Section 2
Assumptions
The whole framework rests on four things I believe are true of any working detection program. If they're true of yours, the machinery in the rest of the framework earns its keep. If they aren't, I'm a little jealous, and a simpler process will do.
On this page
2.1The backlog is always bigger than the team's capacity
A detection backlog only grows. Threat reports come out faster than detections ship, every incident review adds a few more ideas, and about once a week somebody forwards a news article and asks whether it's covered. A team can build a handful of those candidates in a sprint. The rest wait, and some of them will wait forever.
That makes the build order the most important decision the team makes, and by default it goes to whoever asked last or loudest. I'd rather it were made with numbers. People can argue with a number, and nobody has ever won an argument with a mood.
So every candidate detection gets a deterministic priority score before anyone spends engineering hours building it. Each number in the score carries a line of evidence, which gives a reviewer something specific to disagree with. A candidate that needs a log source nobody collects is blocked at intake, since no amount of enthusiasm makes a rule fire on logs that don't exist.
2.2Every live detection costs analyst triage minutes every day
A detection is never free once it's live. Every alert it raises takes a person a few minutes to open, read, and close, and it raises them every day, including the days when nothing is wrong. The bill arrives in analyst minutes, which run out long before disk or compute does. It's also the one cost that rarely gets written down next to the detection that ran it up.
The framework writes it down. Analyst capacity is measured in minutes, and one cap for the whole program says how many analyst minutes a true positive is allowed to cost. Divide a detection's triage minutes by that cap and you get its precision floor. With the default cap of 120 minutes, a detection that takes 30 minutes to triage has to be right at least a quarter of the time. One that takes six minutes can get away with 5%.
2.3Counting detections per tactic makes coverage look better than it is
The ATT&CK heatmap has a flaw you could drive a truck through. A box turns green when a detection maps to the technique, and the chart has no opinion on whether that detection is any good. A fragile rule that matches one filename counts exactly as much as a stronger rule that matches the behavior, even though an attacker beats the fragile one by renaming a file.
So coverage scoring here discounts detections that are fragile and detections that overlap. The quarterly report and the coverage map both weight each detection by how hard it is to evade, and the weighted score sits next to the raw count. Leadership sees both numbers, and the gap between them is the coverage that only exists on the chart.
2.4Detections are added to production far more often than they are removed
Shipping a detection gets you a closed ticket and a line in the quarterly update. Deleting one gets you a meeting where somebody asks what happens if the thing it covered turns up next week. So rules go in and almost never come out, and over time analysts end up triaging alerts from old detections that nobody owns.
The framework takes the courage out of it. Retirement runs on written triggers, such as a detection sitting below its precision floor for two 30-day periods in a row, and a trigger either fired or it didn't. When a detection is retired, its replacement enters intake with a link to the retirement note, so the next hypothesis starts from why the old one was pulled.