Query and metadata | `d8bb51c3e4` |
| [Bert-JanP hunting queries](https://github.com/Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules) | [BSD 3-Clause License](https://github.com/Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 302 | Query and metadata | `1c92e563cc` |
| [reprise99 Sentinel queries](https://github.com/reprise99/Sentinel-Queries) | [MIT License](https://github.com/reprise99/Sentinel-Queries/blob/main/LICENSE) | 462 | Query and metadata | `660895f644` |
| [FalconForce FalconFriday](https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday) | [BSD 3-Clause License](https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/FalconFriday/blob/main/LICENSE) | 48 | Query and metadata | `c662a6a0dc` |
| [CrowdStrike LogScale community](https://github.com/CrowdStrike/logscale-community-content) | [The Unlicense (public domain)](https://github.com/CrowdStrike/logscale-community-content/blob/main/LICENSE) | 136 | Query and metadata | `0152b8a763` |
| [Falco plugin rules](https://github.com/falcosecurity/plugins) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/falcosecurity/plugins/blob/main/LICENSE) | 134 | Query and metadata | `33cbeb9048` |
| [mdecrevoisier Sigma rules](https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules) | [CC0 1.0 (public domain)](https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/SIGMA-detection-rules/blob/main/LICENSE.md) | 337 | Query and metadata | `d61408af87` |
| [cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries](https://github.com/cyb3rmik3/KQL-threat-hunting-queries) | [MIT License](https://github.com/cyb3rmik3/KQL-threat-hunting-queries/blob/main/LICENSE) | 87 | Query and metadata | `1fb575b0bb` |
| [benscha KQL advanced hunting](https://github.com/benscha/KQLAdvancedHunting) | [No license stated](https://github.com/benscha/KQLAdvancedHunting#readme) | 51 | Query and metadata | `447e70fefe` |
| [OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook](https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook) | [MIT License](https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/main/LICENSE) | 26 | Query and metadata | `d310f3882e` |
| [AI DFIR toolkit](https://github.com/depalmar/ai-dfir-toolkit) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/depalmar/ai-dfir-toolkit/blob/main/LICENSE) | 136 | Query and metadata | `1a5963d922` |
| [Anvilogic Forge armory](https://github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory) | [GNU General Public License 3.0](https://github.com/anvilogic-forge/armory/blob/main/LICENSE) | 1,898 | Query and metadata | `6677454cad` |
| [vector-sec Sublime rules](https://github.com/vector-sec/public-sublime-rules) | [GNU General Public License 3.0](https://github.com/vector-sec/public-sublime-rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 7 | Query and metadata | `4a01e8c3b0` |
| [Joe Security Sigma rules](https://github.com/joesecurity/sigma-rules) | [GNU General Public License 3.0](https://github.com/joesecurity/sigma-rules/blob/master/LICENSE) | 112 | Query and metadata | `cb91be06c8` |
| [Google Cloud security analytics](https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/security-analytics) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/GoogleCloudPlatform/security-analytics/blob/main/LICENSE) | 102 | Query and metadata | `2dd8565557` |
| [CTID cloud analytics](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/cloud-analytics) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/cloud-analytics/blob/main/LICENSE) | 16 | Query and metadata | `6106cc1db4` |
| [Exabeam content library](https://github.com/ExabeamLabs/Content-Doc) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/ExabeamLabs/Content-Doc/blob/master/LICENSE) | 1,424 | Metadata and link only | `2896c831c3` |
| [Auth0 customer detections](https://github.com/auth0/auth0-customer-detections) | [Apache License 2.0](https://github.com/auth0/auth0-customer-detections/blob/main/LICENSE) | 26 | Query and metadata | `5b3940da41` |
| [AIPT detection pack](https://github.com/theori-io/aipt-detections) | [Detection Rule License 1.1](https://github.com/theori-io/aipt-detections/blob/main/LICENSE) | 155 | Query and metadata | `9e4653db4d` |
| [Malicious infrastructure hunting queries](https://github.com/frknaykc/Awesome-Malicious-Infra-Hunting-Queries) | [MIT License](https://github.com/frknaykc/Awesome-Malicious-Infra-Hunting-Queries/blob/main/LICENSE) | 864 | Query and metadata | `1fa5ad6214` |
| [Awesome Censys queries](https://github.com/thehappydinoa/awesome-censys-queries) | [CC0 1.0 (public domain)](https://github.com/thehappydinoa/awesome-censys-queries/blob/main/LICENSE) | 84 | Query and metadata | `56ae5ce0bc` |
| [Awesome Shodan queries](https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries) | [CC0 1.0 (public domain)](https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries/blob/main/license.md) | 54 | Query and metadata | `b3439d187b` |
| [ProjectDiscovery search queries](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/awesome-search-queries) | [MIT License](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/awesome-search-queries/blob/main/LICENSE.md) | 7,777 | Query and metadata | `cc66f42ebd` |
| [Snort 3 community rules](https://www.snort.org/downloads/#rule-downloads) | [GNU General Public License 2.0](https://detect.htora.dev/library/licenses/snort-community-gpl-2.0.txt) | 4,024 | Query and metadata | `sha256:969` |
| [Wazuh ruleset](https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh) | [GNU General Public License 2.0](https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/blob/v4.14.9/LICENSE) | 3,840 | Query and metadata | `bed556db3f` |
| [Agent Threat Rules](https://github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules) | [MIT License](https://github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 844 | Query and metadata | `0793de94ca` |
| [ep3p Sentinel KQL](https://github.com/ep3p/Sentinel_KQL) | [MIT License](https://github.com/ep3p/Sentinel_KQL/blob/main/LICENSE) | 354 | Query and metadata | `8dc8925fb7` |
| [Alex Verboon hunting queries](https://github.com/alexverboon/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules) | [BSD 3-Clause License](https://github.com/alexverboon/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 198 | Query and metadata | `b6a846e433` |
| [JPCERT/CC YARA](https://github.com/JPCERTCC/jpcert-yara) | [BSD 3-Clause License](https://github.com/JPCERTCC/jpcert-yara/blob/main/LICENSE) | 239 | Query and metadata | `7837438e7b` |
| [bartblaze YARA](https://github.com/bartblaze/Yara-rules) | [MIT License](https://github.com/bartblaze/Yara-rules/blob/master/LICENSE) | 142 | Query and metadata | `5cc871d823` |
| [Micah Babinski Sigma rules](https://github.com/mbabinski/Sigma-Rules) | [GNU General Public License 3.0](https://github.com/mbabinski/Sigma-Rules/blob/main/LICENSE) | 223 | Query and metadata | `9dea7a5c15` |
| [Jamf Protect custom analytics](https://github.com/jamf/jamfprotect) | [MIT License](https://github.com/jamf/jamfprotect/blob/main/LICENSE) | 80 | Query and metadata | `34e1c6c6e1` |
| [GitLab threat detections (TLDR)](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-security-oss/tldr) | [MIT License](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-security-oss/tldr/-/blob/main/LICENSE) | 61 | Query and metadata | `fa9039504f` |

### Storage and license notes

Elastic detection rules
: Shown under the Elastic License 2.0 with the license and notices kept.

Elastic hunting queries
: Hunting queries from the hunting folder of Elastic's detection-rules repository, shown under the Elastic License 2.0 with the license and notices kept. They find activity for an analyst to review and are not tuned to alert. Where a hunt has several queries, all are shown in order.

Elastic protections
: Endpoint behavior rules, shown under the Elastic License 2.0 with the license and notices kept.

Elastic protections YARA
: YARA rules Elastic ships in its endpoint to find malware families in files and memory, shown under the Elastic License 2.0 with the license and notices kept. Each rule names its operating system, which sets the platform, and the score shown is the rule's own severity field, 0 to 100.

Microsoft Defender hunting
: Hunting queries that find suspicious activity for an analyst to read. They are not tuned to alert.

Sublime Security
: Sublime maps its email rules to its own attack types and has no ATT&CK mapping, so these entries carry no technique or tactic.

Tracee detectors
: Linux runtime detectors for eBPF events, written in Go. Copyright 2019 Aqua Security Software Ltd., Apache License 2.0. Each entry shows the detector's event requirements and event handler.

osquery packs
: Endpoint SQL queries from the security packs (incident response, macOS and Windows attack artifacts, rootkit checks, unwanted browser extensions). The osquery project offers Apache 2.0 or GPL 2.0 at the user's choice, and these are shown under Apache 2.0. The packs carry no ATT&CK mapping, so these entries have no technique or tactic. The compliance, hardware, and vulnerability packs are left out because they inventory settings and do not detect activity.

signature-base YARA
: YARA rules by Florian Roth and contributors, which match files and process memory. The license asks that each rule keep its author and a link to it, and both are shown. Rules whose own metadata names another license are left out, as are private helper rules and the repository's IOC lists. The score is the author's confidence from 0 to 100.

Emerging Threats Open
: Suricata network rules. Only enabled rules that carry an ATT&CK technique are included. Left out: rules that match only a domain name (DNS query, TLS server name, or HTTP host), which are indicators like the IP reputation lists, also left out; the policy, info, hunting, and retired categories; and anything outside SIDs 2000000 to 2799999, which the license shipped with the ruleset gives to Emerging Threats under the BSD license. Rules 2100000 to 2103999, forks of the original Snort GPL rules, are left out too. Severity follows the signature_severity field: Critical is critical, Major is high, Minor is low, and Informational is informational.

Hayabusa rules
: Yamato Security's own Windows event log rules, written in [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) format for the Hayabusa timeline tool. The repository also carries converted copies of SigmaHQ rules, which are left out because SigmaHQ is read directly.

ESET malware IOCs (YARA)
: YARA rules ESET published with its malware research. They match malware families by strings and structure. The two-clause BSD license asks that the copyright notice and license travel with the rules, so both are published beside them.

ReversingLabs YARA
: YARA rules ReversingLabs published for malware families, ransomware, and exploits. The certificate folder, 931 rules that match the serial numbers of signing certificates, is left out as a list of indicators. The MIT license asks that its copyright and permission notice travel with the rules, so both are published beside them.

Mandiant red team tool countermeasures
: YARA rules Mandiant released in December 2020 to detect the red team tools stolen from FireEye. The repository also carries Snort, ClamAV, and HXIOC versions, which are left out. The BSD license text is published beside the rules.

Volexity threat intel (YARA)
: YARA rules Volexity published alongside its threat research, one folder per year. The BSD license text is published beside the rules.

Bert-JanP hunting queries
: KQL hunting queries and detection rules for Defender XDR and Sentinel by Bert-Jan Pals. Where a page gives both a Defender XDR and a Sentinel version, both are shown. The learning, fun, and function folders are left out. The BSD license text is published beside the queries.

reprise99 Sentinel queries
: KQL queries for Microsoft Sentinel by Matt Zorich, mostly for hunting and investigation across Entra ID, Azure, Office 365, and Defender. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

FalconForce FalconFriday
: Detections FalconForce published in its FalconFriday series, each with an ATT&CK mapping, blind spots, and response steps. The BSD license text is published beside them.

CrowdStrike LogScale community
: LogScale (CQL) queries from CrowdStrike's community content repository, released into the public domain. Only the Queries-Only folder is read; its ATT&CK folder names the technique of each query.

Falco plugin rules
: Falco rules for the event sources Falco reads through plugins: AWS CloudTrail, GCP audit logs, Okta, GitHub, and Kubernetes audit. Rules shipped disabled are left out, as are example, test, and dummy rules, and the GKE plugin's copy of the Kubernetes audit rules.

mdecrevoisier Sigma rules
: Sigma rules by Michel de Crevoisier for Windows, Active Directory, Azure, SQL Server, and BITS, released into the public domain. Most carry no Sigma id, so the library derives a stable one from the file path.

cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries
: KQL hunting and detection queries for Defender XDR and Sentinel by Michail Michalos. The learning folder and the template are left out. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

benscha KQL advanced hunting
: KQL hunts for Defender XDR and Sentinel by Benjamin Zulliger, from the repository's ThreatHunting folder, many of them for Kubernetes and containers. The repository states no license, so the queries remain the author's. Its README lists community platforms that index and feature them. The library does the same, crediting the author and linking each original file.

OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook
: Documented hunts from the Open Threat Research Forge, each with a hypothesis, an ATT&CK mapping, and analytics written as Spark SQL over a recorded dataset. Each hunt's analytics appear together in their original order. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

AI DFIR toolkit
: Sigma, YARA, and Suricata rules for attacks on LLM applications, [MCP](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mcp) servers, model supply chains, AI infrastructure, coding assistants, RAG pipelines, and AI agents, by Raymond DePalma. The rules map to MITRE ATLAS and the OWASP LLM Top 10 as often as to ATT&CK; those ids are kept in each description, and the ATT&CK ids in the technique field. The Sigma rules come from the nine category folders and the agent artifact catalog's detections folder. The project is unrelated to The DFIR Report, whose GPLv3 rules stay out. ATT&CK 20.0 adds Direct and Indirect [Prompt Injection](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-prompt-injection), T1699 and T1698. MITRE's data cites no ATLAS id for either, so the library leaves each rule's ATT&CK ids as its author published them.

Anvilogic Forge armory
: The public slice of Anvilogic's detection armory, written as SPL for Splunk or as SQL for Snowflake. Anvilogic calls them threat identifiers, meant to be chained into a longer scenario in its platform. Each query calls macros such as get_endpoint_data in place of your own data, so replace them before running one. Shown under the GNU General Public License 3.0, with the license text published beside them. This site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them, and anyone may copy, change, and share them on the GPL's terms.

vector-sec Sublime rules
: Email detections in Sublime's MQL from an independent author, apart from Sublime's own rules. Shown under the GNU General Public License 3.0, with the license text published beside them. This site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them, and anyone may copy, change, and share them on the GPL's terms.

Joe Security Sigma rules
: Windows Sigma rules Joe Security wrote for hunting in its malware sandbox. Most name no ATT&CK technique; where a rule names one in its own mitreattack field, the library reads it from there. Seven files are not valid YAML and are left out. Shown under the GNU General Public License 3.0, with the license text published beside them. This site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them, and anyone may copy, change, and share them on the GPL's terms.

Google Cloud security analytics
: Community use cases for Google Cloud and Workspace audit logs, each with up to three queries: BigQuery SQL, Log Analytics SQL, and YARA-L for Google SecOps. Each query is its own entry. Three use cases with no query in any of the three are left out.

CTID cloud analytics
: Sigma analytics for Azure, Google Cloud, and Workspace from MITRE's Center for Threat-Informed Defense, published in 2022 with [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) plans for each. Several chain rules together in the correlation format Sigma used before its correlation specification, so a current pySigma reads the single rules and not the chains. One file, the GCP service account permissions rule, nests its detection inside its log source, so it is not a valid Sigma rule and is left out.

Exabeam content library
: The rules of Exabeam's behavioral analytics, as its documentation lists them for each log source it parses: a rule id, what the rule flags, and its ATT&CK technique. The documentation carries no rule logic, so these entries have no query. Each entry counts the log sources and event types Exabeam lists for the rule, and links the page of the first log source.

AIPT detection pack
: Detections by Xint for LLM-driven autonomous penetration testing tools: ARTEX and nine like it, CyberStrikeAI, HexStrike-AI, PentAGI, Strix, Shannon, MetasploitMCP, PentestGPT, Decepticon, and Villager. Sigma, Suricata, and YARA rules are read; the ModSecurity plugin and the correlation queries are left out. Every rule matches a tool's fingerprint, such as a user agent, URL path, port, TLS field, or process name, so a match names the tool but not whether its use was authorized. Rules whose name ends in _base are inputs to the pack's correlations and are not meant to alert alone. The Detection Rule License asks that each rule keep its author and a link to it, and both are shown.

Malicious infrastructure hunting queries
: Shodan, Censys, and Netlas searches for attacker infrastructure, collected by frknaykc: C2 framework servers, RAT and stealer panels, phishing kits, open directories serving payloads, and hosts exposing a known CVE. They run in the search engine and find servers on the internet, so the baseline builder leaves them out. Each is a starting point for hunting and blocking, and a server that matches may be a researcher's or a red team's. The Turkish copy of the files and the ClickFix case study are left out. Where the collection lists several searches in one block, each is its own entry. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

Awesome Censys queries
: Censys searches collected by Aidan Holland, for C2 frameworks and other attacker tooling as well as exposed industrial controls, cameras, and other devices. They run in Censys, so the baseline builder leaves them out. Released into the public domain.

Awesome Shodan queries
: Shodan searches collected by Jake Jarvis for exposed industrial controls, network devices, remote desktops, databases, cameras, and other services that should not face the internet. They run in Shodan, so the baseline builder leaves them out. Released into the public domain.

ProjectDiscovery search queries
: Shodan, FOFA, ZoomEye, and Censys searches that find a named product on the internet, collected by ProjectDiscovery from the metadata of its Nuclei templates: web applications, admin panels, network devices, and servers. A match says where a product is exposed, which is the first question when a vulnerability in it is announced. They run in the search engine, so the baseline builder leaves them out.

Snort 3 community rules
: The free community ruleset for Snort 3, written by Cisco Talos and the contributors its AUTHORS file names, downloaded as a tarball from snort.org. Every enabled rule is included; most are malware command and control, web application attacks, and exploit attempts. A rule's severity follows the priority Snort's classification file gives its classtype. Each entry links the rule's page on snort.org. Shown under the GNU General Public License 2.0 that ships in the tarball, with the license text published beside them. This site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them, and anyone may copy, change, and share them on the GPL's terms.

Wazuh ruleset
: The rules Wazuh ships with its manager, read from the ruleset folder of the 4.14.9 release. They match decoded log fields for Windows, Linux, firewalls, web servers, cloud audit logs, and the agent's own file integrity and rootkit checks. Rules at level 0, which exist to group or silence other rules, are left out. Severity follows the level: 1 to 4 is informational, 5 to 7 low, 8 to 11 medium, 12 to 14 high, and 15 critical. Shown under the GNU General Public License 2.0, with the license text published beside them. This site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them, and anyone may copy, change, and share them on the GPL's terms.

Agent Threat Rules
: Rules in the ATR format for attacks on AI agents: prompt injection, tool and skill poisoning, context exfiltration, and agents acting past their [mandate](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mandate), matched against prompts, tool calls, MCP messages, and agent output. Only the rules folder is read; the repository's generated proposals are left out. The stored copy of each rule leaves out its test cases, evasion tests, and compliance mappings, which the linked file keeps. The rules map to MITRE ATLAS and the OWASP lists for LLMs and agents as often as to ATT&CK. Those ids stay in each description, and the ATT&CK ids go in the technique field. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

ep3p Sentinel KQL
: KQL queries for Microsoft Sentinel from the Queries folder, one file per query, organized by the Microsoft product whose logs they read. Many take their allowlists from Sentinel watchlists, which the repository's Watchlists folder defines. The Learn folder is left out. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

Alex Verboon hunting queries
: KQL hunting queries and detection rules for Defender XDR and Sentinel by Alex Verboon, one page per query, in folders named for the Microsoft product they read. Where a page gives both a Defender XDR and a Sentinel version, both are shown. The BSD license text is published beside them.

JPCERT/CC YARA
: YARA rules JPCERT/CC published for the malware of the groups it tracks, one folder per group. The BSD license text is published beside them.

bartblaze YARA
: YARA rules by Bart Parys for malware families, webshells, and attacker tooling, each with a description and a reference. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

Micah Babinski Sigma rules
: Windows Sigma rules Micah Babinski wrote from public incident reports, one folder per campaign or report, from Gootloader and QakBot to the Red Canary threat detection report. Shown under the GNU General Public License 3.0, with the license text published beside them. This site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them, and anyone may copy, change, and share them on the GPL's terms.

Jamf Protect custom analytics
: Custom analytics for Jamf Protect from Jamf's open source repository: a predicate over a macOS endpoint event, the event type it needs, and the severity Jamf recommends. Tactics come from each analytic's ATT&CK categories; most name Visibility or living off the land instead of a tactic, so few carry one. The agentic folder, detections for AI agent tooling on a Mac, is included. Jamf says the repository is provided as is and is not supported by Jamf Support. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

GitLab threat detections (TLDR)
: Sigma rules for a self-managed GitLab instance's own logs, from GitLab's security team, each inside a page that explains the threat, the log fields, sample events, and the response. Threat detections cover administrator and token abuse; vulnerability detections match the probing of named CVEs. The rules name a team mailbox as their author, and the library shows the team's name in its place. The MIT license notice is published beside them.

Elastic License 2.0
: [A copy of the license text](https://detect.htora.dev/library/licenses/elastic-license-2.0.txt) accompanies the Elastic rules. It allows copying and making the rules available with the license and notices kept, and it bars offering the software itself as a hosted service.

ET Open
: [The license text and copyright notice](https://detect.htora.dev/library/licenses/et-open.txt) shipped with the ruleset accompany the Suricata rules. That license puts SIDs 2000000 to 2799999 under the BSD license, and the catalog publishes only that range. The GPLv2 and ETPRO ranges it names are left out, as are rules 2100000 to 2103999, forks of the original Snort GPL rules.

GPL sources
: Anvilogic's armory, vector-sec's Sublime rules, and Joe Security's Sigma rules are under the GNU GPL 3.0. Their rules stay under it, with the license text published beside them, and this site's CC BY-NC license does not cover them. The DFIR Report's own Sigma repository is empty now, because its public rules go to SigmaHQ, and the library carries the 17 SigmaHQ rules that credit it.

No license file
: benscha's KQL advanced hunting has no license file, and the library carries it because its README welcomes indexing by community platforms.

Skipped on purpose
: PyPanther repeats rules already read from Panther analysis, and hayabusa-rules' converted SigmaHQ copies repeat SigmaHQ.

Attribution
: Sigma rules keep their author line and rule id. Splunk, Panther, and Microsoft rules keep their license notice in the source repository each entry links to.

Test corpus
: OTRF's [Security-Datasets](https://github.com/OTRF/Security-Datasets) (MIT License) are not a source of detections. The library runs its Windows Sigma rules against these recorded attacks and records which fired; the [outside checks page](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/) explains the test. No event from them is published.

### Catalog build

A script reads each repository and writes one catalog: name, description, ATT&CK techniques and tactics, platform, query language, severity, and the source link. Tactics come from the source when it names them, and otherwise from the tactics of each technique in ATT&CK 20.1. A technique ATT&CK has revoked since the rule was written is shown as the technique that replaced it. ATT&CK has also split Defense Evasion into Stealth and Defense Impairment. A rule tagged Defense Evasion goes under whichever of the two its techniques belong to, and under Stealth when they point to neither. Platform is read from each source's log source or tags, so a few detections land under Other. A weekly job refreshes it; this build read it on 2026-10-05.

### Drafts

The translator column counts detections the query translator can read. The score draft is a robustness level of 1 to 3, scored the way [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) scores an analytic: each observable a rule matches gets a level, from the field and what the value names, and the rule's condition combines them. Observables joined by AND take the lowest level, and observables joined by OR take the highest. Levels 4 and 5 need a person who knows the technique, so the draft never claims them. [Checked against CTID's hand scores](https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/). Build effort is set to 1, the anchor for adapting a public detection. Threat relevance, impact, [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness), and [run cost](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) depend on your environment, so the sample backlogs set them to 3 until you replace them.


---

## Reconnaissance detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/reconnaissance/

261 detections in the library are tagged Reconnaissance, across 133 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 261](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=reconnaissance).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **104** | Microsoft Sentinel 63, Elastic detection rules 21, Splunk Security Content 8 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **35** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, AIPT detection pack 9, Elastic detection rules 7 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1593` | Search Open Websites/Domains | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, Emerging Threats Open 8, AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **24** | Elastic detection rules 10, Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Elastic detection rules 3, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Panther analysis 2, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Splunk Security Content 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **16** | Elastic detection rules 6, Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 4, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 12 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Exabeam content library 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **12** | Elastic detection rules 10, AIPT detection pack 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **10** | Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **7** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Wazuh ruleset 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **6** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 1, AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1585.001` | Social Media Accounts | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1585` | Establish Accounts | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1589.003` | Employee Names | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1591` | Gather Victim Org Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1592.004` | Client Configurations | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592.004&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1048.002` | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1090.003` | Multi-hop Proxy | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1491` | Defacement | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1589.002` | Email Addresses | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1590.005` | IP Addresses | **4** | Splunk Security Content 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590.005&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1597` | Search Closed Sources | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1597&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1598.003` | Spearphishing Link | **4** | Exabeam content library 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598.003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **3** | Splunk Security Content 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **3** | Exabeam content library 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1589.001` | Credentials | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1596` | Search Open Technical Databases | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1596&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **2** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1590.001` | Domain Properties | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1590.002` | DNS | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1591.002` | Business Relationships | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1591.004` | Identify Roles | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591.004&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1593.003` | Code Repositories | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593.003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1598.002` | Spearphishing Attachment | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1646` | T1646 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1646&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1110.002` | Password Cracking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1114.003` | Email Forwarding Rule | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.003&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1583.006` | Web Services | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.006&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1586.002` | Email Accounts | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1587` | Develop Capabilities | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1592.001` | Hardware | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592.001&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1592.002` | Software | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1593.002` | Search Engines | **1** | AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593.002&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1657` | Financial Theft | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1657&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1664` | T1664 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1664&tac=reconnaissance) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=reconnaissance) |
| - | No technique tagged | **11** | SigmaHQ 6, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Falco rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=reconnaissance) |


---

## Resource Development detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/resource-development/

304 detections in the library are tagged Resource Development, across 139 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 304](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=resource-development).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1587` | Develop Capabilities | **93** | Emerging Threats Open 82, SigmaHQ 6, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1586.003` | Cloud Accounts | **40** | Splunk Security Content 39, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **35** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **29** | Microsoft Sentinel 23, SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1587.001` | Malware | **20** | SigmaHQ 11, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Wazuh ruleset 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1588.002` | Tool | **19** | SigmaHQ 9, AIPT detection pack 7, Splunk Security Content 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **17** | Elastic detection rules 6, Splunk Security Content 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **13** | Splunk Security Content 13 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 2, Exabeam content library 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1584` | Compromise Infrastructure | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1621` | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | **10** | Splunk Security Content 10 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1621&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **9** | Splunk Security Content 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1585` | Establish Accounts | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1110.004` | Credential Stuffing | **8** | Splunk Security Content 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.004&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Splunk Security Content 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **7** | Wazuh ruleset 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1585.001` | Social Media Accounts | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1588.001` | Malware | **6** | Wazuh ruleset 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **5** | Splunk Security Content 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1593` | Search Open Websites/Domains | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 3, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1535` | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | **4** | Splunk Security Content 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1535&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1584.002` | DNS Server | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1586.002` | Email Accounts | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Alex Verboon hunting queries 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1587.004` | Exploits | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.004&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1589.003` | Employee Names | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **3** | Splunk Security Content 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1204.003` | Malicious Image | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1491` | Defacement | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1584.001` | Domains | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1608.001` | Upload Malware | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1027.004` | Compile After Delivery | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.004&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1080` | Taint Shared Content | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1080&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **2** | Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1437` | T1437 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1437&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **2** | Elastic detection rules 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **2** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1585.002` | Email Accounts | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1591.002` | Business Relationships | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1606.001` | Web Cookies | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T0873` | T0873 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0873&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1496.004` | Cloud Service Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.004&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1553.002` | Code Signing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1583.003` | Virtual Private Server | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1583.006` | Web Services | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.006&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1583.008` | Malvertising | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.008&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1584.007` | Serverless | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584.007&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1585.003` | Cloud Accounts | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1586.001` | Social Media Accounts | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1587.002` | Code Signing Certificates | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1587.003` | Digital Certificates | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1588.003` | Code Signing Certificates | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1588.004` | Digital Certificates | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.004&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1589.001` | Credentials | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.001&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1589.002` | Email Addresses | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1596` | Search Open Technical Databases | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1596&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1597` | Search Closed Sources | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1597&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1608.002` | Upload Tool | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.002&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1608.003` | Install Digital Certificate | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.003&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1608.005` | Link Target | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.005&tac=resource-development) |
| `T1646` | T1646 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1646&tac=resource-development) |
| - | No technique tagged | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=resource-development) |


---

## Initial Access detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/initial-access/

11,354 detections in the library are tagged Initial Access, across 351 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 11,354](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=initial-access).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **7132** | Emerging Threats Open 6229, Microsoft Sentinel 357, SigmaHQ 149 and 18 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **2206** | Emerging Threats Open 1272, Microsoft Sentinel 716, Elastic protections 81 and 19 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **962** | Microsoft Sentinel 300, Exabeam content library 182, Elastic detection rules 149 and 19 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **374** | Microsoft Sentinel 237, Splunk Security Content 31, Exabeam content library 26 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **356** | Elastic detection rules 116, Microsoft Sentinel 51, SigmaHQ 37 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **252** | Emerging Threats Open 150, Microsoft Sentinel 80, Elastic detection rules 8 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **208** | Microsoft Sentinel 64, Elastic detection rules 54, Elastic protections 43 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **191** | Elastic protections 69, Splunk Security Content 29, Microsoft Sentinel 27 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **137** | Microsoft Sentinel 36, Elastic detection rules 35, Elastic protections 19 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **100** | Microsoft Sentinel 65, Elastic detection rules 13, Exabeam content library 11 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **95** | Elastic detection rules 21, Splunk Security Content 20, Elastic protections 19 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **94** | Exabeam content library 39, Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 15 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **93** | Microsoft Sentinel 42, Elastic protections 22, Elastic detection rules 21 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **86** | Microsoft Sentinel 35, SigmaHQ 14, Elastic detection rules 12 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **75** | Elastic detection rules 19, Microsoft Sentinel 17, Panther analysis 16 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **75** | Microsoft Sentinel 30, SigmaHQ 17, Elastic protections 17 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **73** | SigmaHQ 17, Elastic detection rules 15, Agent Threat Rules 13 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **63** | Elastic detection rules 24, Elastic protections 19, SigmaHQ 6 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **52** | Elastic detection rules 19, Splunk Security Content 13, SigmaHQ 10 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **49** | Elastic detection rules 19, Elastic protections 13, SigmaHQ 11 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **48** | Elastic detection rules 17, Elastic protections 9, SigmaHQ 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **44** | Elastic detection rules 27, Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **41** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Elastic protections 15, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **41** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 7 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **39** | Elastic detection rules 18, Elastic protections 10, Agent Threat Rules 6 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **38** | Elastic detection rules 14, Elastic protections 8, SigmaHQ 6 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **38** | Elastic detection rules 15, Elastic protections 14, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **38** | Elastic detection rules 20, Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic protections 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **38** | Elastic detection rules 28, Panther analysis 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **38** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Elastic detection rules 12, SigmaHQ 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **38** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Splunk Security Content 10, Elastic detection rules 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **35** | Exabeam content library 10, Splunk Security Content 7, SigmaHQ 5 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **34** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Elastic detection rules 5, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **34** | Elastic protections 16, Elastic detection rules 12, SigmaHQ 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **33** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Splunk Security Content 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 23, Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **31** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, SigmaHQ 4, Wazuh ruleset 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **31** | Elastic detection rules 24, Panther analysis 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **30** | Microsoft Sentinel 27, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **29** | Microsoft Sentinel 29 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **28** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Wazuh ruleset 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **28** | Elastic protections 13, Elastic detection rules 8, Agent Threat Rules 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **27** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Elastic protections 3, Micah Babinski [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **27** | Exabeam content library 7, Splunk Security Content 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 22, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic protections 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **24** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 10, Elastic hunting queries 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1091` | Replication Through Removable Media | **23** | Exabeam content library 13, Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1091&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **22** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Panther analysis 5, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Panther analysis 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Agent Threat Rules 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 6, Elastic detection rules 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **18** | Anvilogic Forge armory 10, Wazuh ruleset 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **17** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 6, SigmaHQ 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **17** | SigmaHQ 8, Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 17 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Elastic detection rules 3, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1078.001` | Default Accounts | **16** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1052.001` | Exfiltration over USB | **15** | Exabeam content library 13, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1052.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 15 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **15** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 3, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 3, Agent Threat Rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Wazuh ruleset 3, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **14** | Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1080` | Taint Shared Content | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 14 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1080&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Splunk Security Content 4, Exabeam content library 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **14** | Elastic detection rules 9, Panther analysis 1, Okta customer detections 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **14** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 2, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **13** | Wazuh ruleset 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **13** | Wazuh ruleset 6, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **13** | Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic protections 4, Splunk Security Content 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1586.003` | Cloud Accounts | **13** | Splunk Security Content 13 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **12** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1200` | Hardware Additions | **12** | Splunk Security Content 5, Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1200&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **12** | Elastic protections 6, Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **12** | Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1621` | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | **12** | Splunk Security Content 7, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1621&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **11** | Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Splunk Security Content 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **10** | Elastic detection rules 8, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1568.002` | Domain Generation Algorithms | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **9** | Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **9** | Elastic protections 5, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **8** | Panther analysis 6, Wazuh ruleset 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **8** | Elastic detection rules 3, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1110.004` | Credential Stuffing | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0865` | T0865 | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0865&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **7** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **7** | Elastic protections 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic protections 1, Snort 3 community rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1566.003` | Spearphishing via Service | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **6** | Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1090.003` | Multi-hop Proxy | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **6** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.001` | Compiled HTML File | **6** | Elastic protections 3, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1505.001` | SQL Stored Procedures | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Google Cloud security analytics 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **6** | Exabeam content library 4, Wazuh ruleset 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **6** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1585.001` | Social Media Accounts | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **5** | Elastic detection rules 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **5** | Exabeam content library 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1546.016` | Installer Packages | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.016&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **5** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **5** | Elastic protections 3, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1584` | Compromise Infrastructure | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0890` | T0890 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0890&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1048.002` | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1204.004` | Malicious Copy and Paste | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.003` | CMSTP | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.008` | Odbcconf | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.008&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **4** | Google Cloud security analytics 2, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1491` | Defacement | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **4** | Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **4** | Panther analysis 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1550.003` | Pass the Ticket | **4** | Exabeam content library 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **4** | Exabeam content library 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1573` | Encrypted Channel | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1573.001` | Symmetric Cryptography | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1586.002` | Email Accounts | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Alex Verboon hunting queries 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1589.003` | Employee Names | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1593` | Search Open Websites/Domains | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1659` | Content Injection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1659&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0819` | T0819 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0819&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0863` | T0863 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0863&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1025` | Data from Removable Media | **3** | Splunk Security Content 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1025&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **3** | Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1137` | Office Application Startup | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1137.006` | Add-ins | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.006&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **3** | Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1585` | Establish Accounts | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1587` | Develop Capabilities | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1598.003` | Spearphishing Link | **3** | Exabeam content library 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1606` | Forge Web Credentials | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **3** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **3** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **3** | Splunk Security Content 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0866` | T0866 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0866&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0886` | T0886 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0886&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1027.006` | HTML Smuggling | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.006&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1052` | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1052&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1110.002` | Password Cracking | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.014` | MMC | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.014&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1499.004` | Application or System Exploitation | **2** | GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1535` | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1535&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **2** | GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1555.006` | Cloud Secrets Management Stores | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.006&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **2** | Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1585.002` | Email Accounts | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1591.002` | Business Relationships | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1606.002` | SAML Tokens | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **2** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **2** | Falco rules 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0822` | T0822 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0822&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0848` | T0848 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0848&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0859` | T0859 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0859&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0862` | T0862 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0862&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0873` | T0873 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0873&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0882` | T0882 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0882&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0883` | T0883 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0883&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0885` | T0885 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0885&tac=initial-access) |
| `T0889` | T0889 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0889&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1001.002` | Steganography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1016.001` | Internet Connection Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1021.008` | Direct Cloud VM Connections | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.008&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1027.010` | Command Obfuscation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.010&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1030` | Data Transfer Size Limits | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1030&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1036.001` | Invalid Code Signature | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1036.008` | Masquerade File Type | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.008&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1036.009` | Break Process Trees | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.009&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1036.010` | Masquerade Account Name | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.010&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1204.005` | Malicious Library | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1213.002` | Sharepoint | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1218.002` | Control Panel | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1220` | XSL Script Processing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1220&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1423` | T1423 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1423&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1428` | T1428 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1428&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1456` | T1456 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1456&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1489` | Service Stop | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1489&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1505.004` | IIS Components | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1547.004` | Winlogon Helper DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1548.001` | Setuid and Setgid | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1550.004` | Web Session Cookie | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.004&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1555.005` | Password Managers | **1** | Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1556.007` | Hybrid Identity | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.007&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1556.009` | Conditional Access Policies | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.009&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1563.001` | SSH Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1563.002` | RDP Hijacking | **1** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1568.001` | Fast Flux DNS | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1569.001` | Launchctl | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1578.005` | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.005&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1589.001` | Credentials | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1589.002` | Email Addresses | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1591` | Gather Victim Org Information | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1598.002` | Spearphishing Attachment | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1608.001` | Upload Malware | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.001&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1608.002` | Upload Tool | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.002&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1620` | Reflective Code Loading | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1620&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1622` | Debugger Evasion | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1622&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1660` | T1660 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1660&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1664` | T1664 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1664&tac=initial-access) |
| `T1684.001` | Impersonation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1684.001&tac=initial-access) |
| - | No technique tagged | **144** | Microsoft Sentinel 84, Microsoft Defender hunting 33, SigmaHQ 19 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=initial-access) |


---

## Execution detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/execution/

4,114 detections in the library are tagged Execution, across 439 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 4,114](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=execution).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **1258** | Elastic protections 375, Elastic detection rules 326, Microsoft Sentinel 131 and 19 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **710** | SigmaHQ 220, Elastic detection rules 113, Anvilogic Forge armory 93 and 16 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **404** | Elastic protections 166, Elastic detection rules 151, Anvilogic Forge armory 27 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **273** | Microsoft Sentinel 93, Elastic detection rules 57, Elastic protections 56 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **269** | Anvilogic Forge armory 64, SigmaHQ 46, Elastic detection rules 45 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **238** | Elastic detection rules 50, Elastic protections 41, SigmaHQ 39 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **216** | SigmaHQ 52, Anvilogic Forge armory 28, Wazuh ruleset 26 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=execution) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **199** | SigmaHQ 70, Elastic detection rules 37, Microsoft Sentinel 27 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=execution) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **181** | Elastic detection rules 53, Elastic protections 52, SigmaHQ 51 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=execution) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **180** | Microsoft Sentinel 43, SigmaHQ 35, Elastic detection rules 28 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **179** | Elastic protections 84, Elastic detection rules 35, SigmaHQ 29 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=execution) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **160** | Elastic protections 75, Elastic detection rules 46, Microsoft Sentinel 34 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=execution) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **159** | Microsoft Sentinel 45, Elastic detection rules 29, SigmaHQ 25 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=execution) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **157** | SigmaHQ 51, Splunk Security Content 25, Exabeam content library 16 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **140** | Elastic detection rules 39, Elastic protections 32, SigmaHQ 23 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=execution) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **137** | Microsoft Sentinel 51, Elastic protections 49, Elastic detection rules 23 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **135** | Elastic protections 49, SigmaHQ 29, Elastic detection rules 19 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **135** | SigmaHQ 93, Splunk Security Content 19, Exabeam content library 6 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **128** | Elastic detection rules 46, Elastic protections 33, SigmaHQ 13 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **126** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 21, Anvilogic Forge armory 14 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=execution) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **115** | SigmaHQ 43, Anvilogic Forge armory 19, Elastic detection rules 14 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **99** | Elastic protections 40, Elastic detection rules 21, Microsoft Sentinel 18 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **77** | Exabeam content library 41, Splunk Security Content 10, SigmaHQ 6 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **72** | Elastic detection rules 22, SigmaHQ 16, Elastic protections 15 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=execution) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **71** | Elastic detection rules 32, Elastic protections 17, Microsoft Sentinel 11 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **71** | Elastic detection rules 26, Elastic protections 21, Exabeam content library 13 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **69** | Elastic protections 23, Elastic detection rules 17, SigmaHQ 14 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=execution) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **64** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, SigmaHQ 13, Elastic detection rules 13 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=execution) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **62** | Microsoft Sentinel 21, Elastic detection rules 20, Anvilogic Forge armory 6 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=execution) |
| `T1610` | Deploy Container | **61** | Elastic detection rules 32, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Panther analysis 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1610&tac=execution) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **60** | Elastic detection rules 22, Elastic protections 10, Microsoft Sentinel 9 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=execution) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **60** | Elastic detection rules 37, Elastic protections 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=execution) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **59** | LOLRMM 46, Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **58** | Elastic protections 22, Elastic detection rules 19, SigmaHQ 9 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **56** | Elastic protections 17, Microsoft Sentinel 17, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **55** | Elastic protections 21, Elastic detection rules 11, Microsoft Sentinel 10 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=execution) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **54** | Elastic detection rules 25, SigmaHQ 8, Elastic protections 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=execution) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **53** | Elastic detection rules 39, benscha KQL advanced hunting 5, SigmaHQ 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=execution) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **51** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Elastic detection rules 16, Elastic protections 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=execution) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **49** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 9, Splunk Security Content 8 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=execution) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **48** | Elastic protections 16, Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 12 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **47** | Anvilogic Forge armory 19, Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=execution) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **46** | Elastic detection rules 15, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 6, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 6 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **44** | Elastic detection rules 16, Elastic protections 13, Exabeam content library 8 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=execution) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **43** | Elastic detection rules 29, benscha KQL advanced hunting 5, Panther analysis 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=execution) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **42** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Elastic detection rules 13, Splunk Security Content 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=execution) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **42** | SigmaHQ 20, Elastic detection rules 8, Exabeam content library 6 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=execution) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **41** | SigmaHQ 14, Splunk Security Content 7, Microsoft Sentinel 6 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **41** | Elastic detection rules 22, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Agent Threat Rules 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=execution) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **40** | SigmaHQ 14, Elastic detection rules 12, Splunk Security Content 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **39** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=execution) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **39** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic protections 10, Elastic detection rules 7 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=execution) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **38** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic detection rules 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=execution) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **37** | SigmaHQ 9, Agent Threat Rules 8, Elastic detection rules 8 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **37** | SigmaHQ 17, Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=execution) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **35** | Elastic detection rules 13, Elastic protections 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=execution) |
| `T1620` | Reflective Code Loading | **35** | Elastic protections 23, Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1620&tac=execution) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **34** | SigmaHQ 17, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.010` | Command Obfuscation | **33** | Elastic detection rules 22, SigmaHQ 9, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.010&tac=execution) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **33** | Panther analysis 8, Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 4 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=execution) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **33** | Elastic detection rules 19, Elastic protections 7, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=execution) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 6 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 8, Agent Threat Rules 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=execution) |
| `T1197` | BITS Jobs | **31** | SigmaHQ 16, Exabeam content library 6, Splunk Security Content 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1197&tac=execution) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **31** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Elastic protections 6, SigmaHQ 4 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=execution) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **31** | Elastic detection rules 14, Elastic protections 7, Splunk Security Content 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=execution) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **30** | Elastic detection rules 16, Elastic protections 6, Splunk Security Content 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **30** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 4 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **29** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=execution) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **28** | Exabeam content library 10, Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **27** | SigmaHQ 8, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 5, Splunk Security Content 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **27** | Elastic protections 11, Elastic detection rules 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=execution) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **26** | Elastic detection rules 17, Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=execution) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **25** | Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 5, Exabeam content library 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **25** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=execution) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **24** | SigmaHQ 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **24** | Elastic detection rules 8, Splunk Security Content 6, Elastic protections 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=execution) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **22** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=execution) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **22** | Elastic detection rules 13, Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=execution) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **22** | Elastic detection rules 12, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1204.003` | Malicious Image | **21** | Splunk Security Content 10, Exabeam content library 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Wazuh ruleset 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=execution) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **21** | SigmaHQ 7, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **21** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=execution) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **21** | Elastic detection rules 18, benscha KQL advanced hunting 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=execution) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **20** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=execution) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **20** | SigmaHQ 11, Exabeam content library 4, Splunk Security Content 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=execution) |
| `T1651` | Cloud Administration Command | **20** | Elastic detection rules 15, Panther analysis 2, Elastic hunting queries 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1651&tac=execution) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **19** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Elastic detection rules 6, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=execution) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=execution) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=execution) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **18** | Anvilogic Forge armory 7, SigmaHQ 5, Splunk Security Content 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, AI DFIR toolkit 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=execution) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **17** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=execution) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **17** | Elastic detection rules 6, Exabeam content library 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=execution) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=execution) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **16** | SigmaHQ 7, Elastic protections 7, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **16** | Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **16** | Elastic detection rules 7, Exabeam content library 5, Elastic protections 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **15** | SigmaHQ 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=execution) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **15** | Elastic detection rules 7, Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **15** | SigmaHQ 8, Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **15** | Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 6, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=execution) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **15** | Elastic protections 7, Elastic detection rules 6, Agent Threat Rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.003` | CMSTP | **15** | Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **15** | Elastic protections 7, SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=execution) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **15** | Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **14** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.009` | Proc Memory | **14** | Elastic protections 13, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.009&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **14** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=execution) |
| `T1204.004` | Malicious Copy and Paste | **14** | SigmaHQ 6, Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **14** | Splunk Security Content 5, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=execution) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic protections 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **13** | Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic protections 4, Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=execution) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **13** | SigmaHQ 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=execution) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic protections 3, Splunk Security Content 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=execution) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=execution) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=execution) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **12** | SigmaHQ 5, Exabeam content library 4, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=execution) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **12** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=execution) |
| `T1648` | Serverless Execution | **12** | Elastic detection rules 10, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1648&tac=execution) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **11** | Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, MITRE CAR 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=execution) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **11** | Elastic hunting queries 5, Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **11** | SigmaHQ 5, MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.014` | MMC | **11** | Elastic protections 3, Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.014&tac=execution) |
| `T1220` | XSL Script Processing | **11** | Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1220&tac=execution) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=execution) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **10** | SigmaHQ 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **10** | SigmaHQ 3, Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=execution) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=execution) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.003` | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Exabeam content library 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=execution) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.012` | Hypervisor CLI | **9** | SigmaHQ 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.012&tac=execution) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **9** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Exabeam content library 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **9** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic hunting queries 4, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1548.001` | Setuid and Setgid | **9** | Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=execution) |
| `T1553.005` | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass | **9** | Splunk Security Content 4, SigmaHQ 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **9** | Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.004` | Masquerade Task or Service | **8** | SigmaHQ 3, Exabeam content library 2, Elastic hunting queries 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **8** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=execution) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **8** | SigmaHQ 5, MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.001` | Compiled HTML File | **8** | Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **8** | SigmaHQ 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1039` | Data from Network Shared Drive | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1039&tac=execution) |
| `T1053.007` | Container Orchestration Job | **7** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.007&tac=execution) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=execution) |
| `T1529` | System Shutdown/Reboot | **7** | SigmaHQ 3, Splunk Security Content 3, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1529&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=execution) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=execution) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **7** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=execution) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Wazuh ruleset 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **6** | Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=execution) |
| `T1053.006` | Systemd Timers | **6** | Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **6** | Elastic detection rules 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=execution) |
| `T1216` | System Script Proxy Execution | **6** | Elastic protections 3, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1216&tac=execution) |
| `T1222.002` | Linux and Mac Permissions | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=execution) |
| `T1505.001` | SQL Stored Procedures | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=execution) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=execution) |
| `T0871` | T0871 | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0871&tac=execution) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, LOLRMM 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **5** | Splunk Security Content 3, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.002` | Right-to-Left Override | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **5** | Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=execution) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=execution) |
| `T1201` | Password Policy Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1201&tac=execution) |
| `T1219.002` | Remote Desktop Software | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=execution) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=execution) |
| `T1542` | Pre-OS Boot | **5** | Elastic detection rules 4, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=execution) |
| `T1569.001` | Launchctl | **5** | Elastic protections 2, SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=execution) |
| `T0863` | T0863 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0863&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.004` | Compile After Delivery | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.009` | Break Process Trees | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.009&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.001` | Dynamic-link Library Injection | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **4** | Elastic protections 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.008` | Odbcconf | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=execution) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=execution) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.016` | Installer Packages | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.016&tac=execution) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=execution) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=execution) |
| `T1559.002` | Dynamic Data Exchange | **4** | Exabeam content library 2, SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1559.003` | XPC Services | **4** | Elastic protections 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1568.002` | Domain Generation Algorithms | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1573` | Encrypted Channel | **4** | Elastic protections 2, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.010` | Services File Permissions Weakness | **4** | Exabeam content library 2, MITRE CAR 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.010&tac=execution) |
| `T1587.001` | Malware | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=execution) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=execution) |
| `T1659` | Content Injection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1659&tac=execution) |
| `T0858` | T0858 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0858&tac=execution) |
| `T0865` | T0865 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0865&tac=execution) |
| `T0873` | T0873 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0873&tac=execution) |
| `T0890` | T0890 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0890&tac=execution) |
| `T1003.004` | LSA Secrets | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1003.005` | Cached Domain Credentials | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=execution) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=execution) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.001` | Invalid Code Signature | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.008` | Masquerade File Type | **3** | Agent Threat Rules 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.003` | Thread Execution Hijacking | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1056` | Input Capture | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056&tac=execution) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=execution) |
| `T1102.001` | Dead Drop Resolver | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1114.002` | Remote Email Collection | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1132` | Data Encoding | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132&tac=execution) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=execution) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=execution) |
| `T1489` | Service Stop | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1489&tac=execution) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Exabeam content library 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=execution) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1543.004` | Launch Daemon | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1548.003` | Sudo and Sudo Caching | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=execution) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **3** | Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=execution) |
| `T1578.005` | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1587` | Develop Capabilities | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587&tac=execution) |
| `T1588.001` | Malware | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=execution) |
| `T0834` | T0834 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0834&tac=execution) |
| `T0843` | T0843 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0843&tac=execution) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **2** | Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=execution) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=execution) |
| `T1016.001` | Internet Connection Discovery | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.005` | Indicator Removal from Tools | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.011` | Fileless Storage | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.011&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.013` | Encrypted/Encoded File | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.013&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.015` | Compression | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.015&tac=execution) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.007` | Double File Extension | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.007&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.002` | Portable Executable Injection | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.004` | Asynchronous Procedure Call | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.012` | Process Hollowing | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.012&tac=execution) |
| `T1056.002` | GUI Input Capture | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.008` | Network Device CLI | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.013` | Container CLI/API | **2** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.013&tac=execution) |
| `T1070.003` | Clear Command History | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=execution) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1137` | Office Application Startup | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137&tac=execution) |
| `T1176` | Software Extensions | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176&tac=execution) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=execution) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.002` | Control Panel | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1437` | T1437 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1437&tac=execution) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=execution) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=execution) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1499.004` | Application or System Exploitation | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.015` | Component Object Model Hijacking | **2** | Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.015&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.018` | Python Startup Hooks | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.018&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.004` | Winlogon Helper DLL | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.013` | XDG Autostart Entries | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.013&tac=execution) |
| `T1548.004` | Elevated Execution with Prompt | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1555.004` | Windows Credential Manager | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **2** | Wazuh ruleset 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=execution) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.005` | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.012` | COR_PROFILER | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.012&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.014` | AppDomainManager | **2** | signature-base YARA 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.014&tac=execution) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=execution) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=execution) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=execution) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=execution) |
| `T1692.001` | T1692.001 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1692.001&tac=execution) |
| `T0816` | T0816 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0816&tac=execution) |
| `T0819` | T0819 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0819&tac=execution) |
| `T0836` | T0836 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0836&tac=execution) |
| `T0845` | T0845 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0845&tac=execution) |
| `T0859` | T0859 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0859&tac=execution) |
| `T0862` | T0862 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0862&tac=execution) |
| `T0886` | T0886 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0886&tac=execution) |
| `T0889` | T0889 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0889&tac=execution) |
| `T1003.003` | NTDS | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1006` | Direct Volume Access | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1006&tac=execution) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.001` | Binary Padding | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1027.006` | HTML Smuggling | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1036.006` | Space after Filename | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.008` | Ptrace System Calls | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1055.013` | Process Doppelgänging | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.013&tac=execution) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1059.010` | AutoHotKey & AutoIT | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.010&tac=execution) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1078.001` | Default Accounts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1087.003` | Email Account | **1** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1098.002` | Additional Email Delegate Permissions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1110.002` | Password Cracking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=execution) |
| `T1120` | Peripheral Device Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1120&tac=execution) |
| `T1123` | Audio Capture | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1123&tac=execution) |
| `T1132.001` | Standard Encoding | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1134.001` | Token Impersonation/Theft | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1137.002` | Office Test | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1137.006` | Add-ins | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1176.002` | IDE Extensions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1200` | Hardware Additions | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1200&tac=execution) |
| `T1204.005` | Malicious Library | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1213.002` | Sharepoint | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1216.001` | PubPrn | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1216.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=execution) |
| `T1218.012` | Verclsid | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.012&tac=execution) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=execution) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=execution) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=execution) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=execution) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=execution) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=execution) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=execution) |
| `T1456` | T1456 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1456&tac=execution) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=execution) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=execution) |
| `T1496.001` | Compute Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1497` | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497&tac=execution) |
| `T1497.003` | Time Based Checks | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=execution) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=execution) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=execution) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=execution) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=execution) |
| `T1525` | Implant Internal Image | **1** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1525&tac=execution) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=execution) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=execution) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=execution) |
| `T1542.003` | Bootkit | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1543.005` | Container Service | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.005&tac=execution) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.002` | Screensaver | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.011` | Application Shimming | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.011&tac=execution) |
| `T1546.014` | Emond | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.014&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.008` | LSASS Driver | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=execution) |
| `T1547.015` | Login Items | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.015&tac=execution) |
| `T1548.006` | TCC Manipulation | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1553.001` | Gatekeeper Bypass | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1556.003` | Pluggable Authentication Modules | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1557.003` | DHCP Spoofing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.003&tac=execution) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=execution) |
| `T1563.001` | SSH Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1564.004` | NTFS File Attributes | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1564.006` | Run Virtual Instance | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=execution) |
| `T1578.002` | Create Cloud Instance | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.002&tac=execution) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=execution) |
| `T1583.008` | Malvertising | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.008&tac=execution) |
| `T1584` | Compromise Infrastructure | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584&tac=execution) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=execution) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=execution) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=execution) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=execution) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=execution) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=execution) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=execution) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=execution) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=execution) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=execution) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=execution) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=execution) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=execution) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=execution) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=execution) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=execution) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=execution) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=execution) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=execution) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=execution) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=execution) |
| `T1685.006` | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.006&tac=execution) |
| `T1688` | Safe Mode Boot | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1688&tac=execution) |
| `T1689` | Downgrade Attack | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1689&tac=execution) |
| `T1690` | Prevent Command History Logging | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1690&tac=execution) |
| `T1693.001` | T1693.001 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1693.001&tac=execution) |
| - | No technique tagged | **342** | SigmaHQ 144, Microsoft Sentinel 121, Microsoft Defender hunting 67 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=execution) |


---

## Persistence detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/persistence/

4,343 detections in the library are tagged Persistence, across 444 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 4,343](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=persistence).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **689** | Elastic detection rules 193, Microsoft Sentinel 171, Anvilogic Forge armory 66 and 18 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=persistence) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **677** | Exabeam content library 182, Microsoft Sentinel 106, Wazuh ruleset 84 and 16 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=persistence) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **282** | Microsoft Sentinel 56, Elastic detection rules 41, SigmaHQ 37 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **245** | SigmaHQ 97, Splunk Security Content 79, Elastic protections 21 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=persistence) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **181** | SigmaHQ 47, Exabeam content library 35, Splunk Security Content 20 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **171** | Elastic detection rules 62, Microsoft Sentinel 45, Elastic protections 25 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **169** | SigmaHQ 39, Anvilogic Forge armory 29, Elastic protections 26 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **167** | Elastic detection rules 69, Elastic protections 26, Microsoft Sentinel 26 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=persistence) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **162** | SigmaHQ 51, Splunk Security Content 25, Exabeam content library 16 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **158** | Elastic detection rules 80, Elastic protections 24, Microsoft Sentinel 10 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **153** | Elastic detection rules 50, Elastic protections 42, Microsoft Sentinel 25 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=persistence) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **134** | Splunk Security Content 31, Exabeam content library 26, Wazuh ruleset 23 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=persistence) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **132** | SigmaHQ 35, Elastic detection rules 23, Splunk Security Content 17 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **131** | Elastic detection rules 37, Microsoft Sentinel 34, Splunk Security Content 20 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **129** | Elastic detection rules 29, Microsoft Sentinel 24, Elastic protections 22 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=persistence) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **129** | Elastic detection rules 30, Microsoft Sentinel 29, Panther analysis 18 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **118** | Elastic detection rules 37, Microsoft Sentinel 23, Splunk Security Content 18 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=persistence) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **112** | Splunk Security Content 43, Elastic detection rules 23, SigmaHQ 18 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=persistence) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **109** | Emerging Threats Open 36, Elastic detection rules 30, Microsoft Sentinel 25 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **104** | SigmaHQ 92, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **95** | Exabeam content library 39, Microsoft Sentinel 23, Elastic detection rules 19 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=persistence) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **88** | Microsoft Sentinel 35, Elastic detection rules 18, Splunk Security Content 11 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=persistence) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **83** | Exabeam content library 41, Elastic detection rules 11, Splunk Security Content 10 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **80** | Elastic detection rules 25, Microsoft Sentinel 17, Panther analysis 10 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **78** | Elastic detection rules 47, Elastic protections 10, SigmaHQ 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=persistence) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **77** | Splunk Security Content 20, Microsoft Sentinel 15, Elastic detection rules 11 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **74** | SigmaHQ 18, Elastic detection rules 16, Splunk Security Content 13 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **67** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Elastic protections 18, Elastic detection rules 16 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **65** | Elastic detection rules 40, Elastic protections 17, Elastic hunting queries 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **64** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Elastic detection rules 19, SigmaHQ 8 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **60** | SigmaHQ 16, Elastic detection rules 13, Exabeam content library 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **53** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Elastic protections 10, Elastic detection rules 9 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **51** | Splunk Security Content 12, Elastic detection rules 8, Microsoft Sentinel 7 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **49** | Elastic detection rules 16, Splunk Security Content 9, Elastic protections 7 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **48** | Elastic detection rules 26, Elastic protections 9, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=persistence) |
| `T1197` | BITS Jobs | **47** | SigmaHQ 16, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Exabeam content library 6 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1197&tac=persistence) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **44** | Elastic detection rules 15, SigmaHQ 8, Splunk Security Content 5 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=persistence) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **43** | SigmaHQ 14, Wazuh ruleset 8, Microsoft Sentinel 7 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=persistence) |
| `T1176` | Software Extensions | **42** | Wazuh ruleset 13, Elastic detection rules 9, Snort 3 community rules 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.003` | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | **40** | SigmaHQ 12, Exabeam content library 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **39** | Exabeam content library 10, Splunk Security Content 7, SigmaHQ 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **38** | Elastic detection rules 21, Anvilogic Forge armory 7, Splunk Security Content 7 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **37** | Anvilogic Forge armory 10, Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **34** | Microsoft Sentinel 21, Elastic detection rules 8, Splunk Security Content 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **34** | SigmaHQ 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Elastic detection rules 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=persistence) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **34** | Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.015` | Component Object Model Hijacking | **34** | Anvilogic Forge armory 10, SigmaHQ 9, Elastic protections 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.015&tac=persistence) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=persistence) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 6 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=persistence) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **31** | Elastic detection rules 10, Microsoft Sentinel 7, Exabeam content library 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=persistence) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **31** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, SigmaHQ 6, Splunk Security Content 5 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **31** | SigmaHQ 10, Elastic detection rules 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1098.006` | Additional Container Cluster Roles | **30** | Elastic detection rules 30 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **27** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, SigmaHQ 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=persistence) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **27** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=persistence) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **27** | Elastic detection rules 11, Panther analysis 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=persistence) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **26** | Exabeam content library 7, Splunk Security Content 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, SigmaHQ 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=persistence) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **26** | Elastic detection rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Splunk Security Content 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1137` | Office Application Startup | **26** | SigmaHQ 9, Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic protections 6 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137&tac=persistence) |
| `T1505.004` | IIS Components | **26** | Splunk Security Content 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 8, Panther analysis 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **26** | Elastic detection rules 11, Elastic hunting queries 4, Elastic protections 3 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **24** | Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 4, Panther analysis 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=persistence) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **24** | Elastic detection rules 17, SigmaHQ 3, Panther analysis 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **23** | Elastic protections 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Elastic detection rules 6 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=persistence) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **22** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Elastic detection rules 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=persistence) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **22** | SigmaHQ 8, Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1505.001` | SQL Stored Procedures | **22** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Splunk Security Content 6, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **21** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, SigmaHQ 6, MITRE CAR 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **21** | Elastic detection rules 9, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Panther analysis 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **21** | Elastic detection rules 13, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **20** | Elastic detection rules 11, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **19** | Elastic detection rules 14, Elastic protections 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=persistence) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=persistence) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **19** | Agent Threat Rules 6, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **19** | Elastic protections 6, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.016` | Installer Packages | **19** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 6, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.016&tac=persistence) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **19** | Elastic protections 9, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **18** | Elastic detection rules 10, MITRE CAR 3, Elastic protections 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **18** | SigmaHQ 11, Elastic detection rules 4, MITRE CAR 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=persistence) |
| `T1586.003` | Cloud Accounts | **18** | Splunk Security Content 18 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **17** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **17** | Elastic detection rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic protections 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **17** | Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **17** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=persistence) |
| `T1078.001` | Default Accounts | **16** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.011` | Application Shimming | **16** | SigmaHQ 6, Wazuh ruleset 3, Splunk Security Content 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.011&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **16** | SigmaHQ 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=persistence) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **15** | Elastic detection rules 10, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1543.004` | Launch Daemon | **15** | Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1621` | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | **15** | Splunk Security Content 12, SigmaHQ 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1621&tac=persistence) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **14** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **14** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=persistence) |
| `T1098.002` | Additional Email Delegate Permissions | **14** | Splunk Security Content 6, Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=persistence) |
| `T1542` | Pre-OS Boot | **14** | Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic hunting queries 3, Splunk Security Content 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.012` | Image File Execution Options Injection | **14** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.012&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **14** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **13** | Elastic protections 4, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=persistence) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **13** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Wazuh ruleset 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=persistence) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=persistence) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **13** | Wazuh ruleset 4, Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.002` | Screensaver | **13** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 3, cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **13** | SigmaHQ 6, Wazuh ruleset 3, Elastic protections 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556.009` | Conditional Access Policies | **13** | Panther analysis 8, Elastic detection rules 4, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 12 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.004` | Winlogon Helper DLL | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, SigmaHQ 4, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1548.001` | Setuid and Setgid | **12** | Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **12** | Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **12** | Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **12** | Elastic detection rules 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, CTID cloud analytics 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=persistence) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **12** | Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 5, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=persistence) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=persistence) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 1, Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=persistence) |
| `T1176.001` | Browser Extensions | **11** | Elastic protections 5, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 11 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=persistence) |
| `T1525` | Implant Internal Image | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Panther analysis 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1525&tac=persistence) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **11** | Elastic detection rules 5, Exabeam content library 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=persistence) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **11** | Elastic detection rules 4, benscha KQL advanced hunting 3, Panther analysis 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=persistence) |
| `T1037.001` | Logon Script (Windows) | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 3, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **10** | Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.001` | Change Default File Association | **10** | SigmaHQ 5, Exabeam content library 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=persistence) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **10** | SigmaHQ 8, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **9** | SigmaHQ 3, Wazuh ruleset 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=persistence) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1098.007` | Additional Local or Domain Groups | **9** | Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=persistence) |
| `T1137.006` | Add-ins | **9** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **9** | Google Cloud security analytics 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **9** | SigmaHQ 4, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.012` | Print Processors | **9** | Splunk Security Content 7, Wazuh ruleset 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.012&tac=persistence) |
| `T1563.001` | SSH Hijacking | **9** | Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic protections 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=persistence) |
| `T1578.005` | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations | **9** | Elastic detection rules 8, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1053.007` | Container Orchestration Job | **8** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=persistence) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **8** | Exabeam content library 4, Elastic protections 2, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=persistence) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **8** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **8** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=persistence) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **8** | Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=persistence) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **7** | Wazuh ruleset 3, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=persistence) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **7** | Panther analysis 4, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=persistence) |
| `T1484.002` | Trust Modification | **7** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1505.002` | Transport Agent | **7** | SigmaHQ 3, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1542.003` | Bootkit | **7** | Splunk Security Content 3, Exabeam content library 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **7** | SigmaHQ 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1548.003` | Sudo and Sudo Caching | **7** | Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **7** | Exabeam content library 4, Wazuh ruleset 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **7** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2, AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **6** | Splunk Security Content 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1036.001` | Invalid Code Signature | **6** | Elastic detection rules 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **6** | SigmaHQ 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1053.006` | Systemd Timers | **6** | Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=persistence) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1090.003` | Multi-hop Proxy | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **6** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=persistence) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **6** | Panther analysis 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=persistence) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Google Cloud security analytics 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.009` | AppCert DLLs | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556.003` | Pluggable Authentication Modules | **6** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.010` | Services File Permissions Weakness | **6** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 5, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.010&tac=persistence) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **6** | Panther analysis 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=persistence) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **5** | SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **5** | MITRE CAR 3, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=persistence) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=persistence) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=persistence) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **5** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=persistence) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **5** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Panther analysis 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=persistence) |
| `T1542.001` | System Firmware | **5** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.010` | AppInit DLLs | **5** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.010&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.013` | XDG Autostart Entries | **5** | Elastic detection rules 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.013&tac=persistence) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556.007` | Hybrid Identity | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Okta customer detections 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **5** | Panther analysis 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=persistence) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **5** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=persistence) |
| `T0863` | T0863 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0863&tac=persistence) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=persistence) |
| `T1048.002` | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1071.002` | File Transfer Protocols | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=persistence) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **4** | Elastic hunting queries 3, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=persistence) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Okta customer detections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=persistence) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=persistence) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.013` | PowerShell Profile | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.013&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.014` | Emond | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.014&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.008` | LSASS Driver | **4** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **4** | Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=persistence) |
| `T1550.003` | Pass the Ticket | **4** | Exabeam content library 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=persistence) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=persistence) |
| `T1610` | Deploy Container | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1610&tac=persistence) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=persistence) |
| `T1659` | Content Injection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1659&tac=persistence) |
| `T0859` | T0859 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0859&tac=persistence) |
| `T0873` | T0873 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0873&tac=persistence) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Exabeam content library 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=persistence) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1036.004` | Masquerade Task or Service | **3** | SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1037.002` | Login Hook | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1037.005` | Startup Items | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1056` | Input Capture | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Snort 3 community rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056&tac=persistence) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **3** | Falco rules 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=persistence) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=persistence) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=persistence) |
| `T1137.002` | Office Test | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1137.005` | Outlook Rules | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1176.002` | IDE Extensions | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1185` | Browser Session Hijacking | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1185&tac=persistence) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **3** | SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=persistence) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1219.002` | Remote Desktop Software | **3** | SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=persistence) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=persistence) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **3** | Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=persistence) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **3** | Panther analysis 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.017` | Udev Rules | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.017&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.003` | Time Providers | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=persistence) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1569.001` | Launchctl | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1578.002` | Create Cloud Instance | **3** | Panther analysis 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=persistence) |
| `T1584` | Compromise Infrastructure | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584&tac=persistence) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **3** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=persistence) |
| `T1651` | Cloud Administration Command | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1651&tac=persistence) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=persistence) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=persistence) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=persistence) |
| `T1055.009` | Proc Memory | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=persistence) |
| `T1059.012` | Hypervisor CLI | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.012&tac=persistence) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=persistence) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1091` | Replication Through Removable Media | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1091&tac=persistence) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=persistence) |
| `T1114.002` | Remote Email Collection | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1132` | Data Encoding | **2** | Snort 3 community rules 1, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132&tac=persistence) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=persistence) |
| `T1137.001` | Office Template Macros | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1137.004` | Outlook Home Page | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1205` | Traffic Signaling | **2** | Emerging Threats Open 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1205&tac=persistence) |
| `T1205.001` | Port Knocking | **2** | Falco rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1205.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1222.002` | Linux and Mac Permissions | **2** | Falco rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=persistence) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=persistence) |
| `T1491.001` | Internal Defacement | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=persistence) |
| `T1535` | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1535&tac=persistence) |
| `T1543.005` | Container Service | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.018` | Python Startup Hooks | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.018&tac=persistence) |
| `T1547.015` | Login Items | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.015&tac=persistence) |
| `T1548.005` | Temporary Elevated Cloud Access | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1553.003` | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556.004` | Network Device Authentication | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=persistence) |
| `T1563.002` | RDP Hijacking | **2** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1564.004` | NTFS File Attributes | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1564.008` | Email Hiding Rules | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.005` | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.012` | COR_PROFILER | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.012&tac=persistence) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **2** | Elastic detection rules 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=persistence) |
| `T1584.001` | Domains | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=persistence) |
| `T1620` | Reflective Code Loading | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1620&tac=persistence) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=persistence) |
| `T1648` | Serverless Execution | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1648&tac=persistence) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1685.006` | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T0819` | T0819 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0819&tac=persistence) |
| `T0834` | T0834 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0834&tac=persistence) |
| `T0843` | T0843 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0843&tac=persistence) |
| `T0845` | T0845 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0845&tac=persistence) |
| `T0858` | T0858 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0858&tac=persistence) |
| `T0862` | T0862 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0862&tac=persistence) |
| `T0865` | T0865 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0865&tac=persistence) |
| `T0871` | T0871 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0871&tac=persistence) |
| `T0886` | T0886 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0886&tac=persistence) |
| `T0889` | T0889 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0889&tac=persistence) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **1** | Snort 3 community rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=persistence) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=persistence) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=persistence) |
| `T1027.010` | Command Obfuscation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.010&tac=persistence) |
| `T1036.008` | Masquerade File Type | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1036.010` | Masquerade Account Name | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.010&tac=persistence) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=persistence) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1070.008` | Clear Mailbox Data | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1070.009` | Clear Persistence | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.009&tac=persistence) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=persistence) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1114.003` | Email Forwarding Rule | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=persistence) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=persistence) |
| `T1134.001` | Token Impersonation/Theft | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1134.003` | Make and Impersonate Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1134.004` | Parent PID Spoofing | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1137.003` | Outlook Forms | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1200` | Hardware Additions | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1200&tac=persistence) |
| `T1201` | Password Policy Discovery | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1201&tac=persistence) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=persistence) |
| `T1204.005` | Malicious Library | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=persistence) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=persistence) |
| `T1213.002` | Sharepoint | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1216` | System Script Proxy Execution | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1216&tac=persistence) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.002` | Control Panel | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.003` | CMSTP | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1218.014` | MMC | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.014&tac=persistence) |
| `T1220` | XSL Script Processing | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1220&tac=persistence) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=persistence) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=persistence) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=persistence) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=persistence) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=persistence) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=persistence) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=persistence) |
| `T1456` | T1456 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1456&tac=persistence) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=persistence) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=persistence) |
| `T1495` | Firmware Corruption | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1495&tac=persistence) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1505.006` | vSphere Installation Bundles | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=persistence) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=persistence) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=persistence) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=persistence) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=persistence) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=persistence) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=persistence) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=persistence) |
| `T1546.005` | Trap | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=persistence) |
| `T1553.002` | Code Signing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1555.005` | Password Managers | **1** | Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1556.008` | Network Provider DLL | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.008&tac=persistence) |
| `T1557.003` | DHCP Spoofing | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.003&tac=persistence) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1558.004` | AS-REP Roasting | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=persistence) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=persistence) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=persistence) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=persistence) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=persistence) |
| `T1589.001` | Credentials | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1599` | Network Boundary Bridging | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599&tac=persistence) |
| `T1601` | Modify System Image | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601&tac=persistence) |
| `T1601.001` | Patch System Image | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=persistence) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=persistence) |
| `T1622` | Debugger Evasion | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1622&tac=persistence) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=persistence) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=persistence) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=persistence) |
| `T1626` | T1626 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1626&tac=persistence) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=persistence) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=persistence) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=persistence) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=persistence) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=persistence) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=persistence) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=persistence) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=persistence) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=persistence) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=persistence) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=persistence) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=persistence) |
| `T1645` | T1645 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1645&tac=persistence) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=persistence) |
| `T1653` | Power Settings | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1653&tac=persistence) |
| `T1655` | T1655 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1655&tac=persistence) |
| `T1684.001` | Impersonation | **1** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1684.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1685.005` | Clear Windows Event Logs | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.005&tac=persistence) |
| `T1688` | Safe Mode Boot | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1688&tac=persistence) |
| `T1689` | Downgrade Attack | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1689&tac=persistence) |
| `T1692.001` | T1692.001 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1692.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1693.001` | T1693.001 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1693.001&tac=persistence) |
| `T1693.002` | T1693.002 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1693.002&tac=persistence) |
| - | No technique tagged | **207** | SigmaHQ 84, Microsoft Sentinel 72, Microsoft Defender hunting 27 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=persistence) |


---

## Privilege Escalation detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/privilege-escalation/

3,714 detections in the library are tagged Privilege Escalation, across 394 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 3,714](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=privilege-escalation).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **686** | Exabeam content library 182, Microsoft Sentinel 118, Wazuh ruleset 84 and 17 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **409** | Elastic detection rules 116, Microsoft Sentinel 81, Panther analysis 50 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **280** | Elastic detection rules 60, Elastic protections 58, Splunk Security Content 48 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **264** | Microsoft Sentinel 49, SigmaHQ 37, Exabeam content library 29 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **237** | Elastic detection rules 70, Microsoft Sentinel 61, Elastic protections 43 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **194** | Wazuh ruleset 107, Exabeam content library 41, Microsoft Sentinel 15 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **168** | SigmaHQ 56, Anvilogic Forge armory 31, Elastic protections 30 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **157** | Wazuh ruleset 38, SigmaHQ 37, Splunk Security Content 32 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **142** | SigmaHQ 47, Exabeam content library 35, Splunk Security Content 20 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **133** | Microsoft Sentinel 47, Elastic detection rules 35, Splunk Security Content 20 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **129** | SigmaHQ 51, Splunk Security Content 25, Exabeam content library 16 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **121** | SigmaHQ 92, Elastic protections 15, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **104** | Elastic detection rules 51, Panther analysis 10, benscha KQL advanced hunting 8 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **102** | SigmaHQ 39, Anvilogic Forge armory 17, Exabeam content library 14 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **100** | Microsoft Sentinel 33, Elastic detection rules 25, Agent Threat Rules 12 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **80** | Elastic detection rules 13, SigmaHQ 12, Elastic protections 9 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **78** | Elastic detection rules 34, Elastic protections 22, SigmaHQ 8 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **76** | Exabeam content library 41, Splunk Security Content 10, SigmaHQ 6 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **73** | Elastic detection rules 27, Elastic protections 10, Splunk Security Content 10 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **73** | Elastic detection rules 26, SigmaHQ 10, Agent Threat Rules 7 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1548.003` | Sudo and Sudo Caching | **72** | Splunk Security Content 35, Elastic detection rules 16, Wazuh ruleset 9 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **69** | Exabeam content library 39, Microsoft Sentinel 15, Wazuh ruleset 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **66** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic detection rules 16, SigmaHQ 7 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **60** | Elastic detection rules 21, Elastic protections 15, Microsoft Sentinel 12 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1548.001` | Setuid and Setgid | **51** | Elastic detection rules 23, Elastic protections 9, Splunk Security Content 7 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **51** | Microsoft Sentinel 22, Splunk Security Content 7, SigmaHQ 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **50** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, SigmaHQ 8, Wazuh ruleset 7 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **44** | Exabeam content library 10, Elastic detection rules 10, Splunk Security Content 7 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **44** | Panther analysis 10, Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 9 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **40** | Splunk Security Content 9, Wazuh ruleset 8, SigmaHQ 6 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **39** | SigmaHQ 11, MITRE CAR 6, Exabeam content library 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **38** | SigmaHQ 15, Splunk Security Content 8, Exabeam content library 6 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1134.001` | Token Impersonation/Theft | **35** | SigmaHQ 9, Elastic protections 8, Elastic detection rules 7 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **34** | Elastic protections 12, SigmaHQ 7, Elastic detection rules 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **33** | Elastic detection rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Exabeam content library 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **33** | SigmaHQ 14, Panther analysis 5, Google Cloud security analytics 3 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **33** | Elastic detection rules 11, Splunk Security Content 9, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 3 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098.006` | Additional Container Cluster Roles | **32** | Elastic detection rules 32 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **31** | Elastic detection rules 16, Elastic protections 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **31** | Exabeam content library 14, Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 6 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **31** | Elastic detection rules 11, Exabeam content library 4, Splunk Security Content 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **31** | Microsoft Sentinel 15, SigmaHQ 6, Elastic detection rules 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.003` | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | **31** | SigmaHQ 12, Exabeam content library 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1610` | Deploy Container | **31** | Elastic detection rules 25, Panther analysis 3, benscha KQL advanced hunting 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1610&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.001` | Dynamic-link Library Injection | **28** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, SigmaHQ 8, Splunk Security Content 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **28** | Exabeam content library 7, Splunk Security Content 6, Elastic detection rules 6 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1484.002` | Trust Modification | **26** | Google Cloud security analytics 9, Elastic detection rules 6, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **26** | Elastic detection rules 12, Panther analysis 9, SigmaHQ 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **25** | Elastic detection rules 13, Splunk Security Content 3, Exabeam content library 2 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **25** | Anvilogic Forge armory 8, SigmaHQ 6, Exabeam content library 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **25** | Microsoft Sentinel 19, Panther analysis 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **24** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, SigmaHQ 7, Panther analysis 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **23** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **23** | SigmaHQ 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Elastic detection rules 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **23** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **22** | Anvilogic Forge armory 8, SigmaHQ 5, Exabeam content library 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **22** | Elastic detection rules 11, Panther analysis 4, SigmaHQ 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, SigmaHQ 2, Wazuh ruleset 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.015` | Component Object Model Hijacking | **21** | SigmaHQ 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.015&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **20** | SigmaHQ 8, Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **19** | Anvilogic Forge armory 8, SigmaHQ 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **19** | SigmaHQ 10, Elastic detection rules 3, MITRE CAR 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **18** | Splunk Security Content 7, Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1078.001` | Default Accounts | **18** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **18** | Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic hunting queries 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **18** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 7, SigmaHQ 6, MITRE CAR 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **17** | Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **17** | Elastic detection rules 13, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **16** | Agent Threat Rules 6, SigmaHQ 3, Panther analysis 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **16** | SigmaHQ 11, MITRE CAR 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **15** | Elastic detection rules 12, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.011` | Application Shimming | **15** | SigmaHQ 6, Wazuh ruleset 3, Splunk Security Content 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.011&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **14** | Splunk Security Content 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **14** | Elastic detection rules 6, Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1586.003` | Cloud Accounts | **14** | Splunk Security Content 14 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098.002` | Additional Email Delegate Permissions | **13** | Splunk Security Content 6, Exabeam content library 4, Wazuh ruleset 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **13** | Elastic detection rules 5, Splunk Security Content 4, Agent Threat Rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **12** | Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **12** | Elastic detection rules 6, Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, SigmaHQ 1, Exabeam content library 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1621` | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | **12** | Splunk Security Content 10, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1621&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **11** | SigmaHQ 6, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **11** | Elastic detection rules 7, Agent Threat Rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.004` | Winlogon Helper DLL | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, SigmaHQ 4, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **11** | SigmaHQ 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **11** | Elastic detection rules 8, benscha KQL advanced hunting 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.012` | Process Hollowing | **10** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.012&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **10** | SigmaHQ 5, Microsoft Sentinel 4, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 10 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **10** | Wazuh ruleset 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **10** | Splunk Security Content 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **10** | Exabeam content library 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1037.001` | Logon Script (Windows) | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 3, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **9** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Agent Threat Rules 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1098.007` | Additional Local or Domain Groups | **9** | Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **9** | Elastic detection rules 6, Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **9** | Splunk Security Content 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.001` | Change Default File Association | **9** | SigmaHQ 5, Exabeam content library 2, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **9** | SigmaHQ 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.012` | Print Processors | **9** | Splunk Security Content 7, Wazuh ruleset 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.012&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 2, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1134.003` | Make and Impersonate Token | **8** | SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1222.002` | Linux and Mac Permissions | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.016` | Installer Packages | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.016&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1548.005` | Temporary Elevated Cloud Access | **8** | Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **8** | Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **8** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **7** | Elastic protections 3, Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1134.004` | Parent PID Spoofing | **7** | Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **7** | Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.002` | Screensaver | **7** | SigmaHQ 4, MITRE CAR 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.012` | Image File Execution Options Injection | **7** | SigmaHQ 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.012&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **7** | Exabeam content library 4, Wazuh ruleset 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **7** | SigmaHQ 6, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **7** | Elastic detection rules 4, benscha KQL advanced hunting 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **6** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **6** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **6** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 2, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1053.007` | Container Orchestration Job | **6** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **6** | Splunk Security Content 3, Exabeam content library 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **6** | Splunk Security Content 4, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.003` | CMSTP | **6** | Exabeam content library 4, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **6** | Panther analysis 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **6** | Elastic detection rules 3, MITRE CAR 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **6** | Elastic detection rules 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T0859` | T0859 | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0859&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **5** | MITRE CAR 3, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **5** | Wazuh ruleset 3, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **5** | Splunk Security Content 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1053.006` | Systemd Timers | **5** | Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **5** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **5** | Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **5** | Panther analysis 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1543.004` | Launch Daemon | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.009` | AppCert DLLs | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.009&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **5** | SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T0890` | T0890 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0890&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **4** | SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036.004` | Masquerade Task or Service | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.003` | Thread Execution Hijacking | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, Wazuh ruleset 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.008` | Ptrace System Calls | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Falco rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.008&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **4** | SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **4** | Elastic hunting queries 3, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1137` | Office Application Startup | **4** | SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **4** | Panther analysis 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.014` | MMC | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.014&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **4** | Google Cloud security analytics 2, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **4** | SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.013` | PowerShell Profile | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.013&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1548.006` | TCC Manipulation | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1550.003` | Pass the Ticket | **4** | Exabeam content library 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **4** | Panther analysis 2, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1659` | Content Injection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1659&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1006` | Direct Volume Access | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Exabeam content library 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.009` | Proc Memory | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.009&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **3** | Panther analysis 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **3** | SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.010` | AppInit DLLs | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.010&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.014` | Emond | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.014&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.003` | Time Providers | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1548.004` | Elevated Execution with Prompt | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **3** | CTID cloud analytics 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T0863` | T0863 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0863&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036.001` | Invalid Code Signature | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1037.005` | Startup Items | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.002` | Portable Executable Injection | **2** | Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1090.003` | Multi-hop Proxy | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1114.002` | Remote Email Collection | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.013` | Mavinject | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.013&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1535` | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1535&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **2** | Panther analysis 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1543.005` | Container Service | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.017` | Udev Rules | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.017&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.018` | Python Startup Hooks | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.018&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.008` | LSASS Driver | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.008&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.013` | XDG Autostart Entries | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.013&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1556.007` | Hybrid Identity | **2** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1563.001` | SSH Hijacking | **2** | Elastic detection rules 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.005` | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.010` | Services File Permissions Weakness | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.010&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.012` | COR_PROFILER | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.012&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.013` | KernelCallbackTable | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.013&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1606` | Forge Web Credentials | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1626` | T1626 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1626&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T0819` | T0819 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0819&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T0866` | T0866 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0866&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T0871` | T0871 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0871&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1027.004` | Compile After Delivery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1027.010` | Command Obfuscation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.010&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036.008` | Masquerade File Type | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.008&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036.009` | Break Process Trees | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.009&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1036.010` | Masquerade Account Name | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.010&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1037.002` | Login Hook | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.004` | Asynchronous Procedure Call | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.011` | Extra Window Memory Injection | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.011&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1055.013` | Process Doppelgänging | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.013&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1056` | Input Capture | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1059.012` | Hypervisor CLI | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.012&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1176` | Software Extensions | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1201` | Password Policy Discovery | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1201&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1207` | Rogue Domain Controller | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1207&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.002` | Control Panel | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1404` | T1404 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1404&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1499.004` | Application or System Exploitation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1505.001` | SQL Stored Procedures | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1525` | Implant Internal Image | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1525&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1542` | Pre-OS Boot | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1546.005` | Trap | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1547.015` | Login Items | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.015&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1553.002` | Code Signing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1555.005` | Password Managers | **1** | Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1557.003` | DHCP Spoofing | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1558.004` | AS-REP Roasting | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1563.002` | RDP Hijacking | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1569.001` | Launchctl | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **1** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1578.002` | Create Cloud Instance | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.002&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1587` | Develop Capabilities | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1588.001` | Malware | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1589.001` | Credentials | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1599` | Network Boundary Bridging | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1601` | Modify System Image | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1601.001` | Patch System Image | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1620` | Reflective Code Loading | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1620&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1622` | Debugger Evasion | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1622&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1685.005` | Clear Windows Event Logs | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.005&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| `T1690` | Prevent Command History Logging | **1** | Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1690&tac=privilege-escalation) |
| - | No technique tagged | **122** | Microsoft Sentinel 45, SigmaHQ 41, Microsoft Defender hunting 25 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=privilege-escalation) |


---

## Stealth detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/stealth/

4,541 detections in the library are tagged Stealth, across 451 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 4,541](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=stealth).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **604** | Exabeam content library 182, Wazuh ruleset 84, Elastic detection rules 70 and 15 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **486** | SigmaHQ 158, Elastic protections 117, Elastic detection rules 87 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **379** | SigmaHQ 94, Emerging Threats Open 59, Elastic detection rules 45 and 15 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **368** | Elastic protections 182, Wazuh ruleset 38, SigmaHQ 37 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **352** | Elastic detection rules 132, Elastic protections 110, Anvilogic Forge armory 37 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **292** | Elastic detection rules 69, Elastic protections 48, SigmaHQ 40 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=stealth) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **249** | Elastic detection rules 53, SigmaHQ 37, Exabeam content library 29 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **242** | SigmaHQ 92, Elastic detection rules 56, Elastic protections 26 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **222** | Anvilogic Forge armory 54, SigmaHQ 43, Elastic detection rules 29 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **178** | SigmaHQ 93, Elastic protections 35, Splunk Security Content 19 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **175** | Microsoft Sentinel 48, Elastic detection rules 40, SigmaHQ 20 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **146** | Elastic protections 60, Elastic detection rules 59, SigmaHQ 8 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=stealth) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **128** | Elastic detection rules 37, Elastic protections 22, SigmaHQ 18 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **118** | Elastic detection rules 39, Elastic protections 34, Anvilogic Forge armory 18 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **117** | Elastic detection rules 60, Elastic protections 48, SigmaHQ 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **117** | Anvilogic Forge armory 28, SigmaHQ 27, Elastic detection rules 25 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **110** | Elastic detection rules 28, Elastic protections 24, Exabeam content library 21 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **99** | Elastic protections 20, SigmaHQ 19, Exabeam content library 19 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **94** | Elastic detection rules 29, Anvilogic Forge armory 17, Exabeam content library 15 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **92** | Wazuh ruleset 20, SigmaHQ 15, Splunk Security Content 15 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **92** | SigmaHQ 41, Anvilogic Forge armory 15, Elastic detection rules 12 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **85** | Anvilogic Forge armory 29, Elastic protections 18, Elastic detection rules 16 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **83** | Elastic detection rules 29, Microsoft Sentinel 27, Elastic protections 18 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **82** | Elastic detection rules 27, SigmaHQ 24, Elastic protections 7 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **79** | SigmaHQ 27, Micah Babinski [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 12, Elastic detection rules 11 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **78** | Elastic detection rules 26, Elastic protections 20, Microsoft Sentinel 20 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=stealth) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **75** | Elastic detection rules 32, Elastic protections 18, Microsoft Sentinel 12 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=stealth) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **74** | Exabeam content library 39, Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 6 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **74** | Elastic protections 40, Elastic detection rules 15, SigmaHQ 8 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **74** | Elastic detection rules 18, Anvilogic Forge armory 13, Microsoft Sentinel 12 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **73** | Elastic protections 32, Elastic detection rules 11, SigmaHQ 10 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **68** | SigmaHQ 20, Anvilogic Forge armory 17, Elastic detection rules 16 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=stealth) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **67** | Elastic detection rules 26, Elastic protections 17, SigmaHQ 8 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **67** | Elastic detection rules 41, Microsoft Sentinel 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=stealth) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **64** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Elastic detection rules 15, SigmaHQ 10 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=stealth) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **60** | Elastic detection rules 23, Snort 3 community rules 18, Elastic protections 7 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=stealth) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **57** | Elastic detection rules 22, Microsoft Sentinel 14, Elastic protections 11 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **55** | Elastic detection rules 17, Elastic protections 11, SigmaHQ 9 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **53** | Elastic detection rules 32, Microsoft Sentinel 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **51** | Elastic detection rules 17, Splunk Security Content 12, Microsoft Sentinel 7 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=stealth) |
| `T1620` | Reflective Code Loading | **49** | Elastic protections 31, Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1620&tac=stealth) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **46** | Elastic protections 19, Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 10 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1197` | BITS Jobs | **45** | SigmaHQ 16, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Exabeam content library 6 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1197&tac=stealth) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **45** | Splunk Security Content 14, Microsoft Sentinel 12, Wazuh ruleset 7 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=stealth) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **45** | Elastic detection rules 29, Elastic protections 6, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **45** | Elastic detection rules 22, Elastic protections 12, Microsoft Sentinel 7 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564.004` | NTFS File Attributes | **45** | SigmaHQ 23, Splunk Security Content 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.010` | Command Obfuscation | **43** | Elastic detection rules 23, SigmaHQ 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.010&tac=stealth) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **42** | Elastic protections 11, Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Elastic detection rules 9 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **41** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Agent Threat Rules 6, Elastic detection rules 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=stealth) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **37** | Exabeam content library 10, Splunk Security Content 7, SigmaHQ 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **37** | Elastic protections 12, Anvilogic Forge armory 10, Microsoft Sentinel 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=stealth) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **36** | Elastic detection rules 13, Exabeam content library 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.001` | Compiled HTML File | **35** | Anvilogic Forge armory 13, SigmaHQ 6, Elastic protections 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **34** | Elastic protections 22, Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **34** | Exabeam content library 13, Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 6 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **33** | Elastic detection rules 15, Elastic protections 10, Elastic hunting queries 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **33** | SigmaHQ 10, Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic protections 6 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.003` | CMSTP | **33** | Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.004` | Masquerade Task or Service | **32** | Anvilogic Forge armory 15, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic hunting queries 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.005` | Indicator Removal from Tools | **31** | Exabeam content library 24, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **31** | Anvilogic Forge armory 8, SigmaHQ 7, Microsoft Sentinel 7 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **30** | Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 6 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=stealth) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **30** | SigmaHQ 13, Panther analysis 5, Google Cloud security analytics 3 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=stealth) |
| `T1070.003` | Clear Command History | **29** | SigmaHQ 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Elastic protections 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **29** | Exabeam content library 7, Splunk Security Content 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **29** | Elastic detection rules 22, Elastic protections 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **28** | Elastic detection rules 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **28** | Elastic detection rules 7, Splunk Security Content 6, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.014` | MMC | **28** | Anvilogic Forge armory 13, Splunk Security Content 6, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.014&tac=stealth) |
| `T1220` | XSL Script Processing | **28** | Elastic protections 6, Snort 3 community rules 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1220&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **27** | Elastic detection rules 14, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Splunk Security Content 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **27** | SigmaHQ 13, Exabeam content library 6, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **27** | Exabeam content library 14, SigmaHQ 7, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **27** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **26** | Elastic detection rules 14, Splunk Security Content 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.004` | Compile After Delivery | **25** | SigmaHQ 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Exabeam content library 6 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **25** | Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 7, Exabeam content library 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=stealth) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **25** | Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic protections 5, SigmaHQ 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=stealth) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **25** | Elastic detection rules 13, Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.001` | Dynamic-link Library Injection | **24** | SigmaHQ 8, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Splunk Security Content 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **24** | Elastic detection rules 9, Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic protections 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **24** | Elastic detection rules 16, Elastic protections 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=stealth) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **23** | Elastic detection rules 10, Microsoft Sentinel 8, SigmaHQ 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=stealth) |
| `T1216` | System Script Proxy Execution | **22** | SigmaHQ 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic protections 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1216&tac=stealth) |
| `T1535` | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | **22** | Exabeam content library 9, Splunk Security Content 5, Panther analysis 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1535&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **22** | SigmaHQ 11, Exabeam content library 4, MITRE CAR 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=stealth) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **21** | SigmaHQ 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 3 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.002` | Control Panel | **20** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Elastic protections 4, Exabeam content library 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.008` | Odbcconf | **20** | SigmaHQ 8, Elastic detection rules 6, Splunk Security Content 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1497` | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | **20** | Splunk Security Content 7, Wazuh ruleset 6, Elastic detection rules 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **20** | SigmaHQ 8, Elastic protections 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **18** | Splunk Security Content 5, MITRE CAR 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.009` | Proc Memory | **18** | Elastic protections 13, SigmaHQ 2, Tracee detectors 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **18** | Elastic detection rules 13, Elastic protections 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **17** | Wazuh ruleset 6, Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **17** | Elastic detection rules 9, Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=stealth) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=stealth) |
| `T1134.001` | Token Impersonation/Theft | **16** | SigmaHQ 9, Splunk Security Content 5, Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **16** | Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 3, Splunk Security Content 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **16** | Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1586.003` | Cloud Accounts | **16** | Splunk Security Content 16 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=stealth) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1078.001` | Default Accounts | **15** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **15** | Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **15** | SigmaHQ 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **14** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=stealth) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **14** | SigmaHQ 7, Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.001` | Binary Padding | **13** | Elastic protections 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.012` | Process Hollowing | **13** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.012&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.008` | Ptrace System Calls | **12** | Elastic protections 8, Elastic detection rules 3, Tracee detectors 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1132` | Data Encoding | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132&tac=stealth) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **12** | Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 3, Exabeam content library 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=stealth) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=stealth) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **12** | Panther analysis 4, Agent Threat Rules 4, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **12** | Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=stealth) |
| `T1542` | Pre-OS Boot | **12** | Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic hunting queries 3, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542&tac=stealth) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 4, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=stealth) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=stealth) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=stealth) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, MITRE CAR 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=stealth) |
| `T1685.006` | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | **12** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.001` | Invalid Code Signature | **11** | Elastic detection rules 10, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.007` | Double File Extension | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **11** | Micah Babinski Sigma rules 4, Elastic protections 3, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **11** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 3, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=stealth) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, SigmaHQ 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=stealth) |
| `T1497.001` | System Checks | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=stealth) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **11** | Elastic detection rules 5, Panther analysis 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=stealth) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **11** | Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 4, FalconForce FalconFriday 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564.006` | Run Virtual Instance | **11** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 4, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1610` | Deploy Container | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1610&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.003` | NTDS | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **10** | Exabeam content library 4, SigmaHQ 3, MITRE CAR 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.002` | Right-to-Left Override | **10** | SigmaHQ 3, Wazuh ruleset 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1070.008` | Clear Mailbox Data | **10** | Splunk Security Content 7, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1134.004` | Parent PID Spoofing | **10** | Elastic protections 5, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries 3, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **10** | Elastic detection rules 7, Elastic protections 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=stealth) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **10** | Panther analysis 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=stealth) |
| `T1548.001` | Setuid and Setgid | **10** | Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 2, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=stealth) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **9** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **9** | Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 3, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 2, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=stealth) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=stealth) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Panther analysis 1, Okta customer detections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=stealth) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **9** | Elastic detection rules 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=stealth) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=stealth) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Google Cloud security analytics 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=stealth) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **9** | Exabeam content library 4, Wazuh ruleset 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **9** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564.008` | Email Hiding Rules | **9** | SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **9** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1621` | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | **9** | Splunk Security Content 7, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1621&tac=stealth) |
| `T1685.005` | Clear Windows Event Logs | **9** | Elastic detection rules 4, MITRE CAR 2, Exabeam content library 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1006` | Direct Volume Access | **8** | Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **8** | Elastic detection rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.013` | Encrypted/Encoded File | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.013&tac=stealth) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **8** | Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=stealth) |
| `T1070.005` | Network Share Connection Removal | **8** | SigmaHQ 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **8** | Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **8** | Elastic protections 4, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=stealth) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=stealth) |
| `T1550.004` | Web Session Cookie | **8** | Elastic detection rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **8** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, SigmaHQ 1, Okta customer detections 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **8** | SigmaHQ 5, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=stealth) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **8** | Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.009` | Break Process Trees | **7** | Elastic detection rules 5, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **7** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Wazuh ruleset 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=stealth) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **7** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=stealth) |
| `T1204.004` | Malicious Copy and Paste | **7** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Google Cloud security analytics 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1542.003` | Bootkit | **7** | Splunk Security Content 3, Exabeam content library 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1548.003` | Sudo and Sudo Caching | **7** | Elastic detection rules 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=stealth) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Agent Threat Rules 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=stealth) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=stealth) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **7** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.002` | Software Packing | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.008` | Masquerade File Type | **6** | Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **6** | Panther analysis 4, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=stealth) |
| `T1114.003` | Email Forwarding Rule | **6** | SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **6** | Splunk Security Content 4, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=stealth) |
| `T1219.002` | Remote Desktop Software | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1505.004` | IIS Components | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.016` | Installer Packages | **6** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.016&tac=stealth) |
| `T1550.003` | Pass the Ticket | **6** | Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **6** | Elastic detection rules 5, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=stealth) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.003` | Steganography | **5** | SigmaHQ 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **5** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.003` | Thread Execution Hijacking | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Wazuh ruleset 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **5** | Elastic hunting queries 3, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **5** | Splunk Security Content 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **5** | Panther analysis 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=stealth) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=stealth) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1542.001` | System Firmware | **5** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **5** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1543.004` | Launch Daemon | **5** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1548.006` | TCC Manipulation | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=stealth) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=stealth) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=stealth) |
| `T1622` | Debugger Evasion | **5** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1, Falco rules 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1622&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **4** | Splunk Security Content 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.006` | HTML Smuggling | **4** | Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2, Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.011` | Fileless Storage | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.011&tac=stealth) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.002` | Portable Executable Injection | **4** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.004` | Asynchronous Procedure Call | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **4** | Elastic protections 1, MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=stealth) |
| `T1071.002` | File Transfer Protocols | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=stealth) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=stealth) |
| `T1134.003` | Make and Impersonate Token | **4** | SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=stealth) |
| `T1221` | Template Injection | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, signature-base YARA 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1221&tac=stealth) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **4** | Elastic protections 1, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=stealth) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=stealth) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=stealth) |
| `T1489` | Service Stop | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1489&tac=stealth) |
| `T1497.003` | Time Based Checks | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.010` | Services File Permissions Weakness | **4** | Exabeam content library 2, Wazuh ruleset 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.010&tac=stealth) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=stealth) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=stealth) |
| `T1659` | Content Injection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1659&tac=stealth) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T0890` | T0890 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0890&tac=stealth) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=stealth) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.009` | Embedded Payloads | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.006` | Space after Filename | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.013` | Process Doppelgänging | **3** | Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.013&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **3** | SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=stealth) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=stealth) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=stealth) |
| `T1216.001` | PubPrn | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1216.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.012` | Verclsid | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.012&tac=stealth) |
| `T1218.013` | Mavinject | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.013&tac=stealth) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=stealth) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=stealth) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=stealth) |
| `T1484.002` | Trust Modification | **3** | Microsoft Defender hunting 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Exabeam content library 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1525` | Implant Internal Image | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1525&tac=stealth) |
| `T1553.002` | Code Signing | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1561.001` | Disk Content Wipe | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1561.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.013` | KernelCallbackTable | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.013&tac=stealth) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **3** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=stealth) |
| `T1684.001` | Impersonation | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Agent Threat Rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1684.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.004` | LSA Secrets | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.005` | Cached Domain Credentials | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=stealth) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.015` | Compression | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.015&tac=stealth) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1070.009` | Clear Persistence | **2** | Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1090.003` | Multi-hop Proxy | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=stealth) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=stealth) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1137` | Office Application Startup | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137&tac=stealth) |
| `T1137.005` | Outlook Rules | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=stealth) |
| `T1200` | Hardware Additions | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1200&tac=stealth) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=stealth) |
| `T1437` | T1437 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1437&tac=stealth) |
| `T1480` | Execution Guardrails | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1480&tac=stealth) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=stealth) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **2** | Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=stealth) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.015` | Component Object Model Hijacking | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.015&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.018` | Python Startup Hooks | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.018&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1553.005` | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1555.004` | Windows Credential Manager | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1556.007` | Hybrid Identity | **2** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1559.002` | Dynamic Data Exchange | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.005` | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.012` | COR_PROFILER | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.012&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.014` | AppDomainManager | **2** | signature-base YARA 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.014&tac=stealth) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, CTID cloud analytics 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=stealth) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=stealth) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **2** | Wazuh ruleset 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=stealth) |
| `T1589.001` | Credentials | **2** | Wazuh ruleset 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=stealth) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **2** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=stealth) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=stealth) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=stealth) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=stealth) |
| `T0819` | T0819 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0819&tac=stealth) |
| `T0837` | T0837 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0837&tac=stealth) |
| `T0851` | T0851 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0851&tac=stealth) |
| `T0858` | T0858 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0858&tac=stealth) |
| `T0866` | T0866 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0866&tac=stealth) |
| `T0885` | T0885 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0885&tac=stealth) |
| `T1003.007` | Proc Filesystem | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1016.001` | Internet Connection Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1027.012` | LNK Icon Smuggling | **1** | Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.012&tac=stealth) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=stealth) |
| `T1030` | Data Transfer Size Limits | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1030&tac=stealth) |
| `T1036.010` | Masquerade Account Name | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.010&tac=stealth) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=stealth) |
| `T1055.011` | Extra Window Memory Injection | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.011&tac=stealth) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1059.010` | AutoHotKey & AutoIT | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.010&tac=stealth) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1114.002` | Remote Email Collection | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=stealth) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=stealth) |
| `T1132.001` | Standard Encoding | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1185` | Browser Session Hijacking | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1185&tac=stealth) |
| `T1204.005` | Malicious Library | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=stealth) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1222.002` | Linux and Mac Permissions | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=stealth) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=stealth) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=stealth) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=stealth) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=stealth) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=stealth) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=stealth) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=stealth) |
| `T1485.001` | Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1499.004` | Application or System Exploitation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=stealth) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=stealth) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=stealth) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=stealth) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=stealth) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=stealth) |
| `T1538` | Cloud Service Dashboard | **1** | Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1538&tac=stealth) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=stealth) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.003` | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.012` | Image File Execution Options Injection | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.012&tac=stealth) |
| `T1546.017` | Udev Rules | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.017&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.013` | XDG Autostart Entries | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.013&tac=stealth) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=stealth) |
| `T1548.004` | Elevated Execution with Prompt | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1548.005` | Temporary Elevated Cloud Access | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=stealth) |
| `T1555.005` | Password Managers | **1** | Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1556.009` | Conditional Access Policies | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.009&tac=stealth) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1558.004` | AS-REP Roasting | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1558.005` | Ccache Files | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.005&tac=stealth) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1560.002` | Archive via Library | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1561.002` | Disk Structure Wipe | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1561.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1564.012` | File/Path Exclusions | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.012&tac=stealth) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1573` | Encrypted Channel | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573&tac=stealth) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=stealth) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=stealth) |
| `T1583.008` | Malvertising | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.008&tac=stealth) |
| `T1586.002` | Email Accounts | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1587` | Develop Capabilities | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587&tac=stealth) |
| `T1587.001` | Malware | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=stealth) |
| `T1588.001` | Malware | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1589.002` | Email Addresses | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.002&tac=stealth) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=stealth) |
| `T1601` | Modify System Image | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601&tac=stealth) |
| `T1601.001` | Patch System Image | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601.001&tac=stealth) |
| `T1604` | T1604 | **1** | Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1604&tac=stealth) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=stealth) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=stealth) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=stealth) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=stealth) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=stealth) |
| `T1626` | T1626 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1626&tac=stealth) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=stealth) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=stealth) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=stealth) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=stealth) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=stealth) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=stealth) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=stealth) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=stealth) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=stealth) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=stealth) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=stealth) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=stealth) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=stealth) |
| `T1651` | Cloud Administration Command | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1651&tac=stealth) |
| `T1655` | T1655 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1655&tac=stealth) |
| `T1688` | Safe Mode Boot | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1688&tac=stealth) |
| `T1690` | Prevent Command History Logging | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1690&tac=stealth) |
| - | No technique tagged | **233** | SigmaHQ 133, Microsoft Sentinel 51, Microsoft Defender hunting 31 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=stealth) |


---

## Defense Impairment detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/defense-impairment/

2,259 detections in the library are tagged Defense Impairment, across 305 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 2,259](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=defense-impairment).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **949** | Elastic detection rules 193, Microsoft Sentinel 177, SigmaHQ 164 and 18 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **358** | SigmaHQ 97, Splunk Security Content 79, Elastic protections 50 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **206** | Wazuh ruleset 107, Exabeam content library 41, Elastic detection rules 30 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **106** | Elastic detection rules 30, Splunk Security Content 19, Panther analysis 17 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **100** | Elastic detection rules 29, Panther analysis 20, Splunk Security Content 18 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **85** | Elastic detection rules 27, Microsoft Sentinel 15, Auth0 customer detections 14 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **76** | Splunk Security Content 11, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 10 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **60** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Elastic detection rules 15, Panther analysis 9 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **58** | SigmaHQ 28, Splunk Security Content 13, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **54** | Anvilogic Forge armory 18, Splunk Security Content 17, SigmaHQ 5 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **54** | Elastic protections 17, Elastic detection rules 16, Microsoft Sentinel 15 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **54** | Elastic detection rules 21, Anvilogic Forge armory 12, Microsoft Sentinel 11 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **53** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Elastic detection rules 16, Elastic protections 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **52** | Splunk Security Content 12, Elastic detection rules 10, Microsoft Sentinel 7 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **44** | Elastic detection rules 16, Splunk Security Content 7, Elastic protections 5 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1685.005` | Clear Windows Event Logs | **44** | SigmaHQ 8, Exabeam content library 8, Splunk Security Content 6 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **42** | Elastic detection rules 19, Elastic protections 7, Microsoft Sentinel 7 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **41** | Elastic detection rules 13, Microsoft Sentinel 10, SigmaHQ 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **39** | Splunk Security Content 9, Microsoft Sentinel 8, Wazuh ruleset 8 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1222.002` | Linux and Mac Permissions | **33** | Elastic detection rules 11, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, SigmaHQ 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **33** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1489` | Service Stop | **30** | Elastic detection rules 12, Anvilogic Forge armory 10, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1489&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **29** | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 5, Exabeam content library 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1484.002` | Trust Modification | **26** | Google Cloud security analytics 9, Elastic detection rules 8, Splunk Security Content 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic protections 7, Panther analysis 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **25** | Elastic detection rules 12, Panther analysis 6, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **24** | Elastic detection rules 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **23** | Elastic detection rules 17, Elastic protections 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **22** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **22** | Panther analysis 5, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 3 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1207` | Rogue Domain Controller | **21** | Exabeam content library 6, Microsoft Sentinel 4, Wazuh ruleset 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1207&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1578.005` | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations | **21** | Elastic detection rules 18, Splunk Security Content 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1686.003` | Windows Host Firewall | **20** | SigmaHQ 20 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1553.004` | Install Root Certificate | **19** | SigmaHQ 10, Elastic detection rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **18** | Splunk Security Content 13, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **16** | Splunk Security Content 5, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **16** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 5, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1553.005` | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass | **16** | SigmaHQ 6, Splunk Security Content 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1685.006` | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | **16** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 5, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **15** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1556.009` | Conditional Access Policies | **15** | Panther analysis 8, Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.009&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **15** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 5, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, CTID cloud analytics 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Wazuh ruleset 3, Elastic protections 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **13** | Panther analysis 4, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **13** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **13** | Elastic detection rules 8, MITRE CAR 4, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **12** | SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **12** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1553.001` | Gatekeeper Bypass | **12** | Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1689` | Downgrade Attack | **12** | Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 3, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1689&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **11** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **11** | Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Wazuh ruleset 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **11** | Panther analysis 4, SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **10** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic protections 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **10** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 10 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1553.002` | Code Signing | **10** | Hayabusa rules 5, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **10** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 3, MITRE CAR 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **9** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic protections 2, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **9** | Elastic protections 3, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **8** | Elastic protections 6, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1578.002` | Create Cloud Instance | **8** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **7** | Panther analysis 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **7** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **7** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1553.003` | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking | **7** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 2, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1003.005` | Cached Domain Credentials | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **6** | MITRE CAR 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **6** | SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **6** | Splunk Security Content 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **6** | Exabeam content library 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1505.004` | IIS Components | **6** | SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1548.001` | Setuid and Setgid | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1556.007` | Hybrid Identity | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Okta customer detections 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.007&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic protections 1, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic protections 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.015` | Component Object Model Hijacking | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.015&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **5** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **5** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **5** | Panther analysis 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1586.003` | Cloud Accounts | **5** | Splunk Security Content 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1599` | Network Boundary Bridging | **5** | Panther analysis 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1621` | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | **5** | Splunk Security Content 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1621&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1690` | Prevent Command History Logging | **5** | Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1690&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, cyb3rmik3 KQL hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **4** | Panther analysis 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1529` | System Shutdown/Reboot | **4** | Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1529&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1543.004` | Launch Daemon | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.012` | Image File Execution Options Injection | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.012&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1553.006` | Code Signing Policy Modification | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **4** | MITRE CAR 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **4** | Panther analysis 2, Agent Threat Rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1648` | Serverless Execution | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1648&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1685.004` | Disable or Modify Linux Audit System Log | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1070.003` | Clear Command History | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1176` | Software Extensions | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **3** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1485.001` | Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **3** | Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1564.004` | NTFS File Attributes | **3** | Elastic protections 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **3** | Elastic protections 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1578.003` | Delete Cloud Instance | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1036.001` | Invalid Code Signature | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **2** | GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1137` | Office Application Startup | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1176.001` | Browser Extensions | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **2** | Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1491.001` | Internal Defacement | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **2** | Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1525` | Implant Internal Image | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1525&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **2** | Panther analysis 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.001` | Change Default File Association | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.017` | Udev Rules | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.017&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.013` | XDG Autostart Entries | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.013&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1548.003` | Sudo and Sudo Caching | **2** | Okta customer detections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1556.004` | Network Device Authentication | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1578.001` | Create Snapshot | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1600.001` | Reduce Key Space | **2** | Google SecOps (Chronicle) 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1600.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1601.001` | Patch System Image | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1686.002` | Network Device Firewall | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T0828` | T0828 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0828&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1003.004` | LSA Secrets | **1** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1027.005` | Indicator Removal from Tools | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1027.010` | Command Obfuscation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.010&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1036.009` | Break Process Trees | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.009&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1037.002` | Login Hook | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1055.009` | Proc Memory | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.009&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1059.012` | Hypervisor CLI | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.012&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **1** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1074.002` | Remote Data Staging | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1090.001` | Internal Proxy | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1137.002` | Office Test | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1542` | Pre-OS Boot | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.002` | Screensaver | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1546.010` | AppInit DLLs | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.010&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.004` | Winlogon Helper DLL | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1547.015` | Login Items | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.015&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1548.005` | Temporary Elevated Cloud Access | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.005&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1548.006` | TCC Manipulation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1556.003` | Pluggable Authentication Modules | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1558.004` | AS-REP Roasting | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1569.001` | Launchctl | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1578.004` | Revert Cloud Instance | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.004&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1583.008` | Malvertising | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.008&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1584` | Compromise Infrastructure | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1584.001` | Domains | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1584.002` | DNS Server | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584.002&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1588.003` | Code Signing Certificates | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.003&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1599.001` | Network Address Translation Traversal | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599.001&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1600` | Weaken Encryption | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1600&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1601` | Modify System Image | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1601&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1651` | Cloud Administration Command | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1651&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1666` | Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1666&tac=defense-impairment) |
| `T1688` | Safe Mode Boot | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1688&tac=defense-impairment) |
| - | No technique tagged | **26** | SigmaHQ 26 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=defense-impairment) |


---

## Credential Access detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/credential-access/

2,451 detections in the library are tagged Credential Access, across 363 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 2,451](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=credential-access).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **397** | Microsoft Sentinel 134, Wazuh ruleset 92, Elastic detection rules 47 and 16 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **263** | Elastic detection rules 66, Microsoft Sentinel 47, SigmaHQ 37 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **261** | Elastic detection rules 109, Microsoft Sentinel 53, Elastic protections 31 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **219** | SigmaHQ 79, Anvilogic Forge armory 22, Elastic detection rules 21 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **170** | Elastic detection rules 65, Microsoft Sentinel 64, SigmaHQ 9 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **148** | Elastic detection rules 38, Elastic protections 26, SigmaHQ 24 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **148** | Microsoft Sentinel 41, Elastic protections 38, Elastic detection rules 32 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **138** | Elastic detection rules 40, Microsoft Sentinel 39, SigmaHQ 14 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **114** | Splunk Security Content 40, Elastic detection rules 30, Microsoft Sentinel 17 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **106** | Elastic detection rules 53, Microsoft Sentinel 21, SigmaHQ 11 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **99** | Elastic detection rules 26, Microsoft Sentinel 20, Splunk Security Content 18 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.003` | NTDS | **87** | Anvilogic Forge armory 30, SigmaHQ 24, Exabeam content library 7 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **80** | SigmaHQ 28, Anvilogic Forge armory 12, Elastic detection rules 11 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **67** | Snort 3 community rules 19, Exabeam content library 16, SigmaHQ 9 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **67** | Elastic detection rules 27, Splunk Security Content 11, Anvilogic Forge armory 9 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **65** | Elastic detection rules 17, Elastic protections 9, Exabeam content library 9 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **61** | Microsoft Sentinel 27, Elastic detection rules 21, Panther analysis 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **61** | SigmaHQ 17, Splunk Security Content 9, Exabeam content library 8 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **57** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 20, Elastic protections 8 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **56** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Elastic detection rules 15, Panther analysis 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **53** | Elastic detection rules 19, Elastic protections 13, Okta customer detections 4 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **47** | Elastic detection rules 23, SigmaHQ 10, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1621` | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | **47** | Splunk Security Content 18, Anvilogic Forge armory 13, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1621&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **45** | Elastic protections 12, Microsoft Sentinel 9, SigmaHQ 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **44** | Elastic detection rules 23, Anvilogic Forge armory 10, Agent Threat Rules 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **43** | Elastic detection rules 25, Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **43** | Splunk Security Content 12, Okta customer detections 6, Microsoft Sentinel 5 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **42** | Microsoft Sentinel 23, Elastic detection rules 12, Elastic protections 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **42** | Microsoft Sentinel 36, Agent Threat Rules 5, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **42** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Elastic detection rules 6, Splunk Security Content 3 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1110.004` | Credential Stuffing | **41** | Splunk Security Content 12, Elastic detection rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 7 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **40** | Elastic detection rules 25, Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **40** | Splunk Security Content 18, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, SigmaHQ 7 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **39** | Microsoft Sentinel 30, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1056` | Input Capture | **37** | Snort 3 community rules 25, Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **37** | Elastic detection rules 11, SigmaHQ 7, Splunk Security Content 6 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **36** | Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 9, Splunk Security Content 6 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **36** | Elastic detection rules 16, Microsoft Sentinel 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **35** | Snort 3 community rules 19, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **34** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **33** | Microsoft Sentinel 23, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 15, Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **31** | SigmaHQ 7, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **30** | Elastic detection rules 16, SigmaHQ 6, Microsoft Sentinel 6 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **30** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, SigmaHQ 7, Elastic detection rules 6 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **28** | Snort 3 community rules 19, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **28** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Wazuh ruleset 7, Elastic detection rules 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **28** | SigmaHQ 10, Elastic detection rules 8, Splunk Security Content 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1586.003` | Cloud Accounts | **28** | Splunk Security Content 28 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.004` | LSA Secrets | **26** | SigmaHQ 12, Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 3 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **26** | Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 23, SigmaHQ 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **24** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **24** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1555.004` | Windows Credential Manager | **24** | Elastic protections 10, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **23** | Elastic detection rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Elastic protections 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1555.001` | Keychain | **23** | Elastic protections 12, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.005` | Cached Domain Credentials | **22** | SigmaHQ 8, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic protections 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **21** | Elastic detection rules 8, Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Panther analysis 8, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1550.003` | Pass the Ticket | **21** | Exabeam content library 9, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **19** | Elastic detection rules 9, Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **19** | Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **19** | Elastic detection rules 12, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **18** | Anvilogic Forge armory 10, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 3, Splunk Security Content 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Auth0 customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1003.007` | Proc Filesystem | **16** | Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **16** | SigmaHQ 6, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1558.001` | Golden Ticket | **16** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1555.005` | Password Managers | **15** | Exabeam content library 11, Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **14** | Exabeam content library 6, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **14** | Elastic detection rules 13, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 5, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **13** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **13** | SigmaHQ 9, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1056.002` | GUI Input Capture | **13** | Elastic protections 4, SigmaHQ 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.002` | Credentials in Registry | **13** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1555.006` | Cloud Secrets Management Stores | **13** | Elastic detection rules 10, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1606` | Forge Web Credentials | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **12** | Snort 3 community rules 10, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1558.004` | AS-REP Roasting | **12** | Splunk Security Content 6, Elastic detection rules 2, Hayabusa rules 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 3, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **11** | Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **11** | SigmaHQ 6, Exabeam content library 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 11 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **11** | Elastic detection rules 10, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **10** | Elastic detection rules 7, Splunk Security Content 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **9** | Elastic detection rules 5, Splunk Security Content 3, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556.009` | Conditional Access Policies | **9** | Panther analysis 8, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.009&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **8** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **8** | Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **7** | Wazuh ruleset 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1, Okta customer detections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **7** | Elastic detection rules 6, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **6** | Elastic detection rules 3, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **6** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic hunting queries 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 2, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1185` | Browser Session Hijacking | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Okta customer detections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1185&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **6** | SigmaHQ 3, Agent Threat Rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **6** | Panther analysis 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556.003` | Pluggable Authentication Modules | **6** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **6** | Elastic detection rules 5, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **5** | Elastic detection rules 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **5** | Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **5** | Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.003` | Shell History | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Snort 3 community rules 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **4** | Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1055.001` | Dynamic-link Library Injection | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **4** | Splunk Security Content 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **4** | MITRE CAR 1, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1110.002` | Password Cracking | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **4** | GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1548.003` | Sudo and Sudo Caching | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1550.004` | Web Session Cookie | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556.007` | Hybrid Identity | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Okta customer detections 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1558.005` | Ccache Files | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T0859` | T0859 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0859&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1006` | Direct Volume Access | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **3** | Elastic protections 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **3** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1176` | Software Extensions | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Snort 3 community rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **3** | Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **3** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1553.004` | Install Root Certificate | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1563.001` | SSH Hijacking | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1564.004` | NTFS File Attributes | **3** | SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1606.002` | SAML Tokens | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1685.005` | Clear Windows Event Logs | **3** | Exabeam content library 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1689` | Downgrade Attack | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1689&tac=credential-access) |
| `T0871` | T0871 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0871&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **2** | Agent Threat Rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1201` | Password Policy Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1201&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1437` | T1437 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1437&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1489` | Service Stop | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1489&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1497` | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | **2** | Wazuh ruleset 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1552.008` | Chat Messages | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.008&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556.004` | Network Device Authentication | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1557.002` | ARP Cache Poisoning | **2** | Falco rules 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1557.003` | DHCP Spoofing | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1587.001` | Malware | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1588.002` | Tool | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1589.002` | Email Addresses | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1597` | Search Closed Sources | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1597&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1606.001` | Web Cookies | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **2** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **2** | Okta customer detections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T0834` | T0834 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0834&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1055.008` | Ptrace System Calls | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.008&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1078.001` | Default Accounts | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1114.002` | Remote Email Collection | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1134.001` | Token Impersonation/Theft | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1176.001` | Browser Extensions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1176.002` | IDE Extensions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1207` | Rogue Domain Controller | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1207&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1213.002` | Sharepoint | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1213.006` | Databases | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.006&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **1** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1222.002` | Linux and Mac Permissions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1423` | T1423 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1423&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1499.004` | Application or System Exploitation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1546.017` | Udev Rules | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.017&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.013` | XDG Autostart Entries | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.013&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1556.008` | Network Provider DLL | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.008&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1561` | Disk Wipe | **1** | Hayabusa rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1561&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1573` | Encrypted Channel | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1584` | Compromise Infrastructure | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1586.002` | Email Accounts | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1589.001` | Credentials | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1592.004` | Client Configurations | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592.004&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1599.001` | Network Address Translation Traversal | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599.001&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1602` | Data from Configuration Repository | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1602&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1602.002` | Network Device Configuration Dump | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1602.002&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1646` | T1646 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1646&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1660` | T1660 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1660&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1673` | Virtual Machine Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1673&tac=credential-access) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=credential-access) |
| - | No technique tagged | **79** | Microsoft Sentinel 36, SigmaHQ 22, Microsoft Defender hunting 16 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=credential-access) |


---

## Discovery detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/discovery/

1,806 detections in the library are tagged Discovery, across 329 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 1,806](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=discovery).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **272** | Anvilogic Forge armory 54, Emerging Threats Open 51, Microsoft Sentinel 46 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=discovery) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **223** | Emerging Threats Open 74, Exabeam content library 26, Elastic detection rules 26 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=discovery) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **185** | Microsoft Sentinel 46, Elastic detection rules 34, Anvilogic Forge armory 32 and 16 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=discovery) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **173** | Microsoft Sentinel 38, Anvilogic Forge armory 34, Elastic detection rules 21 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=discovery) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **151** | Anvilogic Forge armory 37, Splunk Security Content 22, Snort 3 community rules 19 and 15 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=discovery) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **121** | Splunk Security Content 28, Anvilogic Forge armory 24, SigmaHQ 21 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **105** | SigmaHQ 30, Anvilogic Forge armory 20, Elastic detection rules 19 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=discovery) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **87** | Anvilogic Forge armory 21, Elastic detection rules 20, SigmaHQ 11 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=discovery) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **87** | Anvilogic Forge armory 22, Splunk Security Content 21, SigmaHQ 15 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **87** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Elastic detection rules 28, Anvilogic Forge armory 10 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=discovery) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **81** | SigmaHQ 17, Anvilogic Forge armory 17, Splunk Security Content 14 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **76** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 23, Elastic protections 9 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=discovery) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **76** | Elastic detection rules 28, Anvilogic Forge armory 16, Microsoft Sentinel 9 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=discovery) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **72** | Elastic detection rules 54, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, benscha KQL advanced hunting 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=discovery) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **70** | Elastic detection rules 26, Microsoft Sentinel 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 11 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=discovery) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **64** | Splunk Security Content 14, SigmaHQ 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 13 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **60** | Snort 3 community rules 19, Exabeam content library 16, SigmaHQ 9 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=discovery) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **56** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Elastic detection rules 17, Bert-JanP hunting queries 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **54** | Elastic detection rules 14, Anvilogic Forge armory 10, SigmaHQ 8 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=discovery) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **52** | Anvilogic Forge armory 20, SigmaHQ 9, Splunk Security Content 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=discovery) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **50** | Anvilogic Forge armory 11, Exabeam content library 8, Splunk Security Content 8 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=discovery) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **49** | SigmaHQ 16, Splunk Security Content 14, Elastic detection rules 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **49** | Elastic detection rules 28, Microsoft Sentinel 15, Splunk Security Content 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=discovery) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **48** | SigmaHQ 13, Splunk Security Content 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 7 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=discovery) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **44** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Elastic detection rules 6, Exabeam content library 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **39** | SigmaHQ 10, Elastic detection rules 8, Anvilogic Forge armory 7 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **38** | Anvilogic Forge armory 15, SigmaHQ 11, Exabeam content library 6 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **34** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=discovery) |
| `T1201` | Password Policy Discovery | **34** | Splunk Security Content 9, SigmaHQ 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1201&tac=discovery) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **33** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Elastic detection rules 4, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=discovery) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 15, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=discovery) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 21, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, FalconForce FalconFriday 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=discovery) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **31** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, Elastic detection rules 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=discovery) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **30** | Elastic detection rules 13, Bert-JanP hunting queries 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **30** | Anvilogic Forge armory 11, SigmaHQ 9, Elastic protections 2 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **30** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=discovery) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **29** | Elastic detection rules 11, SigmaHQ 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **28** | Elastic detection rules 15, Anvilogic Forge armory 7, Elastic protections 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **27** | Microsoft Sentinel 21, Elastic detection rules 4, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **26** | Elastic detection rules 14, Microsoft Sentinel 10, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=discovery) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **25** | Anvilogic Forge armory 11, SigmaHQ 6, Exabeam content library 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=discovery) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **25** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=discovery) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **23** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **22** | Anvilogic Forge armory 7, Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **22** | Microsoft Sentinel 19, Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=discovery) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **21** | Elastic detection rules 12, SigmaHQ 5, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Panther analysis 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=discovery) |
| `T1497` | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | **19** | Splunk Security Content 7, Wazuh ruleset 6, Elastic detection rules 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, MITRE CAR 2, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=discovery) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=discovery) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **15** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Wazuh ruleset 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=discovery) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=discovery) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **13** | Exabeam content library 4, SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=discovery) |
| `T1497.001` | System Checks | **12** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=discovery) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **12** | Elastic detection rules 8, Microsoft Sentinel 3, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **12** | Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 1, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=discovery) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **12** | SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=discovery) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=discovery) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=discovery) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=discovery) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **10** | Elastic detection rules 6, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Wazuh ruleset 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=discovery) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=discovery) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=discovery) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=discovery) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **10** | Elastic detection rules 9, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=discovery) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Falco rules 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=discovery) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, SigmaHQ 2, Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=discovery) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1016.001` | Internet Connection Discovery | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 1, CrowdStrike LogScale community 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=discovery) |
| `T1120` | Peripheral Device Discovery | **8** | SigmaHQ 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1120&tac=discovery) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=discovery) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **8** | Elastic detection rules 7, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **8** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **8** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=discovery) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=discovery) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **7** | Splunk Security Content 3, Panther analysis 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=discovery) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **7** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 1, CrowdStrike LogScale community 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=discovery) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=discovery) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **7** | Elastic detection rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=discovery) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=discovery) |
| `T1614` | System Location Discovery | **7** | Emerging Threats Open 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, CrowdStrike LogScale community 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1614&tac=discovery) |
| `T1614.001` | System Language Discovery | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, SigmaHQ 2, CrowdStrike LogScale community 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1614.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T0865` | T0865 | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0865&tac=discovery) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=discovery) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **6** | Elastic protections 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=discovery) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **6** | MITRE CAR 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=discovery) |
| `T1124` | System Time Discovery | **6** | SigmaHQ 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1124&tac=discovery) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **6** | Elastic detection rules 3, Exabeam content library 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, MITRE CAR 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **6** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=discovery) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=discovery) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **6** | Panther analysis 2, Splunk Security Content 2, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=discovery) |
| `T0842` | T0842 | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0842&tac=discovery) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=discovery) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1036.004` | Masquerade Task or Service | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Exabeam content library 2, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1039` | Data from Network Shared Drive | **5** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1039&tac=discovery) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.012` | Hypervisor CLI | **5** | SigmaHQ 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.012&tac=discovery) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic protections 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=discovery) |
| `T1538` | Cloud Service Dashboard | **5** | Okta customer detections 2, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1538&tac=discovery) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=discovery) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=discovery) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **5** | MITRE CAR 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=discovery) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=discovery) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, CrowdStrike LogScale community 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=discovery) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=discovery) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **4** | SigmaHQ 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **4** | Elastic protections 2, Wazuh ruleset 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=discovery) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=discovery) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=discovery) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1673` | Virtual Machine Discovery | **4** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1673&tac=discovery) |
| `T1003.007` | Proc Filesystem | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **3** | Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1087.003` | Email Account | **3** | CrowdStrike LogScale community 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=discovery) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=discovery) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=discovery) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **3** | Elastic protections 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.003` | CMSTP | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.008` | Odbcconf | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.008&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=discovery) |
| `T1497.003` | Time Based Checks | **3** | Splunk Security Content 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1497.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **3** | SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **3** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **3** | MITRE CAR 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=discovery) |
| `T1599` | Network Boundary Bridging | **3** | Panther analysis 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599&tac=discovery) |
| `T1610` | Deploy Container | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1610&tac=discovery) |
| `T1622` | Debugger Evasion | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1622&tac=discovery) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=discovery) |
| `T1654` | Log Enumeration | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1654&tac=discovery) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=discovery) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1030` | Data Transfer Size Limits | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1030&tac=discovery) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=discovery) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=discovery) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=discovery) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1110.004` | Credential Stuffing | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=discovery) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **2** | Exabeam content library 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=discovery) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=discovery) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=discovery) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=discovery) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=discovery) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=discovery) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=discovery) |
| `T1529` | System Shutdown/Reboot | **2** | Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1529&tac=discovery) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1548.001` | Setuid and Setgid | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1548.006` | TCC Manipulation | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=discovery) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=discovery) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **2** | Elastic protections 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=discovery) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1587.001` | Malware | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1590.001` | Domain Properties | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1590.005` | IP Addresses | **2** | Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1591.004` | Identify Roles | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=discovery) |
| `T1606.001` | Web Cookies | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1606.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=discovery) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=discovery) |
| `T1652` | Device Driver Discovery | **2** | Panther analysis 1, CrowdStrike LogScale community 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1652&tac=discovery) |
| `T0830` | T0830 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0830&tac=discovery) |
| `T0837` | T0837 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0837&tac=discovery) |
| `T0840` | T0840 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0840&tac=discovery) |
| `T0846` | T0846 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0846&tac=discovery) |
| `T0859` | T0859 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0859&tac=discovery) |
| `T0886` | T0886 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0886&tac=discovery) |
| `T0888` | T0888 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0888&tac=discovery) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=discovery) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=discovery) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **1** | Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=discovery) |
| `T1059.013` | Container CLI/API | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.013&tac=discovery) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1098.007` | Additional Local or Domain Groups | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1110.002` | Password Cracking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=discovery) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1123` | Audio Capture | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1123&tac=discovery) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=discovery) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=discovery) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1213.002` | Sharepoint | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.001` | Compiled HTML File | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.002` | Control Panel | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=discovery) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=discovery) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=discovery) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=discovery) |
| `T1423` | T1423 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1423&tac=discovery) |
| `T1428` | T1428 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1428&tac=discovery) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=discovery) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=discovery) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=discovery) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=discovery) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=discovery) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=discovery) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=discovery) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=discovery) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=discovery) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=discovery) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=discovery) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=discovery) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=discovery) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=discovery) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=discovery) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=discovery) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **1** | Falco rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=discovery) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=discovery) |
| `T1548.003` | Sudo and Sudo Caching | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1550.004` | Web Session Cookie | **1** | Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1552.002` | Credentials in Registry | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=discovery) |
| `T1555.006` | Cloud Secrets Management Stores | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=discovery) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=discovery) |
| `T1568.001` | Fast Flux DNS | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1568.002` | Domain Generation Algorithms | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1569.001` | Launchctl | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=discovery) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.005` | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.005&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.006` | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.006&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=discovery) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=discovery) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **1** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=discovery) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=discovery) |
| `T1589.002` | Email Addresses | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1592.002` | Software | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592.002&tac=discovery) |
| `T1592.004` | Client Configurations | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592.004&tac=discovery) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=discovery) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=discovery) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=discovery) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=discovery) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=discovery) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=discovery) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=discovery) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=discovery) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=discovery) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=discovery) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=discovery) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=discovery) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=discovery) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=discovery) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=discovery) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=discovery) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=discovery) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=discovery) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=discovery) |
| `T1655` | T1655 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1655&tac=discovery) |
| `T1657` | Financial Theft | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1657&tac=discovery) |
| `T1660` | T1660 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1660&tac=discovery) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=discovery) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=discovery) |
| - | No technique tagged | **89** | Microsoft Sentinel 41, SigmaHQ 20, Microsoft Defender hunting 17 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=discovery) |


---

## Lateral Movement detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/lateral-movement/

1,309 detections in the library are tagged Lateral Movement, across 281 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 1,309](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=lateral-movement).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **312** | Elastic detection rules 91, Microsoft Sentinel 72, Exabeam content library 54 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **259** | Emerging Threats Open 127, Microsoft Sentinel 30, Elastic detection rules 24 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **169** | SigmaHQ 38, Anvilogic Forge armory 22, Elastic detection rules 21 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **107** | Anvilogic Forge armory 19, Elastic detection rules 18, SigmaHQ 16 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **103** | Exabeam content library 40, Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic detection rules 17 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **85** | Anvilogic Forge armory 27, Microsoft Sentinel 19, Elastic detection rules 16 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **69** | Elastic detection rules 25, Panther analysis 14, Microsoft Sentinel 6 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **67** | SigmaHQ 13, Exabeam content library 12, Splunk Security Content 10 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **67** | Microsoft Sentinel 34, Elastic detection rules 13, Elastic protections 9 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **63** | Elastic detection rules 23, Splunk Security Content 11, Wazuh ruleset 8 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **51** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic detection rules 12, Elastic protections 7 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **44** | SigmaHQ 11, Splunk Security Content 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **44** | Elastic detection rules 13, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic hunting queries 6 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **43** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **43** | Anvilogic Forge armory 20, SigmaHQ 7, Elastic detection rules 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **36** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **34** | Exabeam content library 16, SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **33** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **31** | SigmaHQ 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Elastic detection rules 5 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **30** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Elastic detection rules 5, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **30** | SigmaHQ 7, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 5 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **29** | SigmaHQ 8, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **29** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **28** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **26** | Panther analysis 8, SigmaHQ 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Exabeam content library 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **24** | Elastic detection rules 10, Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1550.003` | Pass the Ticket | **23** | Exabeam content library 9, SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Elastic detection rules 4, Splunk Security Content 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1091` | Replication Through Removable Media | **20** | Exabeam content library 13, Splunk Security Content 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1091&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **20** | Panther analysis 7, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **19** | SigmaHQ 6, Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **18** | Elastic detection rules 6, Panther analysis 5, Splunk Security Content 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1080` | Taint Shared Content | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1080&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Splunk Security Content 5, Elastic detection rules 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **16** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Microsoft Sentinel 4, Exabeam content library 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 16 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 4, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **16** | Exabeam content library 7, Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **15** | Exabeam content library 4, Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, MITRE CAR 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **15** | Elastic protections 7, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **15** | SigmaHQ 8, Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **15** | Splunk Security Content 5, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1052.001` | Exfiltration over USB | **14** | Exabeam content library 13, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1052.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **14** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **13** | Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **13** | SigmaHQ 4, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 3, Elastic detection rules 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **12** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **12** | Wazuh ruleset 4, MITRE CAR 3, Exabeam content library 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1563.002` | RDP Hijacking | **12** | Exabeam content library 3, SigmaHQ 2, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **11** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **11** | Elastic detection rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **11** | LOLRMM 3, SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **11** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1563.001` | SSH Hijacking | **11** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 2, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **11** | Elastic detection rules 5, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **10** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **10** | Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 4, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **10** | Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 2, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Exabeam content library 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **9** | Elastic detection rules 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **8** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **8** | Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **8** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **7** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **7** | SigmaHQ 2, Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1197` | BITS Jobs | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1197&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **7** | Elastic protections 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **7** | Splunk Security Content 4, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **7** | Elastic detection rules 6, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0866` | T0866 | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0866&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **6** | SigmaHQ 5, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **6** | MITRE CAR 3, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **6** | Panther analysis 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, MITRE CAR 1, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **6** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0859` | T0859 | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0859&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1003.003` | NTDS | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **5** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **5** | SigmaHQ 2, Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1098.004` | SSH Authorized Keys | **5** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2, OTRF ThreatHunter-Playbook 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, MITRE CAR 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1025` | Data from Removable Media | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1025&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1039` | Data from Network Shared Drive | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1039&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **4** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **4** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **4** | Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1200` | Hardware Additions | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1200&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **4** | Panther analysis 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **4** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1558.004` | AS-REP Roasting | **4** | Splunk Security Content 2, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **4** | Exabeam content library 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1659` | Content Injection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1659&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0886` | T0886 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0886&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1003.004` | LSA Secrets | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.005` | VNC | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1048.001` | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1110.001` | Password Guessing | **3** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Hayabusa rules 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **3** | Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **3** | Exabeam content library 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1218.014` | MMC | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.014&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1550.004` | Web Session Cookie | **3** | Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1, Okta customer detections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **3** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1598.003` | Spearphishing Link | **3** | Exabeam content library 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **3** | Bert-JanP hunting queries 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0843` | T0843 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0843&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0858` | T0858 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0858&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1021.008` | Direct Cloud VM Connections | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.008&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **2** | Elastic protections 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1037.001` | Logon Script (Windows) | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1078.001` | Default Accounts | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1499.004` | Application or System Exploitation | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **2** | Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **2** | Panther analysis 1, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1546.003` | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1548.005` | Temporary Elevated Cloud Access | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **2** | Elastic detection rules 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1559.002` | Dynamic Data Exchange | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1587` | Develop Capabilities | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1608.001` | Upload Malware | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1689` | Downgrade Attack | **2** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1689&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1692.001` | T1692.001 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1692.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0816` | T0816 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0816&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0819` | T0819 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0819&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0836` | T0836 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0836&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0845` | T0845 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0845&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0889` | T0889 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0889&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T0890` | T0890 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0890&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1003.005` | Cached Domain Credentials | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1030` | Data Transfer Size Limits | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1030&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1052` | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1052&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1069.003` | Cloud Groups | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1071.002` | File Transfer Protocols | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1074.002` | Remote Data Staging | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1090.001` | Internal Proxy | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1132` | Data Encoding | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1201` | Password Policy Discovery | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1201&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1207` | Rogue Domain Controller | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1207&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1428` | T1428 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1428&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1496.004` | Cloud Service Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1505.001` | SQL Stored Procedures | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1529` | System Shutdown/Reboot | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1529&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1538` | Cloud Service Dashboard | **1** | Okta customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1538&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1546.002` | Screensaver | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1547.006` | Kernel Modules and Extensions | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1547.012` | Print Processors | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.012&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1553.006` | Code Signing Policy Modification | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1555.004` | Windows Credential Manager | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1555.006` | Cloud Secrets Management Stores | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.006&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1556.009` | Conditional Access Policies | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.009&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1558.001` | Golden Ticket | **1** | Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1558.005` | Ccache Files | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.005&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1564.004` | NTFS File Attributes | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1588` | Obtain Capabilities | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1598.002` | Spearphishing Attachment | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598.002&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1610` | Deploy Container | **1** | Falco rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1610&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=lateral-movement) |
| `T1693.001` | T1693.001 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1693.001&tac=lateral-movement) |
| - | No technique tagged | **89** | Microsoft Sentinel 40, Microsoft Defender hunting 18, Hayabusa rules 18 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=lateral-movement) |


---

## Collection detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/collection/

1,124 detections in the library are tagged Collection, across 305 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 1,124](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=collection).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **207** | Microsoft Sentinel 71, Exabeam content library 30, Elastic detection rules 29 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=collection) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **196** | Emerging Threats Open 96, Elastic detection rules 32, Microsoft Sentinel 23 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=collection) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **132** | Microsoft Sentinel 42, Exabeam content library 38, Elastic detection rules 29 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=collection) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **104** | Microsoft Sentinel 38, Wazuh ruleset 36, Elastic detection rules 11 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=collection) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **79** | Microsoft Sentinel 40, Anvilogic Forge armory 10, Splunk Security Content 6 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=collection) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **64** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Anvilogic Forge armory 15, Elastic detection rules 15 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=collection) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **53** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Snort 3 community rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=collection) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **48** | Microsoft Sentinel 19, Elastic detection rules 14, Panther analysis 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=collection) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **42** | Anvilogic Forge armory 20, Elastic protections 7, Elastic detection rules 5 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1056` | Input Capture | **41** | Snort 3 community rules 25, Elastic protections 11, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056&tac=collection) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **40** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 6 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=collection) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **40** | Elastic detection rules 18, Microsoft Sentinel 12, Panther analysis 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=collection) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **36** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Elastic detection rules 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=collection) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **35** | Microsoft Sentinel 21, Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=collection) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **35** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, FalconForce FalconFriday 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=collection) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **35** | SigmaHQ 10, Splunk Security Content 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=collection) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **33** | SigmaHQ 17, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 30, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=collection) |
| `T1114.003` | Email Forwarding Rule | **31** | SigmaHQ 6, Splunk Security Content 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **29** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Wazuh ruleset 13 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=collection) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **27** | Microsoft Sentinel 22, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=collection) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **27** | SigmaHQ 10, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 3 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=collection) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **25** | Elastic detection rules 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **25** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=collection) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **24** | SigmaHQ 8, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Splunk Security Content 4 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=collection) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **24** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 2, Panther analysis 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=collection) |
| `T1185` | Browser Session Hijacking | **23** | Splunk Security Content 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1185&tac=collection) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **23** | Elastic detection rules 7, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **23** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, Elastic detection rules 7, Panther analysis 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=collection) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **23** | Elastic detection rules 14, SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1039` | Data from Network Shared Drive | **22** | Anvilogic Forge armory 6, Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1039&tac=collection) |
| `T1114.002` | Remote Email Collection | **20** | Splunk Security Content 9, Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=collection) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **18** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=collection) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **18** | Elastic detection rules 10, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=collection) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **17** | Elastic protections 11, SigmaHQ 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 17 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=collection) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **16** | Splunk Security Content 6, Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Splunk Security Content 4, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=collection) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **16** | SigmaHQ 10, Splunk Security Content 5, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=collection) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **13** | Anvilogic Forge armory 10, Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **13** | Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 2, Wazuh ruleset 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=collection) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=collection) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=collection) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **12** | SigmaHQ 4, Wazuh ruleset 4, Panther analysis 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=collection) |
| `T1123` | Audio Capture | **12** | SigmaHQ 6, Exabeam content library 4, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1123&tac=collection) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 12 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=collection) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=collection) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=collection) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=collection) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=collection) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **10** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=collection) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=collection) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Panther analysis 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=collection) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **10** | Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2, Okta customer detections 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=collection) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=collection) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **9** | Splunk Security Content 5, SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=collection) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=collection) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=collection) |
| `T1056.002` | GUI Input Capture | **8** | SigmaHQ 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1213.002` | Sharepoint | **8** | Wazuh ruleset 4, Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=collection) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=collection) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **7** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=collection) |
| `T1176` | Software Extensions | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 2, Snort 3 community rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176&tac=collection) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=collection) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **6** | SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=collection) |
| `T1564.008` | Email Hiding Rules | **6** | SigmaHQ 4, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.008&tac=collection) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **6** | Elastic detection rules 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=collection) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=collection) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **5** | Elastic detection rules 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=collection) |
| `T1025` | Data from Removable Media | **5** | Splunk Security Content 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1025&tac=collection) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, FalconForce FalconFriday 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=collection) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=collection) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **5** | Splunk Security Content 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **5** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=collection) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=collection) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **4** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1030` | Data Transfer Size Limits | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1030&tac=collection) |
| `T1055.001` | Dynamic-link Library Injection | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1070.008` | Clear Mailbox Data | **4** | Splunk Security Content 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.008&tac=collection) |
| `T1074.002` | Remote Data Staging | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1091` | Replication Through Removable Media | **4** | Splunk Security Content 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1091&tac=collection) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=collection) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=collection) |
| `T1213.006` | Databases | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.006&tac=collection) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=collection) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=collection) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=collection) |
| `T1027.013` | Encrypted/Encoded File | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.013&tac=collection) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=collection) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=collection) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=collection) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=collection) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=collection) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=collection) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=collection) |
| `T1200` | Hardware Additions | **3** | Splunk Security Content 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1200&tac=collection) |
| `T1201` | Password Policy Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1201&tac=collection) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=collection) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=collection) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=collection) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **3** | Exabeam content library 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=collection) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **3** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=collection) |
| `T1593` | Search Open Websites/Domains | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593&tac=collection) |
| `T0811` | T0811 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0811&tac=collection) |
| `T0865` | T0865 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0865&tac=collection) |
| `T1003.007` | Proc Filesystem | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.007&tac=collection) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=collection) |
| `T1006` | Direct Volume Access | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1006&tac=collection) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=collection) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **2** | AI DFIR toolkit 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=collection) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=collection) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=collection) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=collection) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=collection) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=collection) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=collection) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1553.004` | Install Root Certificate | **2** | Elastic detection rules 1, AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1555.006` | Cloud Secrets Management Stores | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.006&tac=collection) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=collection) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=collection) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=collection) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=collection) |
| `T1591.004` | Identify Roles | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=collection) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=collection) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=collection) |
| `T0830` | T0830 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0830&tac=collection) |
| `T0842` | T0842 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0842&tac=collection) |
| `T0843` | T0843 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0843&tac=collection) |
| `T0845` | T0845 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0845&tac=collection) |
| `T0858` | T0858 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0858&tac=collection) |
| `T0886` | T0886 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0886&tac=collection) |
| `T0889` | T0889 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0889&tac=collection) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1003.003` | NTDS | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=collection) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=collection) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=collection) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=collection) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=collection) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=collection) |
| `T1020.001` | Traffic Duplication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=collection) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=collection) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=collection) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=collection) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=collection) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=collection) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=collection) |
| `T1078.002` | Domain Accounts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1078.003` | Local Accounts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=collection) |
| `T1098.002` | Additional Email Delegate Permissions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1102.003` | One-Way Communication | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=collection) |
| `T1120` | Peripheral Device Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1120&tac=collection) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=collection) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=collection) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1137.005` | Outlook Rules | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.005&tac=collection) |
| `T1176.001` | Browser Extensions | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1176.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=collection) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=collection) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=collection) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=collection) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=collection) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=collection) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=collection) |
| `T1423` | T1423 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1423&tac=collection) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=collection) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=collection) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=collection) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=collection) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=collection) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=collection) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=collection) |
| `T1496.004` | Cloud Service Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1505.005` | Terminal Services DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.005&tac=collection) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=collection) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=collection) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=collection) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=collection) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=collection) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=collection) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=collection) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=collection) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=collection) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=collection) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=collection) |
| `T1546.007` | Netsh Helper DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.007&tac=collection) |
| `T1547.002` | Authentication Package | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=collection) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=collection) |
| `T1547.010` | Port Monitors | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.010&tac=collection) |
| `T1547.014` | Active Setup | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.014&tac=collection) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1548.006` | TCC Manipulation | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.006&tac=collection) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=collection) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=collection) |
| `T1555.001` | Keychain | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1557.002` | ARP Cache Poisoning | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1557.003` | DHCP Spoofing | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=collection) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1560.002` | Archive via Library | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1560.003` | Archive via Custom Method | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=collection) |
| `T1563.002` | RDP Hijacking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=collection) |
| `T1564.002` | Hidden Users | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=collection) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1567.004` | Exfiltration Over Webhook | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=collection) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=collection) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=collection) |
| `T1578.002` | Create Cloud Instance | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1578.004` | Revert Cloud Instance | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.004&tac=collection) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=collection) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1586` | Compromise Accounts | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586&tac=collection) |
| `T1586.002` | Email Accounts | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1589.002` | Email Addresses | **1** | Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=collection) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=collection) |
| `T1599.001` | Network Address Translation Traversal | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1600` | Weaken Encryption | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1600&tac=collection) |
| `T1602` | Data from Configuration Repository | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1602&tac=collection) |
| `T1602.002` | Network Device Configuration Dump | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1602.002&tac=collection) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=collection) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=collection) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=collection) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=collection) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=collection) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=collection) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=collection) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=collection) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=collection) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=collection) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=collection) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=collection) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=collection) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=collection) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=collection) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=collection) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=collection) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=collection) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=collection) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=collection) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=collection) |
| `T1646` | T1646 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1646&tac=collection) |
| `T1648` | Serverless Execution | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1648&tac=collection) |
| `T1651` | Cloud Administration Command | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1651&tac=collection) |
| `T1657` | Financial Theft | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1657&tac=collection) |
| `T1660` | T1660 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1660&tac=collection) |
| `T1685.001` | Disable or Modify Windows Event Log | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=collection) |
| `T1692.001` | T1692.001 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1692.001&tac=collection) |
| - | No technique tagged | **48** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Microsoft Defender hunting 12, SigmaHQ 2 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=collection) |


---

## Command and Control detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/command-and-control/

3,931 detections in the library are tagged Command and Control, across 324 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 3,931](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=command-and-control).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **1521** | Emerging Threats Open 943, Microsoft Sentinel 259, Elastic detection rules 103 and 14 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1219` | Remote Access Tools | **805** | LOLRMM 667, Anvilogic Forge armory 29, Elastic detection rules 26 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **566** | Anvilogic Forge armory 101, Emerging Threats Open 99, SigmaHQ 87 and 17 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **245** | Elastic protections 108, Elastic detection rules 80, Microsoft Sentinel 32 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **232** | Exabeam content library 58, SigmaHQ 42, Microsoft Sentinel 40 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **192** | Emerging Threats Open 109, Microsoft Sentinel 60, Elastic detection rules 11 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **127** | Anvilogic Forge armory 28, Elastic detection rules 27, SigmaHQ 24 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **126** | Elastic protections 65, Elastic detection rules 55, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **105** | Microsoft Sentinel 32, SigmaHQ 22, Elastic detection rules 22 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **104** | Emerging Threats Open 90, Microsoft Sentinel 8, Snort 3 community rules 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **101** | Microsoft Sentinel 32, Elastic detection rules 21, Wazuh ruleset 17 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **83** | Microsoft Sentinel 19, Elastic detection rules 19, SigmaHQ 13 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **79** | SigmaHQ 17, Elastic protections 17, Elastic detection rules 15 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **67** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Elastic detection rules 14, Exabeam content library 11 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **59** | Elastic detection rules 22, Elastic protections 15, SigmaHQ 14 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1219.002` | Remote Desktop Software | **59** | SigmaHQ 46, Elastic detection rules 13 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1219.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **57** | Microsoft Sentinel 42, Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **56** | Elastic detection rules 13, Anvilogic Forge armory 12, SigmaHQ 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **53** | Microsoft Sentinel 34, Elastic detection rules 15, MITRE CAR 1 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **51** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Elastic detection rules 15, Anvilogic Forge armory 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **49** | Microsoft Sentinel 36, Elastic detection rules 6, Elastic protections 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1573` | Encrypted Channel | **47** | Emerging Threats Open 21, Microsoft Sentinel 11, SigmaHQ 6 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **42** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, Elastic detection rules 12, Elastic protections 11 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **41** | Microsoft Sentinel 22, Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 5 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **39** | Anvilogic Forge armory 15, Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 5 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **36** | Elastic detection rules 17, Elastic protections 13, Elastic hunting queries 5 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1568.002` | Domain Generation Algorithms | **36** | Exabeam content library 13, Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 9 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **35** | Microsoft Sentinel 29, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **32** | SigmaHQ 9, Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 9 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1090.003` | Multi-hop Proxy | **30** | Exabeam content library 13, Google SecOps (Chronicle) 5, Microsoft Sentinel 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **29** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **29** | Elastic protections 16, Elastic detection rules 10, SigmaHQ 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **29** | Anvilogic Forge armory 19, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **28** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 10, Elastic protections 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 24, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **24** | Elastic detection rules 11, SigmaHQ 6, Elastic protections 4 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **23** | Elastic detection rules 11, SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **23** | Elastic detection rules 10, Elastic protections 8, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1197` | BITS Jobs | **22** | Anvilogic Forge armory 8, SigmaHQ 6, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1197&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **22** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **22** | Elastic detection rules 9, Elastic protections 6, Microsoft Sentinel 5 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic protections 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 3 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 21 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic detection rules 2, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **21** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 3, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Elastic detection rules 7, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **19** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic protections 4 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1132` | Data Encoding | **19** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Snort 3 community rules 2 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Elastic protections 3, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Panther analysis 2, Exabeam content library 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 16, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **18** | Elastic detection rules 7, Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **16** | Elastic protections 6, Microsoft Sentinel 6, Exabeam content library 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **16** | Elastic protections 8, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 6, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **15** | Elastic detection rules 8, Elastic protections 5, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **15** | Elastic protections 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **15** | Elastic protections 9, Elastic detection rules 5, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **14** | Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1071.002` | File Transfer Protocols | **14** | Anvilogic Forge armory 9, Exabeam content library 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 3 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **13** | Elastic detection rules 6, Anvilogic Forge armory 3, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **13** | Elastic protections 6, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **13** | Elastic protections 6, SigmaHQ 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **13** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 3, Anvilogic Forge armory 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **12** | SigmaHQ 6, Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218.007` | Msiexec | **12** | Elastic detection rules 8, Exabeam content library 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.007&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **12** | Elastic detection rules 9, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1021.001` | Remote Desktop Protocol | **11** | SigmaHQ 5, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1090.001` | Internal Proxy | **11** | SigmaHQ 6, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **11** | Elastic protections 6, Elastic detection rules 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **11** | Splunk Security Content 5, Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Elastic detection rules 4, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **10** | Elastic protections 3, Splunk Security Content 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1564.004` | NTFS File Attributes | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1102.001` | Dead Drop Resolver | **9** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **8** | Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **8** | SigmaHQ 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic protections 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic protections 1, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **8** | Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1132.001` | Standard Encoding | **7** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1137` | Office Application Startup | **7** | SigmaHQ 4, Elastic protections 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **6** | SigmaHQ 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1037` | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | **6** | Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1059.011` | Lua | **6** | Elastic detection rules 4, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.011&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **6** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **6** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1003.003` | NTDS | **5** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **5** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **5** | Splunk Security Content 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1609` | Container Administration Command | **5** | Elastic detection rules 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1609&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1620` | Reflective Code Loading | **5** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1620&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1048.001` | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1048.002` | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, Exabeam content library 1, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1102.003` | One-Way Communication | **4** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1127` | Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Micah Babinski Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **4** | Splunk Security Content 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **4** | Micah Babinski Sigma rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **4** | Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1546.016` | Installer Packages | **4** | Elastic protections 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.016&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1573.001` | Symmetric Cryptography | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1583.001` | Domains | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1584.002` | DNS Server | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1001.003` | Protocol or Service Impersonation | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1030` | Data Transfer Size Limits | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1030&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1055.009` | Proc Memory | **3** | Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.009&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **3** | Panther analysis 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **3** | Elastic protections 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1553.001` | Gatekeeper Bypass | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **3** | Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1563` | Remote Service Session Hijacking | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1563.001` | SSH Hijacking | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1567.003` | Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **3** | Elastic protections 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1003.008` | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.008&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1027.010` | Command Obfuscation | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.010&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1071.005` | Publish/Subscribe Protocols | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1080` | Taint Shared Content | **2** | Anvilogic Forge armory 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1080&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1137.004` | Outlook Home Page | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1204.004` | Malicious Copy and Paste | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1437` | T1437 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1437&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1489` | Service Stop | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1489&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1496.004` | Cloud Service Hijacking | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **2** | Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **2** | Elastic protections 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1564.003` | Hidden Window | **2** | SigmaHQ 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1586.002` | Email Accounts | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1586.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1588.002` | Tool | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, AIPT detection pack 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1591` | Gather Victim Org Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1591&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1595.003` | Wordlist Scanning | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1647` | Plist File Modification | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1647&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T0884` | T0884 | **1** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0884&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T0885` | T0885 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0885&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1016.001` | Internet Connection Discovery | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1021.005` | VNC | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1027.011` | Fileless Storage | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.011&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1036.004` | Masquerade Task or Service | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1037.004` | RC Scripts | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1037.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1055.008` | Ptrace System Calls | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.008&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1090.004` | Domain Fronting | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1092` | Communication Through Removable Media | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1092&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1098.005` | Device Registration | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1129` | Shared Modules | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1129&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1200` | Hardware Additions | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1200&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1205` | Traffic Signaling | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1205&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1205.001` | Port Knocking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1205.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218.001` | Compiled HTML File | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1220` | XSL Script Processing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1220&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1505.001` | SQL Stored Procedures | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1529` | System Shutdown/Reboot | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1529&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1543.001` | Launch Agent | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1552.005` | Cloud Instance Metadata API | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.005&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1556.003` | Pluggable Authentication Modules | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1563.002` | RDP Hijacking | **1** | Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1563.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1564.006` | Run Virtual Instance | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.006&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1567.004` | Exfiltration Over Webhook | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1568.001` | Fast Flux DNS | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1569.001` | Launchctl | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1585` | Establish Accounts | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1587.002` | Code Signing Certificates | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1587.002&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1588.004` | Digital Certificates | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.004&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1613` | Container and Resource Discovery | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1613&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1649` | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1649&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1651` | Cloud Administration Command | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1651&tac=command-and-control) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=command-and-control) |
| - | No technique tagged | **116** | Microsoft Sentinel 45, SigmaHQ 31, Microsoft Defender hunting 28 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=command-and-control) |


---

## Exfiltration detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/exfiltration/

1,564 detections in the library are tagged Exfiltration, across 264 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 1,564](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=exfiltration).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **705** | Emerging Threats Open 572, Microsoft Sentinel 75, Elastic detection rules 18 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **185** | Microsoft Sentinel 62, Elastic detection rules 36, Panther analysis 21 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **152** | Microsoft Sentinel 78, Elastic detection rules 23, Anvilogic Forge armory 14 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **106** | Microsoft Sentinel 51, Snort 3 community rules 20, SigmaHQ 10 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1048.003` | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **89** | Exabeam content library 45, Anvilogic Forge armory 19, Splunk Security Content 10 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **82** | Microsoft Sentinel 31, Elastic detection rules 15, Panther analysis 12 and 9 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **74** | Microsoft Sentinel 56, Elastic detection rules 17, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1567.002` | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | **62** | SigmaHQ 14, Elastic detection rules 14, Anvilogic Forge armory 11 and 6 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **59** | Microsoft Sentinel 32, Elastic detection rules 12, Panther analysis 7 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1030` | Data Transfer Size Limits | **43** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Anvilogic Forge armory 11, Splunk Security Content 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1030&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **39** | Microsoft Sentinel 32, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **38** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, Elastic detection rules 10, Anvilogic Forge armory 7 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1105` | Ingress Tool Transfer | **37** | Elastic detection rules 9, Anvilogic Forge armory 8, Microsoft Sentinel 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1105&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **35** | Microsoft Sentinel 21, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **33** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **33** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **28** | Microsoft Sentinel 19, Elastic detection rules 8, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **27** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, SigmaHQ 8, Elastic detection rules 3 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **25** | Microsoft Sentinel 22, Elastic detection rules 2, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **24** | Microsoft Sentinel 19, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **23** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1052.001` | Exfiltration over USB | **21** | Exabeam content library 16, Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1052.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 18, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 15, Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 13, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **18** | Elastic detection rules 7, Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 4 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **17** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 5, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 14, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1091` | Replication Through Removable Media | **15** | Exabeam content library 13, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1091&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, SigmaHQ 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 11, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **13** | Elastic detection rules 8, SigmaHQ 2, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1052` | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium | **12** | Exabeam content library 5, Elastic detection rules 4, Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1052&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Panther analysis 3, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 3, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **11** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1056` | Input Capture | **10** | Snort 3 community rules 10 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **10** | Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 2, Exabeam content library 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 10 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1568.002` | Domain Generation Algorithms | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **10** | Anvilogic Forge armory 7, mdecrevoisier [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1008` | Fallback Channels | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1008&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, Google Cloud security analytics 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **9** | Agent Threat Rules 5, Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 9 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1048.001` | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Wazuh ruleset 3, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1048.002` | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol | **8** | Google SecOps (Chronicle) 4, Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1197` | BITS Jobs | **8** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4, mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1197&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **7** | mdecrevoisier Sigma rules 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **7** | Elastic detection rules 5, Elastic protections 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1071.002` | File Transfer Protocols | **7** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Exabeam content library 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1029` | Scheduled Transfer | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1029&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **6** | Anvilogic Forge armory 5, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **6** | Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2, MITRE CAR 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1102.002` | Bidirectional Communication | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Elastic detection rules 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1114.003` | Email Forwarding Rule | **6** | SigmaHQ 4, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1560.001` | Archive via Utility | **6** | SigmaHQ 4, MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1573` | Encrypted Channel | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, MITRE CAR 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **5** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1110.003` | Password Spraying | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **5** | GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 3, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1505.003` | Web Shell | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1566.003` | Spearphishing via Service | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1573.002` | Asymmetric Cryptography | **5** | Splunk Security Content 4, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **4** | MITRE CAR 1, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1055.001` | Dynamic-link Library Injection | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1074.001` | Local Data Staging | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1090.003` | Multi-hop Proxy | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **4** | Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **4** | Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **4** | Panther analysis 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1556.002` | Password Filter DLL | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1564.008` | Email Hiding Rules | **4** | SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.008&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1573.001` | Symmetric Cryptography | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1573.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1012` | Query Registry | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1012&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1087.002` | Domain Account | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **3** | Panther analysis 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1550.001` | Application Access Token | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1567.003` | Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites | **3** | Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1574.001` | DLL | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T0865` | T0865 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0865&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1003.002` | Security Account Manager | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1021.003` | Distributed Component Object Model | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1021.004` | SSH | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Alex Verboon hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1040` | Network Sniffing | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1040&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1087.001` | Local Account | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1087.004` | Cloud Account | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1102.001` | Dead Drop Resolver | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1134` | Access Token Manipulation | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **2** | Splunk Security Content 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1482` | Domain Trust Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1482&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1496.004` | Cloud Service Hijacking | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **2** | Panther analysis 1, MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1518.001` | Security Software Discovery | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1543.003` | Windows Service | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1547.005` | Security Support Provider | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.005&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1548.002` | Bypass User Account Control | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **2** | Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1558.003` | Kerberoasting | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1567.004` | Exfiltration Over Webhook | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **2** | MITRE CAR 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1593` | Search Open Websites/Domains | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1611` | Escape to Host | **2** | Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1611&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1646` | T1646 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1646&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T0813` | T0813 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0813&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T0826` | T0826 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0826&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T0871` | T0871 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0871&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T0879` | T0879 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0879&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1003.006` | DCSync | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.006&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1007` | System Service Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1007&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1010` | Application Window Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1010&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1011.001` | Exfiltration Over Bluetooth | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1014` | Rootkit | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1014&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1020.001` | Traffic Duplication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1021.006` | Windows Remote Management | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.006&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1036.004` | Masquerade Task or Service | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1039` | Data from Network Shared Drive | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1039&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1053.002` | At | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1056.001` | Keylogging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1056.004` | Credential API Hooking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1056.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.002` | AppleScript | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.006` | Python | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.006&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.007` | JavaScript | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.007&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1059.009` | Cloud API | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.009&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1069` | Permission Groups Discovery | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1069.001` | Local Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1069.002` | Domain Groups | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1069.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1070.006` | Timestomp | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.006&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1071.003` | Mail Protocols | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1074.002` | Remote Data Staging | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1098.001` | Additional Cloud Credentials | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1102.003` | One-Way Communication | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.003&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1110.004` | Credential Stuffing | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1114.002` | Remote Email Collection | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1115` | Clipboard Data | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1115&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1125` | Video Capture | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1125&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1127.001` | MSBuild | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1127.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1132` | Data Encoding | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1132.001` | Standard Encoding | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1132.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1134.002` | Create Process with Token | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1134.005` | SID-History Injection | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1134.005&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1135` | Network Share Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1135&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1136.001` | Local Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1136.002` | Domain Account | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1137.005` | Outlook Rules | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1137.005&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1187` | Forced Authentication | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1187&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1195.001` | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1205` | Traffic Signaling | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1205&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1205.001` | Port Knocking | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1205.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1213.002` | Sharepoint | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1213.006` | Databases | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.006&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1217` | Browser Information Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1217&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1484.001` | Group Policy Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1491` | Defacement | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1505.001` | SQL Stored Procedures | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1538` | Cloud Service Dashboard | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1538&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1546.008` | Accessibility Features | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.008&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1547.009` | Shortcut Modification | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.009&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1550.002` | Pass the Hash | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1552.004` | Private Keys | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1552.006` | Group Policy Preferences | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.006&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1555.001` | Keychain | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1557.001` | Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1558` | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1558.002` | Silver Ticket | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1558.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1560.002` | Archive via Library | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1568.001` | Fast Flux DNS | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1569` | System Services | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1574` | Hijack Execution Flow | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1574.004` | Dylib Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.004&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1574.007` | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.007&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1574.008` | Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.008&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1574.009` | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.009&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1574.011` | Services Registry Permissions Weakness | **1** | MITRE CAR 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1574.011&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1585` | Establish Accounts | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1588.002` | Tool | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1588.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1599` | Network Boundary Bridging | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1600` | Weaken Encryption | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1600&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1610` | Deploy Container | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1610&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1615` | Group Policy Discovery | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1615&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1639` | T1639 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1639&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1657` | Financial Theft | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1657&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=exfiltration) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=exfiltration) |
| - | No technique tagged | **101** | Microsoft Sentinel 59, Microsoft Defender hunting 24, SigmaHQ 8 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=exfiltration) |


---

## Impact detections

https://detect.htora.dev/library/tactic/impact/

1,510 detections in the library are tagged Impact, across 247 techniques. Techniques with the most detections come first. A detection with several techniques counts under each. [Browse all 1,510](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=impact).

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Technique | Name | Detections | By source | Open |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `T1486` | Data Encrypted for Impact | **307** | Emerging Threats Open 186, Microsoft Sentinel 47, SigmaHQ 16 and 10 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1486&tac=impact) |
| `T1485` | Data Destruction | **241** | Microsoft Sentinel 67, Elastic detection rules 43, Panther analysis 36 and 12 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485&tac=impact) |
| `T1496` | Resource Hijacking | **155** | Microsoft Sentinel 42, Emerging Threats Open 40, Elastic detection rules 15 and 13 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496&tac=impact) |
| `T1490` | Inhibit System Recovery | **133** | SigmaHQ 27, Elastic detection rules 22, Panther analysis 17 and 11 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1490&tac=impact) |
| `T1499` | Endpoint Denial of Service | **126** | Microsoft Sentinel 52, Wazuh ruleset 48, Elastic detection rules 7 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499&tac=impact) |
| `T1489` | Service Stop | **115** | Wazuh ruleset 25, Elastic detection rules 21, SigmaHQ 20 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1489&tac=impact) |
| `T1531` | Account Access Removal | **112** | Microsoft Sentinel 27, Wazuh ruleset 25, Elastic detection rules 17 and 8 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1531&tac=impact) |
| `T1498` | Network Denial of Service | **93** | Microsoft Sentinel 63, Wazuh ruleset 15, Elastic detection rules 6 and 7 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498&tac=impact) |
| `T1685` | Disable or Modify Tools | **84** | Microsoft Sentinel 27, Elastic detection rules 24, Panther analysis 14 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685&tac=impact) |
| `T1565` | Data Manipulation | **83** | Microsoft Sentinel 55, Elastic detection rules 18, SigmaHQ 3 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565&tac=impact) |
| `T1529` | System Shutdown/Reboot | **68** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Wazuh ruleset 15, SigmaHQ 8 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1529&tac=impact) |
| `T1190` | Exploit Public-Facing Application | **49** | Microsoft Sentinel 44, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 2, Panther analysis 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1190&tac=impact) |
| `T1059` | Command and Scripting Interpreter | **46** | Microsoft Sentinel 25, Elastic protections 10, Elastic detection rules 9 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059&tac=impact) |
| `T1565.001` | Stored Data Manipulation | **46** | Elastic detection rules 17, Agent Threat Rules 7, SigmaHQ 6 and 5 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1078` | Valid Accounts | **34** | Microsoft Sentinel 30, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078&tac=impact) |
| `T1071` | Application Layer Protocol | **32** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 3, Elastic protections 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071&tac=impact) |
| `T1566` | Phishing | **31** | Microsoft Sentinel 28, Elastic protections 1, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566&tac=impact) |
| `T1041` | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | **29** | Microsoft Sentinel 26, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1041&tac=impact) |
| `T1133` | External Remote Services | **28** | Microsoft Sentinel 28 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1133&tac=impact) |
| `T1070.004` | File Deletion | **26** | Wazuh ruleset 9, Splunk Security Content 8, Elastic detection rules 4 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1119` | Automated Collection | **26** | Microsoft Sentinel 26 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1119&tac=impact) |
| `T1021` | Remote Services | **23** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Elastic detection rules 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021&tac=impact) |
| `T1204` | User Execution | **22** | Microsoft Sentinel 20, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204&tac=impact) |
| `T1070` | Indicator Removal | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 7, SigmaHQ 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070&tac=impact) |
| `T1098` | Account Manipulation | **20** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, Wazuh ruleset 4, Panther analysis 2 and 3 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098&tac=impact) |
| `T1003` | OS Credential Dumping | **19** | Microsoft Sentinel 19 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003&tac=impact) |
| `T1087` | Account Discovery | **18** | Microsoft Sentinel 17, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1087&tac=impact) |
| `T1548` | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 15, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1548&tac=impact) |
| `T1567` | Exfiltration Over Web Service | **16** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 6, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567&tac=impact) |
| `T1491` | Defacement | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 12, Splunk Security Content 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491&tac=impact) |
| `T1552` | Unsecured Credentials | **15** | Microsoft Sentinel 10, SigmaHQ 3, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552&tac=impact) |
| `T1114` | Email Collection | **14** | Wazuh ruleset 13, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114&tac=impact) |
| `T1530` | Data from Cloud Storage | **14** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 5, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1530&tac=impact) |
| `T1059.004` | Unix Shell | **13** | Elastic protections 5, Elastic detection rules 5, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1203` | Exploitation for Client Execution | **13** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Wazuh ruleset 4, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1203&tac=impact) |
| `T1547` | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | **12** | Microsoft Sentinel 12 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547&tac=impact) |
| `T1685.002` | Disable or Modify Cloud Log | **12** | Elastic detection rules 8, Splunk Security Content 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1685.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1027` | Obfuscated Files or Information | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 9, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027&tac=impact) |
| `T1036` | Masquerading | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036&tac=impact) |
| `T1046` | Network Service Discovery | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1046&tac=impact) |
| `T1059.001` | PowerShell | **10** | Elastic protections 3, SigmaHQ 2, Microsoft Sentinel 2 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1566.001` | Spearphishing Attachment | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic protections 1, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1595` | Active Scanning | **10** | Microsoft Sentinel 8, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595&tac=impact) |
| `T1047` | Windows Management Instrumentation | **9** | Elastic protections 4, Elastic detection rules 2, SigmaHQ 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1047&tac=impact) |
| `T1068` | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1068&tac=impact) |
| `T1213` | Data from Information Repositories | **9** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213&tac=impact) |
| `T1048` | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 7, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1048&tac=impact) |
| `T1053` | Scheduled Task/Job | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053&tac=impact) |
| `T1071.001` | Web Protocols | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, benscha KQL advanced hunting 1, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1110` | Brute Force | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Panther analysis 2, Wazuh ruleset 2 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1110&tac=impact) |
| `T1112` | Modify Registry | **8** | Wazuh ruleset 4, SigmaHQ 2, Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1112&tac=impact) |
| `T1189` | Drive-by Compromise | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1189&tac=impact) |
| `T1204.001` | Malicious Link | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1210` | Exploitation of Remote Services | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 2, Splunk Security Content 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1210&tac=impact) |
| `T1499.004` | Application or System Exploitation | **8** | SigmaHQ 3, Elastic detection rules 2, GitLab threat detections (TLDR) 1 and 2 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1537` | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 6, Panther analysis 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1537&tac=impact) |
| `T1555.003` | Credentials from Web Browsers | **8** | Microsoft Sentinel 8 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1070.008` | Clear Mailbox Data | **7** | Splunk Security Content 7 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.008&tac=impact) |
| `T1195` | Supply Chain Compromise | **7** | Splunk Security Content 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195&tac=impact) |
| `T1578` | Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure | **7** | Elastic detection rules 4, Anvilogic Forge armory 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578&tac=impact) |
| `T1619` | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1619&tac=impact) |
| `T1657` | Financial Theft | **7** | Microsoft Sentinel 3, Agent Threat Rules 2, Bert-JanP hunting queries 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1657&tac=impact) |
| `T1053.005` | Scheduled Task | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.005&tac=impact) |
| `T1059.003` | Windows Command Shell | **6** | Elastic protections 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1078.004` | Cloud Accounts | **6** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 and 1 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1078.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1090` | Proxy | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 5, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090&tac=impact) |
| `T1140` | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 4, SigmaHQ 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1140&tac=impact) |
| `T1218` | System Binary Proxy Execution | **6** | Elastic protections 4, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218&tac=impact) |
| `T1555` | Credentials from Password Stores | **6** | Microsoft Sentinel 6 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1555&tac=impact) |
| `T1561.001` | Disk Content Wipe | **6** | Wazuh ruleset 4, SigmaHQ 1, Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1561.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1001` | Data Obfuscation | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1001&tac=impact) |
| `T1021.002` | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1082` | System Information Discovery | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1082&tac=impact) |
| `T1485.001` | Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion | **5** | Elastic detection rules 3, Splunk Security Content 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1485.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1496.004` | Cloud Service Hijacking | **5** | Elastic detection rules 4, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1552.001` | Credentials In Files | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1560` | Archive Collected Data | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1560&tac=impact) |
| `T1566.002` | Spearphishing Link | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1566.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1589` | Gather Victim Identity Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1589&tac=impact) |
| `T1592` | Gather Victim Host Information | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1592&tac=impact) |
| `T1595.002` | Vulnerability Scanning | **5** | Microsoft Sentinel 5 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1686.001` | Cloud Firewall | **5** | SigmaHQ 3, Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686.001&tac=impact) |
| `T0826` | T0826 | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0826&tac=impact) |
| `T1005` | Data from Local System | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1005&tac=impact) |
| `T1020` | Automated Exfiltration | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1020&tac=impact) |
| `T1114.001` | Local Email Collection | **4** | Splunk Security Content 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1114.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1136` | Create Account | **4** | Wazuh ruleset 2, Panther analysis 1, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136&tac=impact) |
| `T1491.001` | Internal Defacement | **4** | SigmaHQ 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1554` | Compromise Host Software Binary | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1554&tac=impact) |
| `T1564.001` | Hidden Files and Directories | **4** | Anvilogic Forge armory 3, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1567.001` | Exfiltration to Code Repository | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1567.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1578.005` | Modify Cloud Compute Configurations | **4** | Elastic detection rules 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.005&tac=impact) |
| `T1659` | Content Injection | **4** | Microsoft Sentinel 4 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1659&tac=impact) |
| `T0813` | T0813 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0813&tac=impact) |
| `T1003.001` | LSASS Memory | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, Hayabusa rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1003.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1055` | Process Injection | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1055&tac=impact) |
| `T1057` | Process Discovery | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1057&tac=impact) |
| `T1071.004` | DNS | **3** | Elastic protections 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1071.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1098.003` | Additional Cloud Roles | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1098.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1102` | Web Service | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102&tac=impact) |
| `T1195.002` | Compromise Software Supply Chain | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1195.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1204.002` | Malicious File | **3** | SigmaHQ 1, Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1204.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1212` | Exploitation for Credential Access | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1212&tac=impact) |
| `T1213.003` | Code Repositories | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1213.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1218.010` | Regsvr32 | **3** | Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.010&tac=impact) |
| `T1218.011` | Rundll32 | **3** | Elastic protections 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.011&tac=impact) |
| `T1499.002` | Service Exhaustion Flood | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Auth0 customer detections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1505` | Server Software Component | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1505&tac=impact) |
| `T1556` | Modify Authentication Process | **3** | Elastic detection rules 2, Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556&tac=impact) |
| `T1561.002` | Disk Structure Wipe | **3** | Splunk Security Content 2, SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1561.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1564` | Hide Artifacts | **3** | Panther analysis 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1564&tac=impact) |
| `T1565.002` | Transmitted Data Manipulation | **3** | SigmaHQ 2, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1565.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1582` | T1582 | **3** | Microsoft Sentinel 3 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1582&tac=impact) |
| `T0827` | T0827 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0827&tac=impact) |
| `T0828` | T0828 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0828&tac=impact) |
| `T0882` | T0882 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0882&tac=impact) |
| `T1018` | Remote System Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1018&tac=impact) |
| `T1074` | Data Staged | **2** | Exabeam content library 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1074&tac=impact) |
| `T1083` | File and Directory Discovery | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1083&tac=impact) |
| `T1113` | Screen Capture | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1113&tac=impact) |
| `T1218.005` | Mshta | **2** | Elastic protections 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.005&tac=impact) |
| `T1222.001` | Windows Permissions | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Exabeam content library 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1484` | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1484&tac=impact) |
| `T1495` | Firmware Corruption | **2** | SigmaHQ 1, Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1495&tac=impact) |
| `T1496.001` | Compute Hijacking | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1496.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1498.001` | Direct Network Flood | **2** | Wazuh ruleset 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1498.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1499.003` | Application Exhaustion Flood | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1547.001` | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1547.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1556.006` | Multi-Factor Authentication | **2** | Elastic detection rules 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1556.006&tac=impact) |
| `T1568` | Dynamic Resolution | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1568&tac=impact) |
| `T1580` | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1580&tac=impact) |
| `T1585.001` | Social Media Accounts | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1593` | Search Open Websites/Domains | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1593&tac=impact) |
| `T1608` | Stage Capabilities | **2** | Panther analysis 1, Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608&tac=impact) |
| `T1629` | T1629 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1629&tac=impact) |
| `T1641` | T1641 | **2** | Microsoft Sentinel 2 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1641&tac=impact) |
| `T0822` | T0822 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0822&tac=impact) |
| `T0831` | T0831 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0831&tac=impact) |
| `T0837` | T0837 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0837&tac=impact) |
| `T0879` | T0879 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0879&tac=impact) |
| `T0883` | T0883 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0883&tac=impact) |
| `T0885` | T0885 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0885&tac=impact) |
| `T0889` | T0889 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T0889&tac=impact) |
| `T1011` | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1011&tac=impact) |
| `T1016` | System Network Configuration Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1016&tac=impact) |
| `T1021.007` | Cloud Services | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1021.007&tac=impact) |
| `T1027.005` | Indicator Removal from Tools | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.005&tac=impact) |
| `T1027.013` | Encrypted/Encoded File | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1027.013&tac=impact) |
| `T1033` | System Owner/User Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1033&tac=impact) |
| `T1036.003` | Rename Legitimate Utilities | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1036.005` | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1036.005&tac=impact) |
| `T1049` | System Network Connections Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1049&tac=impact) |
| `T1053.003` | Cron | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1053.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1059.005` | Visual Basic | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.005&tac=impact) |
| `T1059.012` | Hypervisor CLI | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1059.012&tac=impact) |
| `T1070.009` | Clear Persistence | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1070.009&tac=impact) |
| `T1072` | Software Deployment Tools | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1072&tac=impact) |
| `T1090.002` | External Proxy | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1090.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1095` | Non-Application Layer Protocol | **1** | Wazuh ruleset 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1095&tac=impact) |
| `T1102.003` | One-Way Communication | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1102.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1106` | Native API | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1106&tac=impact) |
| `T1111` | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1111&tac=impact) |
| `T1136.003` | Cloud Account | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1136.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1199` | Trusted Relationship | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1199&tac=impact) |
| `T1202` | Indirect Command Execution | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1202&tac=impact) |
| `T1211` | Exploitation for Stealth | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1211&tac=impact) |
| `T1216` | System Script Proxy Execution | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1216&tac=impact) |
| `T1218.003` | CMSTP | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1218.004` | InstallUtil | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1218.009` | Regsvcs/Regasm | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1218.009&tac=impact) |
| `T1220` | XSL Script Processing | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1220&tac=impact) |
| `T1222` | File and Directory Permissions Modification | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1222&tac=impact) |
| `T1406` | T1406 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1406&tac=impact) |
| `T1409` | T1409 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1409&tac=impact) |
| `T1414` | T1414 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1414&tac=impact) |
| `T1417` | T1417 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1417&tac=impact) |
| `T1418` | T1418 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1418&tac=impact) |
| `T1422` | T1422 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1422&tac=impact) |
| `T1424` | T1424 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1424&tac=impact) |
| `T1429` | T1429 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1429&tac=impact) |
| `T1430` | T1430 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1430&tac=impact) |
| `T1471` | T1471 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1471&tac=impact) |
| `T1474` | T1474 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1474&tac=impact) |
| `T1481` | T1481 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1481&tac=impact) |
| `T1491.002` | External Defacement | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1491.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1499.001` | OS Exhaustion Flood | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1499.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1509` | T1509 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1509&tac=impact) |
| `T1512` | T1512 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1512&tac=impact) |
| `T1513` | T1513 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1513&tac=impact) |
| `T1516` | T1516 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1516&tac=impact) |
| `T1517` | T1517 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1517&tac=impact) |
| `T1518` | Software Discovery | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1518&tac=impact) |
| `T1526` | Cloud Service Discovery | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1526&tac=impact) |
| `T1528` | Steal Application Access Token | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1528&tac=impact) |
| `T1532` | T1532 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1532&tac=impact) |
| `T1534` | Internal Spearphishing | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1534&tac=impact) |
| `T1539` | Steal Web Session Cookie | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1539&tac=impact) |
| `T1541` | T1541 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1541&tac=impact) |
| `T1542` | Pre-OS Boot | **1** | Elastic protections 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542&tac=impact) |
| `T1542.001` | System Firmware | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1542.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1543` | Create or Modify System Process | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543&tac=impact) |
| `T1543.002` | Systemd Service | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1543.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1544` | T1544 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1544&tac=impact) |
| `T1546` | Event Triggered Execution | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546&tac=impact) |
| `T1546.004` | Unix Shell Configuration Modification | **1** | Agent Threat Rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1546.004&tac=impact) |
| `T1550` | Use Alternate Authentication Material | **1** | Panther analysis 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1550&tac=impact) |
| `T1552.007` | Container API | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1552.007&tac=impact) |
| `T1553` | Subvert Trust Controls | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553&tac=impact) |
| `T1553.002` | Code Signing | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1553.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1557` | Adversary-in-the-Middle | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1557&tac=impact) |
| `T1559` | Inter-Process Communication | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559&tac=impact) |
| `T1559.001` | Component Object Model | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1559.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1561` | Disk Wipe | **1** | Hayabusa rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1561&tac=impact) |
| `T1569.002` | Service Execution | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1569.002&tac=impact) |
| `T1570` | Lateral Tool Transfer | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1570&tac=impact) |
| `T1571` | Non-Standard Port | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1571&tac=impact) |
| `T1572` | Protocol Tunneling | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1572&tac=impact) |
| `T1578.003` | Delete Cloud Instance | **1** | Micah Babinski [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1578.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1583` | Acquire Infrastructure | **1** | Elastic hunting queries 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1583&tac=impact) |
| `T1584` | Compromise Infrastructure | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1584&tac=impact) |
| `T1585` | Establish Accounts | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1585&tac=impact) |
| `T1590` | Gather Victim Network Information | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1590&tac=impact) |
| `T1595.001` | Scanning IP Blocks | **1** | benscha KQL advanced hunting 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1595.001&tac=impact) |
| `T1598` | Phishing for Information | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1598&tac=impact) |
| `T1599` | Network Boundary Bridging | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1599&tac=impact) |
| `T1608.003` | Install Digital Certificate | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1608.003&tac=impact) |
| `T1616` | T1616 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1616&tac=impact) |
| `T1617` | T1617 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1617&tac=impact) |
| `T1623` | T1623 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1623&tac=impact) |
| `T1624` | T1624 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1624&tac=impact) |
| `T1625` | T1625 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1625&tac=impact) |
| `T1626` | T1626 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1626&tac=impact) |
| `T1627` | T1627 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1627&tac=impact) |
| `T1628` | T1628 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1628&tac=impact) |
| `T1630` | T1630 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1630&tac=impact) |
| `T1631` | T1631 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1631&tac=impact) |
| `T1633` | T1633 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1633&tac=impact) |
| `T1634` | T1634 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1634&tac=impact) |
| `T1635` | T1635 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1635&tac=impact) |
| `T1636` | T1636 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1636&tac=impact) |
| `T1638` | T1638 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1638&tac=impact) |
| `T1640` | T1640 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1640&tac=impact) |
| `T1642` | T1642 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1642&tac=impact) |
| `T1643` | T1643 | **1** | Microsoft Sentinel 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1643&tac=impact) |
| `T1653` | Power Settings | **1** | SigmaHQ 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1653&tac=impact) |
| `T1673` | Virtual Machine Discovery | **1** | Splunk Security Content 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1673&tac=impact) |
| `T1686` | Disable or Modify System Firewall | **1** | Elastic detection rules 1 | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tech=T1686&tac=impact) |
| - | No technique tagged | **110** | Microsoft Sentinel 41, SigmaHQ 40, Microsoft Defender hunting 19 and 4 more | [Browse](https://detect.htora.dev/library/#tac=impact) |


---

## The tools

https://detect.htora.dev/overview/tools/

Overview

Reading about a scoring model is fine, but at some point you want to type your own numbers in. These pages do the framework's work in your browser: the [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) coverage map, the query translators, and the calculators. Nothing you enter leaves the page, so there's no account to make and nobody to send your backlog to. Each tool keeps its settings in the address, so you can share a link.

Framework v0.136.0.

### Pick the question you have

[**Map your ATT&CK coverage**Which techniques do your detections cover, what could you build with the logs you have, and which log source unblocks the most?](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/)[**Explore the lifecycle**What does each stage need before a detection can leave it?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/lifecycle/)[**Score a backlog**What should you build next, and why that one?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/)[**Find your starting point**You're starting out. What are your first 10 detections?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/start/)[**Score your maturity**Where do you stand, and what do you fix first?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/maturity/)[**Plan OKRs and a roadmap**What does the program commit to next quarter, and over the year?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/okr/)[**Map regulatory controls**Which records answer each control, and which reporting clocks apply?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/regulatory/)[**Find your ceiling**How many detections can this team carry?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/)[**Check coverage and alert load**Is coverage real, does the alert load fit, and should this detection retire?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/)[**Translate a query**What does this query look like in the other languages?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/translate/)[**Translate a scanning query**What is this Shodan, Censys, Netlas, FOFA, or ZoomEye search in the other engines?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scan/)[**Grade an AI product**Does this AI product behave like the closed loop?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/ai/)[**Build a baseline**Given what you collect, what should the first detections be?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/baseline/)[**Check a threat report**A report just landed. Are you covered for it?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/report/)[**Test a rule**Does this rule match the events it should, and only those?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/test/)[**Check a record**Would this record pass lint at its stage?](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/check/)

### ATT&CK coverage, in the browser or in Excel

The [coverage app](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/) does this in your browser, and the [ATT&CK coverage workbook](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-attack-coverage-v0.136.0.xlsx) does it in Excel. Both cover every Enterprise ATT&CK technique and sub-technique. List your detections with a [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) score and mark the data components you collect. The workbook then colors the matrix, flags detections that claim uncollected telemetry, and ranks the log sources that would complete the most of ATT&CK's analytics.

*The ATT&CK matrix colored by coverage status, with the example data*

The matrix with the example data, as the coverage app draws it. Green is covered, amber is partial, blue is ready to build, purple has some of the telemetry an analytic needs, and gray is blind.

The other overviews: [The framework](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/framework/) · [Build detections](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/building-detections/) · [Run and measure](https://detect.htora.dev/overview/running-a-program/).


---

## Map your ATT&CK coverage

https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/

Tell it which platforms you run and which logs you collect, then add your detections. The matrix shows what is covered, what you could detect with the logs you already have, and where you are blind. Export it as an Excel workbook, an image, or a PDF.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

The method behind it [Coverage scoring rules](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/model/)

Your data stays in this browser. Nothing you enter is uploaded, and the page works without an account. [How coverage is scored.](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/model/)

[ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) 20.1 (2026-11-05)


---

## Find your starting point

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/start/

Your log source inventory, your incident history, and your engineering hours a week route you to a path. The answers pick the scoring preset to start from and set how many detections to build at once.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Tips

- Answer three questions. The path lists your first steps in order.
- Each step links to the page or template it needs, and the button under the path opens the backlog scorer with the matching preset.
- Your answers stay in the address, so the link opens on the same path for a colleague.

The method behind it [First steps](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/)


---

## Build a baseline

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/baseline/

Say what you run and what you collect, and get a first set of detections your telemetry can support: the library's best rule for each technique that is ready to build, in your [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem)'s language, in the scorer's order, with the log source silence alert first.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

The method behind it [First steps, 4.1 Build a baseline](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/where-to-begin/#4-1-build-a-baseline)

### What does the environment look like?

Each answer sets the platforms in scope and ticks the log sources that environment usually has. Untick what you do not collect in step 4.

### Which operating systems do you run?

Host sources, and whether Sysmon is on the Windows fleet, which changes what the endpoint analytics can see.

### Which tools and vendors send logs?

A vendor stands for the [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) log sources it emits. Ticking one ticks those sources; the names are ATT&CK's, and some vendors fill several. Cloud platforms and office suites are in step 1.

### Which log sources do you collect?

The list the other three questions filled in, out of the log sources ATT&CK's analytics name. This is the list that decides the baseline. Tick and untick freely.


---

## Check a threat report

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/report/

Somebody forwards a report and asks whether it's covered. Paste the report here and get the answer in three parts: the techniques you already detect, the ones you could build today with the logs you collect, and the ones blocked on a log source you lack.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

It runs in this browser. The report is sent nowhere and is not kept after you close the page. The answer is read from the workspace of the [coverage map](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/) in this browser, so it is as true as that map.

### The rules it reads by

- A technique ID in the text, such as `T1059.001`, counts as cited. An ID that [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) has since replaced is read as its replacement.
- A technique's full ATT&CK name in the text counts as named. Names that are also everyday words, such as Server or Tool, are skipped, and so is a name two techniques share.
- A short list of terms reports use in place of the ATT&CK name is read too: ransomware, web shell, RDP, WMI, and a few more. The page shows the sentence each match came from, so you can untick a wrong one.
- A threat group's name is matched against ATT&CK's groups and their aliases. The techniques ATT&CK records for the group are added only when you ask, because the report may describe a different campaign.
- A report that describes behavior in its own words, with no IDs and no ATT&CK names, will come back short. Read it and add the IDs you find at the end of the text.
- Each technique's status follows the [coverage scoring rules](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/model/), the same ones that color the coverage map.


---

## Score a backlog

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/

Rank the backlog by value per unit of cost. Score each candidate on six inputs, choose one of four weightings, and the page ranks your backlog with the same formula as the repository's scorer. A [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) of 0 blocks a candidate until its data is collected, and a [mandate](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-mandate) due within 90 days moves to the front.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Tips

- Select a ranked row to set its scores against each scale and to see its arithmetic, step by step.
- Paste your own backlog as CSV. The note under the box lists the columns, and this browser keeps the backlog between visits.
- Copy link saves your weights in the address, so you can share an ordering.

The method behind it [Prioritization](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/prioritization/)

### Weights

### Backlog

One candidate per line: id, name, T, I, B, R, E, C, an optional mandate due date (YYYY-MM-DD), and an optional [marginal coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-marginal-coverage) state (first, stronger, equal; blank means first). The repository's scorer derives that state from the live set; here you supply it, because the page has no live set to compare against. [Evidence lines](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line) are enforced in the repo, so the page ranks whatever you paste.

Leave a score blank and the candidate waits at the end of the table until you set it there. A file this page exported pastes back, and this browser keeps the backlog between visits.

Select a row to set its scores against the wording of each scale and to see how its score was reached.

| # | Candidate | Score |
| --- | --- | --- |

### Scales


---

## Translate a query

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/translate/

Paste a query in any of the 13 languages it reads, or a [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rule. The filter is read into a Sigma rule, and pySigma, the converter the pipeline runs in CI, writes that rule out in 13 languages with the same backends and field mappings.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

The method behind it [Query languages](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/languages/)

It runs in this browser tab. The query is never sent anywhere; the first translation downloads the engine (about 5 MB) once, and the browser keeps it.

### Translatable parts

Only the filter translates. A Sigma rule describes which single events to match, so the parts of a query that count, join, rename, or reshape results have no place in it. They are dropped, and the notes above the result list each one.

Fields each parser reads

### Round-trip results


---

## Test a rule

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/test/

A rule that has only ever met its author's imagination tends to do well there. Paste a [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rule and a few real events. The page shows which events the rule matches, which part of the rule decided each one, and which field the rule reads that the event does not have.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

It runs in this browser, in the same Python engine as the query translator. The rule and the events are sent nowhere and are not kept after you close the page.

### Limits of the test

- It tests one event at a time, which is what a Sigma rule describes. A rule that counts events or joins two of them needs the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem).
- Field names are compared as written. Each SIEM renames fields, so a rule that passes here still has to pass the kit's replay in the engine it will run on.
- A nested event is read with dotted names, so `process.name` reads the name inside `process`.
- Text matches ignore case, as Sigma does, unless the rule uses the `cased` modifier.
- The [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) draft reads the rule's fields and values by the [method the detection library uses](https://detect.htora.dev/library/health/), which is checked against rules MITRE's Center for Threat-Informed Defense scored by hand.
- A query in SPL, KQL, or another language goes through [Translate a query](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/translate/) first, which writes it as Sigma.


---

## Translate a scanning query

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scan/

Paste a search written for Censys, Shodan, Netlas, FOFA, or ZoomEye and get it for the other four. Each engine indexes the same things under its own names, so most searches for attacker infrastructure and exposed products cross. One that tests something a single engine computes does not, and the page says why.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Tips

- Paste a search and the other four engines' forms appear as you type.
- A card that says no form names what that engine lacks, so you know what to search by hand.
- Each form has its own link, which opens the search in that engine.

It runs in this browser as you type, and the query is sent nowhere. Nobody has run what it writes against the engines, so check what each search returns.

### The same thing in each engine

The names the translator moves between. A blank cell is something that engine has no field for, and a search that tests it is refused for that engine.

| What it tests | Censys Platform | Shodan | Netlas | FOFA | ZoomEye |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |

### Changes a translation makes to the search

- Every engine but Censys returns one service for each result. Censys returns a host, so the translator puts their conditions inside one `host.services`, which asks for all of them on the same service.
- Going the other way, a Censys search can ask for a title on one service and a certificate on another. The other engines can only ask for both on one, and the page notes it.
- Shodan joins its terms with and. A search with alternatives becomes one Shodan search for each, up to six.
- Shodan has no filter for a response header, so a header is written as the text Shodan stores in the banner, such as `"Server: nginx"`.
- Shodan, FOFA, and ZoomEye have a field for only some parts of a certificate's name. For the rest, the translator searches the whole certificate for the value and adds a note to the result.
- FOFA and ZoomEye negate one condition at a time, so a search that excludes a group is rewritten to exclude each condition in it.
- Only Censys and Netlas read a regular expression. A search with one stays in those two.
- Censys's earlier search language is read too, and written for the Platform, which Censys is moving every search to.
- Each engine scans its own ports on its own schedule, so the same search returns different servers in each.


---

## Check a record

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/check/

Paste a score.yml and an ads.md, or drop the two files anywhere on the page, and get the same findings the kit's lint.py prints. The checks run in this browser, and nothing you paste or drop leaves the page.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

After the first check the findings follow each edit, so a fix shows as its finding leaves. The checks follow the record's stage: a hypothesis needs four sections, research needs the four [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) lines, validate needs every section written and numbered response steps. The score is recomputed with the formula score.py uses, so a hand-typed score shows up.

### The checks, stage by stage

The same table lint.py works from. A record passes when every row at or below its stage is true.


---

## Explore the lifecycle

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/lifecycle/

The lifecycle has eight stages and two loops, and each stage has one countable [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done). Tap a station to see what the stage is for and what it takes to leave it. The panel also shows the owner, the output, the metric, the mistake that usually stalls it, and where a detection goes when the count can't be met.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Tips

- Tap a station to see its definition of done, owner, and most common failure.
- The dashed lines are the two loops: tuning returns to validate, and replacements return to intake.

The method behind it [The lifecycle](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/lifecycle/)


---

## Check coverage and alert load

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/

Detection counts overstate coverage. A detection program is working when its live detections cover the [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) technique set and their alerts fit your [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) hours. This page measures both, and both change when you move the levers. For your own techniques one by one, use [Map your ATT&CK coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/).

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Tips

- Open your own metrics.json to see your program in place of the sample.
- Raise the minimum robustness to see which coverage survives.
- Set your cap on analyst minutes per true positive to see each detection's precision floor.
- Run the retirement check on one detection at a time. It tests all five retirement triggers.

The method behind it [Metrics](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/metrics/)

The kit's `python tools/metrics.py` writes it to `site-data/metrics.json`. Open it or drop it on this page. It stays in this browser.

### Coverage

Coverage is counted per ATT&CK tactic. Each detection counts as its [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) level divided by 5. Seven detections matching a tool's filename score below four matching the behavior: renaming a binary defeats the first group. Raise the minimum level to see what survives.

Robustness-weightedDetection count

### Alert budget

A detection's [run cost](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-cost) is its alerts times the minutes to triage one. Set your numbers and the page works out what fits, what the floor is, and what has to give.

The levers open on the sample program: 30 detections at 1.5 alerts a day each, 14 minutes a triage, three analysts with two hours. That program is over budget, so the levers start from one that has to give.

The cap is the framework default of 120 minutes.

### Retirement check

Check one detection at a time. Enter what it did over the last two 30-day windows and the last 180 days, and the page runs all five retirement triggers against it, using the floor your cap sets. The page has only 180 days of input, so it cannot run the 365-day review trigger; a detection with no alerts in 180 days is flagged as a candidate for it.

### Program snapshot

The sample program's measured numbers, with its 30-day [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) checked against the floor your levers just set.

### Misses by cause

Each incident or exercise that no live detection caught first, by the miss code its detection review recorded. The longest bar is where next quarter's fixes go.

### Definitions

The framework defines numbers, each owned by one stage or by the program as a whole, and tags each as a KPI or a KRI. The repository produces the build-side ones from score.yml and the file layout; the rest come from what analysts record about each alert.


---

## Score your maturity

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/maturity/

Score the program, then raise the lowest dimension. Score each dimension on evidence somebody outside the team could check. Your level is the lowest dimension, because a strong one cannot make up for a weak one.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Tips

- Score each dimension on what is true today.
- The lowest dimension is your level, and the queue lists what to fix first.
- Copy link shares your scores. Nothing is sent anywhere.

The method behind it [Maturity levels](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/maturity/)

### The dimensions

### Your result

[Set next quarter's OKRs from this score](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/okr/)


---

## Plan OKRs and a roadmap

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/okr/

The method behind it [Operating rhythm, 11.6 Quarterly OKRs](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/#11-6-quarterly-okrs)

### The program today

Start from a maturity score, or set each level here. The lowest dimensions are picked to rise first, up to three of them.

### The objectives

[Open the maturity score](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/maturity/)

### The year

in every scored dimension


---

## Map regulatory controls

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/regulatory/

The method behind it [Operating rhythm, 11.7 Regulatory requirements](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/#11-7-regulatory-requirements)

### The regulations

Tick each one the program answers to. The records and clocks below follow.

### The records to keep

Each record once, with every control it answers. The ones the repository keeps, the kit's audit pack counts; the rest a person exports.

### The reporting clocks

### Control by control


---

## Find your ceiling

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/

The method behind it [Scaling](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/scaling/)

### Run it forward

The ceilings above are today's. Set how many detections go live in a month and how many come out, and see when the live set reaches each one. It assumes the levers above stay as they are.

### Raising each ceiling

### Breaking points by size

| Live detections | What still works | What breaks first | The change that reaches the next order of magnitude |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

### Work that does not scale


---

## Grade an AI product

https://detect.htora.dev/tools/ai/

Grade an AI product against the closed loop. Answer each question for a product, or for an agent the team built. A question comes from a check in the closed loop, and the grade is the weakest answer among the questions that count.

Interactive Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Tips

- Answer from evidence the maker showed or the trial produced, and note it beside the answer.
- Mark a function not used when the team will keep it with people. It then drops out of the grade.
- Copy link shares the answers and notes. Nothing is sent anywhere.

The method behind it [Choosing AI for detection and response](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)

### The questions

### The grade


---

## Templates

https://detect.htora.dev/templates/

Ready-made pieces for a detection program: the log source inventory, a blank detection record and variables file, the intake ticket, the review checklist, the naming rules, the quarterly report, and the [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) plan and run report.

Copy and paste Framework v0.136.0. Everything here is CC BY-NC 4.0 and free to use in your own program, so adapt it for your own wiki and keep the [credit line](https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/#credit).

The meetings and roles that use these templates are in [Operating rhythm](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/). For a small team, the three standing meetings add up to about three hours and 40 minutes a month, plus 45 minutes after each incident.

### The templates

#### Log source inventory

Paste into a spreadsheet as CSV and replace the example rows. One row per log source. Fewer than 30 days_kept caps that source's [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) at 2, fields_parsed no caps it at 3, and enriched no or silence_alert no caps it at 4. The usual_gap_minutes column is the normal time between two events from the source, read from a week of data. DET-0000 alerts after three times that gap, and never sooner than 1 hour. Every no in silence_alert is DET-0000's work queue.

```
source,owner,days_kept,fields_parsed,enriched,usual_gap_minutes,silence_alert
Windows Security events from domain controllers,Identity team,90,yes,yes,1,yes
EDR process events,Endpoint team,30,yes,no,1,no
Entra ID sign-in logs,Identity team,30,no,no,5,no
```

#### Detection record

Save as detections/DET-NNNN/ads.md, or let python tools/new.py write it. Each comment says what lint checks under that heading. [A finished record](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/example-record/) shows every section filled in.

```
# DET-NNNN Name of the detection

## Goal

<!-- The behavior, the asset it puts at risk, and who asked for the detection. -->

## Categorization

## Strategy Abstract

<!-- One sentence each. Hypothesis: when an attacker does X, log source Y records Z. -->
Hypothesis:

Log source:

## Technical Context

<!-- Filled at Research. Lint counts these four lines from the research stage on. Put the baseline count in
 score.yml as baseline_7d too: the promotion check fails a first week live with no matches when it is above 0. -->
Plan approved by:
Run tag:
Baseline:
Teardown verified:

## Blind Spots and Assumptions

<!-- Name one thing the detection cannot see. -->

## False Positives

## Validation

## Priority

## Response

<!-- Numbered steps an analyst can follow. Lint needs them from the validate stage on. -->

## Additional Resources

## Retirement record
```

#### Detection variables

Declare each threshold, window, allowlist, and scope once, with its evidence. [Detections in SQL](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sql/#detection-variables) explains each kind.

```
# detections/DET-NNNN/variables.yml. lint.py checks each declaration: a kind the framework defines, a default,
# an evidence line, and bounds for a threshold, a window, or a severity cutoff.
variables:
 name_of_the_value:
 kind: threshold # threshold, window, allowlist, scope, severity_cutoff
 type: integer
 default: 10
 bounds: [5, 50]
 evidence: the count or the query behind the default
```

#### Playbook record

Save beside the playbook's code. [Response playbooks](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/#11-8-response-playbooks) gives the ladder, the stages, and the triggers. The kit has no playbook tools yet.

```
# playbooks/PB-NNNN/playbook.md. One section per field; a playbook that closes alerts needs the last one filled.

# PB-NNNN: Name of the playbook

## Serves
<!-- The detection ids or the alert class the playbook runs on, and the alert volume per day it will see. -->

## Trigger
<!-- The alert field values that start it. Nothing else does, so an alert the trigger does not name goes to a person. -->

## Enrichment
<!-- Each lookup, its source, and the field it fills. A lookup that fails leaves its field empty and says so, and the playbook goes on. -->

## Decision
<!-- The rule that turns the enriched alert into one outcome: close as benign, escalate, or act. Every branch is written down, and the default branch is escalate. -->

## Action
<!-- What it does on each outcome, at which tier of the ladder, and the exact call it makes. -->

## Approval point
<!-- Which actions wait for a person, who that person is, and how long the action waits before it expires unacted. -->

## Rollback
<!-- The call that undoes each action, tested once against a real object, and who may run it. -->

## Manual baseline
<!-- The steps an analyst took by hand before the playbook, timed over at least 20 alerts: median minutes, and the outcome each one got. -->

## Fixtures
<!-- One past alert per outcome, with the enrichment results as they were, and the outcome the analyst recorded. -->

## What it gets wrong
<!-- The alert the decision rule will misread, with its name. A playbook that closes alerts has at least one. -->
```

#### Intake ticket

Paste into your detection ticket type as required fields. Nothing enters the backlog without them.

```
- Candidate title, one line naming the behavior
- ATT&CK technique id, and the tactic it sits under
- Where the idea came from: incident, threat report, red team finding, audit, request
- The six scores with one evidence line each
- Log sources the detection would read, and their readiness
- Who asked, and what they expect to happen when it fires
```

#### Review checklist

Paste into the pull request template. The reviewer works down it in order.

```
- [ ] The record has all 11 sections and the blind spots section says something specific
- [ ] The true-positive fixture produces an alert and the false-positive fixture does not
- [ ] The converted query matches the approved copy for every target
- [ ] The response steps could be followed at 3 a.m. by somebody who has never seen this detection
- [ ] Every tunable number is a declared variable with a default, bounds, and evidence
- [ ] The score's six evidence lines are claims somebody could check
- [ ] The alert volume threshold is set, and the detection deploys with alerting off
```

#### Naming and layout

Paste into the team's readme. Decide once, argue never again.

```
- Detection id DET-NNNN, allocated once and never reused, including after retirement
- Detection title states the behavior and the condition: what happened, under what circumstance
- One technique per detection where possible. A detection covering three techniques is three detections
- File layout detections/DET-NNNN/ carrying detection, record, score, fixtures, and golden queries
- Tags carry the ATT&CK technique and the detection id, so alerts join back to the record
```

#### Quarterly report

Paste into the quarterly report. Each line names the metric it reports, as [Appendix C](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/c/) defines it, and the page ends with one ask.

```
- Coverage: robustness_weighted_coverage by tactic, beside the raw count of live detections
- Outcome: incident_detection_rate, the share of this quarter's incidents a live detection caught first
- Health: the median precision_30d across live detections, minutes_per_true_positive, and rule_debt
- Flow: deploy_lead_time_days, first_pass_validation_rate, and rules_retired_per_quarter
- Capacity: the three ceilings against the live count, and which one binds
- One ask, costed, tied to the ceiling that binds
- Misses: misses_by_cause, most frequent code first, with the fix each code got
- Loop: incidents_without_followup, each one named, with the responder who ran it
- Risk: each KRI against its tolerance, red ones first
- Objectives: last quarter's OKRs scored, and next quarter's
```

| Line | Where its number comes from |
| --- | --- |
| Coverage | [Map your ATT&CK coverage](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/) |
| Outcome | [Check coverage and alert load](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/) |
| Health | [Check coverage and alert load](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/) |
| Flow | [Appendix C](https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/c/) |
| Capacity | [Find your ceiling](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/) |
| One ask | [Find your ceiling](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/scale/) |
| Misses | [Check coverage and alert load](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/) |
| Loop | [Operating rhythm, 11.9](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/#11-9-after-an-incident-and-who-carries-the-pager) |
| Risk | [Metrics](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/metrics/) |
| Objectives | [Plan OKRs and a roadmap](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/okr/) |

#### Threat model handoff

Add to the threat model template. Each unmitigated threat becomes one intake candidate carrying these fields.

```
- Service or system modeled, and the owner who signed the model
- The threat, in one line: what the attacker does and what they reach
- ATT&CK technique id, or ATLAS for an AI system
- Why it is unmitigated: no control, control planned, or control accepted as a gap
- Impact score for the service, 1 to 5, and the data class or blast radius behind it
- The log source that would show the behavior, and whether it is collected today
- Candidate id once filed, so the next model review sees what the backlog did with it
```

#### Emulation plan

Fill this in before anything is provisioned, and have a second person approve it.

```
- [ ] State the objective, and what the source says and leaves out.
- [ ] Describe the threat model: what the adversary is trying to achieve.
- [ ] Describe the victim model, with its resources, controls, identities, and network paths.
- [ ] Name the starting identity, and what the attacker has to earn later.
- [ ] Write the operational flow: each call, its actor, its target, the expected result, and the log it should land in.
- [ ] Estimate the cost if metered services are involved.
- [ ] Name the second person who will approve the plan before anything is provisioned.
```

#### Emulation run report

Write this after the run. It is the artifact that outlives the commands.

```
- Objective, scope, and source material
- Threat model and ATT&CK mapping
- Victim model and assumptions, each with the date it was true
- Operational flow: action, API call, identity, result
- Observations, including denials and identity progression
- Telemetry that appeared, and telemetry that did not
- Coverage outcome per detection that fired
- Infrastructure summary and teardown status
- Recommendation: new detection, tune, logging change, hunt, or more research
```

The review checklist and the emulation plan are written as checkboxes, so they can be ticked off in a pull request. Review the record before the query, because a reviewer who starts with the query tends to review syntax and miss the logic.


---

## Glossary

https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/

Each term this framework uses has one definition here. The list under From the data file is generated from framework.json, so those definitions cannot drift from the ones the tools and the pipeline use.

Reference Framework v0.136.0. 61 terms, plus 22 taken straight from the data file.

### Terms

**Agent**A language model that runs tools on its own to finish a task, such as querying logs, writing a rule, or opening a pull request.

**Agent runner**The program that runs an agent: it supplies the instructions, decides which tools the agent may call, and keeps its credentials.

**AGENTS.md**A file at the root of a repository that tells any agent runner how to work there. In the reference repository it is generated from framework.json.

**Agreement floor**The share of alerts on which a playbook's outcome must match the analyst's, at validate and through propose mode. The default is 0.95, higher for a playbook that closes alerts on its own.

**AI SOC product**A product that triages or investigates alerts with a language model, separate from the SIEM or XDR that raised them.

**Alert**One firing of a detection. It costs an analyst the minutes it takes to triage. Alert volume is what analysts feel.

**Alert volume threshold**The most alerts a detection may raise in its first 7 days live with alerting off: one and a half times the weekly count measured at research, and never under 3. Alerting switches on only when the count stays at or under it.

**Alert-rate check**A scheduled query that counts a live detection's alerts per hour and switches its alerting off when the count passes the limit on its record, then opens a tuning pull request.

**Atomic, micro, full**How much an emulation run covers. Atomic is one technique and one signal question, micro chains two or three behaviors, and full runs end to end across planes and surfaces.

**ATT&CK**MITRE's public catalog of what attackers do, organized as tactics (the goal) and techniques (the method). Coverage here is counted per tactic and each detection names its technique.

**Backlog**The list of detection candidates waiting to be built, in score order.

**Binding ceiling**Whichever of the three ceilings (triage, maintenance, or telemetry) the live count reaches first. It is the smallest of the three, and it sets how many live detections the program can carry.

**Core logic lock**A hash over the selection blocks that express a detection's behavior, taken when the rule is authored. A tuning change may add filters beneath those blocks and must leave the hash unchanged, so an agent tuning out noise cannot weaken the rule.

**Definition of done**The countable condition a detection must meet to leave a lifecycle stage, such as "N engine passes, N golden diffs, one approval". "It looks ready" cannot be counted.

**Detection**The whole artifact: the rule that matches the behavior, the record that explains it, the fixtures that prove it fires, and the score that justified building it.

**Detection as code**Keeping detections as files in version control and shipping them through a build, so a change is reviewable, testable, and reversible.

**Detection zero**The first detection a program builds: an alert for each log source when its events stop arriving. Every other detection depends on it.

**Detonation**Running the attack step of an emulation technique against a live sandbox, after its prerequisites exist. In Stratus Red Team, the step that writes the events a rule is written from.

**Emulation**Running an adversary behavior on purpose, in a controlled environment, to produce the events a detection will be written and tested against.

**Eventual consistency**A cloud control plane accepting a change before every service can see it. Poll for readiness, and let logs settle before calling telemetry missing.

**Evidence line**The one line under each scoring input that says where the number came from: an incident id, a report section, a query and its result, or a ticket. A reviewer argues with the evidence line, and CI rejects a record missing one.

**False negative**An attack that got through unflagged: a rule that did not fire on it, or a triage agent that closed its alert.

**False positive**An alert that was not the behavior it was written for. Its cost is the triage minutes it consumes.

**False-close rate**The share of alerts later confirmed malicious that triage had closed as benign, by a person or an AI agent. [Section 19](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)'s ai_false_close_rate is the same count for an agent alone.

**Field dictionary**The table and field names exported from the SIEM's own schema by a scheduled job, used to check every field a rule reads. It replaces documentation and memory, which is where invented field names come from.

**Fixture**A stored event, captured once, that a detection is replayed against in CI. A true-positive fixture must produce an alert; a false-positive fixture must not.

**Foothold**The access an emulation starts from: stolen long-term credentials, an assumed role, or compromised compute. Starting from an admin session produces events no attacker would generate.

**Golden file**The approved copy of a converted query. CI diffs the freshly converted query against it, so a conversion change cannot ship unnoticed.

**Inventory coverage**A detection that is mapped to a technique and reports as coverage, but whose query never touches the telemetry that technique produces. The heatmap is green and the log is silent.

**KPI**Key performance indicator: a metric that says how well the program does its work. The team sets a target for it.

**KRI**Key risk indicator: a metric that says how exposed the program is. The team sets a tolerance for it, the level at which someone has to act.

**Ladder tier**How much a playbook changes outside the alert: 1 enriches, 2 routes, 3 closes, 4 contains. Each tier needs more of a person.

**Mandate**A regulatory or audit requirement attached to a candidate: the framework, the requirement number, and a due date. A mandate due within 90 days goes to the front of the backlog, ordered by date, and a mandated candidate with readiness 0 is still blocked.

**Marginal coverage**The factor that scores a candidate on what it adds to the live set: 1.0 when no live detection covers its technique, 0.8 when its robustness is higher than the best one that does, and 0.5 when the technique is already covered as well. The scorer derives it from the live set, and CI fails a record whose value disagrees.

**MCP**Model Context Protocol, a standard way to give an agent a tool, such as a read-only query interface to a SIEM.

**Miss code**The one code a detection review gives an incident or exercise that no live detection caught first, naming where the path from log source to analyst broke.

**Orphaned resource**Something the emulation created that infrastructure as code does not know about: a backdoor identity, a key, a grant. Destroy these before the provisioned resources.

**Pipeline pager**The rotation that answers for the detection pipeline itself: a silent log source, a red build, an alert count past its limit, or a playbook action waiting for approval.

**Playbook**The automation that runs when a detection fires: it enriches the alert, decides, and acts or proposes an action. It has a record and moves through the same eight stages as a detection.

**Precision**Of a detection's alerts in a stated window that an analyst closed with an outcome, the share that were true positives. A benign true positive counts against it, and an undetermined close counts on neither side. The program reads it over 30 days, as precision_30d.

**Precision floor**The lowest precision a detection can run at and still be worth its triage minutes: triage minutes divided by the program's cap on analyst minutes per true positive. A detection that stays under its floor for two 30-day periods in a row meets the first retirement trigger.

**Prompt injection**Text written to steer an agent that reads it. In detection work it arrives inside log content an attacker controls: command lines, user names, URLs, and file names.

**Propose mode**A playbook state in which it enriches, decides, and writes what it would do, and a person does it. Every playbook runs this way for 14 days before it acts.

**Replay**Loading a detection's fixtures into a real instance of a query engine and running the converted query against them. A pass proves the query matches what it should. A conversion that only parses proves nothing about behavior.

**Robustness**How hard the detection is to evade, scored on the Summiting the Pyramid levels. A detection matching a filename is brittle; one matching the behavior itself lasts.

**Run cost**What a detection costs every day it is live: alerts per day multiplied by the minutes to triage one.

**Run tag**A unique name and short id put into resource names, identity names, and session names for one emulation run, so its telemetry can be filtered and its leftovers found at teardown.

**Shadow mode**Running an AI triage agent on live alerts with no power to act, so its verdicts can be compared with analysts' decisions before it closes anything.

**SIEM**The system that stores the telemetry and runs the detections against it.

**Sigma**An open format for writing a detection once in YAML and converting it to the query language of whichever SIEM you run.

**Signed fixture**An event captured by a collector the agent cannot write to, carrying the collector's signature. The build verifies the signature before it counts the event as proof that a rule fires.

**Summiting the Pyramid**MITRE's model for scoring how hard a detection is for an attacker to evade, which this framework uses as the robustness input.

**Target**One query language the pipeline converts a Sigma rule into, listed in targets.yml with the backend that emits it. A replay target has an engine CI can run. A convert target has no public instance, so its query stays a draft until somebody runs it on a real one.

**Telemetry**The events a detection reads: logs, EDR data, network records, whatever the SIEM receives.

**Telemetry readiness**Whether the data a detection needs is already in the SIEM and usable, scored 0 to 5. A readiness of 0 blocks the candidate, because nothing can be built on missing telemetry.

**Threat-model intake**The practice of filing every unmitigated threat in a service's threat model as an intake candidate, with the technique, the service's impact, and the log source it needs.

**Triage**An analyst reading one alert and deciding whether it is real. Measured in minutes, because that is what runs out.

**True positive**An alert that was the behavior the detection was written for, whether or not it turned into an incident.

**Tuning**Changing a live detection to cut its false positives without losing the behavior, by excluding a named source of noise.

**Warm-up**In Stratus Red Team, creating a technique's prerequisites with Terraform before anything attacks, so the detonation has something to act on.

**WIP limit**Work in progress limit: how many detections a team allows in flight at once. Weekly engineering hours divided by the hours one detection takes.

### From the data file

Scoring inputs, lifecycle stages, maturity levels, and the scaling ceilings, in their own words.

**Threat relevance (T)**How recently, and how close to you, has this technique been used?

**Impact (I)**What does the attacker reach if the technique succeeds?

**Robustness (B)**How hard is it for an attacker to slip past this detection using the data you have? Score it with the five Summiting the Pyramid levels: 1 matches something the attacker can change in seconds, 5 matches something the technique cannot work without.

**Telemetry readiness (R)**Is the data this detection needs already in the SIEM, and in good enough shape to use?

**Build effort (E)**How many hours of work from writing the hypothesis to passing validation?

**Run cost (C)**How many analyst minutes a day will this detection consume? Expected alerts per day multiplied by the typical minutes to triage one. For a detection that runs as scheduled SQL, add the warehouse compute it burns, converted the same way your finance team converts it.

**Intake (stage)**Write down a request for a new detection with enough context that it can be scored.

**Hypothesis (stage)**Write one sentence saying what the detection will catch, which log source it needs, and what it will miss.

**Research (stage)**Produce the events the rule will be written against, and confirm they exist in your logs. Then count how often they appear during normal business.

**Build (stage)**Write the detection in Sigma and the tests that prove it.

**Validate (stage)**Prove the detection fires on what it should catch, stays silent on what it should ignore, and still matches the query a reviewer approved.

**Deploy (stage)**Put the detection into production with alerting switched off, leave it running for 7 days, and switch alerting on only if the alert count stayed at or under its threshold.

**Tune (stage)**Keep the share of true alerts above the agreed floor as the environment changes.

**Retire (stage)**Remove detections whose alerts cost more analyst time than they are worth.

**Ad hoc (maturity level)**Detections exist. Nothing about them is written down in a place a second person can find.

**Repeatable (maturity level)**Every detection has a record and a defined way in. Two people would build the next one the same way.

**Measured (maturity level)**The program counts its own work: definitions of done carry numbers, the backlog carries scores, alerts carry outcomes.

**Enforced (maturity level)**Machines enforce the definitions of done. A skipped step fails the build.

**Self-correcting (maturity level)**Measurement drives change: detections retire themselves on evidence and coverage claims can be falsified.

**Triage ceiling**How many live detections can the analysts absorb?

**Maintenance ceiling**How many live detections can the engineers keep current?

**Telemetry ceiling**How many detections can be built at all?

Next step [The lifecycle](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/lifecycle/)


---

## Downloads

https://detect.htora.dev/downloads/

Everything here is CC BY-NC 4.0, and any organization may use it to run its own detection program. Adapt it and hand it to an auditor, with the credit line on every copy. Every file is generated from framework.json, so the site, the paper, and the workbook carry the same numbers.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

### The paper

[**WhitepaperPDF**122 pages covering the lifecycle, the scoring model, the metrics, and the appendices, laid out for print.1144 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-whitepaper-v0.136.0.pdf)
[**WhitepaperDOCX**The same paper as a Word document with a table of contents, for editing into your own program doc.146 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-whitepaper-v0.136.0.docx)
[**WhitepaperMD**The same paper as Markdown, for a wiki or a repository.267 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-whitepaper-v0.136.0.md)
[**The whole siteMD**Every page of this site as one Markdown file, in the sidebar's order: the framework, the library's guides, what each tool does, the templates, and the appendices. The tools themselves work only on the site.](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-site-v0.136.0.md)

### Worksheets

[**Scoring workbookXLSX**Every part of the model as a sheet: a backlog scorer with live formulas and worked rows, the weights and presets, the score anchors, the definitions of done, adoption by size, the practices, the cadence, the first 90 days, the maturity model, the scaling ceilings, and the metric definitions, with a read-me first.44 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-worksheets-v0.136.0.xlsx)
[**ATT&CK coverage workbookXLSX**Enterprise ATT&CK 20.1: all 706 techniques and sub-techniques, the 15-tactic matrix colored by status, data components as the log source list, and coverage weighted by robustness. List your detections and mark what you collect; everything else is a formula.713 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-attack-coverage-v0.136.0.xlsx)
[**ATT&CK coverage appAPP**The coverage workbook as a page in your browser. Your data stays on your machine, and it exports to Excel, PNG, or PDF.](https://detect.htora.dev/coverage/)
[**AGENTS.mdMD**Instructions for an agent working in a detection repository: what it drafts at each stage, what a person approves, what it never does, and how to treat log content. Generated from framework.json.11 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/AGENTS.md)
[**Scoring specMD**The scoring model on one page: inputs, formula, presets, mandate handling, and the evidence requirement.9 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/scoring-spec.md)

### The diagram

[**Lifecycle posterPNG**The lifecycle, its loops, and the definitions of done on one poster, 4320 pixels wide, for a deck or a wiki.952 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-lifecycle-v0.136.0.png)
[**Lifecycle posterSVG**The same poster as vectors, for print or restyling.36 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/detect-lifecycle-v0.136.0.svg)

### Machine-readable

[**framework.jsonJSON**The framework itself: stages, definitions of done, score model, metrics, crosswalk. This site and the reference repository both read it.370 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/framework.json)
[**score.schema.jsonJSON**JSON Schema for a backlog record. The repository lints every score.yml against it.8 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/score.schema.json)
[**metrics.jsonJSON**The sample metrics snapshot the dashboard page renders.4 KB](https://detect.htora.dev/data/metrics.json)

Scripts can fetch these files directly, because the server allows requests from other sites and caches each file for five minutes. The workbook opens in Excel, LibreOffice, and Google Sheets; the blue cells are yours to fill.

### The credit line

The work is licensed CC BY-NC 4.0. Anyone may copy, adapt, and share it for noncommercial purposes, as long as each copy credits the author, links the source and the license, and says whether it was changed.

Beyond the license, any organization may use DETECT to run its own detection program, at a company or anywhere else. Selling DETECT, building it into a product or service, or using it in paid consulting or training needs the author's written permission.

Paste this line into any copy or adaptation, and replace none with what you changed:

```
DETECT by Habibullah Tora, https://detect.htora.dev, licensed CC BY-NC 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/). Changes: none.
```

Every page of the paper and the workbooks prints the same line, and every page of the site carries it in its source and metadata. A copy that drops the credit does not meet the license. Rules in the detection library keep their own licenses, which the [sources page](https://detect.htora.dev/library/sources/) lists. Versions before 0.77.0 were released under CC BY 4.0, and copies of them keep that license.


---

## The reference pipeline

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/reference-pipeline/

Section 17

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Stage | What the definition of done counts | The job that fails when it is skipped |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Intake** | 6 scores, each with an [evidence line](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-evidence-line), and 1 computed score | `score` |
| **Hypothesis** | 1 hypothesis sentence, 1 named log source, 1 named blind spot | `lint` |
| **Research** | 1 [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) run, [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) saved, every field checked against a real event, 7 days of baseline counts, lab torn down | `lint` |
| **Build** | lint passes, 1 conversion per target, 1 event it must match, 1 event it must ignore | `lint` `convert` |
| **Validate** | fixtures pass on every replay engine, every converted query approved (matching its approved copy on a re-validation), 1 approval by someone other than the author (one-person team: the author after 24 hours) | `lint` `convert` `replay (one leg per engine)` `golden-diff` `review` |
| **Deploy** | 7 days live with alerting off, alert volume at or under its threshold, then alerting on | `deploy` `promote-check` `field-check (scheduled)` `running-check (scheduled)` |
| **Tune** | [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) checked every 30 days, running query matches the approved copy at each check | `lint (core lock, on pull requests)` `field-check (scheduled)` `running-check (scheduled)` `precision-check (scheduled, planned)` |
| **Retire** | status deprecated, alerting off, record kept, retirement note written, replacement linked if one exists | `deploy (the next package leaves it out)` |

Remember

- Copy the repository layout and replace the example detection with your own.
- The scorer writes every score, and CI fails any score that disagrees with the formula.
- Convert once, commit the approved copies, then review every difference after that.
- Lint also fails when AGENTS.md no longer matches framework.json.
- The Splunk replay leg needs only its container's password and HEC token. The promotion check needs a read-only Splunk account in the siem-read environment, and the two daily checks need the same account in siem-read-daily. The deploy job needs the deploy credential in the production environment.

If you're using the repository as a template, replace the example and point the secrets at a Splunk Cloud stack. Each detection is a directory. It carries rule.yml ([Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma)), ads.md (the record), score.yml (the inputs, an evidence line for each, and a CI-written score), the fixtures, and the approved copies of the converted queries.

| Stage | Sigma status | CI jobs | Artifact |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Intake | no rule file yet | score | score.yml with stage set to intake |
| 2. Hypothesis | no rule file yet | lint | The Goal, Categorization, Strategy Abstract, and Blind Spots and Assumptions sections of ads.md |
| 3. Research | no rule file yet | lint | The Technical Context section of ads.md; the emulation plan and run report; tests/events.jsonl |
| 4. Build | experimental | lint, convert | rule.yml, tests/events.jsonl, tests/expected.yml |
| 5. Validate | test | lint, convert, replay (one leg per engine), golden-diff, review | Passing CI run; approved pull request |
| 6. Deploy | stable | deploy, promote-check, field-check (scheduled), running-check (scheduled) | The pull request that moves the detection from deploy to tune, carrying the promotion check's count for its first 7 days live |
| 7. Tune | stable | lint (core lock, on pull requests), field-check (scheduled), running-check (scheduled), precision-check (scheduled, planned) | A [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) pull request that cites the alert ids that prompted it |
| 8. Retire | deprecated | deploy (the next package leaves it out) | A retirement note in ads.md: reason, date, and the id of the replacement detection |

The definitions of done call these tools in the repository:

| Tool | Jobs it backs | What it does |
| --- | --- | --- |
| lint | lint | Checks the layout and parses the detection. It confirms the id and tag agree, the Sigma status matches the stage, the ADS sections are present, and every named fixture exists. It also validates the score record, rejects any [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) id outside the pinned map, and fails when AGENTS.md no longer matches framework.json. |
| convert | convert, golden-diff | Turns each Sigma rule into all 13 targets in targets.yml, and fails when any output differs from its approved copy. |
| score | score | Computes each record's score and sorts the backlog. |
| metrics | score | Adds to the score job's metrics the numbers only the file layout, incidents.csv, and notifications.csv can tell. |
| package | deploy | Builds a Splunk app from the approved queries. A detection at deploy runs with alerting off, one at tune runs with it on, and a retired one is left out, which takes it out of production. |
| replay | replay, promote-check | Loads the fixtures into a real instance of each replay engine (SQLite, Splunk, Kusto, Elasticsearch, ES|QL, OpenSearch). On the pull request that moves a detection to tune, it counts the first 7 days live against the threshold. |
| history | promote-check | Reads from git when each detection changed stage and when it went live, so no record carries a date by hand. |
| fields | field-check | Once a day, counts the events from each live rule's log source and how many carry each field the rule reads. It fails a source that sent nothing and a field that was empty in every event. |
| running | running-check | Once a day, compares each live rule's saved search in Splunk with what the package writes from main. It fails a changed query, schedule, or alert condition, a disabled search, alerting at the wrong stage, and a search in the app with no live detection behind it. |
| next | none; run by hand | Runs the checks a detection's current stage needs, in one command, and prints what is still missing, the count the stage must reach, and the step that moves the detection on. |
| intake | none; run by hand | Prints the weekly intake meeting's agenda from the records and git: new candidates, the ones blocked on telemetry, the queue in scored order, the work in flight, and what has not moved in a month. |

The precision-check job is planned and not yet written. The other seven targets (EQL, Loki, LogScale, NetWitness, Panther, Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting, Google SecOps) have no public test instance. Their conversions stay drafts until someone runs them on a real one. Separate upkeep tools reshape fixtures for each engine, refresh the pinned ATT&CK map, and regenerate the agent instructions.

I cap each query backend below its next major version in requirements.txt. A major release can change the query a backend emits, and the golden check catches that. When pysigma-backend-sqlite 2.0.0 renamed the table placeholder, it failed the check on DET-0001. To move a cap, you open a pull request that updates the approved copies in the same change.

These have run on the example: lint, convert with the golden check on all 13 targets, score, metrics, packaging with one detection at deploy and one at tune, and the promotion check against a stubbed search. The two daily checks ran against a real Splunk in a container. The field check ran on the fixtures with fields renamed, blanked, and removed, and the running check on the packaged app after edits made through the console's own API. Every replay adapter has run end to end against a real engine in a container: SQLite, Splunk, the Kusto emulator, Elasticsearch, and OpenSearch each returned the two fixtures DET-0001 must match and none of the three it must ignore. The site's own build also copies the kit and breaks it on purpose, one case per check: a rule only some targets can convert, a regular expression, a silent re-approval, each stage move the lifecycle refuses, and each count the promotion check fails on. The build stops if any tool misses its break. These haven't run anywhere yet and stay placeholders until they do: the container services inside the GitHub Actions workflow, and the AppInspect and ACS steps.

Next step [Detection as code](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/detection-as-code/)


---

## Borrowed practices

https://detect.htora.dev/framework/sources/

Section 20

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Source | Where it does work |
| --- | --- |
| Palantir Alerting and Detection Strategy Framework | ads.md section names per detection, plus a Retirement record section this framework adds, so a record has 11 sections |
| [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rule status field | stage marker on every rule file; the Sigma rule itself is the single source each query language is generated from |
| MITRE CTID [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) | [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) input, 5 levels (anchor wording paraphrased) |
| MITRE [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) | technique field in score.yml, validated by lint, which also accepts ATLAS ids; tactic derived by metrics.py from the pinned map. The coverage app on the site tracks Enterprise, ICS, and Mobile separately and follows MITRE's releases. Pinned 20.0 (Enterprise) and 20.0 (ICS) on 2026-10-16. |
| MITRE ATLAS | technique ids for attacks on AI systems, accepted in score.yml beside ATT&CK ids; the ATLAS and D3FEND page lists the techniques ATLAS ties to a mitigation that detects. Release 2026.09, read through tools/atlas_extract.py into attack/atlas-2026.09.json. |
| MITRE D3FEND | the defensive techniques D3FEND links to each Enterprise and ICS technique, listed in the coverage map's technique detail by the artifact each one analyzes. Release 1.6.0, read through tools/d3fend_extract.py into attack/d3fend-1.6.0.json. |
| MITRE CTID Top ATT&CK Techniques | threat_relevance anchor 3 |
| SAFe Weighted Shortest Job First | formula shape: value over cost |
| Elastic Security Labs, Cloud Threat [Emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation) methodology | The emulation section: start modes, scope layers, plan-before-execute, [foothold](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-foothold) realism, telemetry verification, coverage outcomes, teardown. Part 1, published 21 September 2026, Terrance DeJesus and Bryan Porras Blanch. |
| MITRE Center for Threat-Informed Defense, Adversary Emulation Library | The plan-first shape of an emulation, and the micro and full scope layers. Public repository, read September 2026. |

Sigma's status field does the work of a stage label from build on, with deploy and tune sharing stable. [Section 17](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/reference-pipeline/) lists the status and the CI jobs for each stage.

### 20.1 Open items

These get checked against their primary sources before each release:

- MITRE ATT&CK: re-run tools/attack_pin.py on each ATT&CK release and review the map diff; v19.2 renamed Defense Evasion to Stealth and added Defense Impairment; v20.0 added nine techniques, among them direct and indirect [prompt injection](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-prompt-injection), and moved none, and ICS techniques now include T16xx ids
- MITRE ATLAS: re-run tools/atlas_extract.py and the kit's tools/attack_pin.py --atlas-only on each ATLAS release and review the diff. The five mitigations the extract counts as detecting are named in the script and need checking against each release
- MITRE D3FEND: re-run tools/d3fend_extract.py on each D3FEND release. Release 1.6.0 maps to ATT&CK 19.0, so check which revoked ids moved to their replacements and whether a later release maps the techniques ATT&CK 20.0 added
- MITRE CTID Summiting the Pyramid: verify level wording and current version against the CTID primary source
- MITRE CTID Top ATT&CK Techniques: verify current list and calculator inputs against the CTID primary source
- Sigma rule status field: verify the status value list against the current Sigma specification
- Detection Engineering Maturity Matrix: map stages to dimensions from the primary source; unmapped until verified
- ACSC and CISA priority logs for [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) ingestion (2025): map the 14 source categories to the telemetry inventory template


---

## Checks against outside sources

https://detect.htora.dev/evidence/

The site makes claims about [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) and D3FEND, about 4,211 Windows [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) rules in its library, and about the queries its kit converts. This page says which of those claims something other than the author has checked, with the numbers, and which remain opinion.

Evidence Framework v0.136.0. The four generated checks rerun with the data they test: the ATT&CK check on every ATT&CK release, the D3FEND check on every D3FEND release, the draft check on every build, and the recordings on the weekly library job.

### The ATT&CK extract, against MITRE's own library

The coverage map and the library read ATT&CK 20.1 through a parser this site wrote. On 2026-11-06, `tools/attack_crosscheck.py` read the same STIX bundle with mitreattack-python 5.4.1, the library MITRE maintains, and compared every count the site shows. They agree on all of them.

| Compared | Items |
| --- | --- |
| techniques | 706 |
| platforms | 706 |
| analytics | 1,708 |
| components | 706 |
| used by | 706 |
| revoked | 149 |
| deprecated | 12 |
| platform counts | 11 |

'Used by' counts direct users; MITRE's library would add 280 group-technique pairs credited through campaigns attributed to the group.

### The D3FEND links, against the source's own API

The coverage map reads D3FEND 1.6.0 from the release's bulk mappings file, which lists each ATT&CK technique's links on its own. D3FEND's website counts a parent technique's links with its sub-techniques' and a sub-technique's with its parent's, and the map does the same fold. On 2026-10-20, `tools/d3fend_extract.py --check` asked D3FEND's API about 5 techniques and compared the count of defensive techniques, and of those that detect. They agree on every one.

| Technique | The map (detect) | D3FEND's API (detect) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| T1003 OS Credential Dumping | 48 (19) | 48 (19) |
| T1003.001 LSASS Memory | 12 (3) | 12 (3) |
| T1558.003 Kerberoasting | 21 (10) | 21 (10) |
| T1059.001 PowerShell | 15 (4) | 15 (4) |
| T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol | 11 (9) | 11 (9) |

### The robustness draft, against hand scores from MITRE's CTID

The library's [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) draft reads a rule and assigns [Summiting the Pyramid](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-summiting-the-pyramid) level 1, 2, or 3. MITRE's Center for Threat-Informed Defense scored 92 public analytics by hand and published the table; 72 of them are SigmaHQ rules the draft can read. On 2026-11-03 the draft matched the hand score on 55 of the 72, stayed at or under it on 66, and was within one level on 66. The draft is meant as a floor a person raises, so the second number is the one that matters, and the 6 rules it overshoots are listed in [the check's output](https://detect.htora.dev/library/data/robustness-check.json). The rules and the table are kept in the repository under `library/ctid/`, so the check reruns on every build.

| CTID's level | The draft's level | Rules |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | 1 | 30 |
| 1 | 2 | 4 |
| 1 | 3 | 2 |
| 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 2 | 2 | 17 |
| 3 | 1 | 4 |
| 3 | 3 | 8 |
| 4 | 3 | 4 |

### The library's Windows rules, against recorded attacks

OTRF's [Security-Datasets](https://github.com/OTRF/Security-Datasets) are Windows event logs captured while one technique ran in a lab, each tagged with the techniques it exercised. On 2026-11-09 the library loaded 107 recordings, 776,654 events covering 56 techniques, and ran every Windows Sigma rule in the catalog against them. Each rule was converted with pySigma's Sysmon and Windows pipelines, so it reads only its own channel and event id. 1,695 of the 4,211 rules have a recording of a technique they name.

| Of those 1,695 rules | Rules |
| --- | --- |
| fired on a recording of its technique | 139 |
| stayed silent, though the recording carries events of the type it reads | 1,307 |
| could not fire: the recording lacks a field the rule reads | 45 |
| could not fire: the recording has no event of the type it reads | 119 |
| could not run: a keyword rule, or one the SQLite backend cannot convert | 85 |

A rule that fired is confirmed on real events of its technique; each one says so on its library page, and the library filter *Fired on a recorded attack* lists them. A rule that stayed silent is not shown wrong: a recording exercises one procedure, and a rule for the same technique may watch another. The two "could not fire" rows are facts about the recordings as much as the rules. No benign recording exists in the corpus, so nothing here measures [false positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-false-positive). The weekly library job reruns this with `library/recordings.py` and commits the result.

### Other runs and reviews

#### The kit's replay, in real engines

2026-10-15

DET-0001's converted queries ran in containers of Splunk (splunk/splunk:latest), the Kusto emulator (kustainer), Elasticsearch 8.15.0, and OpenSearch 2.16.0, and in SQLite, each loaded with the five [fixture](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture) events.

Every engine returned the two events the rule must match and none of the three it must ignore. The dry runs had hidden two faults. Elasticsearch rejected every document, because the index mapping tried to map nested objects as keywords. The Splunk image now refuses to start without the terms flag.

The converted queries mean the same thing in five engines, on these five events.

#### The production count, against a real Splunk search endpoint

2026-10-15

In a copy of the kit with git history that set DET-0001 to deploy three days earlier, tools/replay.py --production ran against the container's REST API.

It reported 3.0 of 7 days live and a count of 0, and no error. The count was 0 because the admin role's default search scope leaves out the fixture index, so a detection that fires could have passed as quiet. Since v0.85.0 the count searches the indexes named in SPLUNK_INDEXES, and the promotion check fails a count of 0 when that variable is unset.

The search request and the window from git history work end to end, and a count needs its indexes named. The promotion check itself has run only against a stubbed search, in the kit self-test.

#### The kit's field check, in a real Splunk

2026-10-29

tools/fields.py checked DET-0001 against Splunk 10.6 (splunk/splunk:latest) in a container, over indexes loaded with its five fixture events: as recorded, with ServiceName renamed, with ServiceName blank, with TicketEncryptionType removed, under another source name, and under another event id. A review of the first version, on 2026-10-29, found two faults. It took a selection's name as the sign of an exclusion, where the rule's condition is the sign. It also counted every event from the source, so a missing event type read as a renamed field.

It passed the events as recorded and failed the other five. Each failure named the field or the source and what it breaks: without TicketEncryptionType the rule cannot match, and without ServiceName its two exclusions never apply. The count now covers only the event the rule fixes, 4769, and a source that flows without it fails as a stopped event. Splunk refused every search on the first run because its disk had less than 5 GB free, and the check now prints Splunk's reason.

The check catches a renamed, blank, or missing field, a source that arrives under another name, and an event that stopped being logged, on these events. It has not run against a production Splunk.

#### The kit's running check, in a real Splunk

2026-10-29

tools/package_app.py built the Splunk app with DET-0001 at tune, and the app was installed in Splunk 10.6 (splunk/splunk:latest) in a container. The check, tools/running.py, then ran after each change made through Splunk's REST API, the interface its console uses.

It passed the app as built. It failed an exclusion added to the query, naming the words added, and failed the search disabled, the alert threshold raised, alerting switched off, and a second search added to the app. It also failed alerting left on after the record moved back to deploy, a live detection with no saved search, and a missing app. A review on 2026-10-29 found three console edits the first version passed, because it compared only the settings the package writes: throttling, a custom trigger condition, and a schedule window. It fails each of them now. Splunk refused to delete the packaged search, so a console user can disable one but not remove it.

The check sees the console edits Splunk allows on a packaged search, on one detection. It has not run against a production Splunk, and it reads only Splunk.

#### The kit self-test

every build

tools/kit_selftest.py copies the kit, breaks it 61 ways, and runs the tool that should notice each break. Eight of the cases test the core lock. It must refuse a changed selection, a removed filter, a one-field filter, and a filter that wildcards a directory. It must accept a three-field filter, the same rule reordered, and any change to a rule not yet live.

Every case passes on this kit. Against the v0.61 kit, 32 of the 33 cases that existed then failed.

Each check in the kit catches the fault it exists for.

#### One pass of the closed loop, by hand

2026-10-16

The author walked [section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/)'s six stages against the 107 recorded attacks, on LSASS memory dumped through comsvcs.dll. The pass counted the two fields the candidates read, wrote the rule, and computed its core hash with tools/corelock.py. It then replayed that rule and SigmaHQ's rule for the same procedure over every event in the corpus.

Both fields were filled in every event of their type. The candidate fired on 1 event and SigmaHQ's rule on 2, all in the one recording of the procedure, and neither fired elsewhere. The core hash survived a reordered file. No model ran any stage, no [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem) received the rule, and no pull request was opened.

Ground, author, prove, and the core lock work on real events with the kit's tools. Extract and tune by a model, the signed fixture, and the alert-rate check remain untested.

#### DET-0001's fixtures

2026-10-15

The five fixture events are real event 4769 records from OTRF Security-Datasets SDWIN-201022042947, a recording of PurpleSharp running T1558.003 in a lab domain.

The rule fires on the recording's 5 RC4 service-ticket requests and on nothing in the other 104 recordings with events. Two of the 107 recordings are empty.

The kit's example detection matches a real Kerberoasting run, and no other recorded technique.

#### The regulatory crosswalk, against the regulations' text

2026-10-21

An agent read every mapped control and clock in its source: NIST's CSF 2.0 PDF, EUR-Lex for DORA and NIS2, the SEC's Form 8-K, eCFR for HIPAA, and the NYDFS PDF. PCI DSS and SOC 2 came from secondary copies, and ISO from its published titles.

The 16 NIST outcomes were quoted word for word, and every base clock was right. Of the 59 paraphrases, 21 left out or narrowed part of what the control asks. One clock ran later than the law, since NIS2 gives trust service providers 24 hours, and DORA's late classification case was marked late though the law allows it. Each was corrected in v0.82.0.

What each control asks, read from its source. Whether a record meets the control stays the auditor's call.

### Still opinion

Nothing outside the site has checked these. Where the site states them, it says they are the author's choices.

- [Section 8.9](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/emulation/#8-9-practical-emulation-in-the-cloud-with-stratus-red-team)'s run with Stratus Red Team. No technique has been detonated from this repository. The commands were run offline against a binary built from the tool's source, and the fields and marks come from that source and its published detonation logs.
- [Section 19](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)'s questions for AI products and its shadow-mode thresholds. No team has graded a product with them yet, and the product tables there come from each maker's documents.
- The closed loop of [section 18](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/closed-loop/) as a loop. No team or agent has run it end to end; one pass by hand, in 18.9, exercised ground, author, prove, and the core lock. Its targets are expectations, and each one names the metric that would confirm it.
- The score model: its six inputs, the anchors behind each, the presets, k, and the 0.8 and 0.5 of the marginal factor. No real backlog with incident outcomes has been scored, and no two people have scored the same candidates to measure agreement.
- The lifecycle's numbers: 7 days with alerting off, 30-day [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) windows, the 24-hour self-approval wait, the 120-minute cap per [true positive](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive). They are defaults the author chose.
- The KRI tolerances of [section 15.2](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/metrics/#15-2-performance-and-risk), the miss codes of [section 11.5](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/#11-5-miss-codes), the OKR and roadmap rules of [section 11.6](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/running/#11-6-quarterly-okrs), and the four response dimensions of section 13. They are defaults the author chose, and no team has run a quarter with them yet.
- The regulatory crosswalk of section 11.7. Which records answer which controls is the author's reading, and no auditor, regulator, or counsel has reviewed it.
- The maturity levels, the three ceilings, and the breakpoints by team size.
- The coverage map's 'ready to build' rule and its roll-up from sub-techniques, beyond agreeing with ATT&CK's own analytics.
- The five ATLAS mitigations the ATLAS and D3FEND page counts as detecting an attack in progress. The author chose them from each mitigation's description, and ATLAS itself does not sort its mitigations that way.
- The metrics page's sample numbers, which are made up to show the page.
- The query translator's claim that its outputs mean the same thing, beyond its own self-test and the five engines above on one rule.
- Every library rule with no recording of its technique, and every rule that stayed silent on a recording with the right event type. A recording exercises one procedure, and a rule for the same technique may watch another, so silence there is not evidence either way.
- False positives: no benign recording exists in the corpus, so nothing here measures how often a rule fires on normal activity.


---

## Appendix A: Definitions of done and stalls

https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/a/

Appendix A

Every stage's [definition of done](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-definition-of-done) in full, with the mistake that most often stalls it.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Stage | You may leave when | The usual stall | If it can't be met |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Intake | The request is written down. It names the behavior, the asset, and who asked. Six scores are recorded with one line of evidence each. | Requests arrive as nothing more than an alert name, with no note about the threat behind it, so you build them in the order they showed up. | A candidate whose scores can't be evidenced stays at intake, and the missing evidence becomes a question for the next intake meeting. A candidate with [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness) 0 is blocked, and its log source request goes to the platform owner. |
| 2. Hypothesis | The record carries a one-sentence hypothesis: when an attacker does X, log source Y records Z. It names the log source. It names one thing the rule cannot see. | The hypothesis describes one tool's fingerprint. When that tool changes, the detection goes quiet. | If no log source you collect records the behavior, the candidate goes back to intake with telemetry readiness 0 and a log source request. If the only hypothesis anyone can write names one tool's fingerprint, rescore its [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) at intake before going on. |
| 3. Research | The behavior has been emulated from a believable starting identity. The events it produced are saved as [fixtures](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-fixture). Every field the rule will use was read from a real event. Its normal rate has been counted over 7 days of production data. The lab is torn down and the teardown verified by [run tag](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-run-tag). | Field names come from documentation or memory, so the detection is almost right and never fires. The other common failure is skipping the 7-day count, which spends the first week in production on noise the count would have shown. | If the events never reach the [SIEM](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-siem), or a field the rule needs arrives unparsed, the candidate goes back to intake with its telemetry readiness lowered and a log source request. If the 7-day count shows the behavior is routine here, rewrite the hypothesis before building anything. |
| 4. Build | The rule file passes lint. It converts cleanly into every target in the registry. It has one event it must match and one it must ignore. | You write the detection straight in the SIEM's own query language. Then it runs on one product only, you can't compare its changes against an approved version, and it can't move when the SIEM changes. | If a target can't express the rule, mark that target convert-only in targets.yml and say so in the record. If [Sigma](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-sigma) can't express it at all, as with a correlation across events, write it as a query file beside the same record and fixtures, and review that file directly. |
| 5. Validate | The fixtures run against a real instance of every engine that has one, and each returns what it should. Every converted query matches the approved copy, or the difference is explained and accepted. A second engineer has approved the change. On a one-person team the approval comes from a colleague outside the team, a peer elsewhere, or the author after a 24-hour wait. | Whenever the conversion output changes, someone overwrites the approved copy to match it. After that the comparison can't fail, so it catches no changes. | If a fixture fails or the reviewer asks for changes, the pull request goes back to build and stays open. If the reviewer rejects the hypothesis itself, the detection goes back to hypothesis. |
| 6. Deploy | The detection is live with alerting off. Over its first 7 days live it returned no more alerts than the threshold on its record, and at least one if research counted the behavior in its baseline. A pull request then moves it to tune, and the move switches alerting on. | Alerting goes on before the 7-day check, and the SOC pays for the noise in [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) time. | If the first 7 days run over the threshold, alerting stays off and the detection stays at deploy. The fix is a pull request that goes back through validate, and the 7 days start again from its merge. If they return nothing though research counted the behavior, check the fields and the index against a real event. |
| 7. Tune | Over the last 30 days its [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision) is at or above its floor. Every [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) change went through a pull request and back through validate, and the query running in production matches the approved copy. | Someone tunes the detection by adding exclusions in the SIEM's own interface, so the rule in the repo no longer matches the rule running in production. | If precision stays under the floor for two 30-day periods in a row, propose retirement. If an incident or an exercise shows the detection missed what it claims to catch, fix this detection. The missed events become a positive fixture, and the change goes back through validate and its 7-day count. |
| 8. Retire | Status is deprecated and the detection is off in production. A retirement note records why, and any replacement is at intake with a link to that note. | Nothing is ever retired, so analysts keep triaging alerts from detections that no one owns or understands anymore. | A retirement is not undone. If the technique still matters, the replacement is a new detection at intake with a link to the retirement note. |

Next step [Ship a detection](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/ship/)


---

## Appendix B: Score anchors

https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/b/

Appendix B

The wording for each score: 1 to 5 for five inputs, and 0 to 5 for [telemetry readiness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-telemetry-readiness). Pick the level whose description matches your evidence, and quote the evidence in the score record.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

### threat_relevance (T)

1. No public reporting in the last 24 months.
2. Public reporting in the last 24 months, but nothing tying it to your sector.
3. On MITRE CTID's Top [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) Techniques list, or near the top of a vendor's annual threat report.
4. Named in reporting about your sector in the last 12 months (an ISAC, a regulator, or a peer).
5. Seen in your own incidents or red team findings in the last 12 months.

### impact (I)

1. Reconnaissance, or a low-consequence action on a single host.
2. One host compromised, and existing controls contain it.
3. Data access or code execution on a business-critical system.
4. A step toward the crown jewels: lateral movement or privilege escalation heading for tier-0 identity (domain admin and the systems that control it), OT, or payment systems.
5. Direct action on tier-0 identity, an OT safety system, or a payment system.

### robustness (B)

1. Matches a throwaway indicator: a file hash, IP address, domain, or filename the attacker can change at will.
2. Matches one tool the attacker brings along: its strings, its arguments, the files it drops. A different tool evades it.
3. Matches how a built-in system program is abused: the arguments or behavior of something that was already on the machine.
4. Matches something most ways of doing the technique share, such as an API call or a sequence of events.
5. Matches something every way of doing the technique must produce.

### telemetry_readiness (R)

1. The log source is not collected at all.
2. Collected, but the event type or field the rule needs is missing.
3. Collected, but sampled, truncated, or kept for less than 30 days.
4. Collected in full and kept 30 days or more, but the fields the rule needs are not parsed out.
5. Collected and parsed, but not enriched with who the user is or what the asset is.
6. Collected, parsed, enriched, and covered by the silence alert (DET-0000).

### build_effort (E)

1. Under 4 hours: adapting a public detection that already comes with test events.
2. 4 to 8 hours.
3. 8 to 16 hours.
4. 16 to 40 hours: needs a simulated attack or new field parsing.
5. Over 40 hours: needs new parsing plus a multi-step [emulation](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-emulation).

### run_cost (C)

1. Under 5 analyst minutes a day.
2. 5 to 15 minutes a day.
3. 15 minutes to 1 hour a day.
4. 1 to 3 hours a day.
5. Over 3 hours a day.

Next step [Score a backlog](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/prioritize/)


---

## Appendix C: Metric definitions

https://detect.htora.dev/appendix/c/

Appendix C

Every metric with its definition, the stage that owns it, its unit, and how it is aggregated.

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

| Metric | Definition | Unit and aggregation | Stage | Kind |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| intake_to_score_days | Days between a request entering the backlog and receiving its first score. | days, median | intake | KPI |
| backlog_age_days | How long scored requests have been waiting with no one starting the hypothesis. | days, median | intake | KPI |
| readiness_at_hypothesis | Of the requests that reach hypothesis, the share whose data is already collected in full and kept 30 days or more (readiness 3 or higher). | percent, ratio | hypothesis | KPI |
| research_hours_per_rule | Hours logged in research for one detection. | hours, median | research | KPI |
| percent_with_tests | Share of detections past the build stage that have both a test event to match and one to ignore. | percent, ratio | build | KPI |
| first_pass_validation_rate | Share of pull requests that pass every validation check on the first run. | percent, ratio | validate | KPI |
| review_turnaround_hours | Hours from a pull request being marked ready to a second engineer approving it. | hours, median | validate | KPI |
| deploy_lead_time_days | Days from the merge that sets a detection's stage to deploy to the merge that moves it to tune and switches its alerting on. | days, median | deploy | KPI |
| post_deploy_replay_failures | Promotion checks in the quarter that failed, because the first 7 days live returned more alerts than the threshold or none at all when research counted some. | count, sum per quarter | deploy | KPI |
| detection_latency_median | Minutes from the timestamp on the event to the alert arriving in the queue. It is the floor under every response time you report, because nobody responds before the alert arrives. Scheduled searches inherit their interval, so a detection running hourly cannot beat 30 minutes on average. | minutes, median per detection, 30 days | deploy | KRI, red over 60 minutes |
| precision_30d | Of a detection's alerts in the last 30 days that an analyst closed with an outcome, the share that were [true positives](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-true-positive). A benign true positive, behavior that happened and was allowed, counts against [precision](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-precision). An alert closed as undetermined counts on neither side. | ratio, per detection; program median | tune | KPI |
| triage_minutes_median | Typical analyst minutes spent on one alert from the detection. | minutes, median | tune | KPI |
| minutes_per_true_positive | Analyst minutes spent for each true positive the detection produces: [triage](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-triage) minutes divided by precision. | minutes, per detection; program median | tune | KPI |
| upkeep_minutes_per_detection | Engineering minutes spent in a month keeping live detections working (precision checks, [tuning](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-tuning) pull requests, query fixes after a field or schema change), divided by the number of live detections. It replaces the 20-minute default in the maintenance ceiling once a quarter has been measured. | minutes, monthly, across the live set | tune | KPI |
| rule_debt | Share of live detections that fired at least 10 times in 180 days and were never right. It counts the same detections the second retirement trigger names, so it is the share of the live set that should already be retiring. | percent, ratio | retire | KRI, red over 20% |
| rules_retired_per_quarter | Detections set to deprecated in the quarter. | count, sum | retire | KPI |
| robustness_weighted_coverage | Per [ATT&CK](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-att-ck) tactic, each live detection counts as its [robustness](https://detect.htora.dev/glossary/#t-robustness) divided by 5. A level-5 detection counts as one, a level-1 detection as one fifth. Shown beside the plain detection count. A tactic covered only by easily evaded detections needs five of them to count as much as one level-5 detection. It is a sum, so it grows with every detection added. The coverage app's weighted share is the per-technique version: each technique scores only its strongest live detection, so it tops out at 100%. | weighted count, per tactic | program | KPI |
| incident_detection_rate | Share of confirmed incidents in the period that a live detection alerted on first. The rest were found by a user report, a third party, an audit, or luck. Each incident this misses goes to intake as a candidate, with the incident as its evidence. | percent, per quarter | program | KPI |
| silent_source_hours | Hours in the quarter that a log source in the inventory sent nothing for longer than its silence threshold. Report the sources behind live detections first. | hours, per quarter, per source | program | KRI, red over 24 hours |
| priority_technique_gaps | Share of the program's priority techniques with no live detection. The quarterly review keeps the priority list: the techniques used by the threat groups the team tracks, or the top of the threat-led backlog. | percent, per quarter | program | KRI, red over 40% |
| misses_by_cause | Confirmed incidents and exercises in the quarter that no live detection caught first, counted by the miss code the detection review recorded. | count, per quarter, by miss code | program | KRI, red the same code in two quarters running |
| open_detection_fixes_age | Days the oldest fix from a detection review has waited without passing validate, counted from the day the incident was confirmed. | days, oldest open, at quarter end | program | KRI, red over 60 days |
| false_close_rate | Share of alerts later confirmed malicious that triage had closed as benign, by a person or an agent. [Section 19](https://detect.htora.dev/framework/choosing-ai/)'s ai_false_close_rate is the same count for an agent alone. | percent, per quarter | program | KRI, red a wrong close on a detection rated impact 4 or 5 |
| time_to_scope_hours | Hours from triage escalating an alert to the case recording the incident's scope: which hosts, accounts, and data. | hours, median per quarter | program | KPI |
| time_to_contain_minutes | Minutes from an incident being confirmed to the first containment action completing. | minutes, median per quarter | program | KPI |
| notifications_on_time | Share of required notifications, to leadership, customers, or a regulator, sent within their deadline. | percent, per quarter | program | KRI, red any regulator or customer deadline missed |
| playbook_coverage | Share of alerts in the quarter whose detection has a live playbook at tier 1 or higher. | percent, per quarter | program | KPI |
| playbook_minutes_saved_per_alert | The manual baseline minutes on the playbook's record, minus the analyst minutes an alert takes with the playbook running, per alert class. | minutes, median per quarter | program | KPI |
| playbook_actions_unattended | Actions a playbook completed with no person in the loop, counted by ladder tier. A tier 4 count above zero names the expendable asset the record allows. | count, per month, by tier | program | KPI |
| playbook_actions_reverted | Playbook actions a person refused in propose mode or undid after they ran. Each one is a tuning pull request. | count, per quarter | program | KRI, red a reverted tier 4 action, or a refused close on an impact 4 or 5 alert |
| incidents_without_followup | Confirmed incidents that produced no intake candidate, no tuning pull request, and no log source request within 30 days of confirmation. | count, per quarter | program | KRI, red the same responder twice, or any incident in two quarters running |

DETECT by Habibullah Tora, https://detect.htora.dev, licensed CC BY-NC 4.0. Version 0.136.0.

Next step [Check coverage and alert load](https://detect.htora.dev/tools/metrics/)
