DETECT hunt Framework

IdeaIntake, Hypothesis, Research

Section 4

First steps

Framework v0.136.0, updated November 17, 2026.

Do it in the browser Find your starting point

Remember

  • Build detection zero first: an alert for every log source that stops sending events.
  • Inventory your log sources before you write detections, with each one's owner, retention, parsing, and normal event rate.
  • Score the backlog before you build anything, then build the top 10.
  • A candidate with telemetry readiness 0 becomes a log source request.
  • Wait on coverage targets until you know your telemetry ceiling.

The temptation with a new detection program is to open the SIEM and start writing rules. I'd do one boring thing first. A rule is only as good as the logs under it. Until you know which logs you have, who owns them, and whether they're still arriving, you're writing detections for an environment you're guessing at. So the first detection here is the least exciting one I can offer, an alert that fires when a log source goes quiet.

Your path depends on what you already have. Do you have a log source inventory? A list of every source feeding the SIEM: its owner, its retention, whether it is parsed and enriched, its usual gap between events, and whether a silence alert covers it. Do you have the last 12 months of incidents, each tagged with the ATT&CK techniques the attacker used? How many engineering hours a week go to building detections, from the first draft through validation? Leave out triage and tuning.

If you have no inventory, build one, ship DET-0000 for every source, and then score. If you have an inventory and no incident history, take threat relevance from public prevalence lists and sector reporting. Score every candidate, and build the readiness 4 or higher ones first. At 3 the fields still need parsing, and below 3 the source needs collection or retention work, so research would send those candidates back. Ship the top 10. If you have both, score threat relevance 5 for every technique in your own incident history, and ship the top 10. The top 10 is the shortlist; you build down it at your work in progress limit: one detection at a time for a single engineer, and for a team the capacity rule. Work on no more detections at once than your weekly hours divided by the hours one detection takes from hypothesis through validate. Use 8 hours per detection until you've measured your own.

Three plans on this site cover the start, each for a different reader. This section picks the first detections for any team. Section 3.4 gives the first month for a team of one, of two to four, or of five or more. Section 11.3 gives the first 90 days to someone handed a function that already runs live detections. Its first month adds no new detections, because the live set comes first.

DET-0000, Log source silence: Alert when a source in the log inventory has sent nothing for three times its usual gap between events, and never sooner than 1 hour. Every other detection depends on its data arriving. A source covered by this alert is one step closer to a readiness score of 5.

4.1Build a baseline

Do it in the browser Build a baseline

The Build a baseline tool does the first pass of this for you. The baseline builder turns an environment into a first set of detections. Four questions each end as a list of log sources, because what is collected decides what can be detected. From the sources, ATT&CK's own analytics say which techniques are ready to build. For each ready technique, the library's best rule that your SIEM can run becomes a candidate, and the scorer's formula puts them in order. The baseline takes the best rule for every ATT&CK tactic the environment supports before it fills the rest in that order. The result is a backlog to start from, with DET-0000 first for every source, and a list of what the environment cannot see. Each environment it asks about ticks the log sources ATT&CK's analytics name for it:

Environment Platforms in scope Log sources it ticks
On-premises Windows and Active Directory Windows, Identity Provider 12 sources, such as WinEventLog:Security, WinEventLog:System, WinEventLog:Application
Linux servers Linux 10 sources, such as auditd:SYSCALL, auditd:EXECVE, auditd:PATH
macOS endpoints macOS 7 sources, such as macos:unifiedlog, macos:endpointsecurity, macos:auth
AWS IaaS 10 sources, such as AWS:CloudTrail, CloudTrail:Signin, CloudTrail:GetCallerIdentity
Azure and Entra ID IaaS, Identity Provider 10 sources, such as azure:activity, azure:audit, azure:policy
Google Cloud IaaS 5 sources, such as gcp:audit, gcp:iam, gcp:config
Kubernetes and containers Containers 10 sources, such as kubernetes:audit, kubernetes:apiserver, kubernetes:events
Microsoft 365 Office Suite, SaaS 10 sources, such as m365:unified, m365:audit, m365:exchange
Google Workspace Office Suite, SaaS 5 sources, such as gcp:workspaceaudit, Google Admin Audit, saas:googleworkspace
SaaS applications SaaS 8 sources, such as saas:audit, saas:auth, saas:api
VMware ESXi ESXi 9 sources, such as esxi:hostd, esxi:vpxd, esxi:auth
Network perimeter and devices Network Devices 12 sources, such as networkdevice:Firewall, networkdevice:Flow, networkdevice:IDS

A library rule is a candidate for a technique when the technique is ready and your SIEM can run the rule. Running it means the rule is in the SIEM's language, or the translator converts it into that language; the library records which languages each rule converts to. On Sentinel, a translated rule counts by the table its KQL reads, either SecurityEvent or one of Defender's Device tables. A Device table needs Microsoft Defender for Endpoint ticked among your tools. On LogScale, it counts only when the translation reads Falcon's events, which needs CrowdStrike Falcon ticked among your tools. For Google SecOps, the translator writes YARA-L only for endpoint rules: process, registry, file, network, and DNS events on Windows, Linux, and macOS. For another SIEM only Sigma rules are candidates, to convert with that SIEM's own Sigma tooling. A translated rule also has to keep the rule's logic. The translator keeps a query's filter and drops the stages after it. A rule that filters again after counting, or joins another table, would match far more in translation: a password spray rule would match every failed login. Those rules are offered only in the language they were written in. One rule per technique: a rule in your SIEM's own language first, then the highest robustness draft, then the one that converts to the most languages, then the one from the source with the most rules. A second rule for the same technique is taken only when it reads a different log source. The rows cover the ATT&CK tactics before they go by score. Every tactic with a ready technique and a rule that runs here gets its best rule first, two each at a baseline of 40 or more and three at 60 or more. The rest go down the ranking, and no tactic takes more than a fifth of the rows while another still has a rule to add. Without that, discovery commands, which a third of ATT&CK's groups run, take many of the top slots, and ransomware falls below the cut. A tactic left with no rule is named with the reason: nothing ready, or nothing that runs on these sources. DET-0000 comes first for every log source you tick, before any candidate. Each library rule's log source is read from where its source writes it: a Sigma rule's logsource, a Splunk rule's data_source field, an Elastic rule's index patterns, the tables a KQL query reads, a Panther rule's log type, a Google SecOps rule's folder. Each maps to the ATT&CK log sources that record it. A rule runs in your environment when one of those sources is ticked, and a KQL rule that joins two tables needs one source for each. Rules written for one EDR's own fields, such as CrowdStrike's or SentinelOne's, run only when that EDR is ticked among your tools. A rule that reads another vendor's own table or a threat intelligence list has no ATT&CK source, so the baseline leaves it out. What the page does not know, it says: Your assets, so impact is 3 everywhere. Your incidents, so threat relevance is ATT&CK group usage. Your alert volume, so run cost is 3 everywhere. Whether a source's fields are parsed, so readiness is 5 for every collected source; lower it in the map or the record when they are not.

The baseline downloads as kit starters, one DET folder per rule at the intake stage, so the first backlog arrives in the repository already scored on everything but impact and run cost. A coverage map with your log sources ticked opens the baseline with them through Export, Build a baseline.